U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke and Congress agreed Friday that the financial system – not the American taxpayer – should bear the costs of bank bailouts. Sheila Bair, head of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC), wants the banks to ante up $45 billion – three years’ worth of deposit-insurance premiums – to bail out the fund that insures bank deposits.

When it comes to bank stocks, we all know that there were a number of Money Morning readers shrewd enough to buy Citigroup Inc. (NYSE: C) shares when the foundering giant’s stock price was below $1 a share.

If you’re one of those investors, good for you: With Citi’s shares now trading at nearly $4.70 a share, that shrewdness – or courage – has been amply rewarded.

But the question we have to ask at this point is: Why would anyone buy banks stocks right now?

Bailouts Revisited

When the Bush administration bailed out the banks last autumn, I opposed the bailout. But I understood the rationale for it. The Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (OTC: LEHMQ) bankruptcy had clearly done a lot of damage to market confidence. Thus, a series of high-profile failures – however well merited – could push the market into a behavioral funk that might take years to emerge from.

After all, as we were incessantly reminded, the banks were all intimately inter-connected – not in the least by the diabolical credit-default-swap market. So a big failure could trigger a mass-market meltdown.

That justified the immediate bailout back then. But it did not justify the continued existence of those banks and other financial institutions – especially Citi, Bank of America Corp. (NYSE: BAC) and insurance giant American International Group Inc. (NYSE: AIG) – a year after the bailout.

Even if there was an argument for preventing the immediate meltdown of those companies – to prevent panic – there was no good argument for allowing them to continue in business as zombies, distorting the market forever after. An orderly liquidation was what was really needed.

But if the plans called for these three bad actors to be liquidated, it should surely be happening by now. Two of the three have even kept their top management for the intervening year. The exception has been BofA, where Chief Executive Officer Ken Lewis is now being shoved – kicking and screaming – toward the exit. (However, I have no doubt he’ll end up being well rewarded for the indignity).

Japan’s ‘Lost Decade’

Economically, keeping banks and other companies alive after they should be dead is the mistake Japan made back in the 1990s. After Japan’s massive stock market meltdown, most of the banks were technically insolvent. A decline in the value of the stocks the banks held had gnawed away their capital, while their assets were shredded by the collapse in the value of their real-estate loans.

Despite this, Japan opted to prop up many insolvent companies, which kept the country’s entire banking system on life support until 1998 – hence the “Lost Decade” of financial legend. And a true resolution of the problem did not come until it was forced by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in 2003. The result was more than a decade of economic stagnation and a mountain of public debt that actually exceeded 200% of gross domestic product (GDP).

For the banks themselves, the fallout can be even worse.

An ‘Artificial’ Market

At first blush, the profits of the last few months look pretty good. And the record bonuses being threatened on Wall Street suggest that all is fine. However, there are two problems. First, bank earnings have been propped up by an extraordinarily bank-friendly monetary policy, keeping short-term interest rates at close to zero and buying up more than $1.5 trillion of bad bank loans from the markets.

That simply can’t last. If it does, we’ll end up with a bad case of hyperinflation.

As for the bonuses, does anybody think that if Citi had gone bust, and ex-Citibankers were now selling apples on the street corners of New York, bonuses would be zooming so high?

If the market for overpaid bankers had been allowed to clear properly, they would no longer be overpaid.

If the Japan’s Nomura Securities (NYSE ADR: NMR) wanted to double its U.S. staff, as it announced Monday (an extraordinarily shareholder-hostile decision, given Nomura’s lousy U.S. track record), it could just lean out of its office and whistle, and a parade of ex-Citibankers, ex-AIG executives and ex-BofA execs would rush in, begging for scraps.

It appears that the concerns that Soros expressed are well justified.

A Grim Reaping For Bank Investors

Since there are more competitors in the market than there should be, once the Fed’s over-generous monetary policy is corrected, there will be too much competition, so bank profits will be squeezed. Conversely, there will be too many jobs in the industry, so banker pay scales will be artificially propped up.

If that’s a recipe for good shareholder returns, I’m a Dutchman.

There’s more. The populist fury against the banking system doesn’t look like it’s doing much about banker pay. However, it will almost certainly result in special extra taxes being levied on surviving banks, to pay for the bailouts.

The costs of those taxes will be passed through to shareholders, because competition from all the zombies that are still in business will prevent banker pay from being squeezed much. The extra levies that Bair, the FDIC chief, is employing to keep the deposit-insurance fund solvent also will fall on banks, although in this case it will be the small and medium-sized that will suffer the worst.

Squeezed profits, expensive staff, extra taxes and special FDIC levies – it doesn’t look to me as if there will be much left for bank shareholders.

Expect 2010 to be a grim year for them.

Source: Hidden Traps Make Bank Stocks a Bad Deal

On one hand, the $130 billion he spent on acquisitions – FleetBoston Financial Corp., MBNA Corp., LaSalle Bank Corp., Countrywide Financial Corp., Charles Schwab Corp.’s (Nasdaq: SCHW) U.S. Trust private banking unit and Merrill Lynch – that more than tripled the size of Bank of America, making it the largest U.S. lender both by assets and deposits.

On the other, his open-wallet policy and the example it set forth almost perfectly encapsulates the boom, bust and nascent rebound of the U.S. housing and banking crisis – which later became the financial plague that devastated markets all over the world.

In the second half of 2007, the extent of the U.S. housing crisis began to crystallize when Countrywide’s freewheeling subprime-lending policy irreversibly sank the nation’s largest home lender. Lewis moved in and acquired the troubled lender for $4 billion the following January, and in doing so, he put Bank of America on the hook for Countrywide $1.5 trillion loan portfolio.

In the second half of 2008, the extent of the how much havoc the destruction of investment banks and brokerage firms would wreak upon the world became clear. The vortex of it was Sept. 15, the day the Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (OTC: LEHMQ) declared bankruptcy and Bank of America agreed to pay $29 billion for world’s largest brokerage firm, Merrill Lynch, which probably would have failed had it not found a partner.

Lewis’ spending got Bank of America into this mess. The question now is whether continued  spending – using the $45 billion bailout courtesy of the U.S. Treasury’s Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) – will get BofA out of it.

And Lewis seems to acknowledge both in the news release announcing his voluntary departure.

“Bank of America is well positioned to meet the continuing challenges of the economy and markets,” Lewis said. “We are in position to begin to repay the federal government’s TARP investments. For these reasons, I decided now is the time to begin to transition to the next generation of leadership at Bank of America.”

Lewis naturally defends his actions just as much as critics chide him for them.

“Their loan portfolio is horrible looking and it’s not going to be easy for them,” Mike Williams, research director at Gradient Analytics in Scottsdale, Arizona, said in a Bloomberg News interview before Lewis announced his departure. “They would have been better off without the Merrill and Countrywide acquisitions over the next few years.”

