And so it begins. Just yesterday, we here at the TFN offices got into a late-day discussion about the fate of the nation’s natural gas markets.

With prices remaining low and entirely removed from the recent commodities bonanza, the nation’s expanding natural gas drilling industry is headed for trouble.

Today we got the news that proves our theory.

ConocoPhillips (NYSE:COP), the third largest of the nation’s Big Oil players, announced it is cutting its capital spending budget by nearly 10% and is selling some $10 billion worth of assets.

Why the drastic moves? Thanks in part to stubbornly low natural gas prices, the company needs to make the cuts to shore up a leveraged balance sheet.

If you recall, just last week the company warned Wall Street to expect reduced earnings figures thanks to a 67% reduction in natural gas prices.

There was similar news yesterday from nation’s second-largest producer, Chevron (NYSE:CVX). The California-based company quietly announced all drilling has stopped at its Piceance Basin facilities in Colorado.

I bet you can guess why they plugged the well. Yep, you betcha, low natural gas prices.

Drill, baby, drill

So if the natural gas price conundrum is having this effect on the nation’s largest companies and their multi-billion dollar cash flows, what is it doing to the tiny, marginal players?

Early last month, Trident Resources gave us a glimpse of what is likely to come. Citing liabilities of nearly a billion bucks and assets worth just $10 million, the Canadian gas driller was forced to walk into bankruptcy court and ask for protection from its creditors.

Indeed, the same companies investors were pumping their money into when gas was soaring to record highs are now failing under the weight of massive debt.

Here’s the kicker that is really going to tear the gas industry apart.

That massive debt that was picked up over the past few years doesn’t simply go away now that prices have plummeted. Drillers still have to pay their bills. That means any bit of cash flow available is direly needed.

That is how we got to where we are today, with natural gas inventories across the country at record high levels and growing by the minute.

With bills to pay, drillers simply refuse to close the valves on their producing wells. If they do, they’ll go bankrupt. But until they slow the flow, the price they get for that gas will sink lower and lower.

Eventually, prices will get so low the weak will be shaken out of the market whether they like it or not. They won’t be able to produce enough gas even to make their weekly payroll.

One of many

I could pick on dozens of small drillers that are facing gale-force headwinds, but since Rex Energy Corp. (NASDAQ:REXX) recently expanded its drilling in the Marcellus Shale formation, which is the chief cause of the current market glut, I will put their issues in the spotlight.

With $70 million in liabilities, the $330 million company is one of the better positioned drillers in its category. But much of that debt is focused on bringing the company to the Marcellus Shale region. If the move does not pay off, Rex could be forced to pay on a dud for quite some time.

Common estimates put the break-even price for Marcellus Shale drilling somewhere around $3.70 per 1,000 cubic feet of gas. Right now, drillers are able to get that price from the futures market, but the overfilled spot market is not willing to spend so much.

With nearly $1.50 difference between spot and future prices, something has got to give. With inventories about to overflow, the spot price won’t budge an inch.

The common argument throughout the market is that typical winter demand will reduce supplies and bring the markets back in equilibrium. But remember, the markets rarely go with the crowd.

The speculators have gas prices going higher over the next two months, but the facts and economic laws show prices will be going lower.

If it happens, it won’t be good for drillers. ConocoPhillips knows it. Now so do you.

Source: Natural Gas Industry Braces for Impact

Now, Chavez’s aggressive economic policies are again being called into question, this time as the country slides into what could be a protracted period of stagflation, which is defined by the exasperating mixture of torpid economic growth and high inflation.

Before that, however, the period from 2004-2007 was marked by rapid economic growth – punctuated by a miraculous 19.42% burst in 2004. Since that time, unfortunately, Venezuelans have watched as their standard of living was slowly eroded by restrictive price controls, rapid inflation, unsustainable public spending, and widespread nationalizations that have put a stranglehold on industry.

Even as these problems festered, an unprecedented surge in oil prices allowed Chavez to maintain his questionable – and ultimately unsustainable – economic policies. When the bull market in commodities abruptly stalled last year, Venezuela’s economy lumbered to a stop.

Venezuela’s economy grew by 3.2% in the fourth quarter of 2008 and just 0.3% in the first quarter of 2009. Then – for the first time in more than five years – that country’s economy contracted, shrinking 2.4% in the second quarter.

Unfortunately for Venezuela, the decline in gross domestic product (GDP) did little to quell surging inflation.  The annual rate of inflation climbed to 26.2% in July, according to the Central Bank of Venezuela. Many foreign sources have it higher.

President Chavez insists his country is not in the midst of a financial crisis, but analysts believe this is just the beginning of a bad-news saga that will trip up a country whose heavy-handed economic policies have made it few friends.

“To sum up, we could say that such scenario of stagflation has two basic components,” Orlando Ochoa, an economist and professor with Andrés Bello Catholic University (UCAB), told El Universal. “On the one hand, price control, exchange control, nationalizations and restricted distribution of foreign currency damage supply. On the other hand, lower oil prices curtail revenues and have an impact on demand.”

Going forward, Venezuela’s currency controls are perhaps the biggest hurdle for the economy to overcome. Chavez and his cabinet have said they are preparing to announce measures to stimulate the economy, but that may not be enough.

The problems that come with over-reliance on oil and a vast net of unwieldy social programs and the cost burden of nationalized industry aren’t going anywhere. And the nation’s other obstacle – the gap between its official and parallel exchange rates – won’t be addressed until at least the end of September.

