They continue to update their data from time to time, the link to their work is at http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3421. I have not previously heard of www.voxeu.org, but it is a collection of the work of well regarded international economists that seems quite interesting for those who enjoy readings in the dismal science.

This week’s OTB will print long, but it is primarily charts. Please note that I have re-arranged some of the new charts to cut down on space because of some duplications. Word count is not all that much and it reads well. I will be referring to their work in future letters as well. Have a great week!

John Mauldin, Editor
Outside the Box

A Tale of Two Depressions

New findings:

• World industrial production continues to track closely the 1930s fall, with no clear signs of ‘green shoots’.
• World stock markets have rebounded a bit since March, and world trade has stabilized, but these are still following paths far below the ones they followed in the Great Depression.
• There are new charts for individual nations’ industrial output. The big-4 EU nations divide north-south; today’s German and British industrial output are closely tracking their rate of fall in the 1930s, while Italy and France are doing much worse.
• The North Americans (US & Canada) continue to see their industrial output fall approximately in line with what happened in the 1929 crisis, with no clear signs of a turn around.
• Japan’s industrial output in February was 25 percentage points lower than at the equivalent stage in the Great Depression. There was however a sharp rebound in March.

The parallels between the Great Depression of the 1930s and our current Great Recession have been widely remarked upon. Paul Krugman has compared the fall in US industrial production from its mid-1929 and late-2007 peaks, showing that it has been milder this time. On this basis he refers to the current situation, with characteristic black humour, as only “half a Great Depression.” The “Four Bad Bears” graph comparing the Dow in 1929-30 and S&P 500 in 2008-9 has similarly had wide circulation (Short 2009). It shows the US stock market since late 2007 falling just about as fast as in 1929-30.

Comparing the Great Depression to now for the world, not just the US

This and most other commentary contrasting the two episodes compares America then and now. This, however, is a misleading picture. The Great Depression was a global phenomenon. Even if it originated, in some sense, in the US, it was transmitted internationally by trade flows, capital flows and commodity prices. That said, different countries were affected differently. The US is not representative of their experiences.

Our Great Recession is every bit as global, earlier hopes for decoupling in Asia and Europe notwithstanding. Increasingly there is awareness that events have taken an even uglier turn outside the US, with even larger falls in manufacturing production, exports and equity prices.

In fact, when we look globally, as in Figure 1, the decline in industrial production in the last nine months has been at least as severe as in the nine months following the 1929 peak. (All graphs in this column track behaviour after the peaks in world industrial production, which occurred in June 1929 and April 2008.) Here, then, is a first illustration of how the global picture provides a very different and, indeed, more disturbing perspective than the US case considered by Krugman, which as noted earlier shows a smaller decline in manufacturing production now than then.

Updated Figure 1. World Industrial Output, Now vs Then (updated)

Source: Eichengreen and O’Rourke (2009) and IMF.

Similarly, while the fall in US stock market has tracked 1929, global stock markets are falling even faster now than in the Great Depression (Figure 2). Again this is contrary to the impression left by those who, basing their comparison on the US market alone, suggest that the current crash is no more serious than that of 1929-30.

Updated Figure 2. World Stock Markets, Now vs Then (updated)

Another area where we are “surpassing” our forbearers is in destroying trade. World trade is falling much faster now than in 1929-30 (Figure 3). This is highly alarming given the prominence attached in the historical literature to trade destruction as a factor compounding the Great Depression.

Updated Figure 3. The Volume of World Trade, Now vs Then (updated)

Sources: League of Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics,http://www.cpb.nl/eng/research/sector2/data/trademonitor.html

It’s a Depression alright

To sum up, globally we are tracking or doing even worse than the Great Depression, whether the metric is industrial production, exports or equity valuations. Focusing on the US causes one to minimise this alarming fact. The “Great Recession” label may turn out to be too optimistic. This is a Depression-sized event.

That said, we are only one year into the current crisis, whereas after 1929 the world economy continued to shrink for three successive years. What matters now is that policy makers arrest the decline. We therefore turn to the policy response.

Policy responses: Then and now

Figure 4 shows a GDP-weighted average of central bank discount rates for 7 countries. As can be seen, in both crises there was a lag of five or six months before discount rates responded to the passing of the peak, although in the present crisis rates have been cut more rapidly and from a lower level. There is more at work here than simply the difference between George Harrison and Ben Bernanke. The central bank response has differed globally.

Updated Figure 4. Central Bank Discount Rates, Now vs Then (7 country average)

Source: Bernanke and Mihov (2000); Bank of England, ECB, Bank of Japan, St. Louis Fed, National Bank of Poland, Sveriges Riksbank.

Figure 5 shows money supply for a GDP-weighted average of 19 countries accounting for more than half of world GDP in 2004. Clearly, monetary expansion was more rapid in the run-up to the 2008 crisis than during 1925-29, which is a reminder that the stage-setting events were not the same in the two cases. Moreover, the global money supply continued to grow rapidly in 2008, unlike in 1929 when it levelled off and then underwent a catastrophic decline.

Figure 5. Money Supplies, 19 Countries, Now vs Then

Source: Bordo et al. (2001), IMF International Financial Statistics, OECD Monthly Economic Indicators.

Figure 6 is the analogous picture for fiscal policy, in this case for 24 countries. The interwar measure is the fiscal surplus as a percentage of GDP. The current data include the IMF’s World Economic Outlook Update forecasts for 2009 and 2010. As can be seen, fiscal deficits expanded after 1929 but only modestly. Clearly, willingness to run deficits today is considerably greater.

Figure 6. Government Budget Surpluses, Now vs Then

Source: Bordo et al. (2001), IMF World Economic Outlook, January 2009.

[They added some country data in their revision that I put here, hence the two figure 5's, but they are labeled as such on the website and I did not change their labellling – JFM]

New Figure 5. Industrial output, four big Europeans, then and now

New Figure 6. Industrial output, four Non-Europeans, then and now.

The facts for Chile, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Sweden are displayed below;

New Figure 7: Industrial output, four small Europeans, then and now.

Conclusion

To summarise: the world is currently undergoing an economic shock every bit as big as the Great Depression shock of 1929-30. Looking just at the US leads one to overlook how alarming the current situation is even in comparison with 1929-30.

The good news, of course, is that the policy response is very different. The question now is whether that policy response will work. For the answer, stay tuned for our next column.

Source: A Tale of Two Depressions

Investors, we are told, demand a risk premium for investing in stocks rather than bonds. Without that extra return, why invest in risky stocks if you can get guaranteed returns in bonds? This week we look at a brilliantly done paper examining whether or not investors have gotten better returns from stocks over the really long run and not just the last ten years, when stocks have wandered in the wilderness.

This will not sit well with the buy and hope crowd, but the data is what the data is. Then we look at how bulls are spinning bad news into good and, if we have time, look at how you should analyze GDP numbers. Are we really down 6%? (Short answer: no.) It should make for a very interesting letter.

Why Bother With Bonds?

If stocks outperform bonds by as much as 5% over the long run then, for our truly long-term money, why should we bother with bonds? Why not just ignore the volatility and collect the increased risk premium from stocks? That is the message of those who believe in “Stocks for the Long Run” and also from those who want you to invest in their long-only mutual fund or managed account program. Indeed, it is always a good day to buy their fund.

One of my favorite analysts is my really good friend Rob Arnott. Rob is Chairman of Research Affiliates, out of Newport Beach, California, a research house which is responsible for the Fundamental Indexes which are breaking out everywhere (and which I have written about in past letters), as well as the only outside manager that PIMCO uses, for his asset allocation abilities. He has won so many industry awards and honors that I won’t take the time to mention them. In short, Rob is brilliant.

He recently sent me a research paper that will be published next month in the Journal of Indexes, entitled “Bonds: Why Bother?” The publisher of the journal, Jim Wiandt, has graciously allowed me to review it for you prior to it actually being sent out. The entire article will be available when the Journal of Indexes goes to print in late April, at www.journalofindexes.com. Qualified financial professionals can also get a free subscription there to pick up the print copy. There is some very interesting research at the website. But let’s look at a small portion of the essay. I am reducing 17 pages down to a few, so there is a lot more meat than I can cover here, but I will try and hit a few things that really struck me.

It is written into our investment truisms that investors expect their stock investments to outpace their bond investments over really long periods of time. Rob notes, and I confirm, that there are many places where investors are told that stocks have about a 5% risk premium over bonds.

By “risk premium,” we mean the forward-looking expected returns of stocks over bonds. As noted above, if you do not think stocks will outperform bonds by some reasonable margin, then you should invest in bonds. That “reasonable margin” is called the risk premium, about which there is some considerable and heated debate.

Most people would consider 40 years to be the “long run.” So, it is rather disconcerting, or shocking as Rob puts it, to find that not only have stocks not outperformed bonds for the last 40 plus years, but there has actually been a small negative risk premium.

In a footnote, Rob gets off a great shot, pointing out that the 5% risk premium seen in a lot of sales pitches is at best unreliable and is probably little more than an urban legend of the finance community.

How bad is it? Starting at any time from 1980 up to 2008, an investor in 20-year treasuries, rolling them over every year, beats the S&P 500 through January 2009! Even worse, going back 40 years to 1969, the 20-year bond investors still win, although by a marginal amount. And that is with a very bad bond market in the ’70s.

Let’s go back to the really long run. Starting in 1802, we find that stocks have beat bonds by about 2.5%, which, compounding over two centuries, is a huge differential. But there were some periods just like the recent past where stocks did in fact not beat bonds.

Look at the following chart. It shows the cumulative relative performance of stocks over bonds for the last 207 years. What it shows is that early in the 19 century there was a period of 68 years where bonds outperformed stocks, another similar 20-year period corresponding with the Great Depression, and then the recent episode of 1968-2009.

In fact, note that stocks only marginally beat bonds for over 90 years in the 19 century. (Remember, this is not a graph of stock returns, but of how well stocks did or did not do against bonds. A chart of actual stock returns looks much, much better.

Bill Bernstein notes that in the last century, from 1901-2000, stocks rose 9.89% before inflation and 6.45% after. Bonds paid an average of 4.85% but only 1.57% after inflation, giving a real yield difference of almost 5%. In the 19 century the real (inflation-adjusted) difference between stocks and bonds was only about 1.5%.

In the late ’90s, stock bulls would point out that there was no 30-year period where stocks did not beat bonds in the 20 century. The 19 century for them was meaningless, as the stock market then was small, and we were now in a modern world.