Money Morning Contributing Editor Martin Hutchinson, a leading banking expert, says that Bank of America has a very difficult journey ahead of it.

“Lewis followed [predecessor CEO Hugh] McColl’s strategy of expanding BofA by acquisition,” he said. “The trouble is that his last 2 deals were both lousy. Countrywide was at the epicenter of all that was bad about housing finance, and that was obvious in January 2008, when he bought it. Just a terrible deal.”

In fact, Hutchinson believes there’s only one viable option for Bank of America.

“BofA will have to be broken up, but may need to be sorted out by a liquidator/ the government,” he said.

Spinning Merrill

The Merrill merger was perhaps the defining moment in Lewis’ tenure, and he Lewis has played the victim and hero of the saga.

Lewis testified that U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke and former U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry M. “Hank” Paulson Jr. pressured him not only to move ahead with a merger with Merrill Lynch despite reservations, but also to stay quiet about the mounting losses at the crumbling investment bank.

And in a note to employees announcing his departure, he took credit for the fact that Merrill has contributed 24% to the Bank of America’s first-half profit, boosted trading and investment-banking revenue, Bloomberg reported.

“I am gratified that even some of the critics of our acquisition of Merrill Lynch have come to acknowledge how well the deal is working out for our clients,” Lewis wrote. “This journey has been a rocky one and not for the faint of heart, but perseverance is paying off.”

But to the rest of the world, Lewis was most often seen sitting under the hot light of probes by Congress, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and New York’s attorney general all trying to determine if Lewis misled investors about Merrill’s losses and bonuses.

And even if shareholders agreed with Lewis’ decisions, they didn’t prefer him to be the company’s face. In April, shareholders voted 50.34% in favor of stripping Lewis of his chairman title.

Changing of the Guard

When Lewis steps down from his post Dec. 31, he joins the ranks of fellow financial firm executives – James Cayne of The Bear Stearns Cos., Charles Prince of Citigroup Inc. (NYSE: C), Stanley O’Neal of Merrill, Kennedy Thompson of Wachovia and Richard Fuld of Lehman Brothers, John Thain of  Merrill Lynch – that resigned, many in disgrace, either during or in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.

Among the survivors, Lloyd Blankfein, CEO of Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (NYSE: GS), and Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan Chase & Co. (NYSE: JPM).

Bank of America said it will find a replacement by Lewis’ last day, and media outlets have already began making lists of possible successors.

Among the names frequently mentioned:

• Brian Moynihan, head of Bank of America’s consumer and small business banking unit.
• Sallie Krawcheck, former Citigroup Inc. (NYSE: C) CFO and president of Bank of America’s global wealth and investment management unit.
• Tom Montag, former Merrill executive and head of Bank of America’s corporate and investment banking unit.

An outsider might well be the best choice, says Money Morning’s Hutchinson.

Lewis is “leaving a company that no human being could manage, with vast problems, and far too broad a franchise,” Hutchinson said. “North Carolina retail bankers haven’t a clue how to run a top international investment bank like Merrill and vice versa. There’s nobody available to succeed him that can do the job.”

Source: Boom, Bust and Rebuild: Bank of America and the Kenneth Lewis Legacy

Now, JPMorgan Chase & Co.  (NYSE: JPM) has issued a report suggesting that investment-banking returns on capital will be sharply down over the next few years. Perhaps this will be only a moderate downturn.

However, there’s also a good chance that labor-cost pressures – combined with tightening margins – will take the likes of JPMorgan and Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (NYSE: GS) down a path similar to that of General Motors Corp. (NYSE: GRM) and Chrysler Group LLP, both of which earlier this year declared bankruptcy.

Challenging Headwinds

JPMorgan anticipates that the regulatory changes that are likely to take place over the next year or so will reduce investment banks’ return on equity (ROE) to around 11% – down from its previous forecast of 15%.

More capital will be needed for trading activity, which naturally reduces the return on capital from that activity. However, there will also be effects from new transparency requirements on derivatives. (Most – if not all – derivatives will have to be traded and cleared across central exchanges.) And tighter limits on commodities positions will prevent firms from cornering less-active markets.

This effect will be concentrated on investment banks themselves – firms such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley (NYSE: MS) – as well as on the investment banking activities of such firms as Credit Suisse Group AG (NYSE: CS), Deutsche Bank AG (NYSE: DB), Citigroup Inc. (NYSE: C), and JPMorgan Chase.

Old-fashioned commercial banking, on the other hand, will likely become somewhat more profitable. That’s because the sharp reduction in securitization activity has reduced the excessive competition for much of the lending business. It’s also improved the lending business profitability.

Investment banks will have to reduce their headcount by another 3% from present levels and cut their overall cost per employee by another 15%, to around $543,000 in 2011, according to the JPMorgan study.

What agony! (Actually, that joke is not quite fair – the cost per employee includes the building, the equipment and all the fancy information services, so the take-home is much less. Even so, these guys – at least those who keep their jobs – won’t starve.)

The New Reality

We are so used to investment banking growing and becoming increasingly more profitable – on virtually an uninterrupted basis – that we have never even considered what might happen if that trend were to reverse.

Even after last year’s crash, Goldman Sachs reported record second quarter profits in 2009. Spreads in all kinds of trading widened dramatically and Goldman found its market share dramatically increased after the demise of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (OTC: LEHMQ).

But here’s the thing: The trillions of dollars poured into the markets by the U.S. Treasury Department and the U.S. Federal Reserve were the driving force behind those profits. Investment banks like Goldman weren’t just given a level playing field – they were given one that was essentially (and artificially) cleared of obstacles. Even the few “competitors” that remained were hobbled by their past mismanagement.

Investment banking is not particularly difficult or intellectually challenging. And the proliferation of new and complex products that turbocharged the profit growth of investment banks during the past few decades won’t continue. Any new financial product will be forced to run a gauntlet of regulatory bureaucrats before being allowed to emerge.

Had the credit-default swap (CDS) been invented today, can anyone doubt that it would have been fenced in by restrictions so onerous that the damaging derivative would have never made it to market? The painful memories of last year’s near-unraveling of the global financial markets are still fresh. So it’s unlikely that investment banks would be able to get the regulatory nod for a big-risk strategy that is likely to result in a taxpayer bailout.

The bottom line is clear: The reduction in U.S. investment banking profitability is likely to be permanent, with various rent-seeking scams blocked. In this post-crisis era, investment pools from China, the Middle East and other parts of Asia – backed by increasingly sophisticated financial players in those markets – will acquire the necessary capabilities to enter the market and further reduce the returns of domestic investment banks.

We have seen this before: An industry, previously very profitable, finds itself hemmed in by government restrictions and its most-profitable products get regulated out of existence. Foreign competition enters the market and grinds away at the domestic market share.