An Unparalleled Problem

Indeed, the problems facing Venezuela are many. But President Chavez and his cabinet believe they have the solution.

“There is a remedy,” Venezuelan Finance Minister Ali Rodriguez said in an interview broadcast on state television. “The differential between the official dollar and the [so-called] ‘parallel dollar’ can be reduced.”

Rodriguez was referring to the difference between the country’s “official” exchange rate – which remains at 2.15 bolivars per U.S. dollar – and the so-called “parallel market,” which suggests a rate of about 6.5 bolivars per U.S. dollar.

The official exchange rate of 2.15 bolivars per U.S. dollar was arrived at in 2003, when Chavez imposed currency controls that force Venezuelans who want to import goods to apply for a government permit. Importers that are unable to get permits to buy currency at the official exchange rate have been forced to turn to the parallel market, where they pay three times the official price.

The problem now is that a large drop in oil revenue has sharply reduced the amount of dollars the government has available to exchange. That has driven more importers to the pricier parallel market. Some have stopped importing entirely.

With limited access to imports, Venezuela’s manufacturing sector contracted by 8.5% in the second quarter.

“The manufacturing sector is going to have a negative performance, mostly because of the restriction in imports and dollars, which has caused a drop in the supply of primary materials,” Miguel Carpio, an economist at Banco Federal CA in Caracas, told Bloomberg News. “Add to that the drop in consumption, and this is going to be a very difficult year.”

Now, with the threat of stagflation looming large, Chavez has no choice but to take action. But economists are unsure of what the government will do.

Few analysts expect the government to order an outright devaluation, because it would push inflation beyond the 28% annual rate. (Venezuela last devalued the official rate in 2005, weakening the currency by 11%.)

Instead, the government could try to lower the parallel rate by issuing dollar-denominated debt, by creating a second, separate exchange rate for “necessary” industries, or by doing both those things.

Traditionally, the government chooses to subsidize certain favorite industries – mainly heavy machinery, foodstuffs and medicines – by allowing them to trade bolivars at the official rate and driving other non-essential goods producers to the parallel market.

This could be taken a step further by imposing a tax on lower priority industries seeking dollars at the official exchange rate, Russ Dallen, head trader at Caracas Capital Markets, said in a research note. Or the government could simply create multiple “official” rates for different industries. Venezuela may create four different exchange rates to help the government deal with a drop in oil revenue.

“This complicated system, if implemented, would satisfy the requirements of the government of pretending not to have a formal devaluation of the exchange rate,” Dallen said.

Credit Suisse Group AG (NYSE ADR: CS) said in an Aug. 28 report that it expects the government to avoid devaluating its currency by selling dollar-denominated debt to the parallel market. In 2008, after an aggressive sale of dollar-denominated bonds, the administration was able to bring down the parallel rate to around 3 bolivars.

Ultimately, it’s Chavez – who opened the door to speculation in August by saying he would “restore balance” to the parallel rate – who will decide what to do about his country’s quandary. But he won’t be making a decision until later this month.

“Is there going to be an adjustment? I can’t respond to that right now,” Chavez said Sunday at the presidential palace in Caracas. “If any adjustment comes, it will be in September, towards the end of the month.”

But whatever Chavez decides to do, his remedy is likely to fall short, analysts say. That’s because the parallel rate is not the problem – it’s actually a symptom of flawed economic principles. The restrictive price-and-exchange-rate controls, government expansion, and political obtuseness that Chavez has made the cornerstones of his economic policy will continue to conspire against Venezuela until there is reform.

“We always said the situation was only tenable for the government if oil prices not only remained high, but also rose constantly. But that has not happened, and the fall in oil income is now clearly in evidence,” UCAB’s Ochoa told Inter Press Service News Agency. “That’s the first factor contributing to stagflation, to which are added price and exchange controls and restrictions on hard currency availability, which harm supply and investment, and thirdly, the policy of nationalization.”

Venezuela’s Crude Oil Slick

In the years leading up to the financial crisis, Chavez used PDVSA’s growing revenue to finance large social programs, as well as the nationalization of other industries.

Spending on social programs soared 340% from 2000-2005, according to the Center for Economic and Policy Research. It rose even higher as oil prices soared into 2008, boosting purchase orders and fueling a spending spree among even the poorest Venezuelans.

But since the financial crisis eviscerated commodities prices, Venezuela’s oil bounty has all but evaporated. Oil brought in $22.8 billion in the first six months of 2009. That’s less than half of the $52 billion it brought in during the first half of last year. For 2008 as a whole, oil generated about $90 billion in revenue for Venezuela.

Meanwhile, FONDEN – Venezuela’s development fund – has already committed all but $3 billion of the nearly $20 billion it had available at the end of January, as the government used most of the money in the first half of the year to sustain fiscal spending.

And while Venezuelan oil traded at an average of $53 a barrel in the second quarter, up from $40 a barrel in the first three months of 2009, that’s still a far cry from last year’s levels.

That means borrowing has had to rise to compensate for the decline in revenue.  Venezuela’s domestic debt jumped 44% during the first half of the year to $20.42 billion from $14 billion at the end of 2008.

“Public spending keeps rising and is financed by more public debt, which increases spending in a vicious circle, while the government defers or postpones workers’ demands, which is itself another sign of the approaching recession, although the government seeks to deny it,” economist Domingo Maza Zavala, a former head of the Central Bank told the IPS.