But what we had was a stock market bubble, just like in 1929, which convinced people of the superiority of stocks. And then we had the crash. Also, from 1932 to 2000 stocks beat bonds rather handily, again convincing investors that stocks were almost riskless compared to bonds. But in the aftermath of the bubble, yields on stocks dropped to 1%, compared to 6% in bonds. If you assumed that investors wanted a 5% risk premium, then that means they were expecting to get a compound 10% going forward from stocks. Instead, they have seen their long-term stock portfolios collapse anywhere from 40-70%, depending on which index you use.

So what is the actual risk premium? Rob Arnott and Peter Bernstein wrote a paper in 2002 about that very point. Their conclusion was that the risk premium seems to be 2.5%. Arnott writes:

“My point in exploring this extended stock market history is to demonstrate that the widely accepted notion of a reliable 5% equity risk premium is a myth. Over this full 207-year span, the average stock market yield and the average bond yield have been nearly identical. The 2.5 percentage point difference in returns had two sources: inflation averaging 1.5 percent trimmed the real returns available on bonds, while real earnings and dividend growth averaging 1.0 percent boosted the real returns on stocks. Today, the yields are again nearly identical. Does that mean that we should expect history’s 2.5 percentage point excess return or the five percent premium that most investors expect?

“As Peter Bernstein and I suggested in 2002, it’s hard to construct a scenario which delivers a five percent risk premium for stocks, relative to Treasury bonds, except from the troughs of a deep depression, unless we make some rather aggressive assumptions. This remains true to this day.”

One other quick point from this paper. Just as capitalization-weighted indexes will tend to emphasize the larger stocks, many bond indexes have the same problem, in that they will overweight large bond issuers. At one point in 2001, Argentina was 20% of the Emerging Market Bond Index, simply because they issued too many bonds. If you bought the index, you had large losses. The same with the recent high-yield index which had 12% devoted to GM and Ford. In general, I do not like bond index funds, and this is just one more reason to eschew them.

So Then, Bonds for the Long Run?

Let me be clear here. I am not saying you should put your portfolio in 20-year bonds, or that I even expect 20-year bonds to outperform stocks over the next 20 years. Far from it! The lesson here is to be very careful of geeks bearing charts and graphs (it will be a challenge for my Chinese translator to translate that pun!). Very often, they are designed with biases within them that may not even be apparent to the person who created them.

Professor and Nobel Laureate Paul Samuelson in late 1998 was quoted as saying, a bit sadly, “I have students of mine – PhDs – going around the country telling people it’s a sure thing to be 100% invested in equities, if only you will sit out the temporary declines. It makes me cringe.”

When someone tells you that stocks always beat bonds, or that stocks go up in the long run, they have not done their homework. At best, they are parroting bad research that makes their case, or they are simply trying to sell you something.

As I point out over and over, the long-run, 20-year returns you will get on your stock portfolios are VERY highly correlated with the valuations of the stock market at the time you invest. That is one reason why I contend that you can roughly time the stock market.

Valuations matter, as I wrote for many chapters in Bull’s Eye Investing, where I suggested in 2003 that we were in a long-term secular bear market and that stocks would be a difficult place to be in the coming decade, based on valuations. I looked foolish in 2006 and most of 2007. Pundits on TV talked about a new bull market. But valuations were at nosebleed levels. And now?

I have been doing a lot of interviews with the press, with them wanting to know if I think this is the start of a new bull market. There are a lot of pundits on TV and in the press who think so. I also notice that many of them run mutual funds or long-only investment programs. What are they going to do, go on TV and say, “Sell my fund”? And get to keep their jobs?

Am I accusing them of being insincere? Maybe a few of them, but most have a built-in bias that points them to the positive news that would make their fund (finally!) perform. And believe me, I can empathize. It is part of the human condition. But you just need to keep that in mind when you are thinking about investing in a new fund, or rethinking your own portfolio.

P/E Ratios at 200? Really?

Just for fun, when I was interviewing with the New York Times today, I went to the S&P web site and looked at the earnings for the S&P 500. It’s ugly. The as-reported loss for the S&P 500 for the 4 quarter was $23.16 a share. This is the first reported quarterly loss in history. That almost wipes out the expected earnings for the next three quarters. For the trailing 12 months the P/E ratio, as of the end of the second quarter, is 199.97. Close enough to 200 for government work.

But it gets worse. The expected P/E ratio for the end of the third quarter is (drum roll, please) 258! However, taking the loss of the fourth quarter off the trailing returns allows us to get back to an estimated P/E of 23 by the end of 2009. The problem is that you have to believe the estimates, which I have shown are repeatedly being lowered each quarter, and which I expect to be lowered by at least another 25% in the coming months.

Now, much of that loss is coming from the financials, which showed staggering write-offs of $101 billion, $28 billion coming from (no surprise) AIG alone. Sales across the board are down almost 9%, with 290 companies reporting lower sales.

This quarter the estimated consensus GDP is somewhere between down 5% to down 7%. Last quarter we were down an annualized 6.3%. That would be two ugly quarters back to back. It is hard to believe earnings for nonfinancial companies are going to be all that much better.

Side note: The economy did not contract at 6.3% in the 4 quarter. That is an annualized number. The quarter actually contracted at about 1.6%. If we go a whole year with a 6% contraction, that would be truly horrendous. We would blow right on through 10% unemployment. While it is possible, we should start to see somewhat better numbers in the second half of the year, although I still think they will be negative.

Mark-to-Market Slip Slides Away

But it is quite possible that the financial stocks see an improvement in earnings this quarter. The US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) changed the mark-to-market rules last week, which many (including your humble analyst) thought was needed. First, they suspended the mark-to-market rules for assets in distressed markets. Second, they widened the definition of “temporary” impairments of troubled assets, which will “allow banks to write up the value of some troubled assets if these have been hit by falling markets without (yet) suffering any significant credit losses.” (www.gavekal.com)

Here’s the important part. The board decided to make the new changes effective immediately, prior to full board approval on April 2.

As my friend Charles Gave noted, this will allow banks to write up their paper, and it happens before Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner starts putting taxpayer money at risk. Expect to see a pop in valuations. It will be interesting to see if Citi and B of A post profits this quarter.

(I should note that the International Accounting Standards Board sent out a scathing press release. I guess from that we should assume that European banks will not be so fortunate as their US counterparts.)

In theory, as I understand it, the information will still be there, but the way it will be recorded will not be reflected in the profit and loss statement. I understand that this is a very controversial proposal, and I expect many readers will disagree. The key is whether or not the information is available to investors and how the proposals are put into actual practice. If there is abuse, and regulators should be all over this, then the old rules must quickly go back into place.

This could put some strength back into financials, at least until the commercial mortgage and credit card problems start having to be written off. At the least, it could make for another solid rise in the stock market until we start to get what I expect to be very bad 1 and 2 quarter earnings.

Housing Sales Improve? Not Hardly

I opened the Wall Street Journal and read that new home sales were up in February. Bloomberg reported that sales were “unexpectedly” up by 4.7%. I was intrigued, so I went to the data. As it turns out, sales were down 41% year over year, but up slightly from January.

But if you look at the data series, there was nothing unexpected about it. For years on end, February sales are up over January. It seems we like to buy homes in the spring and summer and then sales fall off in the fall and winter. It is a very seasonal thing. If you use the seasonally adjusted numbers, you find sales were down 2.9% instead of up 4.7%. But the media reports the positive number. Interestingly, they report the seasonally adjusted numbers for initial claims, which have been a lot better than the actual numbers. Not that they are looking to just report positive news, you understand.

Plus, as my friend Barry Ritholtz points out, the 4.7% rise was “plus or minus 18.3%”. That means sales could have risen as much as 23% or dropped 13%. We won’t know for awhile until we get real numbers and not estimates. Hanging your outlook for the economy or the housing market on one-month estimates is an exercise in futility, and could come back to embarrass you.

But that brings up my final point tonight, and that is how data gets revised by the various government agencies. Typically with these government statistics, you get a preliminary number, which is a guess based on past trends, and then as time goes along that data is revised. In recessions like we are in now the revisions are almost always negative.

There is no conspiracy here. The people who work in the government offices have to create a model to make estimates. Each data series, whether new home sales, employment, or durable goods sales, etc., has its own unique sets of characteristics. The estimates are based on past historical performance. There is really no other way to do it.

So, past performance in a recession suggests higher estimates than what really happens. Then, the numbers in the following months are revised downward as actual numbers are obtained. But the estimates in the current months are still too high. That makes the comparisons generally favorable, at least for one month. And the media and the bulls leap all over the “data,” and some silly economist goes on TV or in the press and says something like, “This is a sign that things are stabilizing.” It drives me nuts.

Ignore month-to-month estimated data. The key thing to look for is the direction of the revisions. If they are down, as they have been for over a year, then that is a bad sign. Further, one month’s estimates are just noise. Look at the year-over-year numbers. When the direction of the revisions is positive and the year-over-year numbers are starting to stabilize, then we will know things are starting to turn around.

Source: Why Bother With Bonds?

Long-time readers know that I have been growing more and more bearish of late. I have been writing for a long time that we are in for a long period of slow Muddle Through growth as the twin crises of the housing bubble and credit bubbles require time to heal. Today we look at a serious proposal for cutting the time to healing for at least one of those bubbles (housing), and at least keep the other (credit) from getting worse. This is the most serious idea I have seen that could actually make a real positive contribution to the economy and help put us back on a growth path.

I will post Gary’s papers and a link to the actual op-ed piece for those who want to do further research, but let me make one point at the beginning that he did not emphasize: the US is already allowing roughly 1 million immigrants a year into the country (which for a variety of reasons I and most serious economists of all stripes believe is a very good thing). We are suggesting that we simply change the nature of what constitutes the conditions for acceptance, so as to jump start the housing industry and the economy. We are not suggesting additional immigrants, although nothing would be wrong with that. I will also post a link for you to send this e-letter to your congressmen and senators.

Let me put up front a few benefits of a program that would allow legal status to immigrants buying a home. Housing values would stabilize and in many cases rise. The massive losses because of bad loans that are being subsidized by US taxpayers would be stemmed, saving many hundreds of billions, if not a trillion or more dollars. The excess inventory of homes would quickly disappear and the millions of jobs that were lost as home construction fell into a deep depression would come back. If housing values rise, many families would be able to refinance their homes at lower rates and have more income left over after paying their mortgages. $12 billion in commissions would end up in real estate agents’ pockets, helping a very battered and bruised group. Hundreds of billions will flow into local businesses, as these new immigrants will need to furnish their homes. This could mean as much as a half trillion dollars in sorely needed stimulus in the next few years, without one penny of taxpayer money and actually adding taxes back to governments from local to national. And we are not bringing in 1 million foreigners, we are attracting 1 million mostly middle-class new Americans, which, if we are smart in how we do this, will result in more jobs for all Americans. So let’s jump right in and look at the details.