The natural reduction of competitors doesn’t happen, as one or more are bailed out by taxpayers and survive to continue competing for the business.  Legacy costs of remuneration promises made when things were better place an ever-increasing burden on the industry’s returns. Reducing the work force pay becomes very difficult, as the workers have great power over production and resist the necessary downsizing of their excessive pay.

Sound familiar? Last time, it was the U.S. auto industry, and the eventual result was the bankruptcy of GM and Chrysler. Reducing pay to a work force when market conditions become harsh is extremely difficult, if now downright impossible.

Of course, investment bankers have no United Automobile Workers (UAW) representing them. But shareholders will know from past experience that the investment-banking work force’s ability to suck up available profits is huge, whereas losses suddenly devolve back on shareholders.

Don’t forget, militant autoworkers could only beat up “scabs” when their livelihood was threatened. Militant traders could re-jig the computer systems so that the trading algorithms worked backwards, producing losses instead of profits. In an era of credit default swaps and millisecond trading, this could wipe out shareholders in half an hour of frantic activity before anyone realized what had gone wrong in an era of credit default swaps and millisecond trading.

It may take a couple of decades for the investment banking business to decline, as it did for the much larger U.S. auto industry. But by 2030, collapse could loom.

The comparison isn’t a stretch. In fact, it wasn’t just a ticker-symbol letter – “G” – that  the two companies shared: GS for Goldman Sachs, and GM when General Motors was still a public company. It turns out that their underlying business models also shared similar strategic flaws. And those flaws put the two on a similar path to ruin at the hands of forces that grew out of the crises in their particular industries – crises that they each helped create.

Source: Could Goldman Sachs Share GM’s Fate?

The Standard & Poor’s 500 Index is up 58% from its March lows, gold has finally broken through the $1,000-an-ounce level – and may go higher – and bond yields have fallen substantially in spite of the huge U.S. budget deficit.

It’s really not difficult to tell when you’re in a bubble. What’s tough is trying to figure out how to invest while it’s developing.

When current Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke doubled the monetary base in a few weeks last fall, it was pretty obvious that the extra money would appear somewhere, either as zooming asset prices or as surging inflation. After all, the rapid increases in the U.S. money supply after 1995 produced a stock-market bubble and then a housing bubble.

And don’t forget about interest rates. When oil prices doubled in less than 12 months between 2007 and 2008, it was because Bernanke aggressively cut interest rates after the recession first hit in late 2007. So you’d have to believe that money supply was irrelevant not to expect markets to start behaving oddly at some point.

Silver and Gold …

That’s why – since late in 2007– I have been recommending investments in gold and other hard assets. While the recession had sharply reduced demand for oil, causing its price to drop from its record high of $147 a barrel in July 2008 to around $30 in February, the gold price had dropped only from its March 2008 peak of $1,000 to around $700, before rebounding. Gold prices remain far below the inflation-adjusted equivalent of their 1980 peak, which would be around $2,300 per ounce today.

Likewise, silver prices are even further below their 1980 peak, which would be around $130 per pounce, or nearly 10 times the current level. Since both gold and silver markets are relatively thin compared to the money available – annual gold production is only $100 billion at current prices – the potential for a run-up is considerable.

The difference between a bubble and a sound bull market is that a bubble happens more quickly. Normal valuation metrics get ignored. You couldn’t rationally justify – on any sort of long-term basis – the dot-com stock prices of 1999, the California house prices of 2005, or the $147-per-barrel record oil prices of 2008.

Similarly, today’s cost of extracting gold is nowhere near $1,000 an ounce. Mining costs have increased. But extraction costs are still only about $400 an ounce for top-tier miners.

Likewise, with inflation at 2% and U.S. budget deficits at more than $1 trillion per annum, there’s no justification for a 10-year U.S. Treasury bond yield below 3.5%.

Let’s look at stocks. And let’s say that the market of early 1995 – when the Dow Jones Industrial Average was at 4,000 – is a reasonable base for estimating a fair value for the U.S. stock market. If that were the case, then inflating the Dow in line with nominal gross domestic product to keep it at fair value would bring us to a current day estimate of 7,800.

[The Dow closed yesterday (Thursday) at 9,783.92. To reach this “fair-value” level, the Dow would have to drop 1,984 points, or 20% – enough of a decline to qualify as an official “bear market.”]

However 1995 wasn’t a bear market, and economic and earnings prospects that year were really good. Besides, the Internet was just starting its rise to prominence. Today, we’re in a deep recession, with huge budget deficits and high unemployment, yet the Dow is closing in on 10,000.

In other words, U.S. stocks are overvalued. Even after the bearish trauma of last year, we remain in a stock-market bubble.

Four “Bubble” Investing Strategies – Including the One That Works

Bubble investing is different from bull-market investing. There aren’t many “good” values, so you have to be very careful.

One bubble-market strategy is to just put everything in cash and hide under the bed. How boring! Plus, as your neighbors brag about their profits at cocktail parties, you’ll feel like an idiot until the bubble bursts. Remember, even after your neighbors’ profits have turned to losses and you look smart, you can never get those cocktail parties back!

That doesn’t mean you should abandon prudence, however. You should certainly keep much higher cash reserves than normal. Indeed, consider investing a chunk of that cash in one of the non-dollar-denominated WorldCurrency Access Deposit Accounts offered by EverBank.

At the same time, it’s a pity to completely miss out on the returns one can earn in a bubble environment. But you have to careful and smart.

A second bubble-investing strategy is to find something that isn’t overvalued, and buy only that. That strategy worked great for me back in 1999. I was working in Croatia, which was going through a deep economic crisis. NATO was bombing neighboring countries in the Kosovo War. That played merry hell with tourism, Croatia’s main foreign currency earner. Croatian shares – there were about six at the time – were each selling at less than five times earnings. So I invested in Croatia and made out nicely when the war ended and things returned to normal.

The problem with that approach is globalization. It was just possible in 1999 to find undervalued investments, if only by putting your money close to a war zone. It isn’t really possible now, at least not to any great extent. Three months ago, there were lots of shares even in the United States, which had been bombed out by the downturn and hadn’t recovered. There aren’t many left now; if a share is bombed out today there’s probably good reason for it.

A third potential strategy is to try to time the bursting of the bubble. For example, you could buy the ProShares UltraShort Trust (NYSE: TBT), inversely related to twice the Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (OTC: LEHMQ) 20-year bond index. Then you’d wait for the bond market to crash, and TBT to soar.

But there are two problems:

• First, the ProShares UltraShort Trust has a fair-sized tracking error, because they have to rebalance the fund daily. Thus if you hold it too long, you won’t do as well as you should.
• Second, the bubble can take a long time to burst; meanwhile it goes on inflating and you get killed. In the long run, it was a good idea to short Cisco Systems Inc. (Nasdaq: CSCO) in 1999. In the short run, it wasn’t so clever.

