(Q): That’s problematic.

Rogers: It’s mind-boggling. Here’s a man who doesn’t understand the market, who doesn’t understand economics – basic economics. His intellectual career’s been spent on the narrow-gauge study of printing money. That’s all he knows.

Yes, he’s got a PhD, which says economics on it, but economics can be one of 200 different narrow fields. And his is printing money, which he’s good at, we know. We’ve learned that he’s ready, willing and able to step in and bail out everybody.

There’s this worry [whenever you have a major financial institution that looks ready to fail] that, “Oh my God, we’re going to go down, and if we go down, the whole system goes down.”

This is nothing new. Whole systems have been taken down before. We’ve had it happen plenty of times.

(Q): History is littered with failed financial institutions.

Rogers: I know. It’s not as though this is the first time it’s ever happened. But since [Chairman Bernanke’s] whole career is about printing money and studying the Depression, he says: “Okay, got to print some more money. Got to save the day.” And, of course, that’s when he gets himself in deeper, because the first time you print it, you prop up Institution X, [but] then you got to worry about institution Y and Z.

(Q): And now we’ve got a dangerous precedent.

Rogers: That’s exactly right. And when the next guy calls him up, he’s going to bail him out, too.

(Q): What do you think [former Fed Chairman] Paul Volcker thinks about all this?

Rogers: Well, Volcker has said it’s certainly beyond the scope of central banking, as he understands central banking.

(Q): That’s pretty darn clear.

Rogers: Volcker’s been very clear – very clear to me, anyway – about what he thinks of it, and Volcker was the last decent American central banker. We’ve had couple in our history: Volcker and William McChesney Martin were two.

You know, McChesney Martin was the guy who said the job of a good central banker was to take away the punchbowl when the party starts getting good. Now [the Fed] – when the party starts getting out of control – pours more moonshine in. McChesney Martin would always pull the bowl away when people started getting a little giggly. Now the party’s out of control.

(Q): This could be the end of the Federal Reserve, which we talked about in Singapore. This would be the third failure – correct?

Rogers: Yes. We had two central banks that disappeared for whatever reason. This one’s going to disappear, too, I say.

(Q): Throughout your career you’ve had a much-fabled ability to spot unique points in history – inflection points, if you will. Points when, as you put it, somebody puts money in the corner at which you then simply pick up.

Rogers: That’s the way to invest, as far as I’m concerned.

(Q): So conceivably, history would show that the highest returns go to those who invest when there’s blood in the streets, even if it’s their own.

Rogers: Right.

(Q): Is there a point in time or something you’re looking for that will signal that the U.S. economy has reached the inflection point in this crisis?

Rogers: Well, yeah, but it’s a long way away. In fact, it may not be in our lifetimes. Of course I covered my shorts – my financial shorts. Not all of them, but most of them last week.

So, if you’re talking about a temporary inflection point, we may have hit it.

If you look back at previous countries that have declined, you almost always see exchange controls – all sorts of controls – before failure. America is already doing some of that. America, for example, wouldn’t let the Chinese buy the oil company, wouldn’t let the [Dubai firm] buy the ports, et cetera.

But I’m really talking about full-fledged, all-out exchange controls. That would certainly be a sign, but usually exchange controls are not the end of the story. Historically, they’re somewhere during the decline. Then the politicians bring in exchange controls and then things get worse from there before they bottom.

Before World War II, Japan’s yen was two to the dollar. After they lost the war, the yen was 500 to the dollar. That’s a collapse. That was also a bottom.

These are not predictions for the U.S., but I’m just saying that things have to usually get pretty, pretty, pretty, pretty bad.

It was similar in the United Kingdom. In 1918, the U.K. was the richest, most powerful country in the world. It had just won the First World War, et cetera. By 1939, it had exchange controls and this is in just one generation. And strict exchange controls. They in fact made it an act of treason for people to use anything except the pound sterling in settling debts.

(Q): Treason? Wow, I didn’t know that.

Rogers: Yes…an act of treason. It used to be that people could use anything they wanted as money. Gold or other metals. Banks would issue their own currencies. Anything. You could even use other people’s currencies.

Things were so bad in the U.K. in the 1930s they made it an act of treason to use anything except sterling and then by ’39 they had full-exchange controls. And then, of course, they had the war and that disaster. It was a disaster before the war. The war just exacerbated the problems. And by the mid-70s, the U.K. was bankrupt. They could not sell long-term government bonds. Remember, this is a country that two generations or three generations before had been the richest most powerful country in the world.

Now the only thing that saved the U.K. was the North Sea oil fields, even though Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher likes to take credit, but Margaret Thatcher has good PR. Margaret Thatcher came into office in 1979 and North Sea oil started flowing. And the U.K. suddenly had a huge balance-of-payment surplus.

You know, even if Mother Teresa had come in [as prime minister] in ’79, or Joseph Stalin, or whomever had come in 1979 – you know, Jimmy Carter, George Bush, whomever – it still would’ve been great.

You give me the largest oil field in the world and I’ll show you a good time, too. That’s what happened.

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