Housing Could Drop Another 20% in Pricing

Let’s review the situation as it will be if we do nothing. Shilling shows that we built 6.7 million more homes in this country between 1996-2005 than the normal trend would have projected, partially because we underbuilt the decade before that. New housing starts average about 1.5 million in normal times but have fallen to 500,000 recently, and could fall further as unemployment rises and demand declines. Even so, Shilling estimates that we still have about 2.4 million excess homes.

This compares rather well with estimates by independent analyst John Burns, which I cited in the e-letter early last year. What they both agree on is that it will take at least until 2012 to work through this excess inventory, and that assumes that foreclosures do not increase as housing prices drop.

Excess supply of anything means lower and continuously falling prices, and that has certainly been the case in housing. Here is what Shilling writes:

“We believe that if nothing is done to eliminate surplus housing, prices will fall another 20% between now and the end of 2010 for a total peak-to-trough decline of 37% (Chart 1 below). The resulting further negative effects on the economy will be devastating. At that point, almost 25 million homeowners, or almost half the 51 million total with mortgages, will be underwater… That’s also a third of the 75 million total homeowners, with the remaining 24 million owning their houses free and clear. It would take a little over $1 trillion to reduce their mortgages to the value of their houses, compared to $449 billion for the almost 14 million currently underwater.”

This is not inconsistent with similar projections by other acknowledged experts and independent analysts like John Burns and Professor Robert Shiller of Yale. If nothing happens to stimulate buying, there is a great deal more pain ahead for American homeowners.

For the great majority of Americans, their homes represent the largest portion of their assets. This is particularly true of Americans of more modest means, who have been hit the hardest. Watching their single biggest assert drop another 20% will be devastating and for many will mean they will not be able to retire as they had planned. More Americans own homes (68%) than own stocks (50%). This helps explain a recent poll which shows more Americans are worried about house prices than about the decline in stock prices.

Falling home prices means that consumers have to save more for retirement, which results in lower consumer spending, which translates into lost jobs and more homeowners coming under stress — a vicious spiral that is increasing unemployment. Realistic estimates of unemployment rising to over 10% within the year abound.

Two years ago I and a few others foresaw the current housing crisis (and an accompanying credit crisis), predicting a protracted recession and a slow, multi-year Muddle Through recovery. Sadly, I was right about the housing crisis. Without some intervention, there is little to suggest that the prediction of a long, protracted recovery will not come true.

Lowering rates, as is being discussed in various circles, will help homeowners who can make their payments, but it does nothing to really bite into excessive inventory. Until we reduce the inventory, housing prices in many neighborhoods all across America are going to continue to come under pressure. And as Barry Habib points out, while the Fed may be lowering rates for securitized packages of loans, those low rates are not available to the average home buyer. The cost of packaging and securitization adds considerable cost.

Shilling discusses the “traditional” options for reducing home inventories, but in the end there is no real solution other than time, or massive amounts (read trillions) in taxpayer money being given to homeowners, which will be very unpopular, as homeowners who were responsible and are paying their mortgages would get no benefits. Waiting another two and a half years for the excessive inventory to sell will keep this country in a very slow or no-growth economy, and devastate the wealth of millions of homeowners.

But there is a solution. There are millions of foreigners throughout the world who would like to come to live in the US. In 2006, there were 1.1 million immigrants allowed into the US, some 63% of whom were allowed in simply because they already had relatives here. Only 13% of visas were granted to people because of their skills. While allowing relatives of current residents to come to the US may be a humane and reasonable policy, it does nothing to assure they bring more than that relationship to help them make their way in the US.

Buy A Home, Get a Green Card

What if we changed the rules for a few years? Starting as soon as possible, we should allow anyone to come into the country who would buy a home. They would be given a temporary visa which would become permanent if they had no problems after, say, five years.

While Gary proposes that they be allowed to borrow against the value of their homes, I lean toward suggesting that initially we take those who buy their homes outright (with a few exceptions). That means they have enough capital to purchase a home to begin with, which probably means they are educated and have skills. In fact, if they have enough cash to buy a home, that means they would have more actual savings than most US citizens. We would be attracting future citizens with the capital to invest in job-creating businesses and/or who have useful skills to assist in the recovery of the US economy.

Of course, there should be some rules that go along with this proposal. Background checks and references should be required. The home could not be rented for a period of time (at least two years), to help reduce the supply of available housing, and could not be resold for at least two years unless another home was purchased. There should be a minimal price, which could be somewhat different for various regions, but $100,000 would seem to be a good minimum for most areas, with higher minimums in certain areas.

The immigrant should demonstrate the ability to support himself and his family for a period of time (at least one year, preferably two), including the purchase of health insurance. Cash or letters of credit or other guaranteed commitments would be required. Only immediate family members (spouse and children) would be allowed to come with the immigrant. Cousins and siblings must buy their own homes. The permanent visa should be contingent on not having gone on welfare or public assistance at any time in the past five years. We are trying to solve a housing problem, not looking to create others.

I would make an exception in having 100% financing for immigrants with advanced degrees or special skills, especially those who did their schooling in the United States. If the US is to remain competitive in an increasingly technological world, we need more scientists and engineers. But getting permission to stay is becoming increasingly difficult. We are seeing a brain drain of those who would like to stay and create new jobs and technologies (and buy houses) here in the US. Shilling and Le Frak write:

“The authors of this report believe that a number of people have given up waiting for those visas or don’t want to put up with the hassle and are leaving the country. This “brain drain” is unfortunate since many of these foreigners are highly productive. In 2006, foreign nationals residing in the U.S. were named as inventors or co-inventors on 25.6% of the 42,019 international patent applications filed from this country, up from 7.6% in 1998. Studies of the authorship of academic papers show the same trend.

“U.S. educational institutions are considered the best in the world by many and are magnets for foreign students, especially at the graduate level. Many of them are inclined to settle and work in this country after completing their studies, if they can obtain permanent resident status.

“The Council of Graduate Schools survey revealed that in the fall of 2007, 241,095 non-U.S. citizens were enrolled in graduate programs. Technological progress and the productivity it generates depends on people educated in biological sciences, engineering and physical sciences, but only 16% of U.S. citizen graduate enrollment was in these three disciplines. In contrast, 55% of total non-U.S. citizen enrollment was in those fields. Conversely, 53% of graduate enrollment by Americans was in education, business and health sciences while those three fields accounted for only 24% of foreign graduate students.”

(There is a great deal more background detail in the second white paper. See link below.)

Much can be learned from similar programs already in place in immigrant-hungry countries such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The United Kingdom has recently added new programs. Many countries realize that in the coming years there is going to be increasing competition for the best and brightest of the world. Again, there are more details in the white papers, but let’s turn to the effects that would result from such a program.

A Real Stimulus Package

First, upon Congressional approval, it would almost immediately stop the seemingly inexorable slide in house prices, as initial demand would be significant. Let’s assume one million new immigrants would buy homes. At an average price of almost $200,000, that would be $200 billion injected into the economy. And each of those homes has to be furnished, food has to be bought, clothing will be needed, local taxes will be paid. Airplane tickets to research potential areas, hotels needed during the interim period, and other related expenditures would add up. Over two years, this could easily be another $100 billion.

Couple 1 million new buyers with current US demand, and the excess inventory would be worked through within a year, and possibly faster. This puts a floor under the housing market, and home values could once again to begin to rise in line with a growing economy.

Such a program would have a salutary effect on the value of the dollar, as not only the initial purchases of homes and materials would need to be converted to dollars, but it is likely that immigrants would bring even more capital into the country.

By stemming the fall of home values, it would decrease the likelihood of foreclosures and help homeowners get refinancing at lower rates. Refinancing now is difficult because most lenders want a substantial slice of equity to go along with any new mortgage. If your home value has dropped 20% and is likely to fall another 20%, it is hard to have enough equity to qualify for a new mortgage. Stopping the fall in prices is critically important; and maybe if prices rise in some areas, homeowners will be able to refinance at better rates, giving them more cash each month to save or spend.

As I have written in previous letters, the psyche of the American consumer is permanently scarred. We are on our way back to a savings rates that will look more like 1987 than 2007, when it was almost zero. Just a few decades ago, we saved 7-10%. Consumer spending was only 64% of US GDP in 1987. It was 71% in 2007. It is on its way back to that lower level.

Lower consumer spending will be a drag on growth for years. But bringing in 1 million already middle-class new immigrant families will help make up for a lot of that reduced spending. If you can spend $200,000 on a home, you are likely skilled at something and well-educated. You will find a job, or create one, as many immigrants do, and then you will add to our total consumer spending.

If you are a real estate agent, you should love this proposal, as it would result in an additional $12 billion in commissions.

If you are a home builder, what a great way to reduce inventory and get back to the conditions where there is a demand for your product. This would help put back to work those who have lost their jobs in the home construction collapse. Home Depot and Lowe’s and local stores? It would help them to increase sales, which leads to more jobs.

We are on the cusp of the Baby Boomers beginning a huge wave of retirement, both in the US and elsewhere in the developed world. There is going to be a need for skilled workers to replace those Boomers, as well to provide services to the retirees. Further, the promised Social Security and Medicare expenditures are going to start increasing at a significant rate. We are going to need immigrants to help pay for those benefits. Given the controversy over immigration, we will look back with some irony in ten years when we find we are in a serious competition with other nations to attract skilled immigrants. We should start now. I think the concept is, let’s not waste a good crisis.

Let’s look at some of the potential critics of this proposal. I was on Yahoo Tech Ticker yesterday talking about this, and got a few irate emails and phone calls.

“Why,” I was asked, “do I hate American workers? Isn’t there enough unemployment? Why do we need more immigrants taking American jobs?” And there was considerable angst about illegal immigrants.

First, I am suggesting we transform the already existing legal immigrant flow, which is going to happen anyway, into a form which helps us solve a major crisis. I am not talking about adding another 1 million immigrants on top of the current legal inflow. Just change the nature of that inflow until the excess housing inventory is settled, and then we can go back to the current program, if that is what is wanted (more on that below).

Second, I am not suggesting we bring in or condone illegal immigrants. That is another issue altogether, for another debate at another time.

