I call them the “zombies,” the institutions being propped up by government bailouts. Companies like Citigroup Inc. (NYSE: C), Bank of America Corp. (NYSE: BAC), General Motors Corp., Chrysler LLC, etc. On an operating level, these walking dead are sucking the life out of the recovery.

Unlike in previous downturns, huge resources have been devoted to propping up entities that should have been taken out of the picture.

Of course, it’s easy to avoid zombies directly. No one is going to force you to take a position in GM. But if you really want to know where to look for the bargains – for companies that have the greatest potential for serious growth in real numbers and real markets – you need to look for what I call “zombie-free zones.”

Unfortunately, the United States and the United Kingdom are not “zombie-free” zones – and thus offer the worst hunting ground available right now.

If you’re looking for something solid, there are only three places to aim your portfolio. In fact, my top three picks are…

Germany, Korea, and Canada.  All have an abundance of companies you can invest in with at least a good chance of not being forced to compete with the undead.

The Problem with Zombies

You see, the problem with zombie banks and companies is that they soak up resources that should be devoted to living banks and companies, while providing unfair competition that makes their competitors unsound.

It’s difficult to see this effect at the moment, because the U.S. Federal Reserve is propping up the banking sector. It’s much clearer in the automobile sector, where the zombies GM and Chrysler make it more difficult for Ford Motor Co. (NYSE: F) to compete. There’s no question that the continued existence of Chrysler after its first non-bankruptcy in 1979 drastically weakened Ford in the 1980s and 1990s.

There’s the effect on wages too. The United Auto Workers (UAW) union is a huge supporter of the GM and Chrysler rescues, partly because they keep UAW members employed at above-market wage rates. One certainly can sympathize with the great many American autoworkers that have lost their jobs, but by keeping the sector over-employed, the government is driving up wages and hurting businesses – particularly Ford, the only member of Detroit’s “Big Three” to not ask for a bailout.

The same effect can be seen in the banking sector. The bonus pool at JPMorgan Chase & Co. (NYSE: JPM) is partly inflated by the continued employment of all the Citibankers who should have lost their jobs. Since banking pay scales got over-inflated during the bubble, it is reasonable now for them to come back down to earth, but that’s not going to happen while banks are in their current undead state.

Turning to the international market, it is immediately clear that Britain has the same problem as the United States, only on a larger scale. Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC (NYSE ADR: RBS) and Lloyds Banking Group PLC (NYSE: LYG), two of Britain’s largest banks have been kept open by the government. (Though, to be fair, Lloyds only got in trouble because the government made it acquire another failing bank, HBOS.)

Financial services is a huge part of Britain’s economy, which needs to diversify, but it won’t be able to diversify if so much of its talent is locked up in banking, and its best graduates are sucked into the high-paying dealing rooms of the City of London.

Japan has the same problem. Here the zombies are really ancient, cobwebbed skeletons left over from the 1990 collapse of Japan’s bubble. Some of them were put out of their misery by Junichiro Koizumi, the reformist prime minister, in 2003. Yet just this week we learned that many Japanese retailers face losses because of competition from The Daiei Inc. and Ito-Yokado Co. Ltd., gigantic retailing companies that were effectively bankrupt in 1993 but have been propped up by Japan’s banks. If you’re afraid of zombies, Japan is really creepy!

Historically, Europe is the continent where investors have suffered most from zombies propped up by governments. Certainly some countries, notably Italy, are attractive only for investment necrophiliacs.

Where to Find “Zombie-Free Zones”

There are some exceptions. Germany has only a few relatively small zombies. Both Sachsen LB and IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, the banks that got in trouble buying U.S. subprime mortgage-backed bonds, have been sold to other buyers – Sachsen to a larger Landesbank and IKB to the private equity group Lone Star Funds. Whatever their subsequent fate, those banks are currently being managed on a profit-maximizing basis.

There is a large older zombie, Hypo Real Estate Holding AG, the former Bayerische Hypothekenbank, which got in trouble in the late 1990s lending to real estate in the former East Germany, but that appears an isolated example. Industrially, Germany has been admirably rigorous in cleaning up its dead companies, and with its new pro-market government looks attractive for zombie-fearing money.

In Asia, South Korea is probably your best bet. The country had a big zombie problem ten years ago, but that problem has been cleared up with the bankruptcy and reorganization of several conglomerates and much of the banking system. This time around, there have been few major casualties and so the economy looks relatively zombie-free.

Finally, there is our northern neighbor, Canada. Canadian housing never became as over-extended as U.S. housing, and the Canadian bank bailout was correspondingly smaller, with none of the banks facing bankruptcy. Canada had a bad zombie problem fifteen years ago from decaying heavy industry, but today those zombies are long gone and the Canadian economy is resilient. The most recent bankruptcy, Nortel Networks Corp. (OTC: NRTLQ) in Jan. 2009, is being handled in a thoroughly market-oriented fashion, with its assets being sold off piecemeal. So your money is safe in Canada – lots of snow, but no zombies!

Source: Why You Need to Look at these Three ‘Zombie-Free Zones’

On one hand, the $130 billion he spent on acquisitions – FleetBoston Financial Corp., MBNA Corp., LaSalle Bank Corp., Countrywide Financial Corp., Charles Schwab Corp.’s (Nasdaq: SCHW) U.S. Trust private banking unit and Merrill Lynch – that more than tripled the size of Bank of America, making it the largest U.S. lender both by assets and deposits.

On the other, his open-wallet policy and the example it set forth almost perfectly encapsulates the boom, bust and nascent rebound of the U.S. housing and banking crisis – which later became the financial plague that devastated markets all over the world.

In the second half of 2007, the extent of the U.S. housing crisis began to crystallize when Countrywide’s freewheeling subprime-lending policy irreversibly sank the nation’s largest home lender. Lewis moved in and acquired the troubled lender for $4 billion the following January, and in doing so, he put Bank of America on the hook for Countrywide $1.5 trillion loan portfolio.

In the second half of 2008, the extent of the how much havoc the destruction of investment banks and brokerage firms would wreak upon the world became clear. The vortex of it was Sept. 15, the day the Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (OTC: LEHMQ) declared bankruptcy and Bank of America agreed to pay $29 billion for world’s largest brokerage firm, Merrill Lynch, which probably would have failed had it not found a partner.

Lewis’ spending got Bank of America into this mess. The question now is whether continued  spending – using the $45 billion bailout courtesy of the U.S. Treasury’s Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) – will get BofA out of it.

And Lewis seems to acknowledge both in the news release announcing his voluntary departure.

“Bank of America is well positioned to meet the continuing challenges of the economy and markets,” Lewis said. “We are in position to begin to repay the federal government’s TARP investments. For these reasons, I decided now is the time to begin to transition to the next generation of leadership at Bank of America.”

Lewis naturally defends his actions just as much as critics chide him for them.

“Their loan portfolio is horrible looking and it’s not going to be easy for them,” Mike Williams, research director at Gradient Analytics in Scottsdale, Arizona, said in a Bloomberg News interview before Lewis announced his departure. “They would have been better off without the Merrill and Countrywide acquisitions over the next few years.”

Money Morning Contributing Editor Martin Hutchinson, a leading banking expert, says that Bank of America has a very difficult journey ahead of it.

“Lewis followed [predecessor CEO Hugh] McColl’s strategy of expanding BofA by acquisition,” he said. “The trouble is that his last 2 deals were both lousy. Countrywide was at the epicenter of all that was bad about housing finance, and that was obvious in January 2008, when he bought it. Just a terrible deal.”