The Winning Play

The normal investment approach, to buy only the most conservative companies in an overvalued but bubbly sector, also doesn’t work. Everybody else is looking for them, too. And that means they end up being overvalued. Besides, they will advance only modestly with the inflating bubble, so you won’t make enough to compensate for the risk of buying too high.

The best alternative, therefore, is to buy bubbly investments – but the junk, not the cream. Buy gold and silver mines that even at $900 an ounce have only been running at close to break-even, because they have expensive deposits.

Don’t buy political risk (i.e. mines in dodgy countries), because if the gold price goes up, the local dictator will seize your company’s winnings. But operating risk is okay. And high operating costs are fine. If your mine has operating costs of $800 an ounce, you’ll make out like a bandits if gold goes from $1,000 an ounce to $1,200. That way, you need only put a modest amount in the investment, and it will zoom up to several times what you paid, making as much profit as if you’d put your entire fortune in something conservative.

Make sure to put only a portion of your money in such a play. Keep the rest in cash.

When to sell? Well, start selling at the first signs that the Fed is beginning to take inflation seriously, meaning the central bank will be pushing up interest rates. You’ll know when this is because you’ll likely start hearing a lot about Fed “exit strategies.”

Don’t be greedy – better to sell too early than too late. Better to leave the theater at the first wisp of smoke, than to wait until the entire crowd is panicking and heading for the exits.

I hate bubbles. And I hate Bernanke and the other central bankers for causing them by their misguided monetary policies. But you can make money out of them. Just don’t get carried away.

Source: The Only Way to Profit from a Stock Market Bubble

But since then, little progress has been made on financial regulatory reform, and many of the large investment banks that received billions of dollars in government bailouts are booking huge profits on the same risky wagers they were making before the financial crisis.

In fact, the five biggest banks in the country – Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (NYSE: GS), JPMorgan Chase & Co. (NYSE: JPM), Citigroup Inc. (NYSE: C), Wells Fargo Corp. (NYSE: WFC), and Bank of America Corp. (NYSE: BAC)  – posted second quarter profits totaling $13 billion.

That’s more than double what they made in the second quarter of 2008 and almost two-thirds as much as the $20.7 billion they earned in the second quarter of 2007, when the economy was still strong, CNBC reported.

Goldman Sachs reported record earnings in the second quarter. As was the case before the financial meltdown, Goldman leaned heavily on its trading desk for revenue. Trading revenue accounted for 50% of the firm’s total revenue. At $6.8 billion, trading revenue was up 186% from the second quarter of 2008.

The bank also saw a massive bump in equity trading where revenue jumped to $2.2 billion – a 110% quarterly increase.

The story was much the same at JPMorgan whose investment-banking operations generated $1.47 billion of profit, almost quadruple the amount earned in last year’s second quarter.

Investment-banking fees – which zoomed 29% from a year ago and 62% from the first quarter – totaled $2.2 billion, and were a “record for any investment bank in any quarter,” according to JPMorgan Chief Financial Officer Michael J. Cavanagh.

Citigroup and Bank of America- which received some $45 billion in government bailout funds – also topped profit estimates in the second quarter.

Of course, it’s not the fact that Wall Street has returned to profitability that’s raised the hackles of analysts, it’s that Wall Street firms are turning huge profits by employing much of the same risky behavior that led to Lehman’s undoing.

“We’re seeing the same kind of behavior from the banks, and that could lead to some huge and scary parallels,” Simon Johnson, former chief economist with the International Monetary Fund, told CNBC.

For instance, banks are still making bets that put far more money at stake than they have on hand to cover potential losses. The five biggest banks average potential losses from a single day of trading topped $1 billion in the second quarter, up 76% from two years ago, according to regulatory filings.

Even more disconcerting is that banks are still packaging risky mortgages into securities and selling them as investments, which is precisely the behavior that helped inflate the real estate bubble and lead to the financial meltdown.

With the full blessings of ratings agencies, banks are repackaging their money-losing securities into higher-rated ones called re-securitization of real estate mortgage investment conduits, or “re-remics,” The New York Times reported. At least $30 billion in residential re-remics have been done this year, according to Morgan Stanley (NYSE: MS).

Wall Street bankers have even set out to create new and exotic financial products, including the securitized life insurance policies.

Indeed, bankers plan to buy so-called “life settlements,” which are life insurance policies that sick and elderly people sell for cash, and package them into bonds for investors. This essentially creates a whole new bond market that lets firms gamble on the lives of thousands of people.

Many analysts fear that insurers will have to raise premiums, because they could end up paying more death claims out to investors than they previously had anticipated. That is, if a policy is purchased and packaged into a security, investors will keep paying the premiums that might have otherwise been abandoned by policyholders. If that’s the case insurance companies will have based their premiums on false assumptions.

“The securitization of life settlements adds another element of possible risk to an industry that is already in need of enhanced regulations, more transparency and consumer safeguards,” U.S. Sen. Herb Kohl, D-Wis., told The Times.

Meanwhile, the regulatory overhaul that U.S. President Barack Obama proposed back in June has been derailed by lobbyists and cast aside by a Congress that is preoccupied with the heated debate over healthcare reform.

Obama’s Overhaul Losing Traction

President Obama on June 17 proposed a sweeping overhaul of the U.S. financial regulatory system.

Under President Obama’s proposal:

• Hedge funds and other private pools of capital would have to register with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
• Many financial institutions would be required to increase capital reserves to protect against unexpected losses, and companies would also have to keep part of the credit risk for loans they have packaged into securities.
• The Federal Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC) would have the power to seize and break up large financial companies that are under duress.
• The U.S. Federal Reserve would be granted more powers over payments and settlements systems in U.S. financial markets to prevent a breakdown that officials fear could destabilize the economy.
• The Office of Thrift Supervision would be merged with the Office of the Comptroller of Currency.
• A new consumer protection agency would be created. That agency would write rules related to mortgages, credit cards and other consumer products, taking away powers previously held by the Fed.

However, the proposal has lost much of the momentum it would have had earlier this year. Now that the U.S. economy is seemingly back on track and many banks have paid back their huge government loans, much of the anger over Wall Street’s hand in the financial crisis has dissipated.

“As we get a little more distance from the actual collapse and things begin to stabilize, then people think we don’t need to take as much drastic action,” Michael Bernstein, an expert in political and economic history who is currently serving as provost at Tulane University, told NPR. “That’s a very disappointing reality.”

In fact, a large portion of the anti-business rhetoric that provided the backdrop to the financial crisis has been replaced by public rants against big government and the vehement debate over healthcare reform that has consumed Congress.

