Shares of Ford were up 7 percent at $8.58 before the bell after senior company executives said the automaker was on track to post its first monthly sales increase in two years.

In banking news, Barclays PLC reported an 8 percent rise in half-year profit, while HSBC Holdings PLC said its first-half profit halved from a year ago, but the results were better than the analyst consensus forecast.

“The greatest difficulty has been in financials, so the gains in HSBC and Barclays (are) adding to optimism and (suggest) that the worst may be over,” said Andre Bakhos, president of Princeton Financial Group, in New Brunswick, New Jersey.

“It’s comforting to see that we are in a global rebound in earnings.”

The Select Sector SPDR Financial ETF was up 2.2 percent before the bell.

A rise in oil prices was also poised to underpin the broader market, with U.S. front-month crude up 2.4 percent, or $1.65, to $71.10 a barrel.

S&P 500 futures rose 10 points and were above fair value, a formula that evaluates pricing by taking into account interest rates, dividends and time to expiration on the contract. Dow Jones industrial average futures climbed 74 points, and Nasdaq 100 futures were 17.00 points higher.

The rise in U.S. stock index futures suggested that indexes will open up about 1 percent or more. The benchmark S&P 500 <.SPX> could begin trading at a 9-month high, very close to the psychologically important 1,000 level, after registering its best five-month winning streak since 1938 on Friday.

In Europe stocks were up more than 1 percent.

3M Co shares rose 2.4 percent to $72.22 before the bell after Goldman Sachs upgraded the Dow component to “buy” from “neutral.”

Ford, due to report its July sales later in the day, is among the primary beneficiaries of the federal government’s “Cash for Clunkers” incentive program that took effect on July 24.

The Senate on Monday is due to vote on extending the program to stimulate auto sales after the U.S. House approved $2 billion for it on top of an initial $1 billion in June.

The economic calendar includes the Institute for Supply Management’s manufacturing index due at 10 a.m. (1400 GMT). A Reuters poll of economists forecast a July reading of 46.2 from 44.8 in June.

NEW YORK, Aug 3 (Reuters)

• Consumer credit in the United States fell by a record $11.1 billion in March after the jobless rate reached its highest level in a quarter century and banks made it harder to get loans in an effort to firm up their balance sheets.  Consumer credit fell by $2.55 trillion, almost three times more than forecast and the most since records began in 1943, according to a Federal Reserve report released yesterday (Thursday) in Washington. “When you have record job losses, you have to expect record declines in spending and economic activity in general,” Richard Yamarone, chief economist at Argus Research Corp. in New York told Bloomberg.

• General Motors Corp. (NYSE: GM) said it burned through $10.2 billion in the first quarter as it tapped into federal bailout funds to survive a sharp decline in global sales that overwhelmed its cost-cutting efforts.  Revenue dropped by almost half to $22.4 billion as the company cut production by about 900,000 vehicles and worked to run down costly inventories in the United States and Europe.  Chief Financial Officer Ray Young said there was evidence consumers were scared away from GM cars and trucks because of concern the automaker was headed for bankruptcy, Reuters reported.

• Delinquencies on commercial mortgages in the U.S. jumped to the highest levels in over 11 years in April as scarce credit made it difficult for landlords to refinance loans, Bloomberg reported, citing a report from property research firm Trepp LLC.  About 2.45% of loans are now 30 days or more behind in payments, more than five times the year-ago number said the report. “It’s about as bad as it’s ever been,” said Thomas Fink, a Trepp senior vice president. “I don’t think we’re done yet. Where it’s going to top out, I don’t know, but we’re not done.”

• Nearly two-thirds of U.S. retailers posted better- than-expected monthly sales results for a second straight month in April, giving fresh evidence that consumer spending is warming up. Most retailers reported April sales at stores open at least a year that topped Wall Street estimates and a handful said their first-quarter results, which start landing next week, will be better than expected. “Overall, you are seeing some signs of a return to discretionary purchases throughout different areas of retail,” Barclays Capital PLC (NYSE: BCS) analyst Robert Drbul told Reuters.

