Ask U.S. Rep. Maxine Waters, D-CA, about credit default swaps and she’ll offer this warning: Ban them now or expect a reprise of the ongoing global financial crisis – which the derivative securities helped create. When it comes to elected officials, Congresswoman Waters is not one I would typically feel that I have a lot in agreement with.

A representative of a low-income district in Los Angeles, Waters is a senior member of the House Committee on Financial Services and has distinguished herself in the past by her sharp attacks on the financial sector and capitalism in general – what her own Web site describes as her “no-holds-barred style of politics.”

However, Congresswoman Waters’ bill to prohibit credit default swaps – introduced last Friday (July 10) – is strangely appealing, even for a crusty old capitalist like myself.

If you want a more pro-capitalist confirmation of Waters’ view (andGeorge Soros doesn’t count) try Warren Buffett’s sidekick Charles T. Munger, who has called the CDS prohibition the best solution, and said “it isn’t as though the economic world didn’t function quite well without it, and it isn’t as though what has happened has been so wonderfully desirable that we should logically want more of it.”

Waters has also pointed out – quite reasonably – that unless credit default swaps are banned outright, “the industry will find a way to loosen standards and widen exemptions for customized contracts and we will be right back to where we are today.”

When There’s No “Free” in Free Market

As a free-market enthusiast, my natural instinct is to resist such calls. But I have to recognize that, as we speak, we’re actually not operating in a free market. Key U.S. banks were bailed out by the U.S. government last fall, after which such financial institutions as Fannie Mae (NYSE: FNM), Freddie Mac (NYSE: FRE) and Citigroup Inc. (NYSE:C) have been permitted to carry on as though nothing bad ever happened.

Furthermore, a number of big players in the CDS market – most notably Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (NYSE: GS) – were bailed out through the rescue of busted insurer American International Group Inc. (NYSE: AIG). In that case, the government injected $180 billion into AIG, largely to allow it to make good on the CDS contracts it had written – $13 billion of which were with Goldman Sachs.

If Citi, Fannie, and Freddie had gone bankrupt – as they would have done in a free market – and Goldman had lost the best part of $13 billion (which might well have sent it bankrupt in turn) the financial market today would look very different. The financial industry would be rife with unemployment and apple-selling ex-Citibankers would be on the streets of New York keeping bankers’ salaries and bonuses way down from their pre-crash levels.

But such as it is, Goldman Sachs is said to be heading for record profits in 2009, and its partners are expecting record bonuses. The investment-banking firm reported stellar second-quarter profits of $3.44 billion yesterday (Tuesday). [For a related story on Goldman Sachs’ quarterly financial report that appears in today’s issue of Money Morning, please click here.]

If U.S. taxpayers are going to be called on to subsidize the very banks that got us into this mess – just so these institutions can continue to carry on as if it was still 2007 – then another expensive and damaging financial crash is almost certainly in the making.

There are a number of product areas in which such a crash might occur, but for my money, credit default swaps top the list. That makes it crucial for us to at least rein in the derivative securities with the utmost urgency. And Congresswoman Waters makes an excellent point when she says that it may prove impossible to rein in credit default swaps without actually banning them altogether.

If You Can’t Beat ‘Em, Ban ‘Em

Indeed, there are two fundamental problems with CDS securities, neither of which appears easy to solve:

• First, there is no watertight way of settling credit default swaps in case of default. The current method is by a mini-auction of the obligations on which the swaps are written to determine a settlement price. But this doesn’t work because the mini-auction relates to only a few million dollars of paper, whereas the credit default swaps in question may have a nominal value of billions – hence it’s in the interest of holders to play games at the auction and distort prices. This might not be a problem for non-participants in the CDS market, but it causes huge risks to the financial system – which in extreme cases, must be bailed out by taxpayers, as was the case with AIG.

• The second problem is that holders of credit default swaps have an incentive to push companies into bankruptcy. In the 1930s, short sales of stock (except on an “uptick”) were prohibited to prevent speculators from driving companies into bankruptcy. Well, the leverage available on CDS securities is much greater than on stock, and in the case of financial institutions, the amount of CDS outstanding is also much greater. That means speculators have correspondingly more incentive to load up on CDS and push a company into bankruptcy.

And it doesn’t end there: Since CDS holders also hold a company’s debt, their position in bankruptcy negotiations is a completely false one. This has already been a problem in the bankruptcies of the Canadian paper company Abitibi-Bowater and the shopping centre developer General Growth; it also caused problems in the massive General Motors Corp. (NYSE: GMGMQ) reorganization.

The stellar bonus prospects of the lucky employees at Goldman Sachs, in a year that has been thoroughly lousy for legitimate financial business, are an indication that we are not currently operating in a free market. Credit default swaps provide a means whereby Wall Street insiders can make huge amounts of money on corporate bankruptcies and disrupt the U.S. economy while doing so.