If we do nothing, unemployment is going to rise to at least 10%. That is certainly not good for the American worker. Home values are going to continue to fall. That is certainly not good for the American worker. The economy is likely to be stagnant for an extended period of time, which means job growth in a Muddle Through recovery will be slow and stagnant. That is not good for the American worker.

Hundreds of billions more of taxpayer dollars will have to go to banks to keep them solvent as falling home prices and increasing unemployment increase foreclosures. That is not good for the American worker and taxpayer.

And further, I am not talking about bringing 1 million foreigners to this country. I am talking about bringing 1 million future Americans, who want to work hard and live the American dream.

Let me say a few words to those who are opposed to immigration — and I have heard from you. With few exceptions, US citizens reading this have an immigrant in their genealogies. Some of mine go back to the 1600s. Some of mine were not exactly considered welcome. “No Irish and Dogs allowed” read the signs. But immigrants and their children have been the driver for growth in this country for generations. It is hard-working immigrants who leave their homes for the dream of being Americans that have been the backbone of the building of the nation — the hewers and shapers, if you will.

It is precisely that melting pot of human diversity that is the strength of the American idea. Each new wave of immigrants has been viewed with trepidation or scorn, yet within one generation they have become American. And in turn, their children’s children forget that their forebears had to deal with discrimination.

America — the US — is not so much a country as it is an idea, the idea that anyone, regardless of race or religion or gender, can come here and with hard work and determination make their own way. Some end up owning the local deli, and some end up founding Google. Some 25% of Silicon Valley start-ups, I am told, are by immigrants, creating jobs at the bleeding edge of technology. They see the US as a land of opportunity. That is why so many want to come and that is why we can attract a new generation of affluent, self-reliant immigrants who can help us solve a problem that we created.

I can see no downside to changing our immigration policy for a few years. We solve the housing crisis, stabilize home values, brings hundreds of billions in stimulus to the US, and with no taxpayer outlay. For a short time, we substitute one class of immigrant for another, to solve a serious crisis. It is not a matter of immigrants or no immigrants, just which immigrants

So which do you want? 10% unemployment and a decade of lower home values and increasing foreclosures, with a slow, Muddle Through, jobless recovery, or a stable housing market and home construction back to trend?

If you agree with me, I suggest you contact your Congressman. You can go to http://www.visi.com/juan/congress/ (selected at random from many such sites) and type in your address and get the name of your congressperson and senators. Just tell them you like this idea, and cut and paste the link where you read this into the letter. And tell them to get into gear! I would like to point out that this proposal is not Republican or Democrat, it is just common sense. I hope we can get broad bipartisan support.

The link to the Wall Street Journal editorial is: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123725421857750565.html

The links to the white papers are:

http://www.frontlinethoughts.com/pdf/Housing_Whitepaper_1.pdf
http://www.frontlinethoughts.com/pdf/Housing_Whitepaper_2.pdf

Las Vegas, La Jolla and the OC

I expect I will get a few new readers from this letter. Normally, at the end of my regular weekly letter, I make a few personal comments. I write this free weekly letter to my 1 million closest friends, and you can add yourself to the list at www.frontlinethoughts.com. You can find out more about me at www.johnmauldin.com.

Parts of this letter have been written in New York and Dallas, and as I write this I am on a flight to Las Vegas to speak at a conference on natural resources. I am sure the recent Fed actions will be at the center of conversation. There is not enough space now to comment on that; but I did do a few segments on Yahoo Tech Ticker (one of which evidently made the Yahoo home page), which you can listen to at the following links.

Links to the Yahoo segments:

D.C. to America: You Can’t Handle the Truth
http://bit.ly/10rUiF

Plan to Solve Crisis: Let Immigrants Buy Houses
http://bit.ly/W0XLq

Fed Strategy: Spread Economic Pain Over Multiple Years
http://bit.ly/wgGjA

Source: Solving the Housing Crisis

It’s an important question for any investor if they plan on making any long-term investment decisions during this global downturn.

Financial newsletter writer John Mauldin gives us a big clue of what’s to come in an article he wrote earlier today…

One of the best gauges of an economy is tax collections. No one pays taxes unless they have to, so collections are a real-world, real-time analysis of the US economy. And the best source I know of for tracking taxes is The Liscio Report, by Philippa Dunne & Doug Henwood.

Tax collections are down. Philippa and Doug give us the actual numbers, which are not pretty. Bottom line? “What does this all mean? It suggests that the consumer retrenchment in this recession will be deep and long, and will probably continue into any recovery. The American consumer is no longer the world consumer of last resort, and that’s an enormous change for both this country and the rest of the world to get used to.”

(You can learn more about the Liscio Report at www.theliscioreport.com.)

If American consumers are spending less, this means the world’s savers (Asians) would have to become spenders (like Japan did during its “Lost Decade”) for the global economy to rapidly rebound.

But Chinese exports were down 17.5% in January. And imports were down 43.1%.

And down from the double-digit GDP growth rates earlier this decade, Chinese GDP grew only 6.8% last quarter (which means recession in China).

China has already shed 20 million jobs (with estimates from the Telegraph.co.uk of50 million more on the way). And Beijing is implementing its $586 billion to stimulate its own economy.

So if China isn’t selling an increasing amount of goods and its consumers are buying less, then how could China keep the world economy from shrinking?

It won’t.

The reality is that China (and Asia in general) is far too export reliant, and the U.S. is far too import reliant. And as long as this imbalance exists, it’s going to be difficult for the global economy to recover.

That means making mid-term market bets on shaky emerging-markets might be a real nice (and easy) way to lose money.

Instead, what you want is steady-eddy income from stable, cash-rich American companies that have virtual monopolies… companies like Microsoft (NASDAQ:MSFT).

Microsoft is a solid company because…

• It holds $20 billion in cash and only $2 billion in debt. Refinancing isn’t an issue. And it has plenty of cash to make it through a downturn and pay shareholders dividends.

• The Windows Vista operating system replacement, Windows 7, is due out by January of 2010. I’ve personally tested the beta, and it’s leaps and bounds better then Vista. There’s been a lot of positive hype around this release, too. So Microsoft should do very well once it hits the market.

Microsoft is a virtual monopoly! Its operating system was the choice of 89.6% of Web users in 2008. Any new upgrade means hundreds of millions buyers will buy

It’s not going to be tough work getting through the next few years of an underwhelming economy. But by holding a strong company like Microsoft, you’re assured that your money is in a safe place and will grow in the years ahead.

Stay free,
Charles

While from one perspective things look rather difficult, from another there is a ray of hope. What can you expect to earn from stocks over the next five years? It should make for an interesting letter. Note: this will be a little longer than usual, but part of it is there are a LOT of charts.

I likened this to the economic situation we are in now. With consumer spending “resetting” to a new lower level, we are going to have to hit the reset button on many business plans, and thus investments, as consumers are going to spend less and save more. Is that level 3% less? 5%? More? No one knows, but since we have not had a consumer-led recession since 1982, too many businesses assumed that the US consumer, like Superman, was bulletproof.

What will be the eventual savings rate? Will we get back to 7-9% from less than 1%? Maybe, because people are going to realize that savings today are the key to a happy retirement. That would put the new level of consumer spending a good deal lower than it has been. Thankfully, that climb in savings will not happen all at once but will play out over more than a few years. I think we will look back in the middle of the next decade and be quite amazed at how much US personal savings have increased. However, this is the Paradox of Thrift: what is good for the individual is hard on the economy, as by definition increased savings reduces consumer spending.

A quick point. This decrease in consumer spending that we are seeing now will not be a permanent condition. After we find that new lower level, consumer spending will start to grow again, albeit more slowly due to increased savings. That is because the US economy and population are growing, and increases in consumer spending are the norm in such conditions.

Now, and I have 100 Swedish witnesses for this, after I finished my speech Thursday morning in Stockholm for the institutional investors of Kaupthing Bank, I sat down and turned on my laptop, which is an Apple MacBook Air. There was a strange noise and then, I swear, I was staring at a blue screen. My Apple notebook, supposedly immune from the Blue Screen of Death, had frozen in a pale shade of blue. Later that night, over drinks, we speculated as to how Bill Gates could manage to do such things, remotely, in revenge. However, since the next day Apple in Malta could not fix it, I missed my deadline. I apologize. Now, let’s jump right into the letter.

Those Wild And Crazy Analysts

Quick review: Last week we showed how consumer spending is falling, as we are in a recession. We then highlighted how analysts are dropping earnings estimates as time goes on. From projecting 15% earnings increases for 2008, they have dropped projections over 40% from March 2007 until today. Actual numbers will be much lower, as analyst projections for the fourth quarter are too high.

The same holds true for 2009. Since March of this year, just six months ago, earnings projections for 2009 have dropped 40% and are almost 10% lower than they were projected for 2008. However, estimates for operating earnings are still roughly double those for as-reported (or what’s on the tax return) earnings. Analysts are still wildly overoptimistic. You can read last week’s (October 17) letter here.

Now, let’s look at the rest of the presentation. I argue in Bull’s Eye Investing and this letter that we should look at long-term secular bull and bear markets not in terms of price but in terms of valuation. On September 26, 2003 I wrote about why we see long-term secular bear markets. I summarized the letter in the speech, but I think it will be useful to review a portion of it today. Remember, this was written in 2003, as a “new bull market” was already nearly a year old. The S&P 500 was at 1,000. So, for the last five years, you are down over 10%.

Investing is more than about price. It is about timing and valuations. Let’s review. I put in bold some important points.

The Evidence for Investor Overreaction

Long-time readers know that it is my contention that we are in a decade-long secular bear market. It typically takes years for valuations to fall to levels from where a new bull market can begin. Why does it take so long? Why don’t we see an almost immediate return to low valuations once the process has begun?

Because investors overreact to good news and underreact to bad news on stocks they like, and do just the opposite to stocks that are out of favor. Past perception seems to dictate future performance. And it takes time to change those perceptions.

This is forcefully borne out by a study produced in 2000 by David Dreman (one of the brightest lights in investment analysis) and Eric Lufkin. The work, entitled “Investor Overreaction: Evidence That Its Basis Is Psychological” is a well-written analysis of investor behavior which illustrates that perceptions are more important than the fundamentals. Let’s look at that study in detail. Stay with me. This is important.

In any given year, there are stocks which are in favor, as evidenced by high valuations and rising prices. There are also stocks which are just the opposite. Dreman (NYSE:DCS) and Lufkin (NASDAQ:LUFK) (or DL for the rest of this letter) look at a database for 4,721 companies from 1973 through 1998. Each year, they divide the database up into five parts, or quintiles, based on perceived market valuations. They separately study Price to Book Value (P/BV), Price to Cash Flow (P/CF), and the traditional Price to Earnings (P/E). This creates three separate ways to analyze stocks by value for any given year, so as to remove the bias that might occur from just using one measure of valuation.