• The U.S. Justice Department’s proposed budget calls for adding more FBI agents to investigate mortgage fraud and white-collar crime, Attorney General Eric Holder said on Thursday. In prepared testimony to a Senate appropriations subcommittee, Holder said the proposed $26.7 billion budget includes a 3.8% increase from the previous year for combating financial fraud for fiscal 2010, Reuters reported.  Increased funding would be used for “additional federal prosecutors, civil litigators and bankruptcy attorneys to protect investors, the market, the federal government’s investment of resources in the financial crisis and the American public,” he said.

• Boeing Co. (NYSE: BA) lost a deal for 25 of its 787 Dreamliners, the biggest order cancellation yet for the plane, meaning the giant jetmaker now has lost one more contract this year than it has won.   The scrapped deal, valued at about $4.44 billion, takes Boeing’s cancellations in the first four months to 59, versus 58 purchases, according to data published today on the Chicago-based company’s Web site, Bloomberg reported. Airbus SAS (NYSE: SPR) said earlier it has 11 net orders after signing 30 agreements and losing 19. The 787 remains Boeing’s best-selling new plane ever, with 861 contracts remaining. The jet, built mostly of composites, has suffered four delays because of defects, parts shortages and redesigns and is due to fly by the end of next month before entering service in the first quarter of 2010.

Investment News Briefs Friday, May 8, 2009

Of course, the reality is that bailouts are likely to do more harm than good in the long run, regardless of what sector they are in. But given the choice, I would rather bail out General Motors Corp. (GM) than Citigroup Inc. (C), because the automaker has a better long-term future.

The financial services industry got far too big during the 1995-2007 bubble. Its growth accelerated in the 1990s on the back of innovative new financing techniques such as derivatives and securitization, as well as a huge expansion in areas such as leveraged buyouts. As a result, its share of United States gross domestic product (GDP) has approximately doubled since the late 1970s.

It is now clear that many of the new financing techniques were misapplied or even spurious. The problem of separating loan origination from credit-risk assumption has become obvious, and so securitization will have a much more limited future.

Of the derivatives, credit default swaps are clearly destabilizing and will be tightly regulated. Many of the new market participants, such as hedge funds and private equity funds, should disappear, since they merely represented conduits through which higher fees could be charged rather than truly innovative investment choices. It is thus likely that the financial services business will revert to close to its previous share of GDP. That would involve a downsizing of its 2007 capacity by 50%.

The automobile industry, on the other hand, has no obvious need to become smaller. With global warming now high on the political agenda, its products need to change radically, employing new technologies that greatly reduce carbon emissions. However, the basic demand for personal transportation has not gone away.

Indeed, it is still expanding rapidly in the growth economies of emerging markets such as China and India. And U.S. urban geography, with its widely spread suburban developments, is wholly incompatible with a sharp drop in automobile usage and would be impossibly expensive to modify except over a very long term.

Why Citi Should Fail

Allowing a large bank such as Citigroup to disappear is probably beneficial. It reduces competition for other major banks, allows medium-sized banks to expand into the space opened up, and provides an appropriate penalty for decades of bad management. Citi was a leader in the Latin American loan crisis of the 1980s; its then-Chairman Walter B. Wriston famously opined that “countries don’t go bust,” a sentiment that has been repeatedly disproved.

Wriston got his succession wrong in 1984, choosing the overaggressive retail banker John Reed (who had pioneered the unsolicited credit card offer in 1978 and lost $100 million – real money back then – in 1980 by doing so) over the capable corporate banker Tom Theobald.

Citi almost went bust in 1991, but was bailed out by Saudi Prince Alwaleed bin Talal. It assembled a financial services conglomerate in 1998 that proved unmanageable, and from 2003-2005 was prevented from making any more acquisitions because of its shaky position.