“The president has offered a reform proposal that would grant broad new authorities to government bureaucrats while intruding in private markets and restricting personal choice,” Spencer Bachus of Alabama, the senior Republican on the House Financial Services Committee told The Times. “The obvious lesson of the events of September 2008 is that we need smarter regulation, not more regulation, not more government bureaucracy, and not more incentives to engage in harmful business practices.”

Meanwhile, big financial institutions and community banks have unified against several pillars of the proposal, including the creation of a new consumer protection agency, and tighter regulation and more transparency regarding derivatives and credit default swaps – the very instruments that have been blamed for exacerbating the financial crisis. They’ve also lobbied hard against restrictions on executive pay, The Times reported.

On the one-year anniversary of Lehman’s collapse, President Obama again sounded the call for reform, warning that “there are some in the financial industry who are misreading this moment.”

“I want everybody here to hear my words,” Obama said in a speech at Federal Hall in New York. “We will not go back to the days of reckless behavior and unchecked excess at the heart of this crisis, where too many were motivated only by the appetite for quick kills and bloated bonuses. Those on Wall Street cannot resume taking risks without regard for consequences, and expect that next time, American taxpayers will be there to break their fall.”

Still, many in Congress continue to bristle at the prospect of more government oversight.

“President Obama supports changes that push us in the wrong direction,” Rep. Tom Price of Georgia, chairman of the conservative Republican Study Committee, told The Washington Times.

But as Congress continues to substitute rhetoric for action, America’s largest financial institutions are growing more powerful and analysts see a precious opportunity for real reform slipping away.

“The clock is ticking and we’re at a cross roads,” Travis Plunkett, chief lobbyist for the Consumer Federation of America, told CNNMoney. “If we don’t see a substantial move this fall, financial reform may wither on the vine.”

Rep. Barney Frank, D-MA, who leads the House Financial Services Committee and largely supports Obama’s plan, will begin marking up the bill in October and is expected to have legislation to the floor of the House by the end of next month or early November.

Source: Wall Street Back to Business as Obama’s Regulatory Overhaul Loses Momentum

Of the 41,572 people polled, it now looks like those 31,179 bullish investors kept their word.

The Standard & Poor’s 500 Index has zoomed 15% since those investors were polled (and 53% from its March 9 market bottom).

Let’s face it. A 75% bullish inclination is a disproportionately high percentage. It’s way out of the norm.

What those 31,179 bulls are telling me is … well … we’d better watch out. Statistically, the individual investor excels at making the wrong decision at precisely the worst possible time. I view this survey as yet more evidence that the “herd” may once again be heading down the wrong path.

After the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (NYSE: LEHMQ) investors yanked more than $120 billion out of equity mutual funds. That’s more than the total amount of money investors poured into these funds during 2007 and 2008, a period when exuberance was at its height, according to Money magazine.

And after the S&P 500 hit its March low, most people missed the subsequent rally – 32% through June 23, when the CNNMoney poll was concluded – a run-up that could have mitigated their enormous losses.

The disturbing reality is that investors chase hot money and hang onto losers.  Most individuals have an awful sense of timing – as well as an unending tendency to act irrationally.

According to a recent Dalbar/IFA study, over-exuberant investors can lose a lot of money.  For example, the S&P 500 returned 11.81% a year on average between 1989 and 2008.  The “exuberant” gain-chaser scored 4.48% in the same time frame. Factor in inflation and the average investor gain disappears completely (See accompanying chart). You could have done better in a bank savings account!

Hope For the Best, Prepare For The Worst

That brings us back to the two most pressing questions of our time:

• What’s going to happen next?
• And what should we do about it?

Although pundits are spewing forth about an “improved” outlook for the U.S. economy, history tells us that we’re more likely to see a stock-market correction in the near term.

Over the last half a century, stock-market rallies that follow the horrific declines we’ve seen over the past 24 months are typically followed by a secondary decline of 14% to 50%.

What will happen after that is anybody’s guess. According to a study by Ned Davis Research, any secular bull market that followed a recession in the last 100 years resulted in gains in excess of 60% during an 18-month stretch. In situations where that rally was actually the catalyst for a resurgent economy, stocks averaged 110% over the next 36 months.

But we also have to remember that the bear market that started all this grew out of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. According to longtime investor Jeremy Grantham, the record deficits, stimulus packages and bailout packages have “reduced to guesswork” any market forecasts (as reported in CNNMoney).  That’s probably why Grantham recently warned clients: “If you feel overconfident about anything, take a cold shower and start [analyzing] again. Just be patient. In our strange markets, you usually don’t have to wait too long for something really bizarre to show up.”

Here at Money Morning, I’ve been counseling readers for more than a year to think long term. My advice is to preserve your wealth by navigating the near-term chaos. Stifle the knee-jerk urges to buy or sell.  If you succumb to the urge to follow the herd, the crowd will inevitably lead you down the wrong path. And probably at the worst possible moment.

Instead, follow these five strategies:

1. Position Your Portfolio: Develop a portfolio structure you can live with – such as the 50-40-10 allocation model we recommend in our monthly sister publication, The Money Map Report. That way you can take all sorts of economic contingencies into account, while still maintaining a steady course that emphasizes sound “safety-first” choices, portfolio stability and high income. How much stability should you be looking for? Our 50-40-10 model is typically 30% less volatile than the broader markets. But it can dramatically outperform the broader indices on the upside.

2. Limit Your Losses: Invest no more money than you can afford to lose. This sounds simple, but you’d be amazed at how many of the thousands of investors I’ve talked with through the years still don’t get it. They view themselves as “investors,” when they’ve actually become “speculators.” One Texas man I know lost half his wealth during the past two years. When I asked why he’d put so much money at risk, he shrugged and replied: “Because I could.”

Get your strategy in place then pick specific investments that keep you within the guidelines you established. Focus on global stocks with high dividend yields. And make sure you include a healthy dose of energy, technology and inflation-resistant holdings. Such stocks tend to blossom at the first signs of a real recovery – just like they have after every other documented economic downturn in history.

And finally, always make sure to manage your risk. Limit speculative positions to 2% to 5% of your overall portfolio value. That way even a total loss in one holding won’t be enough to eviscerate your portfolio.

3. Avoid Surprises: In my talks with audiences all around the world, listeners are often the most surprised to learn that successful professionals  don’t wake up with thoughts of how much money we can make each day. Instead, we think about two things from the time we get up until the time we go to bed:

• What’s the most likely thing that could cause me to lose money today?
• And how can I avoid that?

In other words, concentrate on understanding what it is that you don’t know. And then make sure to steer clear of that potential pitfall. It’s an approach that helps you make better decisions. Don’t swing for the fences and risk a strikeout each time you come to bat. Instead, make up your mind to go for much-higher-probability singles and doubles. Risk aversion should be your new mantra, especially now.