In fact, Hutchinson believes there’s only one viable option for Bank of America.

“BofA will have to be broken up, but may need to be sorted out by a liquidator/ the government,” he said.

Spinning Merrill

The Merrill merger was perhaps the defining moment in Lewis’ tenure, and he Lewis has played the victim and hero of the saga.

Lewis testified that U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke and former U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry M. “Hank” Paulson Jr. pressured him not only to move ahead with a merger with Merrill Lynch despite reservations, but also to stay quiet about the mounting losses at the crumbling investment bank.

And in a note to employees announcing his departure, he took credit for the fact that Merrill has contributed 24% to the Bank of America’s first-half profit, boosted trading and investment-banking revenue, Bloomberg reported.

“I am gratified that even some of the critics of our acquisition of Merrill Lynch have come to acknowledge how well the deal is working out for our clients,” Lewis wrote. “This journey has been a rocky one and not for the faint of heart, but perseverance is paying off.”

But to the rest of the world, Lewis was most often seen sitting under the hot light of probes by Congress, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and New York’s attorney general all trying to determine if Lewis misled investors about Merrill’s losses and bonuses.

And even if shareholders agreed with Lewis’ decisions, they didn’t prefer him to be the company’s face. In April, shareholders voted 50.34% in favor of stripping Lewis of his chairman title.

Changing of the Guard

When Lewis steps down from his post Dec. 31, he joins the ranks of fellow financial firm executives – James Cayne of The Bear Stearns Cos., Charles Prince of Citigroup Inc. (NYSE: C), Stanley O’Neal of Merrill, Kennedy Thompson of Wachovia and Richard Fuld of Lehman Brothers, John Thain of  Merrill Lynch – that resigned, many in disgrace, either during or in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.

Among the survivors, Lloyd Blankfein, CEO of Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (NYSE: GS), and Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan Chase & Co. (NYSE: JPM).

Bank of America said it will find a replacement by Lewis’ last day, and media outlets have already began making lists of possible successors.

Among the names frequently mentioned:

• Brian Moynihan, head of Bank of America’s consumer and small business banking unit.
• Sallie Krawcheck, former Citigroup Inc. (NYSE: C) CFO and president of Bank of America’s global wealth and investment management unit.
• Tom Montag, former Merrill executive and head of Bank of America’s corporate and investment banking unit.

An outsider might well be the best choice, says Money Morning’s Hutchinson.

Lewis is “leaving a company that no human being could manage, with vast problems, and far too broad a franchise,” Hutchinson said. “North Carolina retail bankers haven’t a clue how to run a top international investment bank like Merrill and vice versa. There’s nobody available to succeed him that can do the job.”

Source: Boom, Bust and Rebuild: Bank of America and the Kenneth Lewis Legacy

Now, JPMorgan Chase & Co.  (NYSE: JPM) has issued a report suggesting that investment-banking returns on capital will be sharply down over the next few years. Perhaps this will be only a moderate downturn.

However, there’s also a good chance that labor-cost pressures – combined with tightening margins – will take the likes of JPMorgan and Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (NYSE: GS) down a path similar to that of General Motors Corp. (NYSE: GRM) and Chrysler Group LLP, both of which earlier this year declared bankruptcy.

Challenging Headwinds

JPMorgan anticipates that the regulatory changes that are likely to take place over the next year or so will reduce investment banks’ return on equity (ROE) to around 11% – down from its previous forecast of 15%.

More capital will be needed for trading activity, which naturally reduces the return on capital from that activity. However, there will also be effects from new transparency requirements on derivatives. (Most – if not all – derivatives will have to be traded and cleared across central exchanges.) And tighter limits on commodities positions will prevent firms from cornering less-active markets.

This effect will be concentrated on investment banks themselves – firms such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley (NYSE: MS) – as well as on the investment banking activities of such firms as Credit Suisse Group AG (NYSE: CS), Deutsche Bank AG (NYSE: DB), Citigroup Inc. (NYSE: C), and JPMorgan Chase.

Old-fashioned commercial banking, on the other hand, will likely become somewhat more profitable. That’s because the sharp reduction in securitization activity has reduced the excessive competition for much of the lending business. It’s also improved the lending business profitability.

Investment banks will have to reduce their headcount by another 3% from present levels and cut their overall cost per employee by another 15%, to around $543,000 in 2011, according to the JPMorgan study.

What agony! (Actually, that joke is not quite fair – the cost per employee includes the building, the equipment and all the fancy information services, so the take-home is much less. Even so, these guys – at least those who keep their jobs – won’t starve.)

The New Reality

We are so used to investment banking growing and becoming increasingly more profitable – on virtually an uninterrupted basis – that we have never even considered what might happen if that trend were to reverse.

Even after last year’s crash, Goldman Sachs reported record second quarter profits in 2009. Spreads in all kinds of trading widened dramatically and Goldman found its market share dramatically increased after the demise of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (OTC: LEHMQ).

But here’s the thing: The trillions of dollars poured into the markets by the U.S. Treasury Department and the U.S. Federal Reserve were the driving force behind those profits. Investment banks like Goldman weren’t just given a level playing field – they were given one that was essentially (and artificially) cleared of obstacles. Even the few “competitors” that remained were hobbled by their past mismanagement.

Investment banking is not particularly difficult or intellectually challenging. And the proliferation of new and complex products that turbocharged the profit growth of investment banks during the past few decades won’t continue. Any new financial product will be forced to run a gauntlet of regulatory bureaucrats before being allowed to emerge.

Had the credit-default swap (CDS) been invented today, can anyone doubt that it would have been fenced in by restrictions so onerous that the damaging derivative would have never made it to market? The painful memories of last year’s near-unraveling of the global financial markets are still fresh. So it’s unlikely that investment banks would be able to get the regulatory nod for a big-risk strategy that is likely to result in a taxpayer bailout.

The bottom line is clear: The reduction in U.S. investment banking profitability is likely to be permanent, with various rent-seeking scams blocked. In this post-crisis era, investment pools from China, the Middle East and other parts of Asia – backed by increasingly sophisticated financial players in those markets – will acquire the necessary capabilities to enter the market and further reduce the returns of domestic investment banks.

We have seen this before: An industry, previously very profitable, finds itself hemmed in by government restrictions and its most-profitable products get regulated out of existence. Foreign competition enters the market and grinds away at the domestic market share.

The natural reduction of competitors doesn’t happen, as one or more are bailed out by taxpayers and survive to continue competing for the business.  Legacy costs of remuneration promises made when things were better place an ever-increasing burden on the industry’s returns. Reducing the work force pay becomes very difficult, as the workers have great power over production and resist the necessary downsizing of their excessive pay.

Sound familiar? Last time, it was the U.S. auto industry, and the eventual result was the bankruptcy of GM and Chrysler. Reducing pay to a work force when market conditions become harsh is extremely difficult, if now downright impossible.

Of course, investment bankers have no United Automobile Workers (UAW) representing them. But shareholders will know from past experience that the investment-banking work force’s ability to suck up available profits is huge, whereas losses suddenly devolve back on shareholders.

Don’t forget, militant autoworkers could only beat up “scabs” when their livelihood was threatened. Militant traders could re-jig the computer systems so that the trading algorithms worked backwards, producing losses instead of profits. In an era of credit default swaps and millisecond trading, this could wipe out shareholders in half an hour of frantic activity before anyone realized what had gone wrong in an era of credit default swaps and millisecond trading.

It may take a couple of decades for the investment banking business to decline, as it did for the much larger U.S. auto industry. But by 2030, collapse could loom.