In short, Citi has been a classically mismanaged behemoth that, in any other industry would, have already collapsed.

Yet, its bailout risks more than $300 billion of taxpayer money, and to no obvious economic benefit.

Meanwhile, General Motors has been damaged by two factors: Misguided government regulation of the automobile industry, and a drastic societal shift away from unionized labor.

CAFÉ Backfires

GM had a 60% share of the U.S. market in the 1950s, and was recognized for large cars that performed distinctly better than their imported competitors and were well suited to U.S. driving conditions. Some expansion of foreign competition was inevitable, as Europe recovered and Japan became a major automobile producer, but GM was particularly hard hit by the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFÉ) legislation. CAFÉ, which mandated fuel economy standards instead of simply raising the gasoline tax, put GM’s large models at a disadvantage to their smaller imported competitors.

However, U.S. automobile companies found a loophole, which is that its standards were limited to automobiles. Vehicles built on a truck chassis were exempt. That gave rise to the sports utility vehicle.  Now, higher fuel costs, environmental concerns, and tighter CAFÉ standards have made the SUV an endangered species, but it was a Frankenstein’s monster that only existed because of government meddling.

If GM and the other U.S. automobile manufacturers go out of business, only their foreign competitors will benefit. Furthermore, they have an interdependent network of suppliers, with a total of 3 million employees, which could easily be forced into bankruptcy by the disappearance of their major customers.  U.S. automobile manufacturers have important, and in some areas unique technological capabilities, whose loss would severely damage the U.S. economy as a whole.

The automobile business is unprofitable now, but will eventually return its previous size in the United States, as well as expand worldwide. So, while there is no capacity downsizing needed, capacity restructuring, away from SUVs and towards smaller cars, hybrids and innovative power technologies, is essential.

Ultimately, the right decision would have been to bail out General Motors and allow Citi to go to the wall.

The Case for Citi

Of course, there are important modifiers to this recommendation. In Citi’s case, its interconnection with the financial system as a whole is such that an immediate bankruptcy followed by years-long court proceedings could render many of its counterparties unviable and damage the global economy badly. Hence, an orderly liquidation is needed, with a receiver appointed to wind down Citi’s positions and sell the viable portion of its operations, making good on those obligations incurred by Citi that appear to have systemic importance. Even if the taxpayer made Citi’s counterparts completely whole, however, it would not have been as expensive as the bailout.

As for GM, it has labor costs and pension obligations making it uncompetitive with foreign-owned producers. Those “legacy” costs can most efficiently be removed through a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing. The pension obligations will then fall on the taxpayer through the Pension Benefits Guaranty Corporation, while the labor contracts can be rewritten in a way that is competitive with the market in which GM operates. If a government subsidy is then needed to cover GM’s operating cash deficit during the recession, and the investment costs of transforming GM into a producer of environmentally friendly automobiles, it should be provided through a post bankruptcy “debtor-in-possession” financing.

There is nothing magic about banking that should allow the industry to be uniquely permitted access to taxpayer money when disaster hits. Only bank customers and the market should be protected. Conversely, the automobile industry plays an important role in the U.S. economy that is unlikely to be significantly downsized. So, there is considerable justification for assistance to GM and Ford Motor Co. (F), which have valuable capabilities and long-term competitiveness, though less for a bailout of the smaller and less industrially valuable Chrysler Corp.

Source: Why GM is More Bailout-Worthy Than Citigroup

This from Money Morning:

With America’s “Big Three” automakers all due to submit turnaround plans to Congress today (Tuesday) – a requirement if General Motor Corp. (NYSE:GM), Ford Motor Co. (NYSE:F), and Chrysler Corp., are to receive $25 billion in government loans – I couldn’t help but recall the moment eight years ago when I realized the U.S. auto industry was skidding toward a financial collapse.

I’ve been thinking about that market call of mine a lot of late, particularly after recently reading that JP Morgan Chase & Co. (NYSE:JPM) credit analysts had rated GM’s distressed debt as a “Buy,” noting that the company was likely going to survive.