Calculations based on official figures suggest domestic and foreign debt repayments will total about $19.6 billion between the second half of this year and 2011, the Latin American Herald Tribune reported. Roughly $10 billion of that total will be due on foreign debt, with the remaining $9.6 billion destined for the domestic account. Total state debt is estimated at $50.3 billion.

What’s the government figures don’t include is the cost of compensating private companies that have been taken over or bought out under Chavez’s nationalizations and expropriations.

Chavez’s government earlier this year seized the assets of more than 70 foreign and domestic oil service companies after conflict erupted over nearly $14 billion in debt owed by PDVSA.

PDVSA demanded that service companies accept a 40% cut in their bills; when they refused, the Venezuelan government seized at least 12 drilling rigs, more than 30 oil terminals, and about 300 boats.

The demonstration was a pointed reminder of a 2007 incident, which is still playing out in the international courts. Two years ago, Venezuela forced six oil majors to hand over equity stakes of 60% or more to PDVSA. However, Exxon Mobil Corp. (NYSE: XOM) and Conoco Phillips (NYSE: COP) opted to walk away from their contracts rather than accept a minority role.

This conflict is still being disputed, and last year Exxon won a court order to freeze $12 billion in assets from PDVSA as compensation for its lost projects. Additionally, Chavez’s heavy-handed policy has cost the country untold billions worth of oil-related investments, as many oil majors now refuse to operate there

“There is the uncertain outlook over how the extensive nationalization pursued over the past 12 years will pan out,” Alvise Marino, an analyst at Ideaglobal, told The Wall Street Journal. “Based on the government’s unimpressive track record on the economic management front, we tend to take a less-than-optimistic view.”

The Colombia Conundrum

In addition to alienating foreign oil majors, Chavez has also sequestered Venezuela from many of its neighbors, especially Colombia. Chavez has ordered his country to prepare for an outright “rupture of relations” with Colombia after that country gave the United States permission to use its military bases.

The United States says access to the bases will help it fight drug trafficking, but Chavez has his own theory. He says American use of the bases could be used as a launch point for an invasion of his oil rich nation.

“Those seven military bases are a declaration of war,” Chavez said last week. “We must prepare for the rupture in relations with Colombia. There is no possibility of a return [to normal relations] with Colombia, an embrace.”

However, cutting off ties with Colombia poses yet another economic hurdle for the Venezuelan economy to overcome. Colombia provided about $6 billion in products to Venezuela in 2008, or about 15% of Venezuela’s total imports, according to Venezuela’s government statistics institute INE.

In fact, when Chavez closed the border for three days in 2006, there was shortage of food in Venezuela.

Chavez can turn to other South American countries, but his credit extends only so far.

“Nobody wants to sell to Venezuela if payment isn’t made in advance,” José Rozo, president of Fedecámaras Táchira, the region’s main business association, told the Latin American Herald Tribune

About 70% of trade activity in Venezuela depends on imports from Colombia, Rozo said, adding that the only country that had been willing to export on credit had been Colombia.

Without Colombia, Venezuela will have to settle for trade terms that heavily favor its partners.

For instance, Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner made a visit to Venezuela last month, and signed no less than 22 accords. Virtually all of the deals were in Argentine’s favor, the Tribune reported.

“We’re going to drive a horse and cart through all the regulations if they want to do business with us,” an Argentine official told the paper prior to the signing of the deals. “Prompt payment. Simple procedures. Fewer controls. Less bureaucracy. No delays. Hard currency. I’ll tell you the rest when I’ve thought of them.”

That means if Venezuela wants to keep doing business with Argentina, it’s going to have to pay more.

And that will fuel inflation.

“The cost of purchasing in Argentina is higher, and that means that prices will be higher in Venezuela,” Abelardo Daza, an economics professor at Caracas-based IESA business school, told The Journal.

Source: Is Venezuela’s Stagflation the Beginning of the End for Chavez?

The trip was sponsored by the American Petroleum Institute (API), which paid for the airfare and accommodations. Managers at both Syncrude and ConocoPhillips granted me access to any parts of their operations I wanted to see (within allowances for safety). And everyone answered any and all questions I asked.

Post-trip, I have complete editorial freedom to write about what I saw and learned. And I learned a lot. So this is Part I of a two-part series. Watch for Part II.

The Past and Future of Oil and Oil Sands

The first thing that struck me about visiting the oil sands of Alberta was how much geological and social similarity there is to the oil patch of Pennsylvania.

Geologic similarity? Yes, because the reason that the hydrocarbons are so near the surface in both areas — Pennsylvania and Alberta — is that the Pleistocene glaciers scraped off much of the overlying rock. When the glaciers retreated about 10,000 years ago, they left hydrocarbon-bearing rock formations exposed near the surface, or buried not too deep. This led to oil seeps, which led to people being curious about the black, gooey stuff.

To be sure, the hydrocarbon resource is quite different between the two places. That is, in Pennsylvania, you have light, sweet crude oil that flows easily and is soft and smooth to the touch. Indeed, Pennsylvania crude feels like hand lotion. (It’s the origin of Vaseline, for example. And some people use it as the basis for a shampoo.)

While in Alberta, the “bitumen” from the oil sands is as thick as cold molasses, and very sticky. It’s got some sulfur in it as well.

On a warm day in August, oil sands have the consistency of really stiff, dry oatmeal. Bitumen is a far cry from hand lotion.

And as for social similarities? Well, the Indians of old used to skim the oil from streams near Titusville, Pa. So did people of the “First Nations” of Alberta, who used to recover the tarry bitumen from the rocks along the Athabaska River of northern Alberta. Thus both oil and oil sands have been around for a long, long time.