The top and bottom quintiles become stock investment “portfolios” for all three valuation measures. You might think of them as a mutual fund created to buy just these stocks. They then look ten years back and five years forward for these portfolios. There is enough data to create 85 such portfolios or funds. They first analyze these portfolios as to how they do relative to the market or the average of all stocks. They then analyze the portfolios in terms of five basic investment fundamentals: Cash Flow Growth, Sales Growth, Earnings Growth, Return on Equity, and Profit Margin. They do this latter test to see if you can discern a fundamental reason for the price action of the stock.

First, both the “out-performance” and “under-performance” of these stocks happens in the ten years leading up to the formation of the portfolio. Almost immediately upon creating the portfolio, the price performance comparisons change, and change dramatically. The “in-favor” stocks underperform the market for the next five years, and the out-of-favor (value) stocks outperform the market.

I should point out that other studies, which Dreman does not cite, seem to indicate that the actual experience of many investors is more like these static portfolios than one might first think. That is because investors tend to chase price performance. In fact, the higher the price and more rapid the movement, the more new investors jump in. The Dalbar study, among many others, shows us that investors do not actually make what the mutual funds make because they chase the hottest funds, buying high and selling low when the funds do not live up to their expectations. The key word, as we will see later, is expectations. Other studies document that investors tend to chase the latest hot stock and shun those which are lagging in price performance. Thus, forming a portfolio of the highest-performing quintiles is an uncanny mirror to what happens in the real world.

Why does this “chasing the hot stock” happen? DL tells us it is because investors become overconfident that the trends of the fundamentals in the first ten years will repeat forever, “… thereby carrying the prices of stocks that appear to have the ‘best’ and ‘worst’ prospects. Investors are likely to forecast a future not very different from the recent past, i.e., continuing improving fundamentals for favorites and deteriorating fundamentals for out-of-favor issues. Such forecasts result in favorites being overpriced, while out-of-favor issues are priced at a substantial discount to the real worth. The extrapolation of past results well into the future and the high confidence in the precise forecast is one of the most common errors made in finance.”

The more we learn about a stock, the more we think we are competent to analyze it and the more convinced we are of the correctness of our judgment.

Since you are not looking at the graphs, let me describe them for you. Predictably, the fundamentals improve quite steadily for the first ten years for the favorite stocks in comparison to the entire universe of stocks. But the price performance rises at very high rates, far faster than the fundamentals, particularly in the latter years. It clearly accelerates. It seems the longer a stock does well the more confident investors are that it will continue to do well and thereby award it with higher and higher multiples. The exact opposite is true of the out-of-favor stocks. Even though many of the fundamentals were actually slowly improving in relationship to the market as a whole, the stocks were lagging and the market punished them with ever-lower relative prices.

At five years prior to the formation of a portfolio, the trends of each group were set in place. The next five years just reinforced these trends. This re-strengthened the perceptions about these stocks and increased the level of confidence about the future. Again, past (and accumulated and reinforced over time) perception creates future price action.

Never mind that it is impossible for Dell (NASDAQ:DELL) to grow 50% a year or GE (NYSE:GE) to compound earnings at 15% forever. As many times as we say it, investors continue to ignore the old saw “Past performance is not indicative of future results.”

How much better did the good-performing stocks do than the bad-performing stocks in the ten years prior to creating the portfolios? The highest P/BV (Price to Book Value) stocks outperformed the market by 187%. The lowest stocks underperformed the market by -79%, for a differential of 266%! If you look at the P/CF (Price to Cash Flow) the differential between the two is 172%.

Yet in the next five years, the hot stocks underperformed the market by a negative -26% on a P/BV basis, and -30% on a P/CF basis. The out-of-favor stocks did 33% and 22% better than the market, respectively. This is a HUGE reversal of trend.

So, what happened? Did the trends stop? Did the former outcasts finally get their act together and start to show better fundamentals than the all-stars? The answer is a very curious “no.”

“… there is no reversal in fundamentals to match the reversal in returns. That is, as favored stocks go from outperforming the market, their fundamentals do not deteriorate significantly, in some cases they actually improve…. The fundamentals of the ‘worst’ stocks are weaker than both those of the market and of the ‘best’ stocks in both periods.”

In some cases, the trends of the worst stocks actually got worse. Even as the out-of-favor stocks improved in relative performance in the last five years, their cash-flow growth actually fell from 14.6% to 6.6%. While cash-flow growth for the best-performing stocks did drop by 6%, it was still almost 2.5 times that of the lower group. Read the following carefully:

“Thus, while there is a marked transition in the return profiles [share price], with value stocks underperforming growth in the prior period and outperforming growth stocks in the measurement period, this is not true for fundamentals. In nearly every panel [areas in which they made measurements], fundamentals for growth stocks are better than those for value stocks both before and after portfolio formation.”

“Although there is a major reversal in the returns [prices] to the best and worst stocks, there is no corresponding reversal in the fundamentals.” In fact, in many cases the fundamentals continue to improve for the growth stocks and deteriorate for the value stocks. The data and the graphs clearly show that the fundamentals for the growth stocks clearly beat those of the value stocks, even for the five years after portfolio formation.

And yet, there was a very stark reversal in price. Why, if not based upon the fundamentals?

DL goes to another research paper, which shows “… that even a small earnings surprise can initiate a reversal in returns that lasts many years.” They demonstrate that negative surprises on favorite stocks result in significant underperformance of this group not only in the year of the surprise but for at least four years following the initial event. They also show that positive surprises on out-of-favor stocks result in significant outperformance in the year of the surprise, and again for at least the four years following the initial event. DL attributes these results to major changes in investor expectations following the surprise.

So where was the overreaction? Was it in the years leading up to the surprise, which resulted in a very high- or low-priced stock (relative to the fundamentals), or was it in the immediate reaction to the surprise?

Other studies show analysts (as opposed to investors) are too slow to react to earnings surprises by being too slow to adjust earnings. Even nine months later, analysts’ expectations are too high. (We will see this as we look at analyst performances today!)

Stock Prices Are In Our Heads
Or, Maybe Investors Are Just Head Cases

Dreman and Lufkin then come to the meat of their analysis. For them, underreaction and overreaction are part and parcel of the same process. The overreaction begins in the years prior to the stock reaching lofty heights. As Nobel laureate Hyman Minsky points out, stability leads to instability. The more comfortable we get with a given condition or trend, the longer it will persist and then when the trend fails, the more dramatic the correction.

The cause of the price reversal is not fundamentals. It is not risk, as numerous studies show value stocks to be less risky.

“We conclude,” they write “that the cause of the major price reversals is psychological, or more specifically, investor overreaction.”

But DL go on to point out that when the correction comes, we tend to (initially) underreact. While we do not like the surprise, we tend to think of it as maybe a one-time thing. Things, we believe, will soon get back to normal. We do not scale back our expectations sufficiently for our growth stocks (or vice-versa), so the stage is set for another surprise and more reaction. It apparently takes years for this to work itself out.

As they note in their conclusion, “The [initial] corrections are sharp and, we suspect, violent. But they do not fully adjust prices to more realistic levels. After this period, we return to a gradual but persistent move to more realistic levels as the underreaction process continues through [the next five years].”

The studies clearly show it takes time for these overvalued portfolios to “come back to earth” or back to trend. Would this not, I muse, apply to overvalued markets as a whole? Might this not explain why bear market cycles take so long? Is it not just an earnings surprise for one stock which moves the whole market, but a series of events and recessions which slowly change the perceptions of the majority of investors?

Thus my contention that we are in just the beginning stages of the current secular bear market. These cycles take lots of time, anywhere from 8 to 17 years. We are just in year three, and at nosebleed valuation levels. The next “surprise” or disappointment will surely come from out of nowhere. That is why it is called a surprise. When it is followed by the next recession, stocks will drop one more leg on their path to the low valuations that are the hallmark of the bottom of secular bear markets. [Note: I wrote that in 2003.]

Given the level of investor overconfidence in the market place, and given the length of the last secular bull, it might take more than one recession and a few more years to find a true bottom to this cycle. It will come, of course.

But in the meantime, investors would do well do examine their own perceptions about the future, both positive and negative, and see if they might possibly be clouding their investment strategies. Remember, just because stocks are in a secular bear cycle does not mean there are not plenty of investment opportunities in other markets and strategies.

Just as there is more to life than work and money, there is more to investments than the stock market.

Can We Actually Predict Earnings?

Ed Easterling of Crestmont Reseach offers us the following very important chart. It is reported earnings compared to the historical trend line. As I have repeatedly written, earnings, especially when seen from a valuation standpoint, are mean reverting. They will fluctuate around the long-term trend line. And interestingly, that long-term trend line is nominal GDP. (Nominal GDP includes the effects of inflation.)

Total corporate earnings for any particular large country and stock market by definition cannot grow faster than nominal GDP (though individual stocks can do so). And since the S&P 500 is largely reflective of the US corporate world, earnings for the S&P 500 index will fluctuate around nominal GDP.

Notice how smooth that growth line for nominal GDP is? That will be important in a few paragraphs. But first, let’s look at how well Easterling’s historical trend line (which is nominal GDP) compares with Robert Shiller’s ten-year smoothed earnings. Rather than use the earnings from any one year, which as we know can fluctuate wildly, he smoothes them by using a ten-year average.

Important: Notice how closely correlated the earnings for Crestmont’s nominal GDP and Shiller’s smoothed earnings are.

Now, this is where it gets interesting. Shiller’s data is not predictive. But remember how smooth the earnings trend line from Crestmont was? Ed contends, and I agree, that there is a predictive element when we use nominal GDP. In other words, at some point in the future, earnings will grow back to and then exceed the long-term trend in nominal GDP.

So, while we are in the process of dropping below the mean or below the long-term trend line of earnings in terms of nominal GDP, we can be confident that at some point in the future those earnings will again revert above the mean. It seems to have been part of the economic laws since the time of the Medes and Persians.

This has important implications for future values. Let’s look at the next graph, from Vitaliy Katsenelson. Vitaliy uses a 6% growth of earnings as his baseline (which is, not coincidentally, very close to the long-term rise in nominal GDP). Again, notice how earnings fluctuate around the mean.

Notice also the small box on the right, which show where earnings could actually fall to if earnings drop by the same percentage as they did in the 2000-02 recession. That would suggest that earnings will drop below $40, from the currently projected $48. Remember, last year projections for 2008 were $82.