It was October 2000, and I’d just joined a multi-billion-dollar asset management organization as its head of credit. While most of my experience before this was with very risky and fast-moving emerging markets, this new position was focused on the top tier of the investment market, since the group I was joining had a marked risk aversion and was managed with capital preservation as its main mantra.

“Piece of cake,” I thought to myself.  After decades of deciphering volatile emerging economies, I had “graduated” to analyzing strong companies in the top economies in the world. These credits were all rated “A” or better. And the proportion of our holdings that were not rated “AAA” was a rounding error.

WorldCom Inc., Enron Corp., and the U.S. “Big Three” carmakers were among the companies I had to analyze, as well as some 208 structured investment vehicles (SIVs).  The curious asymmetry was that while companies like Enron and WorldCom were rated “A,” and had tremendous – yet officially unrecognized – risks to the downside, their commercial paper was rated “A1” and “P1,” the highest possible rating offered by leading rating agencies.

The SIVs, Enron, and WorldCom did not resist even minimal analysis. I axed the two companies, as well as the SIVs that did not offer a full guarantee from the sponsor. So I ended up starting with the corporate bonds, by first addressing the largest exposures we had.

A Debt-Focused Tour of America’s “Big Three”

Since the three U.S. carmakers – all carrying “A” ratings on their bonds, and “A1” to “P1” on their commercial paper – accounted for about one-third of all investment-grade paper outstanding, I analyzed them first.  I had a large advantage over my peers in the investment grade industry:  Since emerging-market credits – both sovereign and corporate – were overwhelmingly in junk bond territory, I had seen over years how late the rating agencies were in adjusting their ratings to the credit reality of the issuers in general.

The foregone conclusion in “junk land” was that the rating agencies provided lagging indicators of credit risk.  In addition, having analyzed credits in Argentina with 1% inflation a day, as well as massive, surprising devaluations, I knew how distorted financial statements can become and was highly skeptical.

When I downloaded the balance sheet for General Motor back in the third quarter of 2000, I was stunned. Something just wasn’t right. These numbers I saw just couldn’t be correct.

“Surely I had made a mistake and downloaded the wrong one,” I thought to myself.  “I must have downloaded a subsidiary’s or maybe the parent company’s unconsolidated balance sheet.”

I checked and re-checked.  I had the right one.  The company’s equity-to-assets ratio was only about 2%  – and that was before counting its under-funded pension liabilities. With that deficit factored in, GM had negative equity.

In other words, the leading U.S. carmaker was technically bankrupt.

Now, I wouldn’t even lend money to a bank with such high leverage. And a bank diversifies the risks in its lending portfolio, is highly regulated, and secures a huge amount of its lending with hard assets.

But an industrial company sitting on hoards of car inventories and loans backed by used cars … that nobody particularly liked?  Not a chance.

With such low levels of equity, the ability of a company to withstand an economic shock is almost nonexistent.  So, I searched around for any possible redeeming qualities that I could be missing.  But after a very thorough review, I concluded that we had to drop all three of the U.S. carmakers – GM, Ford and Chrysler.

When I brought my decision to the firm’s chief investment officer, a portfolio manager with years of experience in the investment-grade debt market, and a person I’d known back during my days at Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. (NYSE:MER), he was unnerved.  He trusted my judgment, but he, like the rest of the market, was confident that each of the Big Three was “too big to fail.”

Nevertheless, with our firm’s overarching commitment to capital preservation, we negotiated a fast wind-down of exposures: We would sell all the long-term exposure immediately, freeze any new exposure and we would not roll over the commercial paper – most of which was due to mature within a couple of weeks.  In this way, all of our Big Three exposure would be gone within weeks, and we were confident each of the three had the cash and near-term liquidity to pay us back.

