Since the Great Depression, a period marked by widespread runs on banks, the FDIC has done a good job of fulfilling its mandate. So how are they doing in this crisis?

In a nutshell, they are in trouble.

The FDIC insures 8,246 institutions, with $13.5 trillion in assets. Not all of them are going bankrupt, of course. Yet as of late July, a disturbing 64 banks had gone belly up this year – the most since 1992 – costing the FDIC $12.5 billion. At the end of Q1, the agency was already asking for emergency funding.

And worse, much worse, is likely yet to come. The following chart shows the total assets on the books of the FDIC’s list of 305 troubled banks. The list doesn’t include the biggest banks that are considered too big to fail, as they are being separately supported with bailouts. By contrast, if the banks on this list fail, the FDIC is on the hook to have to step in and take them over and, of course, make depositors whole.

Other measures of how serious the losses at banks are becoming can be seen in the chart below, which shows charge-offs and non-current loans at all banks. You can see that the Net Charge-offs remain stubbornly high, with banks charging off almost $40 billion in bad loans in the last two quarters alone. And the number of non-current loans – loans where payments are not being kept up – is soaring.

Together, these measures indicate the potential for more big failures and more big bailouts coming down the pike.

Into the battle against bank insolvency the Fed brings a level of reserves that can best be described as paper-thin. From almost $60 billion last fall, the FDIC’s reserves have been drawn down to only about $13 billion today, a 16-year low. A quick look at the FDIC’s own data shows us how inadequate those reserves are compared to the deposits they are now insuring.

The chart below says it all:

As you can see, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation currently covers each dollar on deposit with a trivial 2/10ths of a penny.

And even that understates the seriousness of the situation: the $4.8 trillion in deposits the FDIC is providing coverage on doesn’t include the expansion that now extends insurance coverage from $100,000 to $250,000 for normal bank accounts. That likely brings the exposure of the FDIC closer to $6 trillion. But that’s pretty inconsequential at this point: using any reasonable accounting method, the FDIC is already bankrupt and will require hundreds of billions of dollars in government bailouts just to keep the doors open.

So, given the dire shape of its finances, what measures is the FDIC taking, you know, to batten down the hatches and all that?

For starters, they are expanding their mandate by guaranteeing bank loans – $350 billion and counting at this point. And the government has tapped the FDIC to play a pivotal role in guaranteeing the loans issued to buy toxic waste through the government’s highly problematic and fraud-prone new Private Public Investment Partnership (PPIP). The FDIC’s commitment to the PPIP is and may become limited based on its resources.

It is hard to draw any other conclusion but that hundreds of billions in new funding will be required to keep the FDIC operating. Given the catastrophic consequences of the FDIC failing, starting with a bank run of biblical proportions, there’s no question it will get whatever funding it needs. By loading the new loan guarantee responsibilities and the PPIP onto the FDIC’s back, the administration will go back to Congress and ask for the next large bailout.

Of course, in the end, all of this falls on the taxpayer, either directly in the form of more taxes or indirectly via the destruction of the dollar’s purchasing power. Another bale of straw on the camel’s back, and another reason to be concerned about holding paper dollars for the long term.

Regards,

Bud Conrad

Source: The FDIC is in Trouble

But in fact, foreigners have, over the last decade, been by far the single most important source of buying for U.S. Treasuries.

Given the Treasury’s need to flog on the order of $3 trillion worth of its unbacked paper this year just to keep the government’s doors open – and that is a four- or fivefold increase over 2008 – the foreign buyers not only have to show up for the Treasury auctions, they have to show up in droves.

In mid-July, the Associated Press reported that “Foreign demand for long-term U.S. financial assets dropped by the largest amount in four months in May, as Japan and Russia trimmed their holdings of Treasury securities … foreigners actually sold $19.8 billion more long-term U.S. securities than they purchased in May. That compared with net purchases of $11.5 billion in April.”

Below you see the big picture of all cross-border flows in May as published by the U.S. Treasury. It shows both foreign investment in the U.S. and U.S. investment abroad. It includes Treasuries, agencies, corporate bonds, equities, and short-term instruments like T-bills. Foreigners bought a lot of T-bills when the credit crisis became acute.

This should be a serious situation with a big drop in foreign investible funds for meeting U.S. borrowing needs. The borrowing by households and business has dropped close to zero, decreasing demand, while government borrowing has jumped but is still smaller than the private borrowing drop. The Fed has added some lending.