We will come back to this; but if we can project that at some point in the future earnings will once again revert to nominal GDP trendline, then we can make some projections about what earnings will be in the future, or at least what “trend” earnings should be!

Buffett versus Grantham

On October 16 Warren Buffett wrote an op-ed in the New York Times called “Buy American. I am.” Quoting from the beginning of the piece:

“THE financial world is a mess, both in the United States and abroad. Its problems, moreover, have been leaking into the general economy, and the leaks are now turning into a gusher. In the near term, unemployment will rise, business activity will falter and headlines will continue to be scary.

“So … I’ve been buying American stocks. This is my personal account I’m talking about, in which I previously owned nothing but United States government bonds. (This description leaves aside my Berkshire Hathaway holdings, which are all committed to philanthropy.) If prices keep looking attractive, my non-Berkshire net worth will soon be 100 percent in United States equities.

“Why? A simple rule dictates my buying: Be fearful when others are greedy, and be greedy when others are fearful. And most certainly, fear is now widespread, gripping even seasoned investors. To be sure, investors are right to be wary of highly leveraged entities or businesses in weak competitive positions. But fears regarding the long-term prosperity of the nation’s many sound companies make no sense. These businesses will indeed suffer earnings hiccups, as they always have. But most major companies will be setting new profit records 5, 10 and 20 years from now.”

Jeremy Grantham, head of GMO, which manages $150 billion, has another opinion. Note that Grantham lost a great portion of his management business in the late ’90s when he decided that the tech market was a bubble and did not participate. His huge pension fund clients decided he did not “get it” and left him in large numbers. He was right, they were wrong, and now his business is vastly larger. And again, he is putting his opinion and client money on the line. This from a recent Money Magazine article (courtesy of my friend Richard Russell):

“Historically, when a market bubble has popped, it has almost always overcorrected. But after the tech bubble burst in 2000, the stock market didn’t hit the lows it should have. Before it could, the housing bubble and tax cut that followed 9/11 kicked off the biggest sucker rally in history from 2002 to 2006. So I think the market isn’t cheap yet. There is more pain coming. I don’t think we’ll hit the low until 2010.

“Previously in the interview, Grantham had this to say. ‘All you have to do is open a history book and see what happens when you have a bubble. In this case, there was a bubble in housing and there was a magnificent bubble in risk-taking People were just shoveling their money into risk on the pathetic idea that risk is always rewarded. You don’t get rewarded for taking a risk. You get rewarded for buying cheap. Leverage is the ultimate demonstration of risk, and we never had system-wide leverage like this before. Ever. We had several firms that were leveraged 30 to 1(for every $30 of assets they put up $1 of equity and borrowed the other $29). At leverage of 30 to 1 you have to lose only about 3% of your $30 worth of assets and your dollar of equity gets wiped out. You’re bankrupt.”

So, who is right? And the answer depends on your view of what I call the third derivative of value investing. The first two are price and earnings. The third derivative is time.

Long-time readers know I contend that markets go from high valuations to low valuations and back to high over very long secular bull and bear markets which last anywhere from 13-20 years, or about 17 years on average. These cycles do not stop in the middle and reverse. They tend to go the full course. That is why I could contend back in 2003 that were we not in some new long-term bull market. Valuations had not reached the levels from which bull markets are made. Stock market cheerleaders tried to spin it, but valuations are the fundamental ground of investing. You ignore them at your own peril.

Now, let’s look at two more charts from Vitaliy. These show the long-term secular cycles in terms of valuation, both from one-year and ten-year smoothed P/E ratios. Note that we are not back to even below the mean, much less to some place we could call “low.”

So, let’s be a bit of an optimist. Let’s look at yet another chart from Crestmont Research. What happens if stock market earnings revert to the mean in either 3 or 5 years? Ed also assumes that P/E ratios once again rise back to 22.5. From last Friday’s close, such a reversion would yield very handsome returns: 23.5% compounded for 3 years and 15.9 % for five years. If you believe like Buffett that US earnings will revert back to (and above) the mean, then that suggests this is a time to buy, if you are buying for the long term. The full report is at http://www.crestmontresearch.com/pdfs/Stock%20PE%20Report.pdf

Back to 1974?

Go back and look at the valuation charts above. Note that in late 1974 valuations were still at about their long-term average. Buying then was not compelling from a valuation standpoint. But Richard Russell called the bottom in one of his more famous calls late in the year. And it was a “price” bottom.

There was a great deal of volatility in the next eight years, and another recession at the end of the period, before valuations finally got down to extremely undervalued single-digit levels. Thus, those years saw a rising stock market and ever-lower P/E ratios. That happened as earnings grew faster than the prices of the stocks! Why did prices not rise along with the earnings growth?

Now, gentle reader, we come full circle, back to the Dreman and Lufkin study. Investors, twice burned in the late ’60s and early ’70s, were reluctant to get back into the market in a large, overtly bullish way. They were cautious.

I think we may be in a reflection of that same period. While it is possible we have put in the lows for this cycle, I think that as the recession will be deeper and longer than most of us have experienced (think 1982), we will see more rounds of earnings disappointments. I think the market has more downside in its future. But sometime, whether it was last week, or a few quarters in the future, we are going to see a cycle low in terms of price.

But it will most likely be a repeat of 1974-1982. Lots of volatility. Very large run-ups followed by quick and vicious sell-offs on the way back up to new highs. This is NOT going to be a recovery back to new highs in two years. This is going to take a long time. Further, I don’t think nominal GDP will be 6% for the next three years, for reasons stated last week.

Investors are going to get their hearts broken by their favorite companies time and time again. The economic news will not be good for another year at a minimum. This is not the stuff that wild bull markets are made of. That time will come, but it is not yet.

That being said, I am a believer in American business. They will figure out how to maneuver and prosper in this new environment. In 12 years, earnings will have doubled from the trend of last year, which suggests earnings could be $140 in 2020. Put a multiple of 20 on that and we have an S&P 500 at 2,800, up over 3 times from today. That is the long view.

How Should We Then Invest?

Am I personally a buyer today, like Buffett? No, as I think that in a secular bear market you should see absolute returns rather than the relative returns of passive index investing. And, I think there is more pain to come in the market. But there are opportunities other than index funds or long-only mutual funds. So, where should we put money to work today?

1. While I don’t want to be long an index fund, if you are a stock picker (as Buffett is), then there is value out there. And if I am right and there is some more downdraft in the markets, then there will be more value in the near future. This is not a time for hope, it is a time for conviction. I wrote several long chapters in Bull’s Eye Investing on value investing. Vitaliy Katsenelson recently wrote a book called Active Value Investing. It is a good guide. Take your time. There is no hurry. But start your analysis and research now.
2. I like active absolute return managers and investing. In particular, I like actively managed commodity funds which have a bias for volatility. Note: this is NOT an endorsement of long-only commodity index funds. Also, there are a small number of active managers who have demonstrated an ability to navigate this market. As Buffett says, it is not until the tide goes out that we know who is swimming naked. We now have a MUCH better idea of what volatility can do to an investment manager and his systems, and who understands the meaning of the word hedge.
3. It is somewhat heretical to say it in this market, but there are specific styles of hedge funds I like. We are seeing the gut-wrenching demise of many black-box quantitative hedge funds. Hopefully, investors have learned their lesson. There is no free lunch. However, I think that long-short hedge funds (and the few mutual funds that use that style, like John Hussman’s) will once again find an environment in which they can prosper. If you want to be in the market, this makes a lot more sense to me.
4. I think that sometime next year it will be time to really think seriously about emerging market investments. Those markets have in general been beaten down far more than the developed-world markets. And the developed world is going to be growth-challenged in respect to emerging markets. You can find some real value. As an example, the largest liquor distributor in Thailand now pays an 8% dividend. Why? Because it was a large part of Thai index funds, and foreigners unloaded those funds in the current sell-off. And while Sweden can hardly be called emerging, last Thursday institutional investors were talking about the value there as foreigners have fled their markets, pushing values down.Now, here’s a rule. Write this down. If you are going to invest in an emerging market, make sure it is with someone who knows that local market. I do not want to have a manager with the name of Smith sitting in New York looking at a computer screen investing in Thailand for me, and neither should you! You need someone who understands the local scene.
5. Income is going to be critical. If you are going to put some money into bonds and other fixed-income instruments (not funds!), you should be doing it now. As I have been writing, there are simply steals out there in the fixed-income markets, as the margin clerks are forcing funds and individuals to sell any- and everything. The prices we see today will not be there in six months, and I doubt they will be there in three. If you are a fixed-income investor, you should be buying with both fists. But only if you know what you are doing. This is not the time for on-the-job training. Sometimes those bonds are selling at low numbers for a reason other than liquidity and margin calls. If you are not a seasoned fixed-income investor, then get professionals to help you. For portfolios of over $250,000 I can help you find a manager.
6. As I wrote months ago, we are seeing the rise of a new asset class I call Private Credit. These income and asset-backed lending funds are going to take market share from banks and become a market force of their own.
7. While today may not be the time in all markets, it will not be too long until you will be able to find either residential or commercial real estate at distressed prices almost anywhere, which you can buy and then rent out. Buying real estate at the right price and letting someone else pay down the loan is a proven formula for wealth in many a millionaire household.

In general, your target is not to beat the market. It is to beat zero. As I have written for years, the investors who win in this market are the ones who take the least damage.

Source: How Shall We Then Invest?

Many of us in the US are focused on our own woes. But this is a global credit crisis. In today’s Outside the Box, we take a look at the currency markets, which are in an historic upheaval and also look at what is going on in Europe. I suspect that Europe is in for a period of much distress, as the world begins to deleverage That is why one government after another will back the deposits of banks within their countries, for otherwise capital will flee to countries like Ireland and Germany which ARE guaranteeing the deposits for all banks in their borders. Many European banks are leveraged 50 to 1 (not a misprint). I suspect that more government will do like Belgium and the Netherlands and inject capital directly into their local banks deemed too big to fail.

First, from Dennis Gartman:The dollar and the Japanese yen reign absolutely supreme as the world continues the rush to exit from the EUR in whatever form it now holds them. Stock markets around the world are imploding it seems, and as they do, “risk” in any form is being unwound, forcing the Yen/EUR cross to move several “Big Figures” in the shortest span of time we have seen in our years of trading. Only in the “Russian/Emerging Markets Panic” in August of several years ago have we seen movements such as these. We stand in awe and we stand in fear.