Until we can be absolutely sure that the poisons of the most-recent global financial bubble have been fully eradicated from the financial system, the safest measure is to ban those financial products like CDS that seem likely to cause the most trouble.

Congresswoman Waters may go too far in wishing to ban credit default swaps altogether. However, I see no reason not to impose a five-year moratorium on the securities.

If, by 2014, the poisons of speculation have been removed from the world’s financial system, and a newly sober Wall Street can convince us that credit default swaps are both useful and sound, the derivative securities can then be reinstituted on a controlled basis, most likely restricted as swaps on “indices” of credit representing an entire sector or country, rather than on single companies alone. That would make it more difficult for CDS dealers to engage in their dangerous bankruptcy games.

Perhaps Goldman Sachs employees can do without that third Porsche – at least or now …

Source: Here’s Why It’s Time to Ban Credit Default Swaps ]]> http://www.contrarianprofits.com/articles/here%e2%80%99s-why-it%e2%80%99s-time-to-ban-credit-default-swaps/19101/feed 1 http://www.contrarianprofits.com/articles/how-credit-default-swaps-could-reverse-the-economic-recovery/16741 http://www.contrarianprofits.com/articles/how-credit-default-swaps-could-reverse-the-economic-recovery/16741#comments Fri, 15 May 2009 18:26:45 +0000 Shah Gilani http://www.contrarianprofits.com/?p=16741 While the entire U.S. housing market was on the verge of collapse and corporate America was being systemically undermined, regulators purposely looked the other way.  Why would they do this?

The truth is that U.S. regulators believed the American public couldn’t handle the truth that what had been allowed to happen, on their watch, was actually happening.

Unfortunately, we now face the same situation with credit default swaps, a derivative security that has the ability to destroy otherwise healthy companies with the virulence of a full-blown plague.

Until the American public understands this, and forces the government to take action, the odds of a repeat performance of what we refer to as the global financial crisis remain very high.

This is not an “Origin…

The failure here is two-fold: One, the editors’ choices of who’s to blame, and two, the reader poll ranking those choices.

Let’s start with who’s on the little list — or more to the point, who’s not.  Time did an OK job of unearthing lesser-known names who definitely bear some culpability in the disaster — such as AIG’s Joe Cassano, who did much to unleash the nightmare of credit-default swaps.

But how can anyone take this list seriously when it doesn’t include Ben Bernanke?  Yes, Greenspan (who did make the list) laid the foundation, but Bernanke built on it with abandon.  Perhaps it’s because the intelligentsia regards him a genuine scholar on monetary matters — you know, historian of the Great Depression and all that.  A far more respectable background than Greenspan, who hung out with Randians and extolled the virtues of the gold standard.

Where’s Tim Geithner, the guy whose fingerprints were on every boneheaded decision of 2008, from Bear Stearns to Lehman and beyond?

And where’s Robert Rubin?  What, is there some numerical limit of Goldman Sachs guys the editors arbitrarily applied to the list?  Hank Paulson’s on there, so Rubin can’t be?  Seems like Time lays a lot Rubin’s faux-deregulatory handiwork on the shoulders of Bill Clinton, which I daresay might be a bit unfair.  Clinton revealed his naievete on such matters when he remarked early in his first term, “You mean to tell me that the success of the economic program and my re-election hinges on the Federal Reserve and a bunch of f*$(#@g bond traders?”

Oh, and then there’s Time’s inclusion of “The American Consumer.”  Oh, that was clever, alright.  I bet the editors were congratulating themselves over the brilliance of that one — “Gee, this is almost as good as choosing ‘You’ as Person of the Year a while back!”  But this too is too harsh — consumers were merely taking their cues from the politicians and central bankers driving the ship.

Even worse than Time’s 25 choices are the rankings furnished by its readers.  I guess letting the readers vote is Time’s idea of Web 2.0.  But the sheer folly of this is revealed when the number-one choice as ranked by the people who drove by the website, the premier villain of the financial calamity that’s befallen us is… drum roll, please… Phil Gramm.

Phil Gramm?!?  Yes, his name was the first on the faux-deregulation legislation that repealed Glass-Steagall in 1999, and he’s worthy of inclusion on the list.  But I suspect the reason he ranks so high is one that Time doesn’t even mention in its writeup: His Kudlowesque comment last year, while on UBS’s payroll and consulting the McCain campaign, that the recession is a mere figment of the collective imagination.  Must’ve stuck in the craw of a lot of political junkies.

And if we’re going to beat up on former members of Congress, shouldn’t we beat up on a couple of others who are still around, like Barney Frank or Chris Dodd?

But whatever.  Time’s payroll and page count shrinks as the economy and the Internet take their toll.  Let us celebrate.

Source: I Have a Little List

But because these potential borrowers were financially disadvantaged, they also represented a bigger credit risk. Banks didn’t like being told to make mortgages to high-risk borrowers because they wouldn’t be able sell these loans off to anyone else.

Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE) were mandated to insure these higher-risk loans so that with a de facto government guarantee these “subprime” mortgages could be repackaged and sold, removing them from the inventory of the originating bank.

Thus the seeds of the subprime mortgage debacle were planted.

A series of devastating events – the bursting of the tech stock bubble in 2000, the 2001 terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, and the war on Iraq and the spike in oil prices, to name the key ones – posed serious recessionary threats.

The U .S. Federal Reserve aggressively lowered interest rates to stimulate the economy. A long period of low rates reduced returns for investors, but simultaneously afforded borrowers cheap financing. Wall Street went to work manufacturing all manner of products to squeeze extra yield out of this ultra-low-interest-rate environment.

Subprime collateralized mortgage-backed loans, similarly structured and packaged commercial mortgage-backed loans, leveraged corporate loans, and derivatives (especially credit default swaps), were manufactured in massive quantities.

Many of the products were rated investment grade by the major ratings agencies, which were incongruously but handsomely paid by the manufacturing banks to rate their products. Higher ratings meant easier sales and greater profits.

Buyers of the products, including the banks themselves, used cheap financing to leverage returns by borrowing from each other to create and buy more and more products.

Low interest rates were driving homebuyers to banks and mortgage finance companies, most of which were offering cheap “teaser” rates and no-document “liar loans” – all in a mad rush to capitalize on what was actually a rapidly inflating housing bubble.

Consumers were flush with credit and used it, as Wall Street took credit card receivables, packaged them into pools, sold them, and gave the proceeds back to credit card issuers, who then offered the public even more credit in a competitive horn of plenty. Then the housing bubble burst, and the music stopped. Banks were afraid to lend because they had lent too much to too many suspect borrowers, including each other, meaning their collateral was depreciating faster than any econometric model had ever calculated.

As banks’ capital evaporated, lending stopped everywhere. The securities markets imploded, leaving us in a state of suspended animation in which there’s no longer any way to borrow, produce and spend.

Source: How Subprime Borrowing Fueled the Credit Crisis

Of course, the reality is that bailouts are likely to do more harm than good in the long run, regardless of what sector they are in. But given the choice, I would rather bail out General Motors Corp. (GM) than Citigroup Inc. (C), because the automaker has a better long-term future.

The financial services industry got far too big during the 1995-2007 bubble. Its growth accelerated in the 1990s on the back of innovative new financing techniques such as derivatives and securitization, as well as a huge expansion in areas such as leveraged buyouts. As a result, its share of United States gross domestic product (GDP) has approximately doubled since the late 1970s.

It is now clear that many of the new financing techniques were misapplied or even spurious. The problem of separating loan origination from credit-risk assumption has become obvious, and so securitization will have a much more limited future.

Of the derivatives, credit default swaps are clearly destabilizing and will be tightly regulated. Many of the new market participants, such as hedge funds and private equity funds, should disappear, since they merely represented conduits through which higher fees could be charged rather than truly innovative investment choices. It is thus likely that the financial services business will revert to close to its previous share of GDP. That would involve a downsizing of its 2007 capacity by 50%.

The automobile industry, on the other hand, has no obvious need to become smaller. With global warming now high on the political agenda, its products need to change radically, employing new technologies that greatly reduce carbon emissions. However, the basic demand for personal transportation has not gone away.

Indeed, it is still expanding rapidly in the growth economies of emerging markets such as China and India. And U.S. urban geography, with its widely spread suburban developments, is wholly incompatible with a sharp drop in automobile usage and would be impossibly expensive to modify except over a very long term.

Why Citi Should Fail

Allowing a large bank such as Citigroup to disappear is probably beneficial. It reduces competition for other major banks, allows medium-sized banks to expand into the space opened up, and provides an appropriate penalty for decades of bad management. Citi was a leader in the Latin American loan crisis of the 1980s; its then-Chairman Walter B. Wriston famously opined that “countries don’t go bust,” a sentiment that has been repeatedly disproved.

Wriston got his succession wrong in 1984, choosing the overaggressive retail banker John Reed (who had pioneered the unsolicited credit card offer in 1978 and lost $100 million – real money back then – in 1980 by doing so) over the capable corporate banker Tom Theobald.

Citi almost went bust in 1991, but was bailed out by Saudi Prince Alwaleed bin Talal. It assembled a financial services conglomerate in 1998 that proved unmanageable, and from 2003-2005 was prevented from making any more acquisitions because of its shaky position.

In short, Citi has been a classically mismanaged behemoth that, in any other industry would, have already collapsed.

Yet, its bailout risks more than $300 billion of taxpayer money, and to no obvious economic benefit.

Meanwhile, General Motors has been damaged by two factors: Misguided government regulation of the automobile industry, and a drastic societal shift away from unionized labor.