Early white explorers in both Pennsylvania and Alberta noted the oil seeps. They wrote in journals and logs that eventually somebody could do something with the substance.

Eventually, both Pennsylvania and Alberta had their oil booms. In fact, we’re soon coming up on the 150th anniversary of Col. Drake’s oil discovery at Titusville, Pa, on Aug. 27, 1859. Pennsylvania’s oil boom is colorful history at this point (although Marcellus Shale development will soon change that).

Whereas Alberta is still in the midst of its oil sands boom. It’s a boom that’s going to last for quite some time, I believe.

“Easy” Oil Versus Heavy Oil and Bitumen

There’s a reason Col. Drake started an oil boom in Pennsylvania more than a century before Alberta enjoyed the same thing. Col. Drake found some of that so-called “easy” oil. No, it’s not easy to find. It’s that Col. Drake’s oil flows easily from a well.

That is, for all the oil that mankind has pumped out of the ground in the past 15 decades, almost all of it has been the light, sweet stuff that flows easily. Generally, when people looked for oil they bypassed the heavy oil and bitumen. Until lately, of course.

When we think about the concept of “Peak Oil” today, we need to keep in mind what we’re talking about. The curves show oil output peaking in so many parts of the world. This phenomenon is quite real, as long as you understand that it’s the “old fashioned” kind of oil deposit that Col. Drake was drilling. The light, sweet, easy-flowing oil is getting harder and harder to find, certainly in significant quantity.

But there are a lot of other hydrocarbon molecules out there. Most of those molecules are not light, sweet crude oil. Indeed, most of the hydrocarbon molecules that the world will use in the future will be “heavy,” with lots of carbon atoms and not so many hydrogen atoms.

Here’s a graph from oil services giant Schlumberger that estimates the world’s heavy oil and bitumen resources. Canada’s 400 billion cubic meters of bitumen translates into something like 1.4 trillion barrels of oil equivalent. How much is that? Well, it’s about SEVEN times the total oil reserves of Saudi Arabia.

It just so happens that most of that Canadian bitumen is located in Alberta (with some is in Saskatchewan). And Fort McMurray, about 250 miles north of Edmonton, is the heart of the development process.

Oil Sands — Surface Mining

Large-scale oil sands development began in the 1970s. It took gigantic levels of capital investment, like tens of billions of dollars. That’s not pocket change. So a group of lease-owners got together and pooled their capital to form privately held Syncrude Canada, a joint venture. First mining started in 1978.

The way Syncrude operates, it’s not really “mining.” It’s landscape architecture. Under Alberta law, Syncrude could not turn over its first shovel of rock without a master plan for remediation and restoration at the end of the cycle. It’s quite a farsighted model for long-range resource development.

Thus for much of the 1970s, Syncrude performed baseline environmental studies and data gathering. It started digging in 1978. At first, the pit looked like a moonscape of open-pit mining. See the photo below. It looks like a mess, right? Well, there’s more to the story.

The mining process is fairly straightforward. Big shovels (really big) scoop large volumes (really large) of oil-laden sand (API number 8, the “bitumen”) into gigantic loaders (and I mean gigantic.

The loaders haul the rock to a crusher. The crushed rock goes to a washing bin, kind of like your washing machine at home except it’s the size of a high-rise office building. The Syncrude operation washes the bitumen off the sand using naphtha. Then it separates the bitumen, recovers the naphtha for reuse and takes the clean sand (and it’s clean) and replaces it in a previously mined pit.

The process uses a lot of water, but not as much as the horror stories you might hear about “draining the rivers” of northern Canada. Each barrel of water is recycled about 18 times.

The process uses a large amount of natural gas, but not as much as you may have heard (like “all the natural gas of northern Canada”). Pretty much everything about the operation is built with cogeneration in mind, so the company continuously recovers the heat at each stage. That natural gas goes a long way, from what I saw.

If it takes, say, five years to dig a pit, and then it may take five or more years to fill it back up with sand during the restoration process. Syncrude’s goal is to handle the rock as little as possible.

Eventually, Syncrude returns the land to original grade, although the company has some artistic license with the contours. It covers the land with the original topsoil, which has been in cold storage (northern Alberta… it’s cold up here for 10 months of the year). Then it replants trees, and that’s saying something, because the growing season is under two months. It takes 80 years for your basic spruce tree to reach maturity.

There’s even a new water table, despite the disturbance of the land.

Where Things Now Stand

So at this stage, after 30 years or so of mining (with about 80 years to go, at current rates of extraction), Syncrude has come to a point of delivering 350,000 barrels of synthetic crude oil per day. It takes the 8-API bitumen and upgrades it to oil that’s competitive with West Texas Light. Then it delivers it to the JV members, for whatever use the owners want to make of it.

Along the way, the Syncrude process removes the sulfur, so it’s sulfur free (refiners like that). In fact, there’s a mass of sulfur up at Syncrude that’s about the size of the step pyramid at Saqqara, Egypt. And along the way, Syncrude sells the sulfur to the chemical industry.

The former Syncrude mine that I visited is about 3.5 miles square, and formerly about 200 feet deep. Now it’s restored to grade, with trees growing and a herd of 300 wood bison grazing.

For the cynics out there, I’d say that it’s not some environmental Potemkin village, because you can’t fake a replanted forest of 25-year-old trees. You can’t fake a 300-bison herd. Not on a former mine site 3.5 miles square.