The comparison isn’t a stretch. In fact, it wasn’t just a ticker-symbol letter – “G” – that  the two companies shared: GS for Goldman Sachs, and GM when General Motors was still a public company. It turns out that their underlying business models also shared similar strategic flaws. And those flaws put the two on a similar path to ruin at the hands of forces that grew out of the crises in their particular industries – crises that they each helped create.

Source: Could Goldman Sachs Share GM’s Fate?

Stock market bulls aren’t concerned about the inevitable acceleration in bank failures — at least for now. Even though deposits will be insured against loss, the loss of local banks will still have a depressing effect on hundreds of small communities. These communities are going to lose their only access to business credit when their local zombie banks — loaded with toxic construction or commercial real estate loans — are liquidated or merged into other weak banks.

Meanwhile, the latest monthly figures show that commercial bank balance sheets are shrinking at a fairly rapid rate, due to a combination of several factors: loan charge-offs, older loans are being paid back at a faster rate than new loans are being made, and regulators pressuring banks to build larger capital buffers.

So credit-fueled growth in consumption or investment is not occurring. Combine this with stagnant or declining wages and corporate profit margins and it becomes hard to imagine how GDP will rebound on a sustainable basis. GDP is the stat that every money manager fixates upon — despite the fact that GDP does not accurately measure true economic progress; it’s like evaluating a stock purely on sales growth, without thinking about what’s driving sales, and whether these sales are sustainable or accretive to wealth.

Nominal GDP is calculated as “consumption + investment + government spending + exports – imports.” Then, government statisticians subtract a highly doctored CPI figure from annualized changes in the above variables to get “real GDP growth.”

Note that all the variables in the GDP equation can be pumped up by excessive credit growth. As I mentioned in the Sept. 4 alert, if GDP is growing at the expense of degraded balance sheets, the end results are never happy. Japan’s GDP stayed higher than it otherwise would have been in the 1990s despite the incredibly wasteful spending on bridges to nowhere. Its policymakers reacted to a huge misallocation of capital into real estate in the 1980s by misallocating capital into government projects and subsidies to favored industries.

U.S. policymakers are following this playbook even faster, only without acknowledging one crucial difference: Japan had a high household savings rate to finance its government deficits, while the U.S. does not. Plus, the U.S. has already “dollarized” the rest of the world, and there are signs international demand for dollars has reached its saturation point.

The gold and commodities markets are reacting to this unpleasant reality. These markets are starting to discount the fact that the Fed will be the aggressive buyer of last resort for all types of debt securities. We’ve likely only seen the beginning of growth in the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. As long as it can get away with it, the Fed will keep creating new money out of thin air to finance the U.S. federal deficit. Plus, via its liquidity facilities, the Fed and the megabanks will keep swapping Treasuries for legacy toxic securities marked at fantasy levels.

A few wild cards could disrupt this benign “reflationary” environment we’ve been in since the March stock market bottom, resulting in the stock market taking another nasty leg down:

1. If the “audit the Fed” bill were to pass and result in more handcuffs on the Fed, it would help to slow the reckless debasement of the U.S. dollar. But if it put an end to the Fed’s exotic lending facilities, which would force the owners of toxic securities to retain and mark them down sooner, then we could see a return to the January-early March 2009 stock market environment — only most of the damage would be contained to the financial sector as equity of insolvent institutions gets wiped out or diluted.
2. Contraction in the real economy and state governments could easily overwhelm expansion in the “federal government economy.”
3. International holders of trillions in paper U.S. assets could accelerate the rate at which they diversify into real assets. That’s how we could see a spike in “money velocity” that the deflationist camp says is a necessary condition for the CPI to rise. Most of the price pressure will be felt in oil prices, especially later in 2010 and 2011, when today’s underinvestment in new oil projects leads to tight international supplies.

I’d like to bring to your attention one more thing about today’s investing climate, because it’s being used so often lately in the media to justify today’s nosebleed stock valuations: the “money on the sidelines” fallacy. Growth or contraction in the current balance of $3.5 trillion in money market funds depends on how much companies look to borrow in the commercial paper market — not on the level of the stock market, as so many seem to believe.

Those who point to the $3.5 trillion in money market funds as if it’s a bucket that can be “poured” into the stock market bucket to keep the rally going do not understand that money does not go “into” or “out of” the market, but through the market. Trader A sells every share bought by Trader B. Once this transaction settles, cash goes one way and shares the other. The price at which the transaction takes place depends on how badly Trader B wants to own shares, not how many money market shares are in his account.

Also, money market fund balances represent very liquid short-term loans; they reflect an amount of money that’s already been spent in the economy and will be paid back over a very short time frame. John Hussman — one of the best mutual fund managers, in my view — refutes the “cash on the sidelines” fallacy best. It’s worth reading and remembering the next time you hear a talking head arguing that the rally can keep going because of liquidity.

Washington Federal Closes Offering; Now We Wait for Earnings

Yesterday, Washington Federal (WFSL) announced that its secondary stock offering would generate net proceeds of $333 million. This works out to a per share price of $13.79, including underwriting discounts and expenses and assuming full exercise of the underwriter’s overallotment. Here is an example of cash going “into” stocks, because these are newly issued, rather than existing, shares in the secondary market.

As I noted in Monday’s flash alert, I expect the offering will be necessary to absorb a mounting wave of net charge-offs in the future. It’s possible that this offering plan became a necessity after a friendly suggestion from regulators to raise more capital.

On Wednesday, WFSL stock rallied on high volume, but did not reflect organic demand for the stock. JP Morgan (NYSE:JPM) was the sole book-running manager for the Washington Federal offering. Knowing that it would likely receive a few million WFSL shares as a form of compensation in the underwriters’ overallotment, JPM’s trading desk probably established a short position that it plans to cover by delivering the shares it will receive upon the closing of the deal. This likely explains the bizarre trading moves in the stock this week: When institutions were more interested than expected, resulting in a higher offering price of $14.50, JPM likely covered some of their short position.

As for the analyst reaction to the offering, the two analyst notes I saw might as well be corporate press releases, because they expect this new capital to be deployed into an FDIC-assisted rollup of lots of zombie banks in the Pacific Northwest. Also, these analysts cite WFSL’s “strong” capital ratios without adjusting for future credit losses. One might suspect that these analysts have not even read the asset quality footnotes in Washington Federal’s SEC filings.

The big losses WFSL will take on construction loans are obvious, no matter how long management claims it will be able to sit on them. But what’s not obvious to the market — yet — is the rapid future loss formation in its $6.7 billion mortgage book. Management has set aside practically zero allowance for loan losses against its mortgage book. See the chart below for the allocation of WFSL’s allowance by loan type.

WFSL carries a mere $18.8 million loss allowance against its $6.7 billion book of mortgages — a ratio of just 0.28% of assets. The harsh reality of the mortgage crisis tells us that this $6.7 billion asset value is overstated, along with capital ratios (or equity); it should be marked down by far more than $18.8 million. Yet WFSL’s accounting translates as follows: Management does not expect more than $18.8 million in cumulative credit losses in mortgages (defaults, net of recoveries after foreclosure) through the rest of this credit cycle, despite the fact that the majority of these mortgages are now underwater and the job market remains weak.

As you can see in the chart, the ratio of loss allowance to nonperforming loans (by category) has shrunk dramatically. In December 2007, WFSL’s residential mortgage loss allowance was $13 million, and its nonperforming mortgages were also $13 million. As of June 30, this loss allowance had been built up to $18.8 million, but nonperforming mortgages had grown to $119 million (and will keep growing). This loss coverage ratio has shrunk from 100% to 16% over the past six quarters (as shown in the chart’s blue line) and needs to be built back up to a respectable level. And the only way for WFSL to build it up is to book large credit provision expenses in future income statements.