A look at just the longer-term Securities (not T-bills) is even more convincing of the slowing of lending by foreigners:

This decrease in credit should pressure rates higher.

And here is the breakdown of foreign investment into the U.S. Foreigners only continued to buy Treasuries, shunning new investment and selling off agencies in the riskier real estate market.

It’s not for nothing that the Goldman Sachs Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner is hotfooting it around the world lately, last week to Saudi Arabia and the UAE… last month to China.

The purpose of his trip, Geithner told reporters in Paris, he was doing this tour ”to make sure we keep working with governments around the world to continue to provide enough support to lift this global economy back to a sustained pattern of growth.”

Translation: Look here, we’re all in this together. If you jump ship now, we’re all doomed… DOOMED, I say!

But the fact remains that the foreign holders of U.S. dollars have it within their ability – either deliberately or inadvertently as the result of a panic setting in – to literally destroy the U.S. currency.

The latest report shows Russia and longtime monetary ally Japan edging toward the door. China and the oil-exporting nations continue to convert an increasingly moderate amount of their trade surplus into Treasury bills – but not on a nearly large enough scale to meet the inflated (and inflating) borrowing needs of the utterly bankrupt U.S. government. And how long will they continue to show up, when an increasing number of other foreign buyers start selling their Treasuries? No one likes to be the last one to leave a party, especially when the bananas flambé has tipped over on the floor and the curtains are on fire.

Put simply, the only thing now standing between the U.S. dollar holding its own and an almost overnight debasement (and history has shown us that when things go wrong with a currency, they can go wrong very quickly) is the willingness of foreigners to play nice. This was never a threat that the Japanese had to deal with during the worst of their recent dark days, but it’s a very real risk here and now in the United States.

That that risk sits on top of the monetary inflation that has been the steady response of the U.S. government so far –  and will continue to be its response as the economy further erodes – is not something to be sniffed at.

On July 17, Bloomberg reported that “China’s finance ministry failed to meet its debt-sale target for a third time in two weeks at a 182-day bill sale, according to traders at Galaxy Securities Co. and China Citic Bank in Beijing. The ministry had tried to sell 20 billion yuan of bills and only sold 18.51 billion yuan, traders said. The average yield for the bills sold was 1.6011 percent, they said.”

Here’s our take on this news item: The problem from the Chinese government’s point of view is that they were not able to borrow as much money as they wanted, in the light that they are now spending at a very fast clip with a big stimulus program to keep their own economy (bubble?) growing. So how can they fund the spending? They can sell off the stash of foreign-currency-denominated holdings they are sitting on. That could mean Treasuries dumped on the world market.

There are other alternatives, like getting the People’s Bank of China to print up some new money for the government, which would inflate the renminbi (RMB) and decrease its international price and attractiveness. They might like to let the RMB fall to encourage exports and keep relative worker pay low on the world competitive scene. But they are also trying to make the RMB a world currency by itself, so they don’t want it to look weak and at risk.

Our guess is that they are selling Treasuries and not telling.

[Note: In latest news this week, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao said China “will use its foreign exchange reserves to support and accelerate overseas expansions and acquisitions by Chinese companies.” Jiabao called it China’s “going out” strategy. Going out (with a bang), though, may be a better description of what the U.S. will ultimately do.]

This is what The Casey Report, Casey Research’s flagship publication, does: spotting budding trends in the economy and the markets, and then devising ways to profit from them. A strategy that – as thousands of happy subscribers can vouch for – is paying off… and paying off big. Right now, one of our favorite plays, and surest bets, on the economic quagmire we’re in is an investment that is almost guaranteed to be a winner. Let Casey Chief Economist Bud Conrad tell you all about it in his free report. Click here to learn more.

Source: Foreign Investment in the U.S. – Going Down, Down, Down

Now that it’s here, we turn our attention to trying to discern, “How bad can it get?” and “How long can it last?”

While such questions can never be answered with anything approaching absolute certainty, there are methods that can be used to assess what may lurk over the horizon. With that goal in mind, this article focuses on – and then expands upon – the recent work of two economists who painstakingly analyzed a substantial number of previous banking and currency crises in an attempt to derive potentially useful lessons. I have then taken their data and applied them to the current circumstances to see where we are, relative to those other experiences.

