The team at Casey’s Energy Opportunities believe that planned government buying or selling of crude oil for SPRs actually have very little impact in the overall market. However, an overall drawdown of worldwide inventory could put downward pressure on the price of oil. The various countries also have their particular reasons and influences in decisions to tap their reserves.

So which countries are executing preparedness plans to fill their strategic reserves with $70 oil now (as opposed to $140+)? Below are the 10 countries that consume the most oil in the world, as of 2008, the latest figures available from the BP Statistical Review of World Energy:

Russia, Canada, and Saudi Arabia can leave the list, as they are net exporters of oil and thus do not actually require a strategic reserve, at least in the short term. We’ll also bump Brazil, because its balance of imports is dwindling every year, and it should become a exporter before it requires a reserve. That leaves six countries to examine:

The United States

Not surprisingly, America has the largest strategic reserve in the world in an absolute sense. Its 727 million barrels are stored in four hollowed-out salt domes (and one pending) along the coastline of the Gulf of Mexico. These add up to some 62 days’ worth of imports, according to government sources. The United States government currently has plans to push this to 1 billion barrels, or about 85 days’ worth of imports, which would make the reserves equivalent to those of Japan and Korea.

The SPR build-up will be accomplished by expanding two of the current facilities, for an additional 113 million barrels, and (probably) building a new one in Richton, Missouri, for 160 million barrels. The Richton project has met local opposition, because it would require pumping 50 million gallons of freshwater per day from the Pascagoula River to dissolve enough salt to open up another subterranean cavern. The total cost of the program is estimated at US$3.7 billion, not including the cost to fill the reserves. Oil purchases are likely to be slow, at around 100,000 bpd (barrels per day) before 2014 and 150,000 bpd thereafter.

In a real emergency, the combined American strategic and commercial reserves (the latter held by private corporations, especially refiners) may seem unnervingly thin from the perspective of energy security. Add to that the fact that the government can release them at a rate of only 4.4 million barrels per day, or about half its imports.

Still, the 108 or so days’ reserve it has between government and commercial sources are considered adequate by international standards. The United States has used this reserve twice in the past 20 years (Desert Storm and Hurricane Katrina) to combat severe demand or supply disruptions. It also has the luxury of importing more oil from Canada in an emergency.

Scenarios that could force a sustained drawdown of reserves:

• Sustained hyperinflation in the United States due to actions by the Federal Reserve that causes oil-producing countries to look for better markets to sell oil.

• A prolonged general embargo by OPEC on the United States, forcing America to look to traditional partners such as Canada and Mexico, though they might not have sufficient oil.

• Another war, potentially in North Korea or Iran, requiring a large amount of oil input from America that it simply does not have.

• A particularly active hurricane season that knocks out a large amount of production capacity in the Gulf of Mexico, and the United States releases from the SPR to help.

China

China’s strategic reserves began being built in 2004, when leaders in China began to realize that the country had no adequate government-controlled reserves to combat any disruptions in the supply of oil. China is a large importer and is dependent on the same sources of foreign oil as the United States. China is even more anxious to build such a reserve, as two of its neighbors, Korea and Japan, both have large strategic reserves.

China currently has four government reserves with a total reserve potential of 272 million barrels, which translates to about 30 days’ consumption. Two of the four have been confirmed full, and there are rumors that all four are and that China has taken advantage of the recent precipitous drop in the price of oil to buy up. According to Chinese government sources, however, the reserves are likely not to be completely full until 2010, and 2009 buying of oil will be at around 42 million barrels.

The government has also announced plans to increase the country’s reserve from 30 to 100 days of consumption. The next stage of the development will call for an additional 170 million barrels in eight storage facilities. The locations of the facilities are as yet secret.

In an emergency, China would likely turn to Russia to buy oil, though only the naive would be surprised if Russia added a premium for the privilege.

Scenarios that could force a sustained drawdown of reserves in China:

• Worldwide embargo on China due to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

• High oil prices force Chinese industries out of business, pressuring the government to keep oil prices low domestically by selling some of the reserves to domestic companies.