Washington Federal’s “strong” capital ratios are a function of hopeful accounting. I expect the market to come around to this view — not only for WFSL, but also for the entire banking sector. Ever since the loosening of mark-to-market accounting rules last April, the creators and users of financial statements have collectively chosen to deny reality and bury their head in the sand about the future direction of market values for collateral backing loans — and the value of the loans themselves.

Everyone is waiting and hoping for a miraculous rebound in housing prices and the labor market, when we have yet to see the bottom in either. When reality sets in, this will not end well for owners of bank stocks, REITs, and other financial stocks. These stocks are claims on assets that are marked to fantasy levels.

Mark-to-market suspension has slowed the rate at which losses are recognized, but this self-delusional accounting practice cannot make the losses disappear, and will likely make these cumulative, stretched-out losses even bigger in the future by rationing credit to the healthier parts of the economy.

Regards,
Dan Amoss

Source: GDP’s Debt to Credit

The first time around, the three-headed federal serpent – the Bush administration, the Treasury Department and the U.S. Federal Reserve – used Fannie Mae (NYSE: FNM) and Freddie Mac (NYSE: FRE) to “legitimize” trillions of dollars worth of toxic financial waste known as subprime mortgages.

The result was the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression – a mess that was global in nature.

And we’re now headed for a repeat performance.

Some of the players may have changed since the first subprime-mortgage crisis, but the game apparently remains the same. With banks currently unwilling to lend, the new federal triumvirate of the Obama administration, the Treasury and the Fed are trying to inflate the moribund U.S. housing market. This time around, however, the FHA is the weapon of choice.

Obama & Co. are making an all-or-nothing bet that the U.S. economy will recover and bail out the housing market before the final bill for this ill-advised gambit comes due.

When this bubble bursts – and it will – U.S. taxpayers will be on the hook for more than $1 trillion in government-guaranteed debt.

Ginnie Mae: Fannie and Freddie’s Once-Quiet Cousin

As a direct result of the real-estate meltdown, U.S. banks have become reluctant lenders. And they’ve raised their loan standards considerably. Federal officials knew they had to keep the mortgage spigot open, especially to suspect borrowers, so they turned to their new “secret weapon” – the FHA.

The FHA has been cranking out new government-insured subprime loans, which it packages into government guaranteed securities for sale to banks. This frightening reflation of the subprime bubble is being engineered for two key reasons:

• To put a floor under falling house prices.
• And to let banks swap toxic Fannie and Freddie securities for new toxic debt that is 100% guaranteed by U.S. taxpayers.

The almost inevitable insolvency of the FHA could rapidly undermine the fragile recovery of the U.S. economy. And it could plunge stock prices and bank viability to new lows.

Why the FHA?

That’s simple. In an era of increasingly stringent lending standards, the FHA’s standards are laughably lax.

Created by the National Housing Act of 1934, the FHA insures private mortgage lenders against borrower default on residential real estate loans. But its current allure is that it opens the door to prospective homebuyers who almost certainly wouldn’t qualify for a conventional home mortgage. These are buyers with no credit history, a history of credit problems, or not enough cash to cover the down payment and closing costs.

The FHA has quadrupled its insurance guarantees on mortgages in just the last three years, with the bulk of that growth coming in the past two years. Currently, the FHA insures $560 billion of mortgages.

Loans that are FHA-insured are pooled and packaged into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) by the Government National Mortgage Association, more commonly known as Ginnie Mae. Ginnie Mae insures the actual MBS pools composed of FHA loans. Ginnie Mae securities are the only mortgage-backed securities backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government.

Two weeks ago, Ginnie Mae proudly announced that it had issued a monthly record $43 billion in FHA mortgage-backed securities, and through the end of July held guaranteed securities with a value of $680 billion. It is on track to exceed $1 trillion worth of guaranteed securities by the end of calendar year 2010.

Ginnie Mae is a cousin of its better-known siblings Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Those two mortgage giants are technically insolvent, and were forced into government conservatorship at the height of the financial crisis – ostensibly due to concerns that foreign central banks in China, Japan, Europe, the Middle East and Russia might stop buying our bonds. As “government-sponsored enterprises,” or GSEs, Fannie and Freddie were only supposed to have the “implicit” backing of the U.S. government. But recent events have shown these to be fully backed by taxpayers.

The implosion of Fannie and Freddie severely threatened the mortgage market. It essentially shut down the two giant repositories that bought the loans banks and mortgage originators didn’t want to hold as assets on their own balance sheets.

The FHA and its mortgage-backed securities “factory” – Ginnie Mae – have taken up where Fannie and Freddie left off, and are now the dumping ground for toxic mortgages. Using the FHA is the core strategy in the administration’s misguided effort to prop up mortgage origination and modifications, real estate prices and insolvent banks.

Warning Signals?

Administration officials might want to take heed of some eerie parallels between the current situation and the one involving Fannie and Freddie. They could serve as an early warning system.

First and foremost, the FHA has already started to acknowledge systemic fraud in its business. In the earlier subprime crisis, similar circumstances led to the revelation of massive fraud in the issuance, packaging, ratings and sale of subprime toxic mortgage-backed securities.

On Aug. 4, the FHA suspended Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corp., one of its largest approved independent mortgage originators, from making anymore FHA-backed loans. The suspension came one day after federal investigators raided Taylor Bean’s Ocala, Fla., headquarters.

Since 2007, the value of FHA-backed loan originations underwritten by Taylor, Bean had soared 117%. By contrast, the origination of conventional loans by the firm dropped 34% over the same period. Taylor, Bean subsequently filed for bankruptcy.

Earlier this summer, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which oversees the FHA, raised concerns about FHA practices. On June 18, HUD released an internal inspector general’s report that revealed that the FHA’s default rate exceeded 7% and that more than 13% of its insured loans were delinquent by more than 30 days.

In a “Review and Outlook” piece, The Wall Street Journal reported that the FHA’s reserve fund dropped from 6.4% in 2007 to about 3% today, putting it dangerously close to its mandated 2% minimum. That translates to a “33-to-one leverage ratio, which is into Bear Stearns territory,” the newspaper report stated, referring to the now-failed investment bank that had been a central player in the original subprime mortgage crisis.

Bear Stearns is now owned by JPMorgan Chase & Co. (NYSE: JPM).

The HUD inspector general’s report stated that the agency’s growth makes it “vulnerable to exploitation by fraud schemes” and that it may need “Congressional appropriation intervention.”

In a recent article – “FHA Disputes Whispers of Capital Reserve Problems” – on the Mortgage News Daily Web site, HUD Secretary Shaun Donovan said in June that “there’s a better than even chance that we will stay above the two percent reserve threshold. That suggests, not just for the 2010 business, but overall for the portfolio, that we’ll more than likely to stay out of a broader need for any taxpayer funding.”

It may be more than a little disheartening to know that in a very uncertain economic environment, precisely due to fraud in mortgage lending and increasing borrower defaults, that our government is stretching a 50/50 wager on the backs of taxpayers.

That’s only part I of the FHA dilemma story.

Part II is even more frightening.

A Look Ahead

Banks are dumping Fannie and Freddie-backed securities onto the Fed’s balance sheet and replacing them on their own balance sheets with FHA-insured loans packaged into government-insured securities issued by Ginnie Mae. Banks aren’t reducing their net assets, they are aggressively swapping acknowledged toxic securities that no-one wants for a new variety that no one will want in the future. Why?