The Data

The data are from a study called “The Aftermath of Financial Crises” by Carmen M. Reinhart of University of Maryland and Kenneth S. Rogoff of Harvard University. In their study, the authors summarize the results of a broad sampling of banking crises, with between 13 to 22 crises analyzed for each of the variables.

The Reinhart/Rogoff study is based, in turn, on data extracted from an even more comprehensive study of events in 66 countries, titled “This Time Is Different: A Panoramic View of Eight Centuries of Financial Crises,” by the same authors.

I’ve summarized the findings from the latest study in the table below:

The economic measures in the left column show how far the U.S. situation has deteriorated so far. The next columns show the average historical deterioration and the worst case of the crisis analyzed.

I then applied these data to calculate the levels that the U.S. could reach if it followed the path of the historical examples. The projected level is based on the measure analyzed, either from the peak prior to the downturn (e.g., the S&P 500) or from the bottom prior to the downturn (e.g., the lows in unemployment). Thus, as you can see in the table here, the S&P 500 has already dropped from its October 2007 peak of 1565 down to 766. If this crisis were to end up being only “average,” then it would drop to 690.

If, however, the worst case of a 90% drop were to occur, as it did in Iceland last year, then the S&P 500 would trade down to the shocking level of 157. For further reference, if the current crisis were to cause the stock market to fall as sharply as in the Great Depression, the S&P would touch 469.

Duration of Crisis

As you can see in the summary table below, it took 3.4 years, on average, for the stock market to fall from the peak to the bottom. In the worst case, it took five years. With the recent peak in the S&P 500 occurring in October 2007 – just one and a half years ago – the crisis is likely to have some time to go before reaching even an average duration. More specifically, if this crisis turns out to be just “average,” we would not expect to see the low before the first quarter of 2011.

Crisis Horizon: Some Conclusions

The global economic situation continues to deteriorate on all fronts (see charts below).

Housing Prices Can Take Years to Decline	U.S. Federal Debt Is Likely to Jump from Crisis
Unemployment Could Jump over the Decade

Housing prices are down 28% from their bubble peak in 2006 but still have a ways down to go to get back to their pre-bubble levels. Even an average downturn will mean that housing remains a problem for several more years. Unless, of course, the government steps in to stave off those resets… a “solution” that carries with it a separate set of problems, making things worse. We continue to expect very serious problems in the commercial real estate sector.

The stock market is approaching a 50% decline, the average of what has been observed in past crises. Further slowing in U.S. corporate activities and profits means additional increases in unemployment, establishing a negative feedback loop that pushes corporate profits – and stock prices – even lower.

The only growth trend at this point is in government bailouts, which are in high gear, indicating we’ll experience the serious growth of outstanding debt seen in other crises. The elevated levels of government borrowing required to fund that spending are absorbing all available credit from foreigners, directly competing with business in need of the new financing that will be required to expand the economy. The combination of declining business activity, coupled with declining levels of household income, will result in declining tax revenues, increasing the budget deficit beyond the size of the new bailout programs. State and municipal governments across the nation are already being confronted with large shortfalls in their budgets, shortfalls that will only widen as the crisis worsens.

The combined business slowing and jobs contraction assure that the GDP will decline. Components of GDP having to do with necessities like food and shelter will continue to bump along regardless of the economic conditions, but the lack of growth in GDP could extend for years as it did in Japan and as it did after the 1929 stock crash.

Inflation/Deflation

Given that we are currently in a deflationary phase, it is easy to dismiss the case for inflation – and many do. We think that is a mistake. Even a summary tabulation of the unprecedented increases in government debt at this relatively early stage in the crisis make a compelling case for higher inflation, if for no other reason than that it shows clear intent on the part of the government to spend “whatever it takes” to offset the deflationary forces now stalking the land.

The research paints a dismal story of years of economic stagnation. In our view, the trend is now firmly established for dollar debasement, a debasement that will eventually overwhelm the deflationary pressures from collapsing asset values. Therefore, don’t listen to the happy faces on CNBC spouting off, for the umpteenth time since this crisis began, that now is the time to jump back in and buy stocks. It isn’t.

Be extremely skeptical when you hear some pundit pronouncing that this piece of short-term good news or another is an “all clear” signal. Until we start seeing a systematic improvement in the economic fundamentals – for example, an upward movement in consumer confidence – the only signal the economy will be hearing is that of a runaway train coming straight at it.