• North Korea asks for oil from China to support military action on the Korean Peninsula, and China ships it to them on the black market.

• Russia slows or stops its exports as part of the Russian “dominance via energy” strategy, leaving Chinese pipelines trickling and Chinese industries disrupted.

Japan/South Korea

We have placed Japan and South Korea’s reserves together, as the two countries have a treaty that allows them to share their strategic reserves.

Resource-poor Japan has one of the world’s largest strategic oil reserves, enough for 82 days of imports. State-controlled reserves are run by the state-owned Japan Oil, Gas, and Metals National Corporation. The reserves consist of 320 million barrels in 10 different locations, which makes them second only to the United States in absolute volume. Japan’s island geography means that having an emergency supply of crude oil is crucial, and the Japanese government obviously has not ignored this aspect.

South Korea is in one of the global “hotspots” in the world, right beside North Korea. As the country is under an almost constant threat of war, the government has stocked up some 76 million barrels, with capacity for an additional 40 million barrels.

Scenarios that could force a drawdown of reserves:

• Just one at this time, from two possible sources: political instability in the region caused by either the Taiwan or the Korea conundrums disrupts tanker transport, perhaps even forces them to port.

India

India has a small reserve it began to build in 2004. This stockpile is sufficient for perhaps only two weeks of consumption. The country eventually wants to raise this level to 45 days, though the first phase has not even been completed yet. The projects are estimated to come online in 2012, which means it has taken eight years from planning to completion. These figures imply that India will not even have a somewhat sufficient strategic reserve until 2016, given that the expansion project was approved in 2008.

Germany

Germany has the largest reserve in Europe and is among the top in the world as well. Its government has satisfied a federal law that regulates storage be at least 90 days’ worth of net imports. More than half of the storage is in Southern Germany, where large salt caverns exist. Germany is well prepared in its strategic oil reserves, and there are no glaring factors that would force a drawdown of reserves, barring a global catastrophe. Furthermore, the reserves of Germany, France, and Italy are pooled and can be used by any of the three countries in an emergency.

So How Much Do the Reserves Matter?

According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates, some 2 billion barrels are held in government-owned strategic reserves around the world. Though this seems like plenty of oil, does it really impact the spot price of oil? Collectively, the answer is yes, as this volume corresponds to 23 days’ worth of global consumption. If drawn down together over a short period of time, the effect on spot price could be substantial.

For illustration’s sake, suppose that countries collectively draw down their entire reserves over the period of a year. This rate would make up for 10% of the daily worldwide trade of crude oil, which could certainly impact price (imagine ConocoPhillips and ExxonMobil both going under at the same time).

Individually, however, even China and the United States have a limited impact on the spot price of oil over a single year. If the United States’ inventory were drawn over an entire year, it would only make for a 4% increase in supply. Under normal buying patterns of each country’s strategic reserves, the impact is even smaller. Since China’s 42-million-barrel purchase is over one year, their purchase would not even make a dent in the daily trade of oil.

Thus, a concerted effort by the worldwide reserves can definitely keep prices down in the short term (within a year, two at best), but cannot make for a paradigm shift in the supply/demand model of oil or the Peak Oil argument. And from the buying side, if governments plan the filling of their strategic reserves, the impact on the spot price of oil is likely to be minimal.

Perception is a tricky horse to ride, however, as we all know. Given a worldwide panic for oil à la the 1973 oil embargo, oil prices could spike in the short term, because government reserves would likely raise purchases 10% or so in a real emergency. This effect would be short lived for the foreseeable future, though, as worldwide reserves are already reaching their limits.

In short, if everything goes according to “plan” by the governments, even filling a large reserve such as the Chinese SPR would have little impact on the price of oil. For SPRs to truly impact the spot price of oil, it would have to be a global situation, with war and embargo the two most likely scenarios. Even then, the impact would be mellowed by limitations on how quickly governments can either release or purchase the oil.

Regards,

Marin Katusa

Source: Who’s Buying Oil?