It’s not just that Ginnie Maes are fully backed by the U.S. taxpayers and Fannie and Freddie’s securities are only implicitly backed. All of them will be covered by taxpayers.

The devil is in the details.

Because Fannie and Freddie securities are only implicitly guaranteed, banks that hold these securities as assets on their balance sheets must “haircut,” or set aside reserves, based on a 20% risk-weighting assigned to the value of those holdings.

Because Ginnie Maes are explicitly 100% guaranteed, they are considered “risk free,” and on par with U.S. Treasury bonds, notes and bills. There is no reserve requirement, or haircut, on Ginnie Mae securities.

By replacing their asset mix and holding Ginnie Maes, banks don’t have to set aside reserves. They can use the money they otherwise would have to set aside to actually leverage-up their balance sheets. And guess what they’re buying?

More Ginnie Maes, naturally.

The effect of the asset swap – basically one toxic pool for a replacement that’s not much better – creates the illusion that banks have healthier balance sheets and that they are meeting their reserve requirements. It’s such a good deal for the banks and actively promoted by the Fed and Treasury, that banks are using Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) money to buy Ginnie Maes.

But it’s all a façade.

Capital ratios are being manipulated and insolvent banks are being propped up.

The danger of relying on the FHA to prop up the shaky housing market by facilitating mortgage origination, modifications and refinancing to less-than-stellar borrowers will only result in more subprime loans being stockpiled on the Federal Reserve balance sheet.

Eventually, defaults will overwhelm the FHA. And the hoped-for floor in residential real estate pricing will be pulled out from under us all. The next down-round in real-estate values will expose bank balance sheets for what they really are: Over-leveraged and over-stuffed with junk. Already on the ropes, banks will lose capital and will have to tighten the credit screws on consumer borrowers even more.

We may be headed for another bruising round of real-estate and MBS-related depreciation. Even a mild financial-markets setback could put the economy and the stock market onto the canvas for a 10-count. Further pummelling of shaky consumer confidence accompanied by a couple of major bank failures could easily send the U.S. market down for the financial-system equivalent of a TKO.

Taxpayers, always the lowly cornermen holding the spit buckets, are already in place with the safety nets. We will catch the FHA loans because we insure private lenders against subprime borrowers with no skin in the game. We then will have to catch the buyers of Ginnie Maes, because we guarantee those MBS securities. And we will be forced to catch the falling banks, because we already insure depositors through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC).

Perhaps our ultimate fate is that of the permanently punchdrunk veteran boxer, who rues his decision to stay in the game, realizing that he fought “one bout too many.” If that’s the case, that “one bout too many” could be Subprime Crisis II, arranged by the very market referees whose job it was to protect us from such beatings.

Source: How the Government is Setting Us Up for a Second Subprime Crisis

After slashing its forecast for the region in March, the ADB reversed course in its updated Asian Development Outlook (ADO) 2009. The bank said developing economies in Asia would grow by 3.9% this year, up from its previous forecast of 3.4%.

“Despite worsening conditions in the global economic environment, developing Asia is poised to lead the recovery from the worldwide slowdown,” said ADB Chief Economist Jong-Wha Lee.

However, the growth will not be evenly distributed. Economic growth in East Asia will be driven largely by China’s dynamic economy. But economic growth in Southeast Asia will be sluggish, because the recoveries of Vietnam and Indonesia will not be enough to offset weakness in Malaysia, Thailand and Cambodia.

ADB boosted its outlook for annual economic growth in China to 8.2% from 7% earlier this year, and the bank believes China’s economic expansion will accelerate to 8.9% next year. That will help push economic growth in East Asia to an annual rate of 4.4%, compared to 0.1% growth in Southeast Asia.

ADB had underestimated China’s resilience in March when it predicted just 3.6% growth for East Asia.

“In the People’s Republic of China, aggressive monetary easing and the massive fiscal stimulus package rolled out by the government bolstered the region’s largest economy, which is now expected to grow by 8.2% in 2009 and 8.9% in 2010, up from the March forecast of 7% and 8% respectively,” said ADB.

Indeed, the potency of China’s $587 billion (4 trillion yuan) stimulus plan caught many analysts off guard.  Two of the world’s key global institutions – the World Bank and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) – and a large swath of investment banks were forced to raise their 2009 and 2010 growth estimates for China’s economy after the country announced second-quarter gross domestic product (GDP) growth of 7.9%.

The OECD said it now expects China’s economy to grow by 7.7% this year and the World Bank boosted its projection to 7.2% growth.  GDP will expand by 9.3% in 2010, according to OECD estimates.

BNP Paribas SA (OTC: BNPQY), Barclays Capital, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (NYSE: GS), JPMorgan Chase & Co. (NYSE: JPM), UBS AG (NYSE: UBS), Morgan Stanley (MS), Standard Chartered Bank, and RBC Capital Markets all raised their forecasts for China’s economy as well.

China’s stimulus package gave the economy a big kick in the first half of the year, spurring bank lending and driving fixed asset investment. It even stimulated the oft-maligned Chinese consumer, boosting domestic demand while the market for exports remained dormant.

Chinese banks lent about $1.08 trillion (7.37 trillion yuan) in the first half of the year, nearly double the total loans extended throughout all of 2008.

Fixed-asset investment rose 33.5% in the first half year to $1.34 trillion (9.132 trillion yuan), according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Investment in infrastructure rose 57.4% year-over-year, with spending on railways up 126.5% and highway spending up 54.7%. Property sales were up 53% in the first six months from a year earlier.

Of course, fixed-asset investment has been consistently strong in China for the past decade. The real turnaround in the past six months has been that the frugal Chinese consumer has begun to spend more liberally.

China’s retail sales in the first half of the year rose 15% to $859.6 billion (5.87 trillion yuan).

Still, the ADB did warn Asian countries that their strong recovery is still uncertain and said they should continue to carry out stimulus measures until Western countries catch up.

“The improved regional outlook should not make developing Asian economies complacent,” said Lee. “A protracted global slowdown or the hasty withdrawal of stimulus packages can degrade the region’s ongoing recovery.”

Source: Asian Economies to ‘Lead the Recovery,’ Says ADB

But since then, little progress has been made on financial regulatory reform, and many of the large investment banks that received billions of dollars in government bailouts are booking huge profits on the same risky wagers they were making before the financial crisis.

In fact, the five biggest banks in the country – Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (NYSE: GS), JPMorgan Chase & Co. (NYSE: JPM), Citigroup Inc. (NYSE: C), Wells Fargo Corp. (NYSE: WFC), and Bank of America Corp. (NYSE: BAC)  – posted second quarter profits totaling $13 billion.

That’s more than double what they made in the second quarter of 2008 and almost two-thirds as much as the $20.7 billion they earned in the second quarter of 2007, when the economy was still strong, CNBC reported.

Goldman Sachs reported record earnings in the second quarter. As was the case before the financial meltdown, Goldman leaned heavily on its trading desk for revenue. Trading revenue accounted for 50% of the firm’s total revenue. At $6.8 billion, trading revenue was up 186% from the second quarter of 2008.

The bank also saw a massive bump in equity trading where revenue jumped to $2.2 billion – a 110% quarterly increase.

The story was much the same at JPMorgan whose investment-banking operations generated $1.47 billion of profit, almost quadruple the amount earned in last year’s second quarter.

Investment-banking fees – which zoomed 29% from a year ago and 62% from the first quarter – totaled $2.2 billion, and were a “record for any investment bank in any quarter,” according to JPMorgan Chief Financial Officer Michael J. Cavanagh.