The numbers paint a dark picture… but it is in crises like today’s where unusually good opportunities arise for investors. Take our investors, for example, who made money shorting financials over the last year. The Casey Report focuses on recognizing and analyzing market trends way ahead of the investing crowd – a strategy that has already provided its subscribers with up to four-digit returns. The latest edition includes an update on the analysis you’ve read above. Try it risk-free for 3 full months, with our 100% money-back guarantee: click here to learn more.

Source: Bad, Worse, or Worst?

This from Whiskey & Gunpowder:

Under Bernanke’s direction, the Federal Reserve has completely rewritten its mission. Many articles in the International Speculator and The Casey Report have reported the strange growth in the loans they have made and explained that Bernanke has, for a long time, espoused unconventional actions to avert deflation and to expand the economy. So the charts below tell that story, and it is truly amazing.

The Federal Reserve was never envisioned to be lender of last resort to a whole slew of investment banks, money market mutual funds, and commercial paper issuers.

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The situation is not easy to sort out, for the simple reason that the extent of their actions is not presented by the Fed via clear and concise data. Instead, the data is complex and hard to analyze, partly because of the piecemeal way the actions were taken, but also probably due to a desire by the Fed to avoid public scrutiny and criticism.

Digging into the details of the Fed’s balance sheet reveals, however, the complete change of composition and direction of the Fed. The most obvious change is that they have doubled the size of their assets and liabilities. A year ago, the Fed’s assets consisted almost entirely of government Treasuries and a little gold.

That is a clean, safe balance sheet.

The only important liability was the currency they issued (our paper dollars). They also had a small reserve of deposits from all the banks. When Greenspan wanted to give the economy a boost by lowering short-term interest rates, he would create some money and buy Treasuries. He could also do the reverse.

Bernanke has turned this upside down. Initially he made focused loans to big banks. But then the loans became bigger than the reserve deposits, leaving the banks in total as net borrowers. The concept of a fractional reserve no longer applies when the reserve is net negative.

To fund yet more loans, Bernanke then sold off half of the Fed’s Treasuries. And he traded Treasuries for toxic waste of poor-quality mortgage-backed securities. And he encumbered half of the remaining Treasuries with “off balance sheet” swaps of about $220 billion. (Does this sound like Enron accounting?) The balance sheet started with $800 billion of mostly reliable assets and now has about $250 billion of unencumbered Treasuries.

The biggest source of funding is from the Treasury. Banks are leaving deposits in the Fed now that the Fed is paying interest.

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The important conclusion is that the paper dollars are now issued by a far less soundly structured Fed, an organization that is more interested in bailing out the financial community than defending the dollar.

This chart below compares last year’s assets, which were mostly Treasuries, to this year’s twice-as-large and far more questionable mix:

The other side of the balance sheet shows that the Fed has borrowed and taken in deposits to fund the loans that are as big as the issuance of currency. In effect, the Fed has doubled its footprint and doubled its responsibilities. Mostly under the covers, they added almost $1 trillion in new credit to the financial world in about two months.

There are additional important Fed actions not included in their balance sheet. For example, they invented a Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIF) to guarantee up to 90% of $600 billion of loans to that sector. They do this through special-purpose vehicles established by the private sector (PSPVs). The latest Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) started October 27 and has issued $143 billion so far. These are both in addition to the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility initiated September 19. The programs are beyond keeping up with.

Nothing like this has ever been done before by the Federal Reserve. In time, the consequences in terms of confidence in the dollar will be bad.

Source: Backfield in Motion at the Fed

The Federal Reserve was never envisioned to be lender of last resort to a whole slew of investment banks, money market mutual funds, and commercial paper issuers.

The situation is not easy to sort out, for the simple reason that the extent of their actions is not presented by the Fed via clear and concise data. Instead, the data is complex and hard to analyze, partly because of the piecemeal way the actions were taken, but also probably due to a desire by the Fed to avoid public scrutiny and criticism.

Digging into the details of the Fed’s balance sheet reveals, however, the complete change of composition and direction of the Fed. The most obvious change is that they have doubled the size of their assets and liabilities. A year ago, the Fed’s assets consisted almost entirely of government Treasuries and a little gold.

That is a clean, safe balance sheet.

The only important liability was the currency they issued (our paper dollars). They also had a small reserve of deposits from all the banks. When Greenspan wanted to give the economy a boost by lowering short-term interest rates, he would create some money and buy Treasuries. He could also do the reverse.