A couple of weeks later, at a charity function, I happened to bump into the former head of one of the premier asset management organizations in the world.  In a short conversation, I mentioned my private concerns. The gentleman draped an arm across my shoulders and essentially told me that “the Big Three are not going to go bankrupt.”  That was it.  Another too-big-to-fail advocate.

The Too-Big-to-Fail Myth

Evidently, there were reasons beyond mere creditworthiness that led this very smart man – and others – to keep ignoring the fact that the automotive emperor had no clothes.  The pre-eminent one is the “too-big-to-fail argument,” and those who make that argument are trafficking in the moral hazard trade.  Yet, even today, GM on its website ardently contends that it is indispensable to the U.S. economy, hoping to persuade U.S. taxpayers to throw good money after bad.

(We’ll find out how Congress feels about that argument after GM, Ford and Chrysler submit their plans today. It certainly won’t help that today we’ll also likely find that November sales from the major automakers show only a limited bounce from 25-year lows.)

The other argument is that the auto industry is “strategic” to national interests.  That is to say: How can a country defend itself if it produces no vehicles?  And what about advanced transportation and classified technologies research?

But that argument does not hold up under scrutiny, either.

As eminent economist Martin Feldstein has reminded us, giving the Big Three $25 billion will last less than a year. The reason: They are burning through about $7 billion each a quarter.

Clearly, forcing the three carmakers to restructure will be in everybody’s interest.

Through bankruptcy – with some, minimal government intervention – we should force the inevitable restructuring to take place. As a result of that restructuring, worker compensation levels will be brought into line, employee and retiree health benefits will be reduced to lower-but-still-competitive levels, any dividends will be eliminated, and executive payouts and perks will be capped. How far must this go?

That’s easy – keep cutting until the companies are restored to health and, most important of all, to a state of long-term viability.

This does not mean that the Big Three will disappear. What will disappear is corporate waste. The companies will restructure/continuing profitable activities and liberating resources from unprofitable ones to expand future development.  This has been done successfully – and en masse – in many “strategic” industries, such as the steel business in the United States, and telephony, utilities, energy, aerospace, and many others that were restructured in the 1990s in Argentina, Brazil and South Korea.

There is no reason why each of the Big Three – each currently the laughingstock of the global auto industry – should not regain their leadership positions, as measured by profitability and technological prowess. In this way, GM, Ford or Chrysler – or even all three – can create good, secure jobs and contribute to the U.S. economy, rather than detracting from it.

To be fair to GM and the others, they all have attempted to restructure. They’ve secured agreements with the United Auto Workers union that were designed to control costs. And they’ve tried to launch newer, better vehicles.  But those agreements are too little/too late, and the sands have run out of the hourglass.

Union leaders from GM, Ford and Chrysler have now scheduled an emergency session for tomorrow (Wednesday) in Detroit as the companies plan to seek concessions from the United Auto Workers to help land those win $25 billion in government loans, Bloomberg News reported yesterday (Monday). Participants will be asked to reopen a 2007 labor agreement to consider concessions. GM, which has said it may run out of cash to meet its obligations, wants to stop paying union workers when plants are closed and there isn’t any other work for them to do. Now Ford and Chrysler are expected to ask the UAW for similar concessions as part of their bid for the government aid package, Bloomberg said.

All three of the American carmakers were technically bankrupt since at least the time of my first analysis near the end of 2000, and the union agreements still did not bring compensation down to levels comparable to that of their competitors. Now the U.S. automakers are on life support.  There is no time left for gradualism.  They missed that window long ago and the costs imposed on all U.S. taxpayers figure to be huge.

The current predicament in which GM, Ford and Chrysler now find themselves is not only their own fault, as we’ve now already been subsidizing the unions for far too long.

Are Unions to Blame?

One of the biggest reasons Detroit’s Big Three have run out of capital is the extraordinary compensation that has been paid out to unionized workers in the United States.

Even in the last reported quarter, when the economies of Europe and Asia had slowed dramatically, GM was almost breakeven in those two regions and actually had 10% profit growth in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, where GM also has unionized work forces. But the company is losing money in the United States.