4. Risk Less – By Saving More: This is actually a neat little trick. Classic market theory holds that to generate bigger returns, you have to have to take on more risk. That’s true – as far as it goes. But here’s what that adage doesn’t address: By taking some simple steps to save more, you can actually accumulate wealth more quickly than by the increased levels of risk most investors are relying upon at the moment.

5. Don’t Let Yourself Get Whipsawed Out of the Market: Investors who prepare for only one kind of market are the most susceptible to panic selling. To them, investing is an all or nothing propostion. As we highlight in Money Morning, you’ve got to prepare for both “up” and “down” markets. And you do so with some simple hedging strategies. Hedging, after all, isn’t just for hedge funds. In fact, everyday people just like us can use them very effectively, which is why we encourage our readers to do so. You see, if you’ve prepared for “up” and “down” markets, you no longer have to actually “predict” what the markets are going to do. Then you can focus on finding quality companies with real earnings, a healthy dose of overseas sales and high income.

Once these five strategies are in place, you can turn your money loose to do the work it wants do for you. And you can sit back and enjoy beating the so-called “smart” money – practically no matter what the stock market does next.

Source: Five Ways to Outsmart 31,179 Other Investors

U.S. President Barack Obama yesterday (Tuesday) nominated Bernanke for a second four-year term as chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve. The appointment was mildly controversial and must be approved by the Senate, but lawmakers and investors overwhelmingly approved of the decision to the central bank chief who has shepherded the U.S. economy though its worst financial crisis in more than 70 years.

Bernanke has been criticized for greatly expanding the powers of the U.S. central bank by bailing out large financial institutions like American International Group Inc. (NYSE: AIG) and The Bear Stearns Cos. – while letting Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. (OTC: LEHMQ) collapse. At the same time, however, ambitious Fed programs designed to recapitalize banks and unfreeze credit markets have succeeded.

“Ben Bernanke, has led the Fed through the one of the worst financial crises that this nation and this world have ever faced,” said President Obama.  “As an expert on the causes of the Great Depression, I’m sure Ben never imagined that he would be part of a team responsible for preventing another. But because of his background, his temperament, his courage, and his creativity, that’s exactly what he has helped to achieve.”

Of course, that doesn’t mean Bernanke’s greatest challenges are already behind him. Over the next few years, the Fed chairman will have to unwind the programs he set in place to backstop the markets – such as the Commercial Paper Funding Facility – which holds $109.2 billion in short-term IOUs issued by corporations – and the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) – which has lent $25 billion to investors to buy securities tied to auto and other consumer and business loans.

In all, Bernanke has injected more than $2 trillion into the U.S. financial system. He’s also lowered the Federal Reserve’s benchmark lending rate to a record low range of 0.00%- 0.25%.

As a result, the U.S. monetary base has about doubled during the past two years.

Earlier this month, Bernanke said that the central bank’s program to buy U.S. Treasury securities would be shut down by the end of October. He’s also pointed out that some of the Fed’s emergency lending facilities automatically wind down as the economy recovers, because they have onerous pricing and terms.

The central bank could undertake two key steps to accelerate that whole process. It could:

• Increase the amount of interest paid on balances held at the Federal Reserve by depository institutions (banks).
• Sell securities from the Federal Reserve’s portfolio with the agreement to buy them back at a later date.

However, Bernanke has provided very few clues about what his so-called “exit strategy” will involve, or how it will be implemented. That is, at what point will inflation become enough of a concern, and at what point does U.S. growth become sustainable enough, to warrant a change in Fed policy?

And that could easily prove to be Bernanke’s next big challenge.

At some point, Bernanke will have to raise the Fed’s benchmark rate from its current record low range. But it’s almost a classic Catch 22: Doing so too soon could stall the fragile U.S. economic recovery; waiting too long to boost rates could allow ruinous inflation to take hold, resulting in a major spike in the cost of food, energy and other essentials.

In this sense, “policymakers are damned if they do and damned if they don’t,” said Nouriel Roubini, a professor at the Stern Business School at New York University who is often credited with predicting the financial meltdown.

“If they take large fiscal deficits seriously and raise taxes, cut spending and mop up excess liquidity soon, they would undermine recovery and tip the economy back into stag-deflation (recession and deflation),” Prof. Roubini said. “But if they maintain large budget deficits, bond-market vigilantes will punish policymakers. Then, inflationary expectations will increase, long-term government bond yields would rise and borrowing rates will go up sharply, leading to stagflation.”

Part of the reason Obama is seeking to reappoint Bernanke is that another Fed chairman could disrupt the markets if he or she were to deviate from the path Bernanke has set.

“Wall Street can breath a little easier,” Christopher Rupkey, chief financial economist at Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd. (NYSE ADR: MTU), told Bloomberg News. “Having a new chairman come in at this late date would put the Fed-engineered solution to both the recovery and the exit strategy at risk.”

Government officials told reporters that White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel, U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner, and National Economic Council Chairman Lawrence H. Summers all recommended that Obama reappoint Bernanke.

And Summers, the former president of Harvard University, had been the leading candidate to replace Bernanke as chairman of the Fed.

Bernanke’s Political Challenges

Putting the economy back on the path to solid and sustainable growth won’t be Bernanke’s only task, either. In the years ahead, he will have a large role in the Obama administration’s push to overhaul financial market regulation.

“Looking forward, we must urgently address structural weakness in the financial system, in particular in the regulatory framework, to ensure that the enormous costs of the past two years will not be borne again,” Bernanke said earlier this week.

Obama’s plan puts Bernanke and the Federal Reserve in an awkward position. The plan broadly expands the central bank’s authority in dealing with systemic risks – such as the growth of reckless mortgage lending or the misuse of financial derivatives – by essentially giving the central bank the power to oversee from top to bottom almost any financial company in the country, including a firm’s foreign affiliates.

However, that would make Bernanke an even bigger target for members of Congress who believe the Fed already has too much power, and was far too cozy with banks and Wall Street firms as the mortgage crisis was building.

“Why does the Fed deserve more authority when institutionally it seemed to have failed to prevent the current crisis?” U.S. Sen. Christopher J. Dodd, D-CT, asked last month.

It’s possible that Bernanke will face similar questions at his upcoming confirmation hearing.

“I expect many serious questions will be raised about the role of the Federal Reserve moving forward and what authorities it should and should not have,” Sen. Dodd told The Wall Street Journal yesterday.

Despite these concerns about the expanding authority of the Fed, Sen. Dodd did support Bernanke’s reappointment.

“While I have had serious differences with the Federal Reserve over the past few years, I think reappointing chairman Bernanke is probably the right choice,” Dodd said. “Chairman Bernanke was slow to act during the early stages of the foreclosure crisis, but he ultimately demonstrated effective leadership and his reappointment sends the right signal to the markets.”