Thus to begin, we say here this morning, mincing no words whatsoever, we are more frightened now for the future of the global capital markets than we have been at any time in our thirty+ years of watching, commenting upon and taking part in them. We are fearful… and we mean this fully… that we have passed the tipping point; that things are now spinning out of control; that forces have been unleashed that cannot be stopped without some truly massive, truly strong-handed, governmental action including the closure of markets and limits upon bank withdrawals, et al. These are troubling times, and our fear is palpable and growing. Worse, these concerns are giving rise to the likelihood that the Left shall be in ascension, and that manifestly left-of-centre, interventionist government lies ahead here in the US and in Europe. Higher, rather than lower taxes will be the end result. Greater… indeed very much greater… intervention in the capital markets lies ahead. Trade and act accordingly.

To put things into proper perspective, it is reasonable to see the Yen/EUR cross move within a 1 Yen range, high to low in any twenty four hour period of time. Beyond that, the situation becomes uncommon. 1.5 Yen movements, although not rare, are unusual, and 2 yen movements in the cross as “Black Swans” indeed. Now, it seems the world is filled with black swans, looking about for the few white ones that remain, for the Yen/EUR cross, having closed near 144.50:1 on Friday afternoon… which was already rather weak for the cross was trading 156 only a bit more than a week ago…is this morning trading 140.50!

We have long said that this cross relationship is the barometer of the relative health of the global capital markets, for over the course of the past several years as risk was embraced Mr. and Mrs. Watanabe would sell their Yen holdings and “swap” them for investments abroad that might return them more money. At the same time, foreign non-Japanese investors were very willing to borrow in Yen terms, take that low cost capital outside of Japan and invest elsewhere. This was the “Carry Trade” and it was one of the driving forced in the global capital market. Hedge funds around the world employed the “carry,” borrowing cheap Yen and investing into anything, anywhere around the world where the returns were larger. Once confidence began to ebb, however, and once the losses on the carry trade itself began to wane, the pressure upon those exposed grew.

Now, not only are those who borrowed Yen and bought EURs, or Aussie dollars, or Russian Rubles, or gold, or equities anywhere around the world, or debt securities of almost any kind, finding that they are losing money on the “cross” itself, they are losing more and vast sums on the investments they made. It is horror story writ large and getting larger.

Is there any fundamental investment reason to be bullish of the Japanese Yen? No there is not. The demographics of Japan are horrid as her population ages and begins to actually decline. We have written often of this demographic time-bomb that is exploding consistently over time in Japan. The country’s population is imploding and it continues to do so despite government policies aimed at changing that trend. However, once demographics as consequential as what is happening to Japan become entrenched, time… and very, very long periods of time,… decades certainly; centuries perhaps… are needed to reverse the course.

Thus, the only thing driving Yen higher is the panic liquidation of the “carry trade.” This unwinding has been going on for several months, having begun in earnest in July when the cross touched 170:1 ever-so-briefly. It took years to build the trade up as Yen was borrowed and the EUR bought since the turn of the Millennium. It may take months yet to unwind these years of accumulation. The process is not pretty. The damage wrought is enormous. The panic lies still ahead.

Moving on, the unwinding of the long EUR/short Yen cross is being made all the more dramatic as investors find reason to shun the EUR and investments in Europe generally as confusion regarding the EUR’s future has leaped dramatically to centre stage. As we pointed out last week, Dr. Milton Friedman once said regarding the EUR… in which he tended to have very little confidence…that he doubted it would last through its first real recession. His fears are being put to test today. The world is testing the very mettle of the European confederation experiment, and investors the world wide are watching to see just how well the officials in Brussels and Frankfurt can resolve their large and growing differences.

When the economic weather is mild, the “boat” that is a unified Europe runs pleasantly upon the water. The passengers may be a bit unruly, and they may argue amongst themselves, but their arguments rarely will tip the boat for at least the waters are calm. However, when the waters around the boat are riled, the least bit of unruly activity amongst the passengers is amplified and made serious. When the waters are riled, what would have passed for mere annoyance during periods of quiet become life-threatening instead. We are at that point.

This week I try to help you see what might lie ahead around the Curve in the Road. We look at how the rescue plan will function, see what is happening in the economy, and finally muse as to whether Muddle Through is really in our future. It will make for an interesting, if not very upbeat, letter, so strap in. I would like your promise to not shoot the messenger. I am just trying to give you some of my thoughts as to what may lie in our future. And remember, as you read this, we will get through it. There are better days “a’coming.”

The Curve in the Road

When you are out driving on a strange new road, you can’t see around the curve ahead. But you can read the warning signs to get an idea of what might be coming. And while we can’t really know how the developments in the economic world will actually unfold, there are some signs we can point to that might give us a few ideas.

First, let’s look at the “rescue plan” as passed by Congress. As I pointed out last week, this is a bad bill. But it was necessary to pass something, and soon. Earlier this week I sent out a report that reviewed a study of 42 major baking crises. The conclusion: navigating them successfully depended upon quick action.

As everyone should know, the credit markets are almost completely frozen. LIBOR is bid only, no offers. Commercial paper markets are imploding. And what is trading is often at rates that are much higher than they were a few months ago. Corporations are being strangled on high rates. Corporations have little or no access to normal credit markets, and they will face massive problems when it comes time for them to roll over short-term debt.

LIBOR has gone crazy. This is not an orderly market.

Look at the following chart from friend Greg Weldon. For most readers, the commercial paper market is something you don’t think about. But it is the lifeblood of business. We have seen this market drop by almost 30% in a year and by 10% in just the last three weeks! I simply cannot overstate how serious this is. Left unchecked, business activity in the US would soon slow enough to bring thoughts of the Great Depression. It will not be left unchecked.

The credit crisis is not simply a Wall Street issue. It has fast become a Main Street issue. And Main Street is where jobs are created and maintained.

As I have said repeatedly for months, the problem is that financial institutions are having to deleverage. They have massive losses and simply have to raise capital in order to survive. If you can’t raise equity capital (and most can’t), one of the ways you do that is to make fewer loans and to take less risk. You also charge more for the loans you do make.

Larger institutions cannot raise capital on competitive terms. GE is an AAA-rated company. Yet they had to pay Warren Buffett 10% to get $5 billion, plus in-the-money warrants worth at least another 10%. Buffett is likely to double his money on this deal over 4-5 years. A short while ago, GE could get short-term commercial paper for a few percentage points. That difference is going to significantly impact GE’s bottom line. But they had no real choice. They took the money.

As did Goldman Sachs. Yet another Buffett $5 billion preferred-share purchase (with more warrants) at a rate that even Goldman will find it hard to make money on. But they had to raise capital quickly, and they had little choice.

I had lunch with Michael Lewitt and Joe Harch yesterday. They were in town to meet with a client, and we took the opportunity to get together and share notes. They run (among other things) a collateralized loan obligation fund. They buy bank and corporate debt. They now have the opportunity buy well-collateralized loans from rated companies at prices well below par. They related story after story of debt from quality, highly rated companies selling below $.90 on the dollar, and some much lower.

If GE and Goldman are paying 10%, what do you think it costs a firm with “only” a B rating? 15%? More? Junk bond yields have simply gone ballistic. Firms which used the credit market to access capital now are simply shut out. If they are a small public company, they can go to what are known as PIPE hedge funds (Private Investment in Public Equity) and sell equity at usurious rates (which is what Buffett does but on a larger scale). But a small or medium-sized private company? It is a hard time to go looking for money.

Left alone for the markets to work out, the economy of the US and the world would be in a depression within two quarters and would need years to recover. Think Japan.

Philippa Dunne & Doug Henwood of The Liscio Report highlight a major study of 42 fairly recent banking crises around the world. Result? Some types of government intervention works and some don’t.

One characteristic that is needed though is speed. Dithering, a la Japan, is a recipe for disaster. This is a brief summary of the report (to which they provide a link) and their conclusions as to the basic outlines of what the US should do. Given that Europe is already in the throws of its own bank crisis, and the rest of the world could experience problems, this should be useful reading. They also provide graphs of banking crises and comparisons with developed countries and the resulting market experience.

One major point? This is like the old Fram oil filter commercial line “Pay me now or pay me later.” As this study points out, the tax payers and citizens of the US (and the world) are going to pay for this crisis in one way or another. Either a major recession (with high and persistent unemployment), reduced incomes and tax collections or a collective efforts to stabilize the banking system. The costs of inaction are much higher. It is not a matter of cost or no cost. We are going to have to pay in one form or another.

We cannot avoid the costs given where we are today. The time to avoid cost was years ago reigning in Freddie (FNM) and Fannie (FRE) and proper oversight of the mortgage industry. We (Congress) missed that opportunity. (Sadly, we are going to re-elect the very leadership to both parties largely responsible for the neglect. There is plenty of blame to go around. No amount of partisan finger pointing by Speaker Pelosi shifts that blame.)

However, we can choose the form of the cost will be paid in. Personally, I prefer collective efforts to 10% or more unemployment and the risk of an extended recession and its costs. I know this is not pure free market theory, and sticks in the craw of many of my readers, but when many of my neighbors and friends will be unemployed and businesses are suffering theory will not make a very good meal. Congress must act now. This report is a good reminder of what has worked in the past.

Having rejected Henry Paulson’s rescue plan, it’s not clear what Congress –or those in the broad population opposed to a “bailout”– propose to do to keep the financial system from imploding. But a database of systemic banking crises recently assembled by IMF economists Luc Laevan and Fabian Valencia provides a useful map of how crises play out and what does and doesn’t work.Laevan and Valencia identify 124 systemic banking crises between 1970 and 2007, and assemble detailed information on 42 of them, representing 37 countries. (Some countries, like Argentina, appear multiple times.)

In almost every case, governments took active measures to mitigate the crisis, so there is no real test of whether rescue schemes actually work; no politician seems willing to face the consequences of letting the chips fall where they may. But the work of Laevan and Valencia does offer some guidance as to what works best.

Dithering Costs

One crucial lesson stands out: speed matters. This is obvious to anyone who followed Japan’s dithering in the 1990s; standing aside and hoping the problem goes away is not a good idea. Relatedly, “forbearance” –regulatory indulgence, such as permitting insolvent banks to continue in business– does not work, as has been established in earlier research. As the authors say, “The typical result of forbearance is a deeper hole in the net worth of banks, crippling tax burdens to finance bank bailouts, and even more severe credit supply contraction and economic decline than would have occurred in the absence of forbearance.” This suggests that suspending mark-to-market requirements is not a good idea.

