According to World Steel Dynamics, a U.S. steel consulting firm, steel production could fall next year by 13.9% compared with this year. This downturn comes after a long period of growth in the steel industry. In fact, output has grown every year since 1998 – soaring from 777 million metric tons a decade ago to 1.34 billion metric tons in 2007.

The catalyst behind the expansion has been a robust world economy and a steep rise in demand in China – by far the world’s biggest steel producing and consuming nation, accounting for more than a third of global steel output.
But the sector has been among those worst hit by this year’s financial storms, with share prices in many steel companies having fallen by more than two-thirds since the middle of 2008.

“The reduction in demand we’ve seen in steel goes beyond typical cyclical downturns given the level of distress in global financial markets and tight credit conditions,” Carol Cowan, a U.S.-based analyst at Moody’s Corp.(MCO)credit rating agency, told the Financial Times.

Steel companies’ share prices have been hit hard. Severstal OAO, Russia’s biggest steelmaker, has seen its shares fall almost 90% since July, ArcelorMittal (MT) has dropped more than 70 per cent; and United States Steel Corp. (X), the United States’ biggest steel company is down 79% over the same period.
Meanwhile, China’s steel industry, the world’s largest, is sitting on a stockpile of 63 million metric tons, or about 13% of annual production.  Baosteel Group Corp. General Manager He Wenbo said in November that his company was facing the “most difficult” period since it was founded 30 years ago.

But China is making noise about a shift in trade policy meant to rekindle its steel mills and keep its economy humming.  The government is considering measures, including buying unsold inventory and raising export rebates, to help steelmakers weather the slowdown, Minister of Industry and Information Li Yizhong told Bloomberg News on Dec. 12.

That represents a dangerous shift in policy that could hinder international trade, according to Myron Brilliant, vice president for Asia at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Washington.  The economic crisis has prompted China to turn back to “export-oriented policies that could lead to an increase in the trade imbalance” and new tension with the United States.

Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson has spent more than two years smoothing over U.S.-China trade relations.  Part of those efforts focused on the value of China’s currency, the yuan, to redress what U.S. officials saw as an unfair price advantage for Chinese products.  The yuan rose 21% versus the dollar from 2005, but its steady rise stalled in July, and has barely budged since.

Before leaving for trade talks in Beijing this month, Paulson told business representatives his biggest concern was that China would revise policy and reverse moves it had made during the past year to cut aid to exporters and stimulate domestic consumption.

China’s five-year plan through 2010 aims to rebalance growth away from exports and increase domestic consumption, but so far it has met with dismal results. Household consumption declined to slightly more than 35% of China’s gross domestic product (GDP) last year from 45% in 1993.  By comparison, consumer spending represents almost 70% of the U.S. economy.

“What separates China from the rest of the world is its incredibly low level of consumption relative to GDP,” Brad Setser, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, told Bloomberg News. “What can China do that would most directly help the world economy during a period of very severe weakness? Get its consumption back up to 40% of GDP.”

A shift in Chinese policy is bound to meet with resistance in U.S. business circles, especially among steelmakers.  Lawyers representing Nucor Corp, the second-largest U.S. steelmaker, and smaller steel pipe makers say they are considering new trade complaints against China.

Shift in China Trade Policy Could Accelerate Western Steelmakers’ Slump

A dollar crash will have disastrous implications for global financial markets. At the end of 2001, the euro was worth $ 0.8915, but it has been on a steady upward march since then. On the last trading day of the third quarter in 2007, the euro hit a high of 1.4282. A target of 1.50 is very much within range.

How do all of those surplus countries play into this falling dollar picture? Remember, former Fed chairman Alan Greenspan observed that in economics, the sum of all surpluses equals the sum of all deficits.

So when a surplus country stops investing that surplus in U.S. dollars, its currency will increase against the dollar. This realization has profound implications. Not only does the dollar continue to fall against other currencies; as it does so, it accelerates the undesirability of pegging currencies to U.S. currency or investing in Treasury bonds and other debt. In other words, it becomes less and less viable for foreign investors and central banks to fund ever – growing U.S. debt.