That’s because the GM pays about $75 per hour – $156,000 a year – to its assembly line employees.

And because of that, the Big Three are lagging far behind in technology investment. That has not only damaged the auto-related technology industry, but has decreased productivity and innovation, delaying the shift to more fuel-efficient technologies.  And because they have jointly held the market leadership, they set prices high, allowing foreign competitors to undercut them.

These phenomena have increased the costs of transportation for all Americans for decades.  Americans have overwhelmingly voted with their dollars by buying foreign brands, which has contributed to our growing trade deficit.

Ultimately, inefficiencies in the auto industry have imposed huge costs on the rest of the economy, putting the Big Three at a competitive disadvantage that has hurt profits, cost the economy jobs, and opened the door to foreign companies to export U.S. dollars back to Germany and Japan (and now South Korea and China).

GM lost $21.3 billion in the third quarter and burned through about $7 billion in cash.  It has only about $16 billion in cash left, and already its liabilities are $60 billion larger than its assets, which means that GM has negative equity.

And the current quarter will be worse.

The bottom line is that GM is essentially bankrupt – and has been for years.

At this point, GM should – like so many companies before – have to restructure its costs to a point that allows it to be competitive before receiving a single taxpayer dollar.  Otherwise, we are just throwing good money after bad and it won’t be long before GM comes crawling back for more.

I just hope that the politicians and government officials in Washington are wise and determined enough to control the situation, and force the bitter medicine down the company’s throat.

To Buy, or Not to Buy

In this environment of high uncertainty, I would not go near any GM securities.

However, highly sophisticated players may consider making a very small bet, in one of several ways. With GM’s bonds and credit default swaps trading at near-bankruptcy levels (15 cents on the dollar), it may be attractive (albeit highly speculative) to buy GM’s bonds, in the hope of converting these debt securities into the debt-and-equity of a newly restructured General Motors. Over the course of a couple of years, this could turn out to be extremely profitable, but only if GM’s work-force wage-and-benefits costs are brought into line with the company’s global rivals – and if the U.S. economy recovers. Among the many financial scenarios under review, GM’s board of directors is reportedly considering an option that would grant current bondholders equity in a restructured company in return for maneuvering room, according to media reports.

Reuters reported that GM’s bonds fell nearly 12% early yesterday (Monday) as investors waited for the automaker to submit a new turnaround plan that might actually have a chance of winning lawmaker support. GM’s 7.125% notes due in 2013 fell to 23 cents on the dollar, down from 26 cents on Friday, according to MarketAxess. As we noted earlier, GM is due to submit that plan by today.

When JP Morgan’s credit analysts made their market call last month, GM’s benchmark 8.375% bond due 2033 has dropped to 25.75 cents on the dollar, which was down from 36.5 cents at the end of October, MarketAxess said. The bonds had traded at more than 80 cents on the dollar at the beginning of the year and currently yield 32.5%.

In the case of selling credit default swaps, an investor would get paid some 80% to 85% of the value they are “insuring” up front. If GM gets bailed out, which is an increasingly likely scenario, that investor would keep the full premium and walk away.  And in the case of default, that investor would have to pay the buyer 100%, therefore losing some 15% to 20% after the default, but getting the bonds he is insuring in exchange for that loss.  We would then take the bonds into the restructuring as noted above.

I would not buy the actual GM shares, even though I have friends in high places in finance that still believe in the too-big-to-fail theory. My concern with GM’s stock is that there would be a very strong chance the company’s equity gets totally wiped out in a bankruptcy, or at least heavily diluted as a result of any government infusion the company receives.

GM’s shares closed yesterday at $4.59 each, down 65 cents each, or 12.4%. They have traded as high as $29.95 in the past 12 months. The company right now has a market value of only $2.8 billion.

Source: Buy, Sell or Hold Insight: GM Remains a High Risk Profit Play – Even as it Files its Turnaround Plan Today