Since forbearance does not work, some sort of systemic restructuring is a key component of almost every banking crisis, meaning forced closures, mergers, and nationalizations. Shareholders frequently lose money in systemic restructuring, often lots of it, and are even forced to inject fresh capital. The creation of asset management companies to handle distressed assets is a frequent feature of restructurings, but they do not appear to be terribly successful. More successful are recapitalizations using public money (which can often be partly or even fully recouped through privatization after the crisis passes); recaps seem to result in smaller hits to GDP. But they’re not cheap: they average 6% of GDP, which for the U.S. would be about $850 billion.

Total fiscal costs, net of eventual asset recoveries, average 13% of GDP (over $1.8 trillion for the U.S.); the average recovery of public outlays is around 18% of the gross outlay.

But those who don’t want to spend that kind of taxpayer money should consider this: Laevan and Valencia find that “[t]here appears to be a negative correlation between output losses and fiscal costs, suggesting that the cost of a crisis is paid either through fiscal costs or larger output losses.” And if the economy goes into the tank, government revenues take a big hit, so what’s saved on the expenditure side could well be lost on the revenue side.

Oh, and about half the countries that have experienced crises have had some form of deposit insurance. So merely expanding the FDIC’s coverage is not likely to do the trick –and, in any case, it’s going to be hard to escape the huge expense of a systemic recapitalization, though using the FDIC might simplify the politics of the rescue.

(A note on the politics of the rescue: an ABC poll shows the public to be far more worried about the economic consequences of the bailout’s defeat than Congress seems to be. There’s not a lot of enthusiasm for what’s seen as handing money over to Wall Street –but if properly structured and sold, say with more cost recovery prospects for the government, more relief for debtors, a rescue is not as unpopular as some would have it.)

Relevant Examples

Most of the countries in the Laevan/Valencia database are in the developing world, and are of questionable relevance to the U.S. But TLR has taken a closer look at four countries that offer more relevant models: Japan, Korea, Norway, and Sweden. Some major stats for the four and the U.S. are in the table at the end of the newsletter, and graphs of some important indicators are there as well.

Sweden, now widely seen as a model of swift, bold action, kept its ultimate fiscal costs relatively low –3.6% of GDP at first, almost all of which was recovered through stock and asset sales– but was unable to avoid a deep recession. At the other end of the spectrum, Japan, the model of foot-dragging half-measures, saved no money through its procrastination; its fiscal outlay was 24% of GDP, almost none of which was recovered. And it was unable to avoid recession.

Note, though, that some of the worried talk surrounding the financial market impact of bank bailouts looks misplaced, at least on these models. Three years after the outbreak of crisis, inflation was lower and stock prices higher in all four countries, and government bond yields were lower in all but Japan. It’s likely that the deflationary effects of a credit crunch outweigh the inflationary effects of debt finance.

Although the U.S. in 2007 had a lot in common with other countries on the brink of a banking crisis, one thing stands out: the depth of the current account deficit. Of the four comparison countries, only Korea comes close to the U.S. level of red ink. The unweighted average current account deficit of the 42 countries in the Laevan/Valencia database was 3.9% of GDP –compared with 6.2% for the U.S. That suggests that the U.S. has more to deal with than just resolving a banking crisis.

The short answer is no, but let’s look at the data from one of the most knowledgeable sources on that topic. John Burns of John Burns Real Estate Consulting consults with over 2000 of the largest banks and homebuilders in the country (his client list is a who’s who of banks, builders, and hedge funds). He has a reputation for solid research and pulling no punches. Some of his hedge fund clients were the ones you read about who made billions. (He wishes he had negotiated a percentage!) He is deeply involved in analyzing trends in the housing market. His web site is www.realestateconsulting.com. He has graciously sent me the executive summary of his latest posting (a 27 page executive summary) that we will be looking at for the next few pages.

Let’s start with a quote from John at the beginning of his report: “The prospects for the U.S. housing market have changed for the worse. It has become increasingly clear that the U.S. economy is on the brink of recession, as overall job growth has slowed to zero and retailers are reporting abysmal results. New home sales, traffic and pricing are all heading down according to the results of our survey of over 300 builder executives. Resale [existing home] sales are starting to plateau in some markets, but pricing continues to fall as distressed sales dominate the market. The new housing bill will help in some ways, but will first serve a devastating blow to homebuilders, with the elimination of seller-funded down payment assistance, which accounts for 17% of new home demand by one estimate.”

How far along are we? Burns thinks that home prices will drop by 22%, 12% which has already occurred. His analysis differs from that of the Case-Shiller Indices, which suggests a much steeper decline. Note in the graph below that the Case-Shiller Index shows home prices rising more than does Burn’s work. Part of it is different methodology and part of it is the CS index focuses on major markets and Burns work is more broadly based.

However you slice it, there has been a lot of pain. Shiller’s work shows home prices in the areas he measure to be down about 17%. He said last week that he does not think it unlikely that we sill see home prices drop by as much as 30%, or about the same as during the Depression of the 30s. Burns see less of a drop, but from not as high a point, so they both end up close to the same end point.

The graph above shows Burns’ projection for the next few years. He thinks it will be 2011 before housing prices begin to turn back up on a nationwide basis, with national prices continuing to fall into 2010. That will not sit well with the pundits who keep telling us each month that we have seen the bottom.

For the difference in his numbers with Case-Shiller, he offers the following explanation: “The Case-Shiller national number, which is a “paired sales” analysis, showed much more price appreciation than other indices based on median prices. We suspect that there was a shift in the mix of homes sold to lower priced homes in 2006 due to subprime lending, which depressed the median value and showed large % increases in the paired sales index.”

Sales volumes are suffering. “We believe sales volumes have already fallen back to 1995 levels and will hit 1992 levels sometime next year, when they will begin to slowly rebound later in the year. We are already seeing rebounds in some of the hardest hit markets, such as Southern California, where sales fell to below the levels of the early 1990s. The rebound in sales will be driven by foreclosure buying activity and demand from real households that need to move for personal reasons and have been delaying their purchase for fear of further price corrections. Our 8% per year projected [starting in 2010] increase doesn’t get us back to normal sales volumes until after 2012, and that is because the tremendous excesses of this cycle moved many renters into homeownership earlier than usual, and allowed existing homeowners to “move up” to their dream home earlier than usual. Conservative mortgage lending will also prevent a sharp turnaround.”

]]> http://www.contrarianprofits.com/articles/housing-are-we-near-the-bottom/5428/feed 0 http://www.contrarianprofits.com/articles/who-holds-the-old-maid/5068 http://www.contrarianprofits.com/articles/who-holds-the-old-maid/5068#comments Sat, 30 Aug 2008 19:56:47 +0000 John Mauldin http://www.contrarianprofits.com/articles/who-holds-the-old-maid/5068 It’s All About the Spread… The Coming Bank Credit Crunch… More Thoughts on Fannie and Freddie… Who Is Holding the Old Maid?… When is the credit crisis going to end? How will we know?

The credit crisis is getting ready to enter its second phase. This week we examine what that means, and what the economic environment will look like over the coming quarters. We also (sadly) re-visit Freddie (FRE) and Fannie (FNM) and examine the risks that they put into the markets. Risks, by the way, that were sanctioned by regulators and encouraged by a Congress that took in hundreds of millions in campaign contributions and lobbying fees. We (the US taxpayer) have taken on a huge risk and potential…

]]> It’s All About the Spread… The Coming Bank Credit Crunch… More Thoughts on Fannie and Freddie… Who Is Holding the Old Maid?… When is the credit crisis going to end? How will we know?

The credit crisis is getting ready to enter its second phase. This week we examine what that means, and what the economic environment will look like over the coming quarters. We also (sadly) re-visit Freddie (FRE) and Fannie (FNM) and examine the risks that they put into the markets. Risks, by the way, that were sanctioned by regulators and encouraged by a Congress that took in hundreds of millions in campaign contributions and lobbying fees. We (the US taxpayer) have taken on a huge risk and potential loss for that paltry few hundred million. Sadly, those who encouraged that risk will by and large be voted back into office rather than ridden out of town on a rail (an old US custom, rather barbaric, but one which should maybe be revived for this purpose). It should make for an interesting letter as we count down the last days of summer.

But first, last winter I mentioned that I am looking for private equity and venture capital funds and investment professionals who specialize in those deals, and asked those who would be interested in looking at the potential deals I see from time to time to write me. I had a nice response, but my filing system is somehow inadequate to the task and I seemed to have misplaced about half the respondees. If you have not heard from me lately and would like to be “at the table,” just drop me a note at this email address. And now, let’s jump into the letter.

It’s All About the Spreads

Credit spreads have been increasing and getting ever more volatile. We are going to look at them in detail this week, as one of the signs that the credit crisis is waning will be when spreads start behaving more normally.

Briefly, when we talk about credit spreads we are generally talking about the difference between a benchmark cost of a bond or index and the higher cost for another unrelated loan or bond. As an example, as of Wednesday, a high-grade corporate bond yielded 3.15% more than US Treasury bonds, based on a Merrill Lynch index. Very roughly speaking, in finance terms that means a typical corporation paid 315 basis points more than a similar longer-dated US Treasury. Thus we talk about the spread being 315 basis points or bps. (A basis point is 1/100 of a percent, which means that there are 100 basis points for each 1% difference in interest rates.)

To see how much credit spreads have moved over the past year, let’s look at a few charts (I apologize for some of the fuzziness, but I had to resize them). The data is from www.investinginbonds.com . First, let’s look at the cost for a typical US financial firm. The cost has gone from 70 bps to 390 bps! That is over a 500% move – a big hit to margins and profitability.

Merrill Lynch US Financials Index

And it can get much worse for some banks. In the “for what it’s worth” department, Iraq’s bonds are now considered safer than those of many US banks. The country’s $2.7 billion of 5.8% bonds due 2028 have gained 45% since August 2007, according to Merrill Lynch & Co. indexes. Investors demand 4.84 percentage points more in yield to own the debt instead of Treasuries, down from 7.26 percentage points a year ago. The spread is narrower than for notes of Ohio banks National City Corp. and KeyCorp, suggesting Baghdad may be safer for bond investors than Cleveland. National City and KeyCorp, based in Cleveland, have debt ratings of A and spreads of 959 basis points (9.59%) and 7.55 basis points (7.55%), respectively. Iraq debt has no ratings. Clearly the market is ignoring the rating agencies which give the banks an “A” rating. Their debt is priced at the junk level. Go figure. (Source: Bloomberg)

Utilities, which you would think would be somewhat immune to the economic crisis and the recession, have seen their borrowing costs rise by almost 300%.

Merrill Lynch US Utilities Index

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