Bernanke has turned this upside down. Initially he made focused loans to big banks. But then the loans became bigger than the reserve deposits, leaving the banks in total as net borrowers. The concept of a fractional reserve no longer applies when the reserve is net negative.

To fund yet more loans, Bernanke then sold off half of the Fed’s Treasuries. And he traded Treasuries for toxic waste of poor-quality mortgage-backed securities. And he encumbered half of the remaining Treasuries with “off balance sheet” swaps of about $220 billion. (Does this sound like Enron accounting?) The balance sheet started with $800 billion of mostly reliable assets and now has about $250 billion of unencumbered Treasuries.

The biggest source of funding is from the Treasury. Banks are leaving deposits in the Fed now that the Fed is paying interest.

The important conclusion is that the paper dollars are now issued by a far less soundly structured Fed, an organization that is more interested in bailing out the financial community than defending the dollar.

This chart below compares last year’s assets, which were mostly Treasuries, to this year’s twice-as-large and far more questionable mix:

The other side of the balance sheet shows that the Fed has borrowed and taken in deposits to fund the loans that are as big as the issuance of currency. In effect, the Fed has doubled its footprint and doubled its responsibilities. Mostly under the covers, they added almost $1 trillion new credit to the financial world in about two months.

There are additional important Fed actions not included in their balance sheet. For example, they invented a Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIF) to guarantee up to 90% of $600 billion of loans to that sector. They do this through special-purpose vehicles established by the private sector (PSPVs). The latest Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) started October 27 and has issued $143 billion so far. These are both in addition to the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility initiated September 19. The programs are beyond keeping up with.

Nothing like this has ever been done before by the Federal Reserve. In time, the consequences in terms of confidence in the dollar will be bad.

Bud Conrad is the chief economist of Casey Research, LLC., providing fiercely independent analysis and investment recommendations for subscribers in the U.S., Canada, and over 150 other countries around the world.

Powerful forces are at work in the economy; a global tidal wave of bank failures, credit crises, and sky-high debt. The central banks of the world may not be able to stave off what’s coming — but you can protect yourself and profit… by catching one of the massive market riptides Casey Research identifies every month in The Casey Report. Don’t miss the lifeboat that can take you to financial safety. Learn more here.

Source: What’s Up, Doc?

The dollar is losing its special status as the global “reserve currency,” is leading, in turn, to higher inflation, higher interest rates, weakening financial assets (stocks and bonds) and runaway prices for commodities.

Let’s look at the data and let them speak for themselves, with some interpretation along the way:

1. U.S. Government Deficits: From Bad to Worse

Government deficits are the root source of the creation of money… and its eventual debasement. Simply, when the federal government spends more than it raises in taxes, it eventually has to create more money (in complicity with the Fed) in order to pay the bills.

Of course, it can borrow the money, but that often includes borrowing newly created money from the Fed. The deficits remain and they accumulate and in time. They must be resolved, either by payment or default, either overtly or covertly through the mechanism of inflation.

While some level of government deficits may be acceptable over modest periods of time, the U.S. deficit is now well past the point of being acceptable. The deficit will soon grow to monster proportions as the baby boomer retirement obligations exceed the ability to tax the declining number of workers contributing to the Social Security and Medicare funds.

Projections of the likely deficit compared to GDP growth make it clear that the government is faced with hard choices. The easy path of just letting the dollar fall is the most likely.

2. The Expanding U.S. Trade Deficit

It is consumers who primarily receive the money provided by U.S. government deficits. In this globally interconnected world, they then spend a portion of that money on foreign goods. An unintended consequence of the ballooning government deficits, therefore, is a large and growing trade deficit.

The foreign recipients of those dollars – whether Chinese manufacturers or Middle Eastern oil sheiks – have, in recent years, turned around and reinvested those dollars in U.S. Treasuries. They have done so because of the perceived safety of those instruments, and because of the sheer volume of the dollars they have to invest. In addition, it has been in their commercial interest to help finance the U.S. deficit.

With the trade deficit now running at $750 billion per year, and much of that money coming back into U.S. Treasuries, the U.S. government has grown dependent on foreigners to sustain the continuing deficits.

That level of debt would normally cause extreme weakness in a currency – just as it would in the value of debt owed by a deeply indebted individual. However, the sheer magnitude of the foreign holdings provides something of a bastion against a total collapse in the dollar.