CAFÉ Backfires

GM had a 60% share of the U.S. market in the 1950s, and was recognized for large cars that performed distinctly better than their imported competitors and were well suited to U.S. driving conditions. Some expansion of foreign competition was inevitable, as Europe recovered and Japan became a major automobile producer, but GM was particularly hard hit by the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFÉ) legislation. CAFÉ, which mandated fuel economy standards instead of simply raising the gasoline tax, put GM’s large models at a disadvantage to their smaller imported competitors.

However, U.S. automobile companies found a loophole, which is that its standards were limited to automobiles. Vehicles built on a truck chassis were exempt. That gave rise to the sports utility vehicle.  Now, higher fuel costs, environmental concerns, and tighter CAFÉ standards have made the SUV an endangered species, but it was a Frankenstein’s monster that only existed because of government meddling.

If GM and the other U.S. automobile manufacturers go out of business, only their foreign competitors will benefit. Furthermore, they have an interdependent network of suppliers, with a total of 3 million employees, which could easily be forced into bankruptcy by the disappearance of their major customers.  U.S. automobile manufacturers have important, and in some areas unique technological capabilities, whose loss would severely damage the U.S. economy as a whole.

The automobile business is unprofitable now, but will eventually return its previous size in the United States, as well as expand worldwide. So, while there is no capacity downsizing needed, capacity restructuring, away from SUVs and towards smaller cars, hybrids and innovative power technologies, is essential.

Ultimately, the right decision would have been to bail out General Motors and allow Citi to go to the wall.

The Case for Citi

Of course, there are important modifiers to this recommendation. In Citi’s case, its interconnection with the financial system as a whole is such that an immediate bankruptcy followed by years-long court proceedings could render many of its counterparties unviable and damage the global economy badly. Hence, an orderly liquidation is needed, with a receiver appointed to wind down Citi’s positions and sell the viable portion of its operations, making good on those obligations incurred by Citi that appear to have systemic importance. Even if the taxpayer made Citi’s counterparts completely whole, however, it would not have been as expensive as the bailout.

As for GM, it has labor costs and pension obligations making it uncompetitive with foreign-owned producers. Those “legacy” costs can most efficiently be removed through a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing. The pension obligations will then fall on the taxpayer through the Pension Benefits Guaranty Corporation, while the labor contracts can be rewritten in a way that is competitive with the market in which GM operates. If a government subsidy is then needed to cover GM’s operating cash deficit during the recession, and the investment costs of transforming GM into a producer of environmentally friendly automobiles, it should be provided through a post bankruptcy “debtor-in-possession” financing.

There is nothing magic about banking that should allow the industry to be uniquely permitted access to taxpayer money when disaster hits. Only bank customers and the market should be protected. Conversely, the automobile industry plays an important role in the U.S. economy that is unlikely to be significantly downsized. So, there is considerable justification for assistance to GM and Ford Motor Co. (F), which have valuable capabilities and long-term competitiveness, though less for a bailout of the smaller and less industrially valuable Chrysler Corp.

Source: Why GM is More Bailout-Worthy Than Citigroup

More from Money Morning:

The reality is that these bailout programs remain with us, meaning we must factor them into our efforts to scout out profit opportunities. And on that point, we see six primary areas of change and opportunity:

• The U.S. Dollar: By pumping an estimated $3 trillion into the global financial system, the U.S. government is setting the stage for the mother of inflationary conflagrations. According to classic economic theory, the greenback should be in an actual freefall right now – especially in the current low-interest-rate environment, where there’s the potential for still more rate cuts and for additional capital outlays by the U.S. government. And that’s just with the current administration. President-elect Barack Obama has made it clear that if an additional stimulus isn’t announced before he takes office, he’ll make that one of his first official acts. What’s saving the dollar, at least for now, is that there’s so much global uncertainty that the dollar is retaining its reputation as a “safe-haven” currency. And, for now, at least, a safe U.S. dollar trumps inflationary concerns. However, should global investors regain confidence for whatever reason, expect the dollar to decline sharply.
• Oil: Many people are focused on declining oil prices as a function of a perceived slowdown in global demand. We think that’s an erroneous analysis for three key reasons. First, oil is still largely priced and traded in U.S. dollars. That means that as the dollar has risen, oil has become correspondingly cheaper. In other words, much of the price decline we’ve seen can simply be attributed to a rise in purchasing power associated with a stronger dollar. Second, China, India and other newly capitalist (and still-reasonably robust) economies are still increasing their oil consumption at a rate that more than offsets the decline in consumption we’re seeing here in the United States and in other developed markets. And third, Brazil aside, there hasn’t been a major new discovery capable of offset global demand on anything more than a temporary basis for more than 30 years, and most major oil fields are in decline or soon will be. Increasing demand and diminishing supply are clearly bullish influences over the longer term. More immediately, however, a stronger dollar negates this and may well keep oil under $100 a barrel for much of 2009. Obviously a terrorist attack would change the ballgame significantly, meaning we could see a spike to levels exceeding our multi-year target price of $225 a barrel. A year ago at this time, we called for oil to spike well up over $100 a barrel, and touch $150, which it essentially did. Even with recent price declines, some energy-industry insiders are starting to subscribe to our bullish outlook: The Paris-based International Energy Agency (IEA) last week projected that long-term oil prices would reach $200 a barrel (although we think that will happen much sooner than the IEA does).
• Commodities: The story is much the same for commodities, in general, and we expect that longer-term investors will be amply rewarded. More immediately, the popular – though erroneous – assumption that a global slowdown will negate demand is driving prices lower, and may continue to do so for the next six months. Gold will be the most obvious casualty in this arena, as hedge-fund-redemption requests and margin calls continue to mount, which is why we expect the price of the yellow metal to remain lower far longer than most people expect (We’ll focus specifically on gold in an upcoming installment of the “Outlook 2009” series). When it does rebound, however, the returns will be high.
• Global Markets: There’s no doubt that the global markets have taken their share of lumps along with their U.S. counterpart in recent months. But we don’t expect them to suffer forever. Countries with high cash reserves as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) – such as China, India and Brazil – are becoming less dependent on the fractured U.S. consumer almost daily, and the economic decoupling we’ve seen developing for several years may really take hold in the New Year. This stands in direct contrast to the situation a decade ago, when the Asian Rim and South America were economic train wrecks and the United States and Europe held all the cash. Companies with significant global exposure to the Asian Region, Latin America and Europe – in that order – remain the best bets for relative safety and growth in 2009.
• Stocks in General: Many investors are questioning the wisdom of being in stocks at all. While we certainly understand the pain that sentiment is based upon – and are hurting, too – it’s important to remember that the last time stocks really performed this badly was during the 1930s. Investors who decided to “get out” entirely then missed the investment opportunity of their lifetime. Don’t make the same mistake. Data shows, unequivocally, that investors who buy when the world is going to hell in a hand basket –think 1932, 1942, 1982 and 2003 – enjoy the largest returns. That’s even true if you’re “early,” and buy ahead of the specific market bottom. However, history also demonstrates that investors who pile in at the market’s peaks – such as 1928, 1969, 1999 and 2007 — tend to incur the worst returns.
• Global Stocks in Particular: Led by cash-rich China, we expect global blue chips to remain the best relative bets for safety, income and appreciation potential in the New Year. We are especially focused on companies involved with infrastructure projects and with firms that derive substantial portions of their revenues from Asian consumers. The first is a no-brainer. According to the latest studies from a variety of sources, planned global infrastructure expenditures in this area exceed $40 trillion by 2030. There is not a bigger, more unstoppable trend on the planet today. If you want proof, notice that a big portion of China’s just-announced half-trillion-dollar stimulus package is devoted to infrastructure projects. Infrastructure companies there will certainly benefit. So will consumer-products firms that are positioned to benefit from the rise of an increasingly Asian consumer base, which boasts significant savings and pent-up demand. Many of the best companies are beaten down to the point that they now feature single-digital Price/Earnings (P/E) ratios – lower than we’ve seen in decades. Some are actually trading for less than cash value, despite a strong history of growth. And the companies we’re studying have solid cash flow – and excellent prospects of maintaining it.

Now for the $64,000 question – when could we see a rebound?

We don’t know for sure. Nobody does. History demonstrates that the first and second years of any newly elected U.S. president’s term are almost always problematic. When taken in isolation, we could see a scenario where this is countermanded by President-elect Obama’s planned stimulus, but given the potent combination of flagging earnings and slowing U.S. growth, we’re leery of doing so. 

On the other hand, for a variety of reasons, history also suggests that if we are to see a rebound, however nascent, the probability is highest for a resurgence starting in the middle of next year. First, since the 1970s, the time between the first and last market lows in any given bear market is an average of seven to eight months. If historical trends hold true, this suggests we could see a bottoming out by the middle of next year. That’s consistent and plausible, especially since other data shows U.S. recessions, on average, last 14.6 months – which also points to a bottoming out in late spring or early summer.

But the biggest indicator of all that we may see a bullish rebound in late spring or early summer – however slight – is admittedly based on emotion. Literally. Small investors have fled the stock markets in droves, and so far they’ve yanked more than $175 billion from the markets, with nearly 50% of that coming out during October alone. Granted, this is a mere 3.2% of the $5.5 trillion invested in stock market funds, according to Forbes, but it’s the first year that net equity flows have been negative since … a drum roll please … 2002.

History shows that small investors may be the most telling of all Contrarian indicators. According to TrimTabs, the Investment Company Institute and our own proprietary research, individual investors have a remarkable habit of rushing in near market tops and fleeing near market bottoms.

That means that long-term investors seeking the best wealth-building opportunities should find the immediate price declines we see ahead to be some of the most compelling buying opportunities of their investing lifetimes.