Not to crunch too many metaphors right here at the top, but a consensus seems to be firming up in the animate jello of the Internet that we have entered the Season of the Witch. An odor of ripeness fills the virtual air — something between dead carp and apples baking.

Whatever else appears to be going on in the upper stories and verdigris-tinged turrets of capital finance — currency rackets, gold switcheroos, interest rate arbitrage games, concealment of losses under rugs and behind curtains, Chinese fire drills performed by Spanish prisoners, executive three-card-monte set-ups, boardroom work-arounds, accounting quicksteps, Peter-to-Paul-shuffles, check kitings, pigeon drops, Ponzi schemes, hugger-muggers, bezels, shucks, jives, and enough monkeyshines to make Lord Greystroke cry for mercy — apart, in other words, from business-as-usual, such as it is these days, on Wall Street, there is a rising collective sense of anxious expectation that things are about to shake loose in the sad-ass shell of what remains of our economy. And the most perplexing part is that there hardly seems any safe place to preserve one’s savings.

The showmen over at the Financial Sense website, have put on an excellent month-long series of interviews and debate podcasts between leading inflationistas and deflationistas — Daniel Amerman, Peter Schiff, Robert Prechter, Mark Faber, Michael “Mish” Shedlock, Harry Dent — and after weeks of sedulous listening I still remain flummoxed as to where to stash the dwindling cash.

Harry Dent was a curious case in point this week. He has made some howlingly wrong calls before (e.g. in 2006, predicting a Dow 40,000 at the conclusion of the post-2001 bubble). Perhaps he missed the crack-up aspect of the most recent boom. He did not foresee the long gruesome meltdown of late 2007 to March 2009, or rather, his timing was off, since he called for the commencement of a new Great Depression in 2010. (And I hasten to insert here that my own timing of events has not been so great either.) Anyway, Dent sees a “winter” of finance and economy looming from here forward, characterized by extreme deflation, based on his view that the amount of private debt going bad (est. $40 trillion) far outweighs government’s ability to create new “money” (a few measily trillion) and hence that there is no chance in hell we’ll find ourselves in an inflationary situation for some time ahead. The private debt workout has to be completed first.

Most curious, though, was when the interviewer, Jim Puplava, probed Dent about his views on Peak Oil. Dent said he didn’t believe in it; that when he was in college in the 1970s (remember the OPEC oil embargo of ‘73), he learned to disregard any suggestions that we are “running out of oil.” He stated this, by the way, as a simple assertion, without any further explanation, and Puplava didn’t belabor him with arguments. But it was a weird moment. Of course, it hardly need be said that Peak Oil story has never been about “running out of oil” per se, but rather about declining flows, geopolitical management of flows, and the effects of depletion on industrial economies — in particular the effect on regular, expected, cyclical “growth” of the type that financial markets utterly depend on to power the trade in investment paper.

It is exceedingly odd that this does not factor into Dent’s thinking, because what Peak Oil inescapably does is introduce the very sobering idea of discontinuity — that is, that the game has changed radically, especially where all our assumptions about continued “growth” are concerned. In that brief exchange on Peak Oil, Dent seemed to take the position that the “winter” part of any historical financial cycle always produced “new technology” that invariably saves the day, putting this seemingly very smart man in the camp of so many techno-cornucopian triumphalists all wishing for the same outcome: that some mythical “they” will “come up with” a set of rescue remedies to keep all the cars circulating on the freeways, and all the WalMarts groaning with swag.

Like so many major league prognosticators, Dent arrives at his ideas by building models of reality, assembling “data” to create charts of trends in prices, interest rates, and especially demographics – what age group of people are buying a lot of what in which stage of their lives. The whole business seems very rational and reasonable except when you realize that it is just another “narrative” — to borrow one of Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s terms — girded with statistical justification. One can hardly fault it from a strictly procedural point of view — since, in our culture, conclusions ought to proceed from evidence — but one can’t escape the feeling that it amounts to little more than old-fashioned augury… that someone examining the entrails of a dead chicken, spread over the front page of The Wall Street Journal, might arrive at very similar conclusions. All that said, Dent was an appealingly confident personality on-the-air, the kind of authoritative voice you’d like to believe, if only it were possible.