Sure, there are still issues about land disturbance, settling ponds, water usage, gas usage and myriad of other things that come up when you’re spending billions of dollars on a major mining effort. But Syncrude has built its business model around dealing with the “other” issues, and not just moving oil sands and recovering oil products. Don’t underestimate the ability of the Alberta government to regulate its energy producers. This is a long way from Appalachia.

Meanwhile, we’re talking about literally billions of barrels of bitumen (or oil equivalent) that the process makes available to the North American marketplace. And if the U.S. wants to get onto its environmental high horse about the source of the hydrocarbons from the oil sands — and tax or ban their importation — there are other buyers in the world. Like the Chinese, who have racked up many frequent flyer miles on their treks to Fort McMurray.

That’s all for now. In Part II, I’ll discuss the in situ process that I saw at the ConocoPhillips Surmont site.

Until we meet again,
Byron King

Source: Update on Canada Oil Sands, Part I

What Are These Oil Sands?

Back in Pleistocene time, the glaciers covered much of northern Alberta.  In places, there was a mile of ice.  During some of the warmer periods, there was a lot of melting.  On occasion, and in some places, there were giant, glacial-dammed lakes.

Every now and again, these glacial dams would break, sending massive volumes of water downstream, wiping away pretty much everything along the way.  Well, it turns out that in this scoured-out area that included much of the rock covering some lower Cretaceous deposits of oil.  Or rather, it was “oil” that had long ago lost the volatile components.  The stuff is properly called bitumen.

Thus we have an area in northern Alberta that’s about the size of New York State.  That area holds near 1.4 trillion barrels of bitumen resource.  To be sure, not all of it is recoverable.  In terms of recoverable “reserves,” there are only (ahem…) about 175 billion barrels, or over eight times the total of U.S. oil reserves.

Of those 175 billion barrels, about 20% are near enough to the surface to strip mine.  That’s within about 250 feet or so.  Any deeper, and the cost-benefit calculation dictates that you have to recover it via a well-and-pumping process.  Still, that makes for about 35 billion barrels of bitumen that could be extracted by mining.  (About 1.5 times total U.S. oil reserves.)  The actual, mineable area is about the size of Rhode Island.

The Heart of Oil Sands Country

All of which gets me back to why I was in Fort McMurray.  This is the heart of oil sands country.

Near 200 years ago, early explorers noticed gooey oil seeping out of the banks along the Athabaska River.  On warm days, with direct sunshine, the stuff actually flows.  Mostly, it has the consistency of peanut butter.  Unless it’s cold up here – which happens a lot – and it’s hard as a rock.

Needless to say, people talked about these “oil sands” for a lot of years.  Then in the 1960s, some people within Canadian industry and the Alberta government began to do something about it.  They decided to develop them.  It’s a long, long story.

Here’s the Short Version

The short version of the story is that large-scale oil sands development began in the 1970s.  It took gigantic levels of capital investment, like tens of billions of dollars.  That’s not pocket change.  So a group of lease-owners got together and pooled their capital to form Syncrude Canada, a joint venture.  First mining started in 1978.

Thing is, the way Syncrude operates it’s not really “mining.”  It’s landscape architecture.  Under Alberta law, Syncrude could not turn over its first shovel of rock without a master plan for remediation and restoration at the end of the cycle.

So for much of the 1970s, Syncrude performed baseline environmental studies and data-gathering.  Then they started digging in 1978.  At first, the pit looked like a moonscape of open pit mining.

The process is fairly straightforward.  Big shovels (really big) scoop large volumes (really large) of oil-laden sand (API number 8, the “bitumen”) into gigantic loaders (and I mean gigantic.)  The loaders haul the rock to a crusher.  The crushed rock goes to a washing bin, kind of like your washing machine at home except it’s the size of a high-rise office building.

The Syncrude operation washes the bitumen off the sand using naphtha.  Then they separate the bitumen, recover the naphtha for reuse, take the clean sand (and it’s clean), and replace it in a previously-mined pit.

The process uses a lot of water, but not as much as the horror-stories you might hear about “draining the rivers” of northern Canada.  Each barrel of water is recycled about 18 times.

The process uses a large amount of natural gas, but not as much as you may have heard (like, “all the natural gas of northern Canada.”)  Pretty much everything about the operation is built with co-generation in mind, so they continuously recover the heat at each stage.  That natural gas goes a long way, from what I saw.

If it takes, say, five years to dig a pit, then it may take five or more years to fill it back up with sand during the restoration process.  Syncrude’s goal is to handle the rock as little as possible.

Eventually, Syncrude returns the land to original grade, although they have some artistic license with the contours.  They cover the land with the original topsoil, that’s been in cold storage (northern Alberta… it’s cold up here for 10 months of the year).  Then they replant trees, and that’s saying something because the growing season is under two months.  It takes 80 years for your basic spruce tree to reach maturity.

There’s even a new water table, despite the disturbance of the land.

Where Things Now Stand

So at this stage, after 30 years or so of mining (with about 80 years to go, at current rates of extraction), Syncrude has come to a point of delivering 350,000 barrels of synthetic crude oil per day.  They take the 8-API bitumen and upgrade it to oil that’s competitive with West Texas Light.  Then they deliver it to the JV members, for whatever use the owners want to make of it.