Now for the caveats – and you knew this was coming – we see three wildcards in 2009, and any one of them could prove to be a joker:

• The continued de-leveraging of hedge funds and other financial institutions.
• More credit-default-swap valuation problems.
• And unknowns associated with the ongoing U.S. and global-economic-system bailouts.

There are still huge questions regarding who owes what to whom, how large the debts are, and exactly who’s going to get what help and when. History shows that the most effective bailouts are those that recapitalize institutions and that allow the weak to fail, which is why we are especially leery of the U.S. government’s plan to acquire bad debt while rewarding weaker institutions that should be put out of their misery.

What’s more, as a Money Morning investigative story demonstrated, many banks are using the government bailout money as takeover capital, and not to boost their lending, which at least would have had an expansionary benefit for the U.S. economy. With most of the bailout programs, and through no fault of their own, U.S. taxpayers and investors have been caught in the middle – or left on the sidelines altogether.

The Outlook 2009 Action Plan

For investors who want to get a head start, it’s important to bear in mind that the markets tend to begin their rebound in earnest anywhere from two months to six months before an actual economic bottom. While that doesn’t suggest going “whole hog” into stocks, it does speak to the need to take some steps now to get ready. Here are the top moves to make now:

• Rebalance Now: As markets have declined, many portfolios have done out of kilter, too – not only in terms of value, but in terms of balance. And that lack of balance can seriously dampen returns, even as we await the market recovery – and even more so once the market begins to rally. It’s far harder to catch a moving train than most investors think.
• Think Safety First: There’s no need to rush into the markets. It’s not clear we’ve hit bottom yet. Keep your powder dry for the better days and easier trades we see developing ahead, while bargain-hunting for those stocks with true upside, and that are positioned to capitalize on the strongest global trends.
• Spread your buys over several days: When you’ve found something to buy, wait for a particularly bad day, then place your order in the last half an hour of trading. Leverage the lower prices (and maximize your returns) by spreading your purchases over several days or weeks. That way you won’t get tripped up by committing your entire nest egg when the market looks cheap and will probably get cheaper.
• Go Global: China is still on track for 9.6% growth this year and may, in fact, slow to a “mere” 8.0% next year. Even that reduced growth rate will probably be about eight times the growth rate of the U.S. economy – if we’re lucky. Consider adding exposure to the Asian Rim as part of the rebalancing process, or as a primary focus once the recovery begins in earnest.
• Get Inverted: Continue to use specialized inverse funds to hedge downside risk. We’re not out of the woods by a long shot.
• Stop Your Losses – with Stop Losses: By all means include trailing stops to control small losses before they become catastrophic ones. This market could easily fall further before it gives way to the rally that history suggests is in the making.

Source: Unprecedented Volatility Will Continue to Rock the Stock Market in Advance of a Possible Rebound in Mid-2009

You’ll recall that one of the fairest of the Bubble Era’s revelers was the idea that, over the long run, you would make money in stocks. All you had to do was ‘buy and hold.’ Who didn’t like her? She seemed so easy…so willing…so fetching and attractive.

Yesterday, the Dow lost another 203 points. Investors are down 44% so far this year. Worldwide, they’ve lost $10 trillion this month – far worse than the crash of ‘29.

The most successful economy of the 20th century was the United States of America. The second was probably Japan. It rose from the bombed-out ruins of WWII to become a worldwide export powerhouse, dominating the auto and electronic equipment industries.

But yesterday, stock prices in Japan fell to more than a quarter-century low. Investors in Japanese stocks – including your editor (who is better at giving advice than taking it) – have made nothing in 26 years.

Here’s the press report:

“Tokyo’s Nikkei 225 index closed down 6.4 percent to 7,162.90 – the lowest since October 1982 – with exporters like Toyota Motor Corp. and Sony Corp hit hard. The losses came despite a report that the government was considering massive capital injection into struggling banks in a bid to calm jittery financial markets.”

“Decades of pain and still no relief,” adds the Financial Times, noting that investors in Japan have been waiting for a recovery for the last 18 years.

With the mask off, stocks in Japan are giving investors a Halloween fright.

But what other masks are coming off?

How about the sweet mask worn by housing? ‘Housing always goes up.’ And, ‘you can’t lose money in property.’ Remember those beauties? Those masks hit the floor a year ago. Since then, the whole world has looked at the property market and gasped in horror. How could houses be so ugly, homeowners have wondered; they look like they just woke up.

Oh and there’s oil…down to $63 yesterday. Oil was supposed to go up forever. At least, that was one of the favorite masks of the late Bubble Era.