Prechter was much the same a few weeks earlier, and he, too, foresees a darker American future, based on a different set of models called Elliot Wave principles. His forecasts derive from a picture of “social mood” as much as economic data flows. He, too seems to disregard the Peak Oil story and its implications as the master resource driving growth in industrial economies.

Personally, I am not at all sure that the Peak Oil story, or its associated general resource scarcity story, will shed a whole lot of light on the question of inflation-or-deflation. I say this because I think it is a short way down the road of depletion-and-scarcity before the major complex systems we depend on for daily life become so unstable that general socio-economic collapse ensues. After all, capital finance is only one of these many complex systems — some other biggies being food production, trade and manufacture, transportation, electric power distribution, infrastructure maintenance, the military, and governance. Inflation-or-deflation will only be symptomatic of larger failures and instabilities in these systems necessary for modern, civilized life.

All of it begs the question not only whether you or I will have two nickels to rub together, or two gold eagles, or a bundle of six month US Treasury bills, or a zillion shares of Apple (NASDAQ:AAPL), or a gainful vocation, or a roof over our heads, or a hot meal at the end of the day, or a safe place to sleep, or a country we can recognize. I’ve done my share of forecasting, with some episodes of notably bad timing. I don’t do it for grandstanding effect but to provide some basis for knowing what to do in the years directly ahead, so we can hope to construct lives worth living. I’m impatient with models, charts, and statistical analysis. Perhaps this is childish. I’d rather tell a story or paint a picture. So, I’m going to spend the rest of the week finishing the last chapter of World Made By Hand Two: The Witch of Hebron while the US economy wanders where it will.

Regards,
James Howard Kunstler

Source: Inflation, Deflation, Peak Oil and Complex Systems

It’s odd, that in his otherwise excellent blow-by-blow account (”Eight Days,” in the Sept 21 New Yorker Magazine) of the September 2008 Wall Street meltdown that left Lehman dead, and AIG croaking in a ditch, and the banking system in general functionally crippled, reporter James B. Stewart never got around to really describing the cause of it all — namely, the on-the-ground material catastrophe of American suburbia.

It was the worthlessness of the tradable securitized debt associated with all those overpriced (and overvalued) chipboard and vinyl houses, smeared recklessly over the American landscape, that started all the trouble in the first place. And it is our inability to come to grips with that underlying catastrophe that prolongs the resolution of the still-florid banking crisis — since the federal government is doing everything possible to prop up the failed capital equation of terminal suburbia, and to deny the obsolescence of that version of the American Dream and all the mechanisms for delivering it.

The suburban project was not a conspiracy by the likes of Robert Moses, Walt Disney, Frank Lloyd Wright, and President Eisenhower to produce a living arrangement with no future. It was the emergent, self-organizing result of special circumstances in a particular time and place: post World War Two America, with an immense supply of cheap oil, cheap land, and the industrial capacity to churn out all the necessary components for a car-dependent development pattern. Suburbia was spawned out of a couple of persistent themes in American cultural history: 1.) that cities and city life were no good; 2.) and that the romance of settling the wilderness could be reenacted, at great profit, in all that space beyond the towns and cities. It would be silly to deny the appeal of this arrangement at its inception. By the end of WW II, city life in the popular imagination was reduced to one potently awful image: Ralph Kramden’s apartment in “The Honeymooners” TV show.

There had to be something better than that. Suburbia was engineered as the antidote to the Kramden’s apartment: country-living-for-everybody. The evacuation of the cities to the new outlands proceeded as relentlessly as the landings at Normandy. It wasn’t until the program was well underway that the self-destructive essence of it became obvious — that every new housing subdivision killed the original rural character of the land, with the result that suburban life quickly became a cartoon of country living in a cartoon of a country house in a cartoon of the country. With additional layer-on-layer of, first, the shopping in the form of highway strips, then malls, along with the office “parks,” these places elaborated themselves into a kind of cancer-of-the-landscape, a chronic and expensive condition that Americans had no choice but to live with, because of the monumental investments they had already made in it. The discontents it produced lent it to psychological depression and dark humor, just as chronic illness does. But we were stuck with it.