Citigroup and Bank of America- which received some $45 billion in government bailout funds – also topped profit estimates in the second quarter.

Of course, it’s not the fact that Wall Street has returned to profitability that’s raised the hackles of analysts, it’s that Wall Street firms are turning huge profits by employing much of the same risky behavior that led to Lehman’s undoing.

“We’re seeing the same kind of behavior from the banks, and that could lead to some huge and scary parallels,” Simon Johnson, former chief economist with the International Monetary Fund, told CNBC.

For instance, banks are still making bets that put far more money at stake than they have on hand to cover potential losses. The five biggest banks average potential losses from a single day of trading topped $1 billion in the second quarter, up 76% from two years ago, according to regulatory filings.

Even more disconcerting is that banks are still packaging risky mortgages into securities and selling them as investments, which is precisely the behavior that helped inflate the real estate bubble and lead to the financial meltdown.

With the full blessings of ratings agencies, banks are repackaging their money-losing securities into higher-rated ones called re-securitization of real estate mortgage investment conduits, or “re-remics,” The New York Times reported. At least $30 billion in residential re-remics have been done this year, according to Morgan Stanley (NYSE: MS).

Wall Street bankers have even set out to create new and exotic financial products, including the securitized life insurance policies.

Indeed, bankers plan to buy so-called “life settlements,” which are life insurance policies that sick and elderly people sell for cash, and package them into bonds for investors. This essentially creates a whole new bond market that lets firms gamble on the lives of thousands of people.

Many analysts fear that insurers will have to raise premiums, because they could end up paying more death claims out to investors than they previously had anticipated. That is, if a policy is purchased and packaged into a security, investors will keep paying the premiums that might have otherwise been abandoned by policyholders. If that’s the case insurance companies will have based their premiums on false assumptions.

“The securitization of life settlements adds another element of possible risk to an industry that is already in need of enhanced regulations, more transparency and consumer safeguards,” U.S. Sen. Herb Kohl, D-Wis., told The Times.

Meanwhile, the regulatory overhaul that U.S. President Barack Obama proposed back in June has been derailed by lobbyists and cast aside by a Congress that is preoccupied with the heated debate over healthcare reform.

Obama’s Overhaul Losing Traction

President Obama on June 17 proposed a sweeping overhaul of the U.S. financial regulatory system.

Under President Obama’s proposal:

• Hedge funds and other private pools of capital would have to register with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
• Many financial institutions would be required to increase capital reserves to protect against unexpected losses, and companies would also have to keep part of the credit risk for loans they have packaged into securities.
• The Federal Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC) would have the power to seize and break up large financial companies that are under duress.
• The U.S. Federal Reserve would be granted more powers over payments and settlements systems in U.S. financial markets to prevent a breakdown that officials fear could destabilize the economy.
• The Office of Thrift Supervision would be merged with the Office of the Comptroller of Currency.
• A new consumer protection agency would be created. That agency would write rules related to mortgages, credit cards and other consumer products, taking away powers previously held by the Fed.

However, the proposal has lost much of the momentum it would have had earlier this year. Now that the U.S. economy is seemingly back on track and many banks have paid back their huge government loans, much of the anger over Wall Street’s hand in the financial crisis has dissipated.

“As we get a little more distance from the actual collapse and things begin to stabilize, then people think we don’t need to take as much drastic action,” Michael Bernstein, an expert in political and economic history who is currently serving as provost at Tulane University, told NPR. “That’s a very disappointing reality.”

In fact, a large portion of the anti-business rhetoric that provided the backdrop to the financial crisis has been replaced by public rants against big government and the vehement debate over healthcare reform that has consumed Congress.

“The president has offered a reform proposal that would grant broad new authorities to government bureaucrats while intruding in private markets and restricting personal choice,” Spencer Bachus of Alabama, the senior Republican on the House Financial Services Committee told The Times. “The obvious lesson of the events of September 2008 is that we need smarter regulation, not more regulation, not more government bureaucracy, and not more incentives to engage in harmful business practices.”

Meanwhile, big financial institutions and community banks have unified against several pillars of the proposal, including the creation of a new consumer protection agency, and tighter regulation and more transparency regarding derivatives and credit default swaps – the very instruments that have been blamed for exacerbating the financial crisis. They’ve also lobbied hard against restrictions on executive pay, The Times reported.

On the one-year anniversary of Lehman’s collapse, President Obama again sounded the call for reform, warning that “there are some in the financial industry who are misreading this moment.”

“I want everybody here to hear my words,” Obama said in a speech at Federal Hall in New York. “We will not go back to the days of reckless behavior and unchecked excess at the heart of this crisis, where too many were motivated only by the appetite for quick kills and bloated bonuses. Those on Wall Street cannot resume taking risks without regard for consequences, and expect that next time, American taxpayers will be there to break their fall.”

Still, many in Congress continue to bristle at the prospect of more government oversight.

“President Obama supports changes that push us in the wrong direction,” Rep. Tom Price of Georgia, chairman of the conservative Republican Study Committee, told The Washington Times.

But as Congress continues to substitute rhetoric for action, America’s largest financial institutions are growing more powerful and analysts see a precious opportunity for real reform slipping away.

“The clock is ticking and we’re at a cross roads,” Travis Plunkett, chief lobbyist for the Consumer Federation of America, told CNNMoney. “If we don’t see a substantial move this fall, financial reform may wither on the vine.”

Rep. Barney Frank, D-MA, who leads the House Financial Services Committee and largely supports Obama’s plan, will begin marking up the bill in October and is expected to have legislation to the floor of the House by the end of next month or early November.

Source: Wall Street Back to Business as Obama’s Regulatory Overhaul Loses Momentum

Commercial property values in the U.S. have plummeted 36% since peaking in 2007, and the commercial real estate market is unlikely to recover before 2012, according to the quarterly PricewaterhouseCoopers Korpacz Real Estate Investor Survey, released yesterday (Tuesday).

Office rents in New York and San Francisco may drop 20% through next year, the survey found.

“The biggest problem is that commercial real estate lags what happens in the economy,” Susan Smith, who is the director of PricewaterhouseCoopers’ real estate advisory practice and editor-in-chief of the survey, told Bloomberg News. “Companies are looking for ways to cut costs, many are continuing to reduce workers and are continuing to reduce their space needs.”

That means many of the banks that made commercial real estate have only realized a fraction of their losses. And as those losses continue to mount, we’re likely to see more and more bank failures.

Roughly $530 billion in mortgage-backed securities are due for refinancing between now and 2011, according to property researcher Foresight Analytics LLC. Foresight estimates that the U.S. banking sector could incur as much as $250 billion in commercial real estate losses, enough to cause a as many as 700 banks to fail, in that time.

The FDIC’s “problem list,” or banks that run a higher risk of failure, grew to 416 in the second quarter, up from 305 in the first quarter. That’s the highest number since the second quarter of 1994, when there were 434 banks on the list.

San Francisco-based Wells Fargo & Co. (NYSE: WFC) has the largest share of the $3.1 trillion commercial debt market with 16.5% of its $821 billion loan portfolio invested. JPMorgan Chase & Co. (NYSE: JPM) is a distant second with 5.4% of its portfolio invested in commercial loans, followed by Citigroup Inc. (NYSE: C) with 3.4%.

However, smaller banks – 92 of which have already folded this year compared to 25 last year – are even more at risk because they will likely have a harder time accessing the crucial capital to offset rising defaults, according to the TARP-inspired Congressional Oversight Panel’s August Oversight Report.