It was Bernanke’s slowness to act early on that may actually cost the Fed some of its powers. While Obama’s plan generally increases the role of the Fed, it also calls for the creation of a new, independent regulatory agency. That agency would write rules related to mortgages, credit cards and other consumer products, taking away powers previously held by the central bank.

Bernanke has acknowledged that the Fed underestimated the seriousness of the financial crisis at the outset – including the danger posed by subprime mortgage lending – but remains reluctant to relinquish the Fed’s role as a consumer advocate.

“We think the Fed can play a constructive role in protecting consumers,” Bernanke told members of the House Financial Services Committee last month.

Indeed, Bernanke’s response to the financial crisis – and what he does to keep the U.S. economy from relapsing – will play two vital roles: It will shape Bernanke’ s financial-crisis legacy; and it will help determine the future role of the Federal Reserve.

“This last couple of years has been clearly a move through uncharted territory, and as we’ve seen it’s taken a lot of unconventional moves to try to deal with the situation,” Robert Parry, former president of the San Francisco Fed, told Bloomberg. “There’s been a lot of innovation that’s gone on, and it seems to me that much of it has been successful.”

Source: With Reappointment in the Bag, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke Turns to Face Troublesome New Challenges

In both of these cases, credit default swaps became an actual bankruptcy catalyst – for the first time ever.

In the lead-up to both bankruptcies, the lenders who had debt outstanding – who would have the right to vote on any reorganization – had hedged their debt through credit default swaps and so stood to benefit from the company’s bankruptcy. That made it very difficult for both companies to get the majorities they needed for debt reorganization, making bankruptcy inevitable.

The CDS holders were in the position of seeing a 1929-vintage stockbroker balanced on a window ledge, and yelling “Jump, jump” – while simultaneously taking bets on the result.

In the AbitibiBowater bankruptcy case, holders of credit default swaps played two key roles:

• They were spectators and potential litigants.
• And they were the generator of lawsuits.

Let’s consider the first point.

When AbitibiBowater missed a bond payment on March 20, there were a lot of CDS derivatives outstanding that were close to maturity. Holders of these securities wanted to have AbitibiBowater immediately declared in default so that they could collect – a delay would allow their credit default swaps to expire.

However, non-payment of bond obligations generally does not become an actual “default” for several days (because the company is given a few days to come up with the money). Moreover, AbitibiBowater obtained a court order allowing the bond payments to be suspended while the company completed its debt restructuring. Thus, the CDS holders (to a value of about $500 million) were out of luck.

Or were they?
An International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) ruling on March 28 allowed CDS holders (as of March 20) to claim payment through a cash-auction system, as if a default had actually occurred.

The second role that CDS holders played truly was analogous to sadistic spectators placing bets at a suicide. Bowater (which had merged with Abitibi in an over-leveraged deal just two years ago) wanted to exchange its 9% bonds in order to improve its cash flow and to remove the likelihood of bankruptcy. To do this, it needed 97% acceptance from holders of bonds maturing in 2009 and 2010. The company was only able to get a 54% acceptance – largely because many bondholders also held credit default swaps, and so would actually benefit, rather than lose, from a Bowater bankruptcy.

General Growth, a shopping center developer with $27.3 billion in debt (real money even these days) – making it the largest default in U.S. real estate history – demonstrated the darkening cloud that’s hovering over the U.S. commercial real estate market. It also underscored the risks of being involved with credit default swaps.

General Growth’s mortgage debt had been securitized into mortgage-backed bonds, many holders of which had also bought credit default swaps, so debt restructuring proved impossible. Credit default swaps on General Growth’s vaunted Rouse unit were valued by auction on April 15, and were deemed to be worth 71% of par, so investors in them received $710,000 for each $1 million of CDS they held – a nice reward for voting “no” to a corporate restructuring.

Guess what? If busted insurance giant American International Group Inc. (AIG) was the writer of any of the credit default swaps on either AbitibiBowater or General Growth, we as taxpayers have paid the profits of the guys who forced those companies into bankruptcy.

A comforting thought, isn’t it?

The credit-default-swap rap sheet is becoming quite long. In the AIG case, CDS securities allowed an insurance company to write more than $200 billion worth of contracts, booking the premiums as income and reserving nothing against the potential losses, thus bankrupting itself at taxpayer expense.

Credit default swaps then allowed major banks – such as Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS) – to collect large sums through their holdings of AIG CDS contracts, while themselves having protection against an AIG bankruptcy, thus double-dipping at the expense of American taxpayers.

These big financial institutions have now facilitated the largest real estate bankruptcy in U.S. history – as well as the bankruptcy of the world’s largest supplier of newsprint – by preventing creditors from agreeing to restructuring plans.

These same perpetrators were an accessory before the fact in the Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (LEHMQ) bankruptcy, because they provided the best-leveraged and highest-volume method by which hedge funds could benefit from a Lehman default – the CDS markets had much bigger volume than the stock-options markets, and better leverage and less risk than a direct short sale of Lehman’s stock. By buying credit default swaps and shorting Lehman stock, hedge funds caused a classic “run” on that unfortunate institution that would probably not have occurred otherwise – or even been possible.

In each of these cases, credit default swaps have imposed costs on taxpayers, on the U.S. and Canadian economies, and on society in general. And these costs are outside the terms of their own contracts.

If credit default swaps were just Wall Street gamblers’ playthings – used to “hedge” exposures and provide gaming opportunities for hedge funds – the securities might have some modest net social utility.

However, in the cases we’ve highlighted, the CDS market has proved to be a means of extracting rents from taxpayers and other outsiders. If AIG had been allowed to go bankrupt properly – causing huge losses to banks, investment banks and hedge funds – credit default swaps might well have died a natural death.

The rescue of AIG provided them with artificial life support – thanks to a U.S. taxpayer subsidy of more than $150 billion – a fact that has perpetuated their existence.

In terms of regulation, a moderate step would be to allow the purchase of CDS securities only by those with an “insurable interest” in a particular debt. Further provisions could be written, providing that voting rights on a debt were transferred as credit default swaps were written on that liability. You could even force CDS securities to be weighted 100% in bank risk capital calculations, as if they were direct loans.

However, even a CDS purchase to offload a direct credit risk can equally well be undertaken by a simple sale of the debt, which would at the same time transfer its voting rights in any bankruptcy.

Since hedging and transfer of a debt position is perfectly possible without the existence of credit default swaps, what valid economic purpose do they serve?

I’m one of the biggest free-marketers on the planet, but these things aren’t the free market, they only work because of bank regulation and the “too big to fail” doctrine. When I ran a derivatives desk in the 1980s, we looked at the possibility of credit default swaps – it was an obvious derivatives application – but we decided that they were impossible to hedge and their payout in default was too uncertain for them to be sound financial instruments.