Meanwhile, all the machinery of culture and politics made it impossible to construct anything differently. The exquisitely fine-tuned planning-and-zoning codes generated by the thousands of town boards mandated a suburban outcome everywhere — with plenty of help from the DOT traffic engineers, the fire marshals, and the even the mandarins of academia who trained all these professionals. As a natural consequence of all this, the disinvestment in cities — especially the older cities of the industrial heartland — continued remorselessly until it seemed as if the Second World War had taken place in St. Louis and Cleveland.

This mode of behavior persisted through the first, short-lived oil scarcity tremors of the 1970s. It was so completely embedded in the popular imagination that it had become the baseline American identity. The suburban project caught a second wind in the 1990s, when the last great non-OPEC oil fields of the North Sea, Alaska, and Siberia nullified the grip of the Islamic cartel for while, and sent the price of oil down to $11-a-barrel. Ironically, it was during those years that the warnings of “peak oil” first circulated beyond the geology offices, and it was clear to anyone who reflected on the connections that the project of suburbia was doomed.

It was also ironic, tragically so, that during this same period Wall Street began to seek some new way to make real money beyond stock and bond markets, which didn’t seem to produce wealth at all for more than a decade when inflation was factored in. By a fortuitous coincidence, the revolution in computers enabled Wall Street bankers to concoct abstruse new species of tradable paper securities based on bundles of debt that seemed to produce miraculous earnings. It had the added advantage of being inscrutable to both investors and financial regulators. Due diligence became impossible and moral hazard spread like ringworm in a dormitory. The bulk of the securitized debt originated in home mortgages and the larger result was a gigantic racket ramped up between Wall Street and the US government to conceal all the structural weaknesses of a de-industrialized US economy behind a hyperbolic commerce in the very thing that the American public cherished most: their houses, which, understandably, everybody had come to call “homes.” Wall Street might as easily have commoditized mother and apple pie – if you could sell each one for half a million dollars.

The banking fiasco still underway is at once a proxy for the larger failure of the American economy and the greatest fissure in it. Put as simply possible: we can’t service our debt, we can’t generate more debt, and the notional “capital” we thought we possessed is dissolving into nothingness. The federal government and Wall Street remain committed to supporting all the rackets associated with a suburban sprawl economy that has entered its own zone of remorseless failure. It is failing as a capital investment first, and is secondarily failing as a practical living arrangement. The two failures will continue in a close race toward terminal entropy.

The dirty secret all along was that by 2005 there was no economy left in the USA beyond the suburban sprawl economy with its so-called “consumer” nexus — largely devoted to the outfitting of suburbia. More mortgage debt (and credit card and car loan debt) will go bad and the investment paper that represents it will go bad and it will eventually destroy our current system for accumulating, valuing, and deploying wealth. It will not destroy the function of capital — no matter how many angry intellectuals inveigh against the straw man of capital-ism, as if it were merely a belief system – but it will be a long long time before anything sturdy or credible in the way of banking will be reconstructed out of the wreckage.

Regards,
James Howard Kunstler

Source: Ruinous Debt to Create Futureless Suburbia

Supply has outrun demand this year as a global recovery has yet to accelerate. Yet, oil prices more than doubled from February to August and are up about 50% from where they started the year.

Now, many traders are positioning themselves to profit from a pullback. The gap between prices of options betting on a decline in prices and those that would profit as a result of a rise in oil has widened to a record 10 percentage points, according to five years of data compiled by Banc of America Securities-Merrill Lynch.

Put options, which give traders the right to sell oil in December below current prices have an implied volatility of 54.3%, compared to 43.3% for options to call, Bloomberg News reported. Implied volatility is estimated volatility of a security’s price. Implied volatility generally increases when the market is bearish and decreases when the market is bullish.