Along the way, the Syncrude process removes the sulfur, so it’s sulfur-free (refiners like that).  In fact, there’s a mass of sulfur up at Syncrude that’s about the size of the Step-Pyramid at Suqqhara, Egypt.  And along the way, Syncrude sells the sulfur to the chemical industry.

I visited a former Syncrude mine, about 3.5 miles square and formerly about 200 feet deep.  Now it’s restored to grade, with trees growing and a herd of 300 wood bison grazing.  For the cynics out there, I’d say that it’s not some environmental Potemkin Village because you can’t fake a replanted forest of 25-year old trees.  You can’t fake a 300-bison herd.  Not on a former mine site 3.5 miles square.

Bottom line is that this is an immense operation.  Syncrude employs 5,000 people, plus 2,000 contractors.  Paychecks are north of $100,000 per year.  Every oil sands job supports 3 local jobs, 6 provincial and 9 others across North America (especially at Caterpillar, where they build those giant, 400-ton loaders).

In the coming weeks I’m going to delve deep into North American oil sands operations and any companies that may be set to profit. Oil sands are nothing new, but now may be the perfect time to scoop up shares of a small player or two…

Regards,
Byron W. King

Source: The Oil Sands in Alberta, Canada

When we think about the concept of ’Peak Oil’ today, we need to keep in mind what we’re talking about. The curves show oil output peaking in so many parts of the world. This phenomenon is quite real, as long as you understand that it’s the light, sweet, easy-flowing oil that is getting harder and harder to find, certainly in significant quantity.

But there are a lot of other hydrocarbon molecules out there. Most of those molecules are not light, sweet crude oil. Indeed, most of the hydrocarbon molecules that the world will use in the future will be ’heavy,’ with lots of carbon atoms and not so many hydrogen atoms.

Here’s a graph from oil services giant Schlumberger that estimates the world’s heavy oil and bitumen resources. Canada’s 400 billion cubic meters of bitumen translates into something like 1.4 trillion barrels of oil equivalent. How much is that? Well, it’s about SEVEN times the total oil reserves of Saudi Arabia.

Sure, there are still issues about land disturbance, settling ponds, water usage, gas usage and myriad of other things that come up when you’re spending billions of dollars on a major mining effort. But Syncrude has built its business model around dealing with the ’other’ issues, and not just moving oil sands and recovering oil products. Don’t underestimate the ability of the Alberta government to regulate its energy producers. This is a long way from Appalachia.

Meanwhile, we’re talking about literally billions of barrels of bitumen (or oil equivalent) that the process makes available to the North American marketplace. And if the United States wants to get onto its environmental high horse about the source of the hydrocarbons from the oil sands — and tax or ban their importation — there are other buyers in the world. Like the Chinese, who have racked up many frequent flyer miles on their treks to Fort McMurray.

Source: The Saudi Arabia Next Door

Of course that doesn’t mean that they aren’t still making money.

Exxon Mobil (NYSE: XOM) reported that profit dropped 66% last quarter. Although it still made $3.95 billion, it’s just not making money hand over fist like last year.

In a eerily similar report, Royal Dutch Shell ADR (NYSE: RDS.A) said that it’s profit dropped 67% to $3.82 billion. ConocoPhillips (NYSE: COP) fared even worse, with profits plummeting 76% to $1.3 billion.

Hard times indeed in the petroleum industry.

This all comes on the heels of a volatile market in oil prices, regulators considering limits on oil speculation, and oil stockpiles fluctuating.

The real reason oil supplies have been moving so much is the contango situation that caused millions of barrels of oil to be stored offshore in tankers. As the capacity has opened up some of this oil is migrating ashore – but not much.

This is skewing the supply numbers up and down depending upon the pricing and motivations of the sellers.

Oil is opening up at almost $67 a barrel today, and it’s easy to see how supply and demand pressures will keep that fluctuating for a good deal into the future.

Source: Oil Companies Still Making Piles of Money

Here are listed sales in the filing, courtesy of 24/7WallStreet.com:

· 7/20/09… 1,817,000 at $28.7269 average in open market sale.

· 7/21/09… 3,915,100 at $26.9188 average in open market sale.

· 7/22/09… 2,254,200 at $26.6425 average in open market sale.

What took Buffett so long to start selling Moody’s? We have no idea. Moody’s runs one of the biggest scams on Wall Street. It charges the companies whose securities it rates (just like Standard & Poor’s and Fitch also do).

So what do you think these ratings agencies did when presented with a whole load of junk mortgage-backed securities to rate? They assigned them investment grade status and pocketed the cash.

If these ratings agencies had instead acted honestly and responsibly (rather than pimping themselves out to the highest bidder) the whole subprime debacle and the ensuing credit crisis could have been avoided.

Buffett isn’t the only investment whizz who thinks Moody’s is heading for trouble. Hedge-fund legend David Einhorn of Greenlight Capital is selling Moody’s short.

Yesterday, Moody’s shares tumbled almost 4% on the news that the Buffett had began to unwind his position in the company. We’d like to see Moody’s go out of business. But that’s maybe wishful thinking. Make sure you don’t own any shares in Moody’s. And if you’re feeling speculative, consider going short Moody’s along with Einhorn.

One of the easiest ways of deciding what stocks you should own is by “standing on the shoulders of giants.” We’re no geniuses here at Notes. But at least we are smart enough to recognize it. And that’s why we track what people far smarter than us are doing with their money.