“Unlike large banks that can sustain a certain number of defaults, even of large commercial loans, smaller banks may have far more difficulty in absorbing more than a few large loan losses,” the panel said. “The FDIC’s statement that ‘banks have been able to raise capital without having to sell bad assets through the LLP’ may not reflect the reality for these banks.”

Indeed, the number of smaller banks expected to seized by the FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) is forecast to accelerate by economists. More than 150 publicly traded U.S. banks have nonperforming loans that account for 5% of their assets, according to the report.

The panel said rising commercial real estate loan defaults may prompt the need for $12 billion to $14 billion more in TARP funds as well as well as stress tests for smaller banks.

The early 1990s saw a devastating crash of the real estate market, but this coming time around the result could be far worse. The $3.1 trillion that makes up the commercial real estate debt market is three times the size it was during the early 1990s – meaning the potential for losses is steeper than ever before.

In 1993, less than 2% of U.S. banks and thrifts had an exposure to commercial real estate that was more than five times their Tier I capital. By the end of last year, that ratio had spiked to 12%, involving about 800 banks and thrifts.

And this time around – compared to the early 1990s – banks left themselves no margin of safety in the form of “Tier I Capital” – a measure of how well a lender can navigate serious levels of losses. The higher the ratio, the less likely a lender will be able to work its way through a stretch when loans start going bad.

Source: Bank Failures Could Surge as Commercial Real Estate Losses Continue to Mount

That’s if you believe a Nobel economist, of course. His crude “experiment” was the start of “modern portfolio theory” decades ago. The downside, however, was that with a reduction of risk came a dampening of profits. So scratch that idea.

How about this? A startling study in the late 1970s showed that owning a portfolio of large U.S. companies with international divisions drops your risk 10% below a domestic stock portfolio. Much better. But that wasn’t the eye-popper…

The study also found that owning stocks in international companies cuts your risk in half…

Take that, “efficiency” theorists! Yet the stuffy professors still tried to refute these results. It was a losing battle, though, as more studies emerged, laden with more evidence that international stocks reduce risk.

But the most startling thing? The studies indicate that adding international stocks to your domestic portfolio may even increase your average profits.

But how do you buy stocks in foreign companies trading in London, Hong Kong, or São Paulo? By investing in ADRs… let me explain.

How to Go Overseas Without Even Getting On a Plane

Let’s say you want to buy shares of an English company, trading on the FTSE-100 index. You’d have to convert your cash to pounds, buy the stock, wait to sell it at a profit, then convert it all back to U.S. dollars.

If the greenback weakened, you’d make a profit on the stock but lose on the conversion!

In a word: Ugh.

This is why the vast majority of investors buy a managed international mutual fund. This allows the “experts” to run overseas with your bag of cash and make the investments for you.

But is this really smart?

As early as the 1960s, some economists confirmed that fund managers can’t forecast stock prices well enough to cover their own expenses, let alone make you a profit. In the end, all economists – regardless of their background – agreed that the performance of a managed mutual fund is worse than throwing darts at a list.

Here’s a better way…

Investing in ADRs: Harness JP Morgan’s Secret Weapon

In 1927, a chain of retail stores wanted to list on the NYSE.

Problem was, all the stores were in England!

Even for JP Morgan (NYSE:JPM) – the greatest investment banker of all time – this one was tricky. But he came up with a solution: He bought a big block of the retailer’s shares on the London Stock Exchange and put them in a trust.

Then he sold shares of the trust on the NYSE. These shares were called American Depository Receipts – or ADRs for short.

The company was Selfridges. And with Americans able to invest in a well-managed foreign company with far less risk, the shares sold like hotcakes. And thanks in no small part to this early access to American money, Selfridges is renowned and still thriving today.

So if you want to toss darts around, you could randomly add 3-7 ADRs to your portfolio – a move that will cut your portfolio risk in half, while increasing your profits.

For example, you can go to www.adr.com and throw darts at companies like Holland’s Aegon NV (NYSE: AEG), China’s Acorn International Inc (NYSE: ATV), or Brazil’s Aracruz Celulose SA (NYSE: ARA).

But randomly picking foreign companies is pretty reckless. Here’s how to invest in international stocks properly…

The Four Advantages of Investing in ADRs

What if you knew which international companies were primed to explode in share price? That’s exactly the kind of profitable information that New Frontier Trader readers get all the time.

So here’s my four-point guide for selecting the best foreign ADRs and how they can roll back your risk, even as they ramp up your returns.

• ADR Advantage #1: International Markets Don’t Move Together:

One of the main advantages that ADRs offer is that stocks in two different countries don’t move together.

When you hit the ground in most foreign countries, it’s a whole new economic, political and cultural landscape.

So even if your U.S. stocks are going down, your ADRs might be rising. Take Argentina’s Banco Macro (NYSE: BMA), for example. You could have bought it on July 6 for $16.34. It’s currently trading around $22.85. That’s a 40% return in just two months.

The New Frontier Tip: Buy at least three different high potential ADR stocks, operating in at least three different international countries.

• ADR Advantage #2: Hardship Breeds Managerial Excellence:

Okay, so what about countries that are chaotic – either economically, politically, or in terms of corruption? Places where managers tread in fear day by day.

Check out Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. It’s a good measure of social disarray. The United States has a relatively low corruption score of 18, while Somalia has the highest at 180.

Managers become slothful when business is easy. But imagine trying to do honest trade in a pirate haven like Somalia?!

And how about the BRIC economies – Brazil, Russia, India, and China? The corruption score is 96. In fact, Russia alone scores a whopping 147 on the global “Dewey, Cheatem & Howe” scale. Not even Superman’s x-ray vision would help an economist’s macro analysis.

But intense social disarray breeds the toughest managers, and the companies that rise to the top, despite the chaos, are often the pick of the bunch.

One such firm is Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC). It’s the largest integrated oil company in Colombia. You could have bought it on May 18 for $19.31 per share. By Labor Day weekend, it was trading at $26.41 for a tidy return of 37%!

The New Frontier Tip: Look for outstanding management where Wall Street doesn’t expect to find any.

• ADR Advantage #3: Muddy Waters Hide Big Fish:

Studies have proven that Wall Street analysts are incapable of honestly reporting opportunities in their home market. And they’re even more misleading if you try to follow them overseas.

The analyst’s real job is directing traffic where Wall Street’s CEOs and their boards want order flow to go. If executives need to cash out their options, the analyst’s opinion is suddenly upgraded to a green light.

Frankly, Wall Street doesn’t make a dime helping you find a potential fortune in developing countries.

But there are a few outstanding individuals like Warren Buffett, who are skilled at spotting hidden jewels. So you could just buy Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE: BRK.B).

But we have a better way: Go direct!

Take China, for instance. Getting solid information from this murky, mass-demand economy is like pulling teeth from a shark!

But if you had the edge, you could have bought shares in the massive Chinese Holiday Inn, with more than 500 budget hotels in more than 90 Chinese cities. Had you bought Home Inns & Hotel Management (Nasdaq: HMIN) at $15.19 on May 12, you’d be sitting on an 88.1% gain in just four months.

The New Frontier Tip: Target markets that Wall Street doesn’t want you to understand.

• ADR Advantage #4: Hunt Down Profits That American Conglomerates Can’t Touch:

Foreign companies located in faraway lands that rise to the top of their regional markets are special. By the time the world’s biggest investment banks invite them to become an ADR, they’re pumping out profits like one of J. Paul Getty’s oil rigs.