Implied volatility is used in calculating an option’s premium and right now the premium for December and other put options shows “the market is worried,” Harry Tchilinguirian, a senior oil analyst at BNP Paribas SA (NYSE ADR: BNPQY) told Bloomberg.

“If puts are pricing higher than calls, we are looking at a situation where the market is more averse to the downside and is looking for more compensation” for the option, he said.

Perhaps the biggest reason the market is worried is that a generous supply of oil remains on the market, some of it piled up in offshore tankers. Meanwhile, the global economy is healing at a considerably slow pace with many analysts forecasting a so-called U-shaped recession for the United States – the world’s largest petroleum consumer.

U.S. stockpiles of crude are 14% higher than they were a year ago, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA). U.S. distillate fuel inventories – which include heating oil and jet fuel – stood at 167.8 million barrels as of Sept. 11 of this year, according to the Energy Information Administration (EIA). That’s the highest level since 1983.

As of Sept. 11, U.S. gasoline supplies are at 207.7 million barrels – 2.2% higher than they were in late May at the start of peak summer driving season, according to the EIA.

The story is much the same overseas where gasoil stockpiles – the European equivalent of heating oil -reached a record 23 million barrels on Sept. 10, according to PJK International BV, Bloomberg reported.

At the end of July, oil inventories in the 30 nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) totaled about 2.8 billion barrels – 4.6% more than the same time last year, according to the IEA. More than 60 million barrels of oil are being held in tankers offshore.

The Centre for Global Energy Studies (CGES) in a monthly report that it expects high crude stockpiles will continue to constrain the market.

“The CGES expects little sustained upward pressure on oil prices over the remainder of this year and even next year prices are unlikely to rise much unless clear signals emerge that world is pulling out of recession in a sustainable fashion,” the CGES said. “High inventories, particularly of middle distillates, are putting a ceiling on oil prices at the moment … and this will only lift once those inventories start to be drawn down.”

The report also noted the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which controls 40% of the world’s oil supply, sees promoting economic growth as being more important than the short-term pursuit of higher prices.

“OPEC signaled its broad satisfaction with the current level of oil prices when it met in Vienna earlier this month,” CGES said. “It recognized that sustainable upward price pressure will only come with economic recovery and rising oil demand.

Saudi Arabia’s oil minister, Ali al-Naimi weeks ago told reporters that the cartel is more concerned with reinvigorating the global economy than raising oil prices.

“Economic growth is the name of the game, that’s what’s going to drive the price,” said al-Naimi. “As long as economic growth is there, the price is going to go up.”

OPEC has last year lowered its production quotas by 4.2 million barrels per day (bpd) – about 5% of global demand – hoping to put a floor under prices that plunged more than 80% from their record high above $147 a barrel last summer. The reduction was effective in halting the fall in prices, but even with the cuts supplies continue to grow.

Additionally, some OPEC nations have not strictly adhered to the mandate. The cartel’s production exceeded its quotas by 1.2 million barrels a day in August, according to Bloomberg estimates.

The glut of oil on the market has some analysts wondering whether or not spooked speculators will hasten their retreat from the market.

“If ever there was going to be a retreat below $60 a barrel, it is now,” Stephen Schork, president of consultant Schork Group Inc. in Villanova, Pa., told Bloomberg in a telephone interview.

Light, sweet crude for December delivery yesterday tumbled $2.33 a barrel, or 3.24% to settle at $69.71.

Source: Traders Anticipate a Drop in Oil Prices as Supply Outruns Demand

However, a report from the International Energy Agency (IEA) indicated that demand is recovering more quickly than previously thought, and that OPEC may be playing catch-up as the global recovery gathers steam.

The IEA increased its outlook for global oil demand by nearly 500,000 barrels per day (bpd) for 2009 and 2010, to 84.4 million and 85.7 million bpd respectively.