But there are still a few Bubble Era masks that have not yet come off. In fact, the belle of the ball is the mask on ‘progress.’ People still believe that the world grows and improves – if not steadily, at least episodically. It’s certainly true that long periods of history show what appears to be economic progress. Things get better. But occasionally, something terrible happens – plagues, wars, revolutions, Great Depressions and Dark Ages. Then, the world turns backward. The bull market in progress turns into a bear market of progress turns into a bear market of backsliding.

Today, people are losing faith in stocks and housing…but they still have faith in progress. Just a few months ago, they thought capitalism would make them rich. But wicked capitalism has disappointed them badly; it didn’t guarantee rising asset prices after all. So, now they turn their sad eyes to the feds. ‘Oh ye all-knowing, all-seeing, all-powerful ones…hear us. Save us – from capitalism!

They figure the feds will do the trick… And sure enough, all over the world the federales are playing along. The G7, the IMF, the central banks, the finance ministers and Treasury Secretaries – all have put on their own masks…strutting around, pretending to know what they are talking about. Curiously, France’s president Nicholas Sarkozy is a leading strutter. He’s trying to organize a New World Financial Order…based on something other than the dollar.

These poseurs don’t look too bad – as long as they leave the masks on. Take them off, of course, and you will see the same silly clowns who CAUSED the crisis in the first place.

That is what is so amusing about this stage in the collapse of Western Civilization. You see, most of the world’s financial press has come around; they see things much the way we do. They see, for example, that the U.S. Fed erred – big time – by fixing the price of credit too low for far too long.

Of course, there’s nothing in the Manual of Capitalism that allows the feds to fix the price of credit or support the housing market. This was the government at work, not the market. With the misleading signal coming from the credit markets, the capitalists just did what they always do – they overdid it.

Still, the world’s press, pundits and politicians have convinced themselves that the fault lies not in themselves…but in capitalism. And now, they expect the feds to do something about it.

But that’s just the way it works…one hallucination gives way to another. One delusion on the way up; another on the way down.

*** Even star mutual fund managers are getting walloped by this market. Chris Mayer offers us a few examples:

“Managers with great track records are faring poorly, and it may help you feel better about how you are doing. Jean-Marie Eveillard, for example, has been running money for 50 years. He’s beaten the market handily for a long time. He is a cautious type. He likes gold stocks. He likes Japan. He’s down 27% this year. Robert Rodriguez, another cautious money manager who holds a lot of cash and runs FPA Capital, is down 29%. These are among the best of the best, as the market is down more than 40% this year. William Fries at Thornburg is down 43%. David Winters at Wintergreen is down 37%. Wally Weitz at Weitz Value is down 39%. The list goes on and on…

“So you see, nothing is really working well in this market right now – at least not for investors in stocks. However, there are a lot of cheap stocks out there, bargains I haven’t seen in a long time. Unless the world comes to an end, which it has a habit of not doing, future investors will be a happy lot. Count me a cautious buyer of stocks.”

Caution is the name of the game here…and if you’d like to see what Chris has been thoughtfully recommending to his Capital & Crisis subscribers, see here.

And the bargain hunters were abound this morning, setting up a rally worldwide in the markets.

Also boosting the markets is the anticipation of the Fed’s two-day meeting, that begins today. It is widely believed that the Fed will cut rates…but it remains to be seen what, if any, lasting effect it will have on the markets.

Lurking behind this rally is this unsurprising tidbit: consumer confidence in the United States hit an all-time low in October. The Conference Board reported that expectations have turned “significantly pessimistic with the percentage of consumers expecting business condition to worsen over the next 6 months rising to 36.6% from 21% and those expecting fewer jobs rising to 41.5% from 26.9%”

*** Perhaps the biggest delusion of the financial world now is that the dollar…and dollar-based Treasury obligations…are a safe refuge. In a sense, of course, they are. The U.S. government is in no danger of defaulting on its loans. In an emergency, it can always just print up the money. But that’s the problem. An emergency is coming. More on this when we get a chance to think about it…

*** “I’ll be all right down here,” said our old friend Doug Casey. Doug has bought a place in Cafayate, a town that reminds us of Santa Fe or Aspen, before they were ruined by rich people. He’s building a world-class resort – complete with golf course, riding trails, tennis, health spa, library…everything he wants.

Cafayate also has several things going for it that Aspen and Santa Fe did not. First, it is prettier and the weather is better. It is always sunny, with pleasant temperatures. Wherever you look, you see beautiful mountains. What’s more, it produces some of the world’s best wine.

Doug’s place is right in the middle of a vineyard. In fact, he’s got it set up so that revenue from the vines pays much of the operating costs of running a golf course and so forth.

“Another big plus,” says Doug, “is that this place isn’t going to suffer too much from the credit crisis. Nobody down here had any credit.”

*** Doug is not completely right about Argentina’s credit situation. Believe it or not, there were lenders – mostly big banks – who were foolish enough to extend the nation credit. Naturally, the Argentine government treats these angels like taxi drivers in Buenos Aires treat other foreigners.