This is not just a problem of U.S. consumer debt trends. We may be the addicts, but we have codependents and enablers around the world. Just as the U.S. consumer is addicted to spending excesses, foreign exporters have become addicted to selling goods to Americans. The problem is with sellers, as well as buyers. The governments in those other markets are as concerned about the U.S. dollar’s fall as Americans are (or should be). Why? The fall of a dollar is the same thing as a rise in other currencies. So the competitiveness of the foreign export economy is damaged more and more as their own currencies increase in value. Just as a falling dollar hurts the buyer (Americans), a rising currency hurts the seller (foreign economies) in the same degree.

The United States is only one side of the problem. As the consumer, our dollars have tremendous influence throughout the world, if only because so many central banks (e.g., China’s) have pegged their currency to the dollar – and at the same time many exporting nations are seeing their currencies going up in value, making it untenable to continue exporting at the same rates as in the past. So we have, through trillions of dollars of debt accumulation, created a de facto dollar standard in much of the world economy.

The debt is based, however, on a worldwide bubble economy, perhaps the biggest bubble in world history. The whole theory behind this comprehensive “bubblization” (a new word for you, referring to the combination of federal deficit, trade, mortgage, housing, dollar, and credit bubbles all working together) has grown out of the economic theories of the Fed. Although Mr. Greenspan was the chief culprit behind the theory that spending is good, more spending is better, and the most spending is best, we can’t pin the whole thing on him. Like the U.S. consumer, he had enablers and codependents everywhere. His helpers include an array of bankers, corporate executives, and investors – all buying into the Greenspan version of the U.S. economy and how it just might work.

Now Mr. Bernanke, who happily puts himself out there as the leading economic forecaster and wise man, also contends that bubbles can’t be recognized until they burst. That’s like saying you can’t tell that your house is on fire just because smoke is billowing from the windows; you have to wait until it bursts into flame. The truth is, bubbles are easily recognizable well in advance of bursting, but we cannot know when they will burst. The dollar bubble is going to burst, and that is inevitable. The effects on the economy of that burst are going to be serious. As long as investors, consumers, and business managers continue to base our financial decisions on assets of inflated and unrealistic value, we are denying this inevitable outcome. The more we depend on those inflated values, the more damage we will suffer when the bubble bursts.

In the case of Japan in the recent past, its pattern was somewhat different from the U.S pattern of today. Japan’s deficit budget spending went into business investment, which in turn expands productivity and trade profits. Spending on business equipment and plans, commercial buildings, and other production – based infrastructure had a specific effect: When Japan’s economy slowed down, it merely came to a halt and has remained chronically slow ever since. In comparison, U.S. deficit spending is overwhelmingly going into consumer spending with very little business investment or consumer savings to offset that trend. Thus, the U.S. trend in GDP is led by consumption and not by investment. So the use of deficit spending has everything to do with the consequences of deficits, and ultimately with the effect of a dollar crash. Unlike Japan’s economy, which merely flattened out as a consequence of deficit spending, the U.S. economy is likely to see a more devastating change in the entire economic landscape – with the accompanying price inflation we have to expect as an outcome.

Addison Wiggin
for The Daily Reckoning Australia

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Source: A Dollar Crash Will Have Disastrous Implications for Global Financial Markets

It seems some banks are giving phony LIBOR quotations that don’t reflect the true rates at which they accept deposits. In the perfect financial system, beloved of regulators and academics, this kind of discrepancy shouldn’t happen.

In the real world it does, and I’ll explain why.

The LIBOR system was set up in the 1960s, when the market for dollar-denominated bank deposits outside the United States grew big enough to worry about. On a daily basis, the British Bankers Association would go to 16 banks, which were thought to be top quality, and ask those banks at what rate deposits were being offered. Assuming an honest reply, the data would be compiled to determine the average rates at which deposits were offered to prime banks. The average of the 16 banks becomes that day’s LIBOR – for 1-month, 3-month, 6-month or other period deposits.

Should be a foolproof system, right?

Not quite. To see what can go wrong, let me share a little personal story. Ten years ago, when I was working in Zagreb, Croatia, I advised on the establishment of a LIBOR-type market between Croatian banks for 1- and 3-month deposits in Croatian kuna. We called it the “ZIBOR” market. Realizing that very few Croatian banks were solid credit risks at that time, I suggested that the bankers’ association restrict the system to no more than the three top banks.

Naturally, since I was only the advisor, they ignored me and let in all the large members of the association – seven in all.