Perhaps the biggest reason for the increase was surging demand in China, where the Red Dragon’s $587 billion (4 trillion yuan) stimulus plan has resuscitated manufacturing and helped China grow into the world’s largest auto market.

China’s imports of oil hit a record high in July, soaring 18% from the month prior to 19.63 million metric tons, or about 4.64 million barrels a day, according to the nation’s General Administration of Customs.

China’s economy grew by 7.9% in the second quarter, and Beijing estimates 8% growth for the year, compared to an expected 3% dip for the United States.

Chinese demand for oil this year will grow by 2.8%, according to the IEA.

“I am more confident today than what I was back in May,” about China’s economic recovery, Saudi Oil Minister Ali Naimi told Bloomberg.

The rise of China has been a tremendous boon to OPEC – which controls 40% of the world’s oil supply – particularly since the financial crisis has crimped oil demand in developed nations around the world.

“We’re looking East more these days,” said Kuwaiti Oil Minister Sheikh Ahmad Abdullah al-Sabah.

The IEA expects demand for oil in North America to plunge 4.4% this year. However, that figure is an improvement from last month’s forecast of 5.1%, and could accelerate further as the recovery gains momentum.

Data for gasoline and heating oil consumption in June showed a “hefty” increase in demand the IEA said. That data was further substantiated yesterday when the Energy Department reported a larger-than-expected drop in inventories.

Inventories dropped by 5.9 million barrels for the week ended Sept. 4 – more than three times estimates of analysts surveyed by Platt’s, the energy information arm of McGraw-Hill Cos, according to The Associated Press.

Indeed, even Saudi oil minister Naimi has acknowledged the bullish shift in the market.

“You guys must realize that there is a fundamental change in the market,” he told reporters ahead of the night-time meeting that agreed to keep supplies officially unchanged.”Economic growth is the name of the game, that’s what’s going to drive the price. As long as economic growth is there, the price is going to go up.”

Still, OPEC remained cautious, opting to keep production level until demand in the West returns to its pre-crash levels. Of course, that means the cartel will likely be playing catch-up, boosting production behind price increases as the economic recovery gains momentum.

Oil prices have more than doubled from their February lows, closing yesterday at $72.17 a barrel on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX).

Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (NYSE: GS) has raised its 2009 oil price forecast to $85 a barrel from $65 and said prices would reach $95 a barrel in 2010.

Source: Oil Prices Gaining Momentum as OPEC Keeps a Lid on Production

U.S. crude prices for October delivery rose 2 cents to $68.07 a barrel by 11:44 a.m. EDT (1644 GMT), after earlier reaching a high of $69.40 on U.S. stock gains and a weaker dollar.

London Brent crude was down 32 cents at $67.34 a barrel.

“Right now, there’s not a whole lot of momentum here in either direction. I think the trend for the week, which has been down, is still in force,” said Tom Bentz, senior commodity analyst, BNP Paribas commodity Futures Inc in New York.

“Everything seemed to kind of slip right after the jobs data,” he added.

U.S. jobless claims fell last week, according to a report released by the Department of Labor on Thursday, but the prior week’s figure was revised up.

The number of people collecting long-term unemployment benefits rose to 6.23 million in the week ended Aug. 22, well above market expectations for 6.12 million.

U.S. stocks edged up on Thursday on better-than-expected sales from retailers in August.

The Institute for Supply Management released a report on Thursday showing that while the U.S. services sector shrank in August, an index measuring activity was at its highest in nearly a year.

RANGEBOUND

Oil prices are not likely to break out of the confines of the current range in the short term, analysts said.

U.S. crude prices have been rangebound, between $65 to $75 a barrel since the start of August, fluctuating on the latest clues about the speed of an impending economic recovery.

“There isn’t the structural tightness for the market to break out of this range,” said Petromatrix analyst Olivier Jakob, pointing to brimming global distillates such as diesel stored on land and at sea.

Traders were also eyeing news that big oil producers are increasing output. Russian oil output hit a record high in August, nearing 10 million barrels per day as the country launched a new giant field.