South America has hidden Copa Airlines (NYSE: CPA) from American investors until just recently. You could have bought the stock for $32.22 on May 27. Today, it’s trading for $43 – a fast return of 33.4%. In addition, the firm’s operating margin is 20.3%. Compare that to margins at Southwest (2.1%), Jet Blue (6.5%), or American (-3.4%).

The Single Best Way for Investing in ADRs…

Each of the returns I’ve mentioned above were recommendations in Alex Green’s New Frontier Trader newsletter. This service gives you an edge over the crowd in grabbing the best gains from investing in ADRs.

And the rest of the track record speaks for itself. This year, the service has closed out nine double-digit winners on international stock positions and six triple-digit winners by playing foreign stock options.

Time after time, history has shown that the best way to combine reduced risk with explosive returns is to invest in overseas markets, where Wall Street doesn’t want you to look.

If you’d like to start enjoying the kind of profits that the New Frontier Trader has kicked out to subscribers, simply check out this report.

It all starts with education,

Dr. Scott Brown

Source: Investing in ADRs: The Most Powerful Way to Reduce Market Risk

What is most remarkable about the world a year after Lehman fell is that so little seems to have changed. Even the papers have noticed.

“A year after Lehman, little change on Wall Street,” says the headline on today’s International Herald Tribune. “Backed by huge U.S. government guarantees, the biggest banks have re-structured only around the edges. Employment [on Wall Street] has fallen just 8% since last September.”

“Obama to push banking overhaul,” says another headline at the Telegraph. Yes, the pols will try to convince the world that they have regulated risk out of the market. Perhaps they will limit salaries… or insist on more disclosure… or require that the capitalists hold onto more of their capital. Then, they will stand before voters and say they have made the world safe for democratic capitalism. Don’t believe it; their bailouts have made it more dangerous.

We don’t know whether this was what Nobel prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz had in mind. But he has come to the same conclusion:

“Stiglitz says banking problems are now bigger than pre-Lehman,” says the Bloomberg report.

Yes, Wall Street has a good gig going. The whole industry now benefits from the hedge fund formula – ‘heads I win, tails somebody else loses.’ When the hedge funds play the game, it’s their clients who lose money. But the way Wall Street banks play it, the big loser is the US government, directly, and US taxpayers and bondholders indirectly.

When the going is good, the bankers make millions in profits – which they take home as salary and bonuses. An analyst at JPMorgan (NYSE:JPM) estimates that American and European banks will pay their 141,000 investment banking employees $77 billion in 2011… or about $543,000 per employee. Since they pay out so much of what they earn, they lack the capital to survive a crisis. But when they’re threatened with extinction, the feds step in to bail them out. No wonder they have no fear of a meltdown…

Wall Street was quiet on Friday. The Dow was down just 22 points.

The most exciting news was that gold closed at $1,006. But if gold buyers were afraid of inflation they neglected to mention it to the folks over in the bond market. The US 10-year Treasury note yielded all of 3.34% on Friday. Which is to say, fear of inflation is probably NOT what is driving up gold. But we’ll come back to that tomorrow… We’ve been doing a lot of thinking about gold… Stay tuned.

Meanwhile, the Financial Times says world equity markets have rallied 65% since their lows in March. There is no longer any sign of panic. Or fear. People seem to think the crisis of over. This has reinforced their illusions. They desperately want to believe that their financial authorities have the matter under control. So long as things seem to be stabilizing – or actually getting better – they figure they can relax.

‘Nothing has really changed,’ they tell themselves. ‘It was just a hiccup… nothing serious,’ they say. They look out their windows and see the same trees, same buildings, same automobiles; it certainly seems as if nothing had changed.

Of course, when you set out on a drive from Manhattan, it takes a long time to get out of the city. For a long time, the buildings… the landscape… and the people still look the same. But you haven’t even crossed the Hudson yet! It is only later, after a lot of driving, that you realize… you are a long way from home. We suspect that there’s a long trip ahead of us too. We have begun the process of reversing a half-century of credit expansion. Since 1945, debt per person has increased. Now it is decreasing –with vast consequences. If we’re right, the financial sector will shrink for many years. Profits will be hard to come by. A job will be difficult to get too. And the part of the world dominated by Anglo-Saxons will diminish.

Fear will make a comeback… when people realize where they’re headed…

And more thoughts…

*** As you’ll recall from Friday, between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the fall of Lehman was perhaps the happiest, most worry-free period in American imperial history. The country had no military challengers (it had to pretend that a handful of muslim fanatics armed with box cutters represented a serious threat). Finance was the world’s highest margin business… and New York’s hustlers were good at finance – rivaled only by those in London. And English was the world’s dominant language. With these advantages behind them, Americans (and Brits) saw nothing before them but growth and prosperity. They had gotten used to living off the kindness of strange lenders. They thought they could get away with it forever. But when Lehman went down, so did hopes for the eternal reign of the anglo-american financial empire.

Now, savings rates are going up in America. Spending is down. So are salaries and prices. It’s a deflationary world… Practically everything is deflating…

Consumer prices… inflation is negative in the US and Europe…

Wages… household income is down in the US. Unemployment is up and the length of the average workweek is down. Result: lower wages.

Housing…“house price decline [in England] will continue after false dawn fades,” says a headline at today’s Telegraph. A study by Ernst and Young predict a 1.6% drop in British house prices in the first half of next year, after an 11.4% fall this year.

Net household wealth… down too, caused by falling house prices and falling incomes.

Oh… but here’s one thing that is up: government deficits. The US posted a deficit of $111 billion in August. A few years ago, that would have been a frightening deficit for an entire year. Now, we have hundred-billion deficits every month… with no end in sight.

*** As forecast, protectionism is on the rise. The Obama administration put a tariff on tires imported from China. It was done do to protect American tire manufacturers from competition. Free trade? Sure, when it suits us.

But China is getting huffy about it. In an “unusually strong riposte,” Beijing, using diplomatic language of course, said to the US roughly what Serena Williams said to her net judge:

“I swear to God, I’m f**** going to take this f**** ball and shove it down your f**** throat…”

Why’s China so upset? In an expanding world, everyone greedily grabs market share. Even if they’re not as fast as the next guy, they still feel they’re making progress. In a deflating world, on the other hand, if you give ground… you’re not just losing market share…you’re losing money!

*** This weekend we traveled back to Paris to take part in a panel discussion on freedom. Liberty is not a hot topic in Paris. In a metropolitan area of some 4 million people only about 50 turned out to hear our talk – and half of them were American or English. Still, we were surprised there were so many. Liberty is a popular word. But freedom has never been much in demand. Millions of books are sold that promise to reduce your weight. How many are sold that promise to increase your freedom? We don’t know of any. Our guess is that the bookseller who makes freedom his market niche will soon have dust on his books and cobwebs in front of his door.

Still, the little group was enthusiastic. Assembled in a stuffy miniature theatre off the Rue Mouffetard, the freedom enthusiasts had a number of ideas for promoting their cause. One wanted to infiltrate the government with closet libertarians. Another suggested a takeover of academia. Still another suggested engaging taxi drivers in Socratic dialogues.

We looked for a fire alarm. Clearly, the heat was getting to them. They needed a good hosing down. We live in a world dominated by rules, laws, edicts, taxes and regulations. But it is not because the masses have never heard of liberty. They know what freedom is; they just don’t want it.

Instead, what they want is an edge, an angle… a law that protects them from honest commerce… a special tariff that gives them an advantage… a monopoly… a privilege…

They want food stamps and unemployment compensation. They want free medical care for their parents and free schools for their children.

They want what we all want… growth and prosperity, without corrections. And they want to go to heaven without dying.

Source: No Fear