As of the end of the first quarter this year, this is how Warren Buffett’s holdings (via Berkshire Hathaway, his investment vehicle) looked like:

1. American Express Co. (NYSE:AXP) over 151.6 million shares, same as before.

2. Bank of America Corp. (NYSE:BAC) 5 million shares; same as last quarter.

3. Burlington Northern Santa Fe (NYSE:BNI) 76.77 million shares; HIGHER than 70.089 million shares of last quarter.

4. Carmax Inc. (NYSE:KMX) 12 million shares; LOWER than the 17.63 million and that is two straight quarters of declines.

5. Coca Cola (NYSE:KO) right at 200 million shares, still same as before.

6. Comcast (NASDAQ:CMCSA) 12 million shares, same as before.

7. Comdisco Holdings (NASDAQ:CDCO) roughly 1.5 million shares, same as before.

8. ConocoPhillips (NYSE:COP) is really lower than the 71.228 million shares reported as this has been used for cutting taxes, and we already know that the number is lower than what the filing says.

9. Constellation Energy Group (NYSE:CEG) was just updated this week so the number is actually about 12.4 million rather than what the filing shows as being 14.828 million shares.

10. Costco Wholesale (NASDAQ:COST) 5.254 million shares, same as before.

11. Eaton Corp. (NYSE:ETN) 3.2 million shares; looks like new holding but may have been missed before.

There’s a lot of talk these days about how Buffett has lost his touch. This may be so. But the guy remains the world’s most successful investor. If you have a medium- to long-term investment horizon, you could do a lot worse than consider following Buffett into some of these long positions. If you think you can outsmart the guy, go ahead. But we know who our money would be with…

“I’m more interested in exploiting Buffett than defending him,” Hough writes. “The shortest path to being a great investor is to copy one.”

He recommends against Berkshire shares because of its concentration in financial service companies. “Investors who prefer to avoid that can simply cherry-pick from its holdings, which are reported quarterly.”

Hough chose five stocks that “Buffett says he still likes but that Berkshire has trimmed its stake in to make room for new purchases.”

The selections: Burlington Northern (NYSE:BNI); Eaton (NYSE:ETN), an industrial products company; ConocoPhillips (NYSE:COP); Kraft (NYSE:KFT); and NRG Energy (NYSE:NRG), a utility.

What, there are no trolleys where you live? Instead, you spent an hour and a half grinding through gridlock in your car? Yeah, me too.

That’s because there are virtually no trolley lines left. Seems that someone bought them up and scrapped them all. Now who would do such a thing?

Actually, General Motors (GM:NYSE) would, which has a great deal to do with why I am inclined to consign the bankrupt beggars to rot in corporate hell.

Trolley Dodging

Dial your “Way Back Machine” to 1937: Trolley lines happily and efficiently serve most every major metropolis. Heck, my own hometown baseball team, the Brooklyn Dodgers, draws its name from agile street crossers trying to avoid death by tram.

Suddenly, an odd company named National City Lines (NCL) pops up out of nowhere like an evil mushroom. Operated by five brothers named Fitzgerald, these nigh-illiterate Minnesota bus drivers have somehow gotten a hold of millions of dollars and are buying up every trolley company they can get their greasy hands on.

Eventually their network of shell companies and subsidiaries owns transit companies in some 40 cities. So what do they do with these fast, clean, effective, cheap “light rail” operations? They tear up the tracks, sell the cars for scrap, and replace them all with slow-moving, smoke-belching, rubber-tired buses. And then they raise all the fares.

Birth of an Eventually Bankrupt Nation

So you know what folks did? They bought cars. Lots and lots of cars, which require lots and lots of concrete roads, and lots and lots of gas stations and lots and lots of garages to put them in, and two-income families to pay for it all.

In other words: modern, gridlocked, unhappy, bankrupt America.

As I said earlier, who would want to do such a thing?

GM would, along with Mack Truck, Phillips Petroleum (a.k.a. ConocoPhillips [COP: NYSE]), Standard Oil (a.k.a. Exxon Mobil [XOM: NYSE]), and Firestone Tires (now Japan’s Bridgestone-Firestone [BRDCY.PK] after the whole melting tires/SUVs blowing up/people getting injured debacle).

You Can’t Make Up Stuff Like This

No, this is not some fevered anti-industrialist dream. In 1946, the FBI caught wind of the whole sordid affair, and in ‘47, the bunch of them were caught and hauled into federal court on charges of criminal conspiracy.

Here’s what the G-men uncovered: The four corporate giants paid millions (in current dollars, billions) for NCL preferred stock. NCL used the cash to buy and destroy trolley lines, and replace them with buses sporting GM chassis, Mack engines, and Firestone tires, to be fueled by Esso Diesel.

And the best part? Trolleys running on smooth steel rails last decades, while these new buses were guaranteed to shake themselves apart in a few years. Now that’s an eternal stream of income if there ever was one.

It’s also sorta, kinda, you know, “illegal?” So on April 1, 1949, the judge handed out a verdict: Mack, Firestone and GM would each pay $5,000. Esso only owed a grand. And each Fitzgerald brother was forced to pony up a dollar. And allowed (one might say even encouraged) to continue buying and closing trolley lines. After all, what’s good for General Motors… is certainly good enough for the likes of us.

Buy the Cars… Don’t Buy the Cars… It Matters Not, Because We Still Foot the Bill

Now we get back into our time machine and journey back to the present: After decades of filling the highways with god-awful cars that seldom outlast their payments, Americans are done with GM. Just don’t want one this year, thank you very much.