The system worked fine for a time, but then a credit crisis struck. NATO got upset about Kosovo and started bombing the neighborhood. Only occasionally did bombs accidentally fall on Croatia, but the bombing played merry hell with Croatia’s tourist business. The result was a liquidity crisis in Croatia, and big trouble in the ZIBOR market.

I heard some grumblings that ZIBOR had become unrealistic and been investigated. There were two problems:

• First, one of the ZIBOR banks, Splitska Banka, was in such horrendous shape that no other bank would offer it deposits at all – not at any rate. Splitska was naturally interested in continuing to participate in the immense honor of the daily ZIBOR fixing, so its dealers would insist on going last. They would ask what the other banks had quoted, and then quote the average. Perfectly sensible solution, as I told everybody, provided none of the other banks took to doing it – it just meant there were only 6 banks really quoting ZIBOR, but six was still plenty.

• The second problem occurred as liquidity got worse, and consisted of banks complaining that they were actually being asked to place deposits. Other banks would ring them up and ask them to place deposits at ZIBOR. They complained that this was impossible, since most days, they hadn’t any money. Admittedly, the ZIBOR “reference amount” (the amount for which the quotation was supposed to be good) was only 100,000 kuna, or about $15,000. But some days even that amount was difficult to find. They wanted to reduce the reference amount to 10,000 kuna ($1,500), presumably so that if they were asked to place a deposit, the bank’s chief executive officer could conceivably raise the money on his credit card!

So much for emerging-markets banking. When I returned to the United States in 2000, I thought I had left all that behind me. Apparently not!

Banks are now apparently making fake LIBOR quotes on the grounds that they don’t want to be thought of as a credit risk, from which other banks would then demand a premium. Just like the old days in Zagreb!

But given the subprime mess, some large banks are rather dodgy credit risks, and they should be paying a modest premium for their deposits. In the 1974 credit crunch, some perfectly respectable Japanese banks paid a premium of as much as 2% for their short-term dollar deposits.

In these volatile markets, any whisper of trouble over a bank makes other banks’ dealers not want to place money with them. Their feeling is that there’s no point in getting fired for doing business with another bank that goes bust, especially as you’d probably be losing your job at the bottom of a bear market, when times are tough. So it’s not surprising that the LIBOR system is wobbling a bit.

Despite its troubled history, Croatia’s ZIBOR has survived to this day. And it’s likely that LIBOR will do the same. However, there needs to be some realistic threat of banks being banned from participating in the LIBOR system if they provide false quotes. There also needs to be some realization that, in a tight market, not all banks will borrow at the same rate.

The real problem is the hundreds of trillions of dollars of derivatives contracts that use LIBOR – $382.3 trillion in interest rate swaps alone at the end of 2007, according to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association Inc. Just a 0.10% error on a six-month deposit, quoting 2.75% when the rate is really 2.85%, may not sound like much, but if it’s repeated over $382.3 trillion in LIBOR quotes for interest-rate-swap contracts it comes to a fair piece of change. A lot of change. To be precise, we’re talking about $194.3 billion.

Now that’s what I call an accounting error.

It looks to me like it’s a major problem. But it’s one the world will just have to live with.

And there seem to be a lot of those kinds of problems, right now.

In its twice-yearly review of the global financial markets, the UN agency also warned that there is a “collective failure” to grasp the extent of leverage in the financial system that could further damage the health of the US economy.

According to a report on Reuters:

“The credit shock emanating from the US subprime crisis is set to broaden amid a significant economic slowdown,” Jaime Caruana, director of the IMF’s monetary and capital markets department, said at a news conference.

“The deterioration in credit has moved up and across the credit spectrum to prime residential and commercial mortgage markets, and to corporate credit markets. As the credit cycle turns, default rates are likely to rise across the board.”

“The horses are out of the barn,” says Gary North in The Daily Reckoning.

“The subprime real estate loans have been made. The slightly safer Alt-A loans have been made. The unqualified borrowers bought their homes at the top of the housing bubble: 2005, 2006. In 2007, the market visibly reversed. Now the delinquency rate has risen.

“The investment banks that loaned smart people all that stupid money are now hemorrhaging. They are lining up to get paid by busted hedge funds. When the courts and the lawyers get through with them, whatever is left over will have to be put on the books at market value, not book value.”