We were right. The market for CDS securities only mushroomed in the late 1990s because – by that stage in the long economic bubble – bankers had stopped worrying about long-term soundness if it meant they could receive larger short-term bonuses.

Let’s ban them. Wall Street will scream about the loss of income, but that loss will be trivial compared to the amounts taxpayers have already paid to bail out Wall Street from its mistakes. The modest economic benefits of credit default swaps are dwarfed by the costs and distortions they impose.

Taxpayers have rights, too.

[Editor's Note: When Slate magazine recently set out to identify the stock-market guru who most correctly predicted the stock-market decline that accompanied the current financial crisis, the respected online publication concluded it was Martin Hutchinson, a veteran international investment banker who is one of Money Morning's top forecasters.

It was no surprise to our readers: After all, Hutchinson warned investors about the evils of credit default swaps six months before the complex derivatives did in insurer American International Group Inc. Then last fall, Hutchinson "called" the market bottom.

Now Hutchinson has developed a strategy for investors to invest their way to "Permanent Wealth" using high-yielding dividend stocks. Indeed, he's currently detailing a strategy that will enable investors to make $4,201 in cash in just 12 days. Just click here to find out about this strategy - or Hutchinson's new service, The Permanent Wealth Investor.]

Ban Credit Default Swaps? These Corporate Bankruptcies Show We Should

]]> http://www.contrarianprofits.com/articles/ban-credit-default-swaps-these-corporate-bankruptcies-show-we-should/15849/feed 0 http://www.contrarianprofits.com/articles/five-wall-street-whoppers-and-why-you-need-to-know-them/15091 http://www.contrarianprofits.com/articles/five-wall-street-whoppers-and-why-you-need-to-know-them/15091#comments Thu, 19 Mar 2009 15:34:09 +0000 Keith Fitz-Gerald http://www.contrarianprofits.com/?p=15091 If you’re like many investors, you are probably sitting on the sidelines right now, unsure of what to do. If you want to buy, you may be thinking “let’s wait a little longer.” If you want to sell, you might be concerned about “missing out.”

Either way (and even if you don’t plan on making either move anytime soon), having a sense of what got us here can keep you from repeating the same mistakes and even help you make smarter financial decisions – particularly when it comes to repairing your portfolio and even growing it in the years ahead.

When it comes to understanding exactly “what got us here,” I find it helpful to review some of the key bits…

Speaking at a dinner at Columbia University, Soros actually compared the current situation to the breakup of the Soviet Union, and said that the whipsaw effects of the crisis are actually more severe than the Great Depression.

“We witnessed the collapse of the financial system,” Soros told his audience. “It was placed on life support, and it’s still on life support. There’s no sign that we are anywhere near a bottom.”

He said the bankruptcy of. Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (OTC: LEHMQ) in September marked a turning point in the functioning of the market system.

His comments echoed those made earlier at the same conference by former U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Paul A. Volcker, who is now a top adviser to U.S. President Barack Obama. Volcker said that overseas industrial production was declining even more rapidly than it was in the United States, which is itself under severe strain.

“I don’t remember any time, maybe even in the Great Depression, when things went down quite so fast, quite so uniformly around the world,” Volcker said.

Market Matters

Nothing has been able to get this economy (and stock market) back on track. Congress passes – and President Barack Obama signs – a near-$900 billion stimulus package and the U.S. Federal Reserve revises (negatively) its economic outlook for the remainder of 2009. Major financial institutions get significant (bailout) assistance from the government and Bank of America Corp.’s (BAC) chief is subpoenaed for misleading investors over Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc.’s (MER) (excessive) bonuses.

Automakers beg Congress for (and receive) a bailout of their own and General Motors Corp. (GM) and Chrysler LLC come back for even more as part of their restructuring plans.  Investors try to look past the unscrupulous practices of Madoff and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brings suit against billionaire Alan Stanford’s global enterprises over an apparent $8 billion fraud through its high-yielding CDs (with Venezuelans particularly hard hit).

Stanford Financial manages assets of $50 billion in 140 countries, with the primary bank operations in question based in Antigua.  With the Dow Jones Industrial Average hitting a six-year low and falling below the perceived floor set in November, investors are left scratching their heads.

So much for the “challenging” times setting a tone for bipartisanship in Washington.  As the stimulus package passed with only token Republican support in the Senate, its party leader called it “a missed opportunity, one for which our children and grandchildren will pay a hefty price.“  He then revealed that not one House member even took the time to read the bill.  The Obama administration also announced a plan to help millions of homeowners avoid foreclosure, while attempting to stabilize the housing market (to the tune of another $275 billion).  As long as the Treasury’s checkbook is out, GM wants another $16 billion and Chrysler could live a few more days with an additional $2 billion.

Oil rose (briefly) late in the week as the U.S. Department of Energy revealed a surprising decline in crude inventories and a slight increase in the demand for gas now that prices at the pumps have fallen below $2 a gallon and stayed for a while.

After taking the Dow down more than 300 points following Presidents’ Day, nervous investors sold all the way to a new six-year low and the worst week for equities since October.

Financials continued to be hammered as talks of bank nationalization picked up steam.  Global stock markets followed suit with Japan’s Topix closing at a 20-year low.   With investors shunning equities of all shapes and sizes (and U.S. Treasuries offering little in the way of returns), gold became the safe-haven recipient and futures climbed above $1,000 an ounce.  For now, investors just talk of “values,” “opportunities,” “rallies,” and “rebounds,” but few seem willing to follow-through with any real buying.

Economically Speaking

With U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke and friends trying any and all tricks in their arsenal to jumpstart the economy, the central bank chief admitted that the efforts to date have resulted in very limited successes.  The Fed negatively revised its outlook for the remainder of the year and now projects that unemployment could reach 8.8% and the GDP may shrink by as much as 1.3% in 2009.  Meanwhile, our global trading partners are struggling with problems of their own.  Japan’s economy experienced its worst quarter in almost 35 years as its manufacturers suffered through substantially declining demand for their goods.

The domestic economic data confirmed that the Fed’s new (weaker) projections may be right on target.  Housing starts in January fell by almost 15% and activity now stands 56% below the pace of construction last year.  Industrial production tumbled more than expected last month, and automakers face even more shutdowns as part of their recently proposed restructuring plans.

The labor market remained incredibly weak as new jobless claims rose again in the most recent release and the number of workers receiving unemployment benefits for over a week stood around a record high 5 million people.  On the inflation front, the cries of deflation can be put on hold for the time being.  Both the producer price index (PPI – wholesale) and the consumer price index (CPI – retail) experienced their biggest gains since July 2008, as energy prices actually rose last month.

Still, consumer prices remained flat (no real increase) on an annual basis, the lowest level of price change since August 1955.

Weekly Economic Calendar

Source: Super-Investor George Soros the Latest to Predict the Worst is Yet to Come