GM’s outraged reaction: If you won’t buy our cars, fine! Just give us $50 billion in cash (for now; we will probably ask for a lot more again in a few weeks). If you do that, we will still close down plants and fire a boatload of workers.

But if you don’t, we will declare bankruptcy, which would cost you $100 billion up front, and God only knows what else, when we start firing millions of workers and shutting down supply lines to every other manufacturer.

Oh, and those billions you already lent us? Fergedaboudit! Our buddies with bonds are waaay ahead of you in line. Wanna argue about it? Take us to court (’cause we looove the courts)!

Once a Thug, Always a Thug

My emotional response is that this is blackmail, plain and simple, and I am, as I said earlier, inclined to let the crooks rot.

However, I suspect that, just as they did in 1949, GM will once again get a free pass to continue making our lives miserable. Oh, they will be “restructured,” with “brands” that were once independent operations, but haven’t had any real meaning in decades, finally fading into the night.

But in the end, we will comply with their blackmail, and write this check, and the next one. And the next one.

Source: Once a Thug, Always a Thug

That is, the price of oil was high enough that people were beginning to change their usage habits, but the price wasn’t bad enough to break the banks (so to speak). The worldwide pace of well drilling was strong, but not unsustainable with the existing fleets of onshore and offshore rigs. Meanwhile, across the world, the oil patches were booming.

What a difference a year makes. By about March last year, the price of oil began to spike upward. Eventually, in July 2008, it reached $147 per barrel. And then the price broke. Oil prices slid down into the $100s by Labor Day. Between late September and late December, prices dropped as low as $33 per barrel. Now in January 2009, oil is hovering around the low $40s per barrel, $100 less than back in July, only six months ago.

We had a wild ride in 2008. And I believe 2009 will give us some new shocks. First, we are seeing significant companies in the domestic gas drilling business, like Chesapeake Energy (NYSE:CHK), scaling back their drilling programs. And we’re seeing eye-popping fourth-quarter losses from key industry players like Conoco-Phillips (NYSE:COP) (lost $31.2 billion in the last quarter) and Shell (lost $2.8 billion in the last quarter). We will see more reports like that, of operating losses, diminishing reserves, reduced earnings, write-downs and even some shotgun weddings (if not bankruptcies). Remember how Congress spent much of last year licking its collective chops over how it was going to tax those horrible so-called “windfall profits” of the oil firms? Well, not anymore, eh?

Also, watch how fast the drilling and oil service industry decelerates. Oil companies that lose money also scale back their capital expenditures. Conoco-Phillips and Occidental are cutting back. We’re seeing layoffs in key parts of the oil service sector. Companies like Schlumberger, Halliburton and Baker Hughes have announced personnel cutbacks just in the past week. And Rowan, a large offshore driller, is canceling new rigs. Across the oil patch, the hiring boom of the past couple of years has halted, while the average age of the current work force just gets older by the day.

With less drilling going on, we will soon start to see tighter output for both oil and natural gas. In Russia, oil output decreased by a seemingly small — but telling — 1% toward the end of 2008. You can expect a larger drop from Russia for 2009. Mexican oil output dropped by about 10% in 2008, and is on track to drop even more in 2009. According to figures recently published by the International Energy Agency, about 58% of world oil output comes from just 800 oil fields. And most of those oil fields are in the “mature” category. They were discovered in the 1950s-70s and are past their respective output peaks. So the macro view is grim, out beyond two years or so.

Markets work, right? Yes, basically. That’s the idea, anyhow. Unless, of course, they don’t work very well. And if something doesn’t work very well, does it still work? A stopped clock tells the correct time twice a day, right? But what if the clock just stops and starts whenever it gets banged around? To use another cliche, is that any way to run a railroad?

Let’s try to figure this out. What’s the difference between oil at $100 in January 2008, $147 that July, $100 in September and $33 in December? Has global demand been changing all that much? (Hint: Worldwide demand was not rising all that much in the first half of 2008. And demand is down over the past six months, but not by large factors.) Is the current oil price — in mid-January 2009 — in the low-$40s per barrel the “right” price? Can we believe the market?

One key thing that has changed in recent months is the oil market’s perception of the future. The marketplace is predicting lower oil usage as the world recession unfolds. So oil prices tend to fall with the release of bad economic news. But that perception is just plain myopic. Look at both the amount and the composition of the oil for sale. We’re seeing falling oil prices in the face of flat (at best) world output. And total world oil output includes increasing volumes of natural gas liquids (NGLs) and tar sands from Canada.

Let me translate that for you. NGLs are evidence that the oil industry is blowing down the world’s gas caps. And tar sand “oil” is the capital-intensive stuff with low energy return on investment. Tar sands use a lot of water and energy and come out at great capital cost and environmental cost to the North American landscape.

Ask yourself a couple more questions. In the near term, will worldwide economic contraction lower the use of oil? Yes, probably. And in the medium-to-long term, will depletion lower the worldwide output of oil? Yes, as well.

For now, lower oil demand is trumping stagnant supply. Oil prices are down. Near-term issues are beating out the medium-and-long term issues. But the longer oil prices stay low, the more damage will be inflicted on the world oil and drilling industry. More rigs will not be built. More wells will not be drilled. More prospects and fields will not be developed. More personnel will not enter into an aging industry work force. More of the current infrastructure and human capital will just run down.

In short, we are setting ourselves up for a period of severe volatility in oil prices. When demand starts to recover, supply falls below some not-yet-defined volume or perceptions change about the future of oil availability… prices will take off.

Source: What’s the Right Price for Oil?