Almost every time we go to the airport, the taxi driver tries to pull a fast one. “My meter is broken,” said one, “the standard fare is 200 pesos.” (It is really about 70 pesos.) “We crossed into another zone,” said another, “so I have to add another 50 pesos.” “It’s night time,” came another invention, “after dark you have to pay a surcharge.”

It’s all good fun. The taxi drivers are merely establishing the going rate. The price for a run to the airport is much higher for naïve foreigners, but why shouldn’t it be?

So is the price for lending to the Argentine government.

This from MoneyWeek:

“In December 2001 [Argentina] reneged on its $95bn of sovereign debt.

“At the time, that was the biggest default in world history, though these days such a number looks like chicken feed compared with what the world’s bankers have recently managed to mislay. Only in 2005 did Argentina sort the final details, with a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ 70% ‘haircut’ on face value, again the largest sovereign debt markdown ever.

“Three years later, it’s back to square one. Inflation is rocketing (some estimates put it at 20% annualized) and the government is once again running out of cash. Argentina’s borrowing needs will swell to as much as $14bn next year from $7bn in 2008, says RBC Capital Markets. And any confidence that the country will be able to repay what it owes is fast flying out of the window.

“Argentina’s 8.28% government bonds are due to be redeemed in 2033. Fat chance of that, the way things are looking right now. Now priced at 22 cents on the dollar, they currently yield 31%, as against ‘just’ 12% a month ago. And still no one wants them.

“What’s more, the price of credit default swaps – market insurance that investors can buy to protect themselves against default (Read: All you need to know about credit default swaps for more) – covering the country’s sovereign debt has more than quadrupled over the past month. These CDS now stand at more than three times the Icelandic level, and suggest there’s almost a 2:1 chance that Argentina will go bust this year.”

Does this worry your editor – who has substantial (for him) investments in Argentina? Not at all. As a dear reader pointed out, the average Buenos Aires taxi driver knows more about financial crises than Bernanke, Paulson and Greenspan put together. The Argentines know how to get through a crisis, in other words, and still put steak on the table and wine in their glasses.

We’re going to learn from them.

*** Finally, another dear reader sends a news item explaining why there was a bagpiper in front of our neighborhood church last Sunday.

It was the “kirking of the tartans,” said the headline. Turns out, the local Scottish Argentine society does this every year…a kind of blessing of the clans, performed by the local priest. “Kirk” in Scottish means church.

Source: The Masquerade is Over

This from Today’s Financial News:

The markets were forced to endure one round of default swap payouts last week. Now, the debt from three more companies will hit the auction blocks. Even more trouble is on the way.

On a micro level, yesterday’s 900-point rally looks like a big deal. Many short-sighted investors look at the day as an indication that the worst is behind us. But on a macro-level, the surge barely stands out. After all, yesterday’s bounce did not put us anywhere near the levels we started out at last week. We still have a long way to go and there are some pretty big hurdles to clear along the way.

One major challenge over the next few weeks is three more debt auctions. Yes, three more defaulted credit auctions.

The International Swaps and Derivatives Association has held just nine auctions since 2005. It will hold five of them in October alone. It is a sign of the times.

Last week, we saw Lehman Brother’s debt on the auction block. Selling for about nine cents on the dollar, the market had a tough time swallowing the nearly $400 billion that was suddenly needed to cover the debt’s default insurance.

Now, there are more costly auctions on the way. On October 23, Washington Mutual’s debt will be sold. Again, investors can expect the debt to sell at a drastic discount.

You can count on the equities market taking a shot on the chin that day as credit default swap (CDS) owners are forced to cash in their portfolios to write checks for tens of billions of dollars in insurance payouts.

Just as we saw a “run” on the markets last week, we will see it again as another multi-billion payout comes due.

Big problems overseas

In Iceland, the country that is arguably feeling the credit crunch the most, investors are already flinching at what could be deadly CDS payments.

When Landsbanki and Glitnir were taken over by the Icelandic government, its debt went into default. That means the folks stuck holding the default insurance will be forced to pay up. Even if the debt is auctioned at a fairly substantial rate, billions will be paid out.

Landsbanki CDS sellers are obviously hoping for a highly successful auction. If the debt sells for fifty cents on the dollar (which is highly unlikely), some of them may actually make money. After all, the banks default insurance was selling for nearly a nearly 50% premium in the last few weeks.

I would not expect too many smiles.

Look for strong selling activity on the markets across the globe on November 4 and 5, the dates Landsbanki and Glitnir will see their former debt hit the auction house. Once again, CDS sellers will be forced to liquidate their portfolios (hundreds of billions of dollars worth) in order to pay their insurance guarantees.

It will be an interesting week for the global markets.

Some investors may believe the panic selling is over. It is not. As more and more debt hits the auction block, even more investors will be forced to cash out of the markets, creating another round of harsh sell-offs.

Source: Iceland’s CDS Market Will Create More Turmoil