OPEC is expected to leave output targets unchanged when it next meets on Sept. 9 in Vienna.

Sept 3 (Reuters)

No one reads it. The mainstream media ignore it.

It’s the product of the best prognosticators in the Department of Energy. Okay, that may be what puts most people off. But if you’re patient enough to dig into it, it will cough up some fascinating nuggets of information.

The present edition is no exception. The report refrains from spelling out the conclusion that seems most obvious from its data. However, confirming a trend begun just last year, the 2009 edition clearly reveals that the government has been forced to admit that Peak Oil is coming. Moreover, it’s expected to arrive much faster than was believed as recently as two years ago.

This represents a remarkable turnaround in the agency’s opinion. Up until 2008, they were predicting unbroken growth in world oil supplies for the next two decades. But in ’08 and ’09, the rosy picture turned decidedly unrosier.

Before we look at the numbers, a couple of notes on terminology. The EIA makes its projections based on what its analysts call the “reference case,” i.e., average economic growth. It also provides estimates for better- and worse-case scenarios, but the reference case represents the best guesses they have.

Oil (as we generally think of it), upon which most of the world economy depends, is termed “conventional liquids,” i.e., the stuff that comes gushing up from under Saudi sands. “Unconventional liquids” – extra-heavy oil, bitumen, coal-to-liquids, gas-to-liquids, and biofuels – are also covered in the report, as we’ll see, but conventional is far and away the most important one at this moment in history.

With that in mind, by 2007 the IEO was in its final year of irrational exuberance, confidently predicting that world production of conventional liquids would be 107.5 million barrels/day (up from 81.9 in 2005). That dovetailed nicely with a forecast for world demand of 118 million b/d, with 10.5 million barrels of unconventional liquids taking up the slack.

By ’08, they had put the info into table form, and look what happened:

Same table, ’09:

Projected production, as you can see, is suddenly shriveling up. From 107.5 million b/d of oil projected for 2030 in 2007, to 102.9 million b/d in 2008, to this year’s meager expectation for 93.1 million. That’s a drop of 13.4% in only two years, and posits production growth of only 11.6 million b/d (14.2%) from 2006 levels.

If that isn’t an admission that the era of Peak Oil is upon us, what is?

The report assumes that some of this stunning shortfall will be made up by development of unconventional liquids to the tune of 13.5 million b/d, including a jump of 5.9 million b/d in biofuels. At the same time, while conventional liquid production from non-OPEC nations is projected to grow only 7%, OPEC is expected to substantially increase its contribution, ramping up output by almost 25%. (All figures are for the period of 2006-2030.)

Does this seem optimistic? Well, it presupposes some heavy lifting on the part of OPEC, a dicey proposition in the best of times.

And it means creation of the infrastructure necessary to exploit extra-heavy oils, tar sands, shale, ultradeep deposits and other unconventionals, all of which require sophisticated technological know-how and face significant environmental challenges.

Biofuel production could more easily be elevated. But to reach the lofty level of nearly 6 million b/d would necessitate a huge diversion of cropland from food to energy, certain to be attended by a rise in food prices, not to mention potentially serious food shortages. The need for food being rather more primal than the need for gasoline, politicians are going to be reluctant to risk loosing angry mobs into the streets.

Even if all of these developments proceed flawlessly, though, we’ll still have to face a widening gap between production and consumption. Or will we?

As it turns out, we’re in luck! Or so the EIA would have us believe. Because, accompanying that falling supply is – you guessed it – declining demand. In 2007, the IEO anticipated world demand for all liquids of 118 million b/d in 2030. This year, that estimate shrank to 107 million b/d, right in line with production.

The important point to take away from the IEO’s analysis is that the world is facing a decline in liquid fuel production and the government, after years of straight-faced denial, is now admitting it.

Does this mean we’re going to run out of oil? No. But supply constrictions mean that the good old days of limitless, cheap oil are gone. And, though viable alternatives eventually will be developed, there’s no way of putting a timetable on that. In the interim, we’re going to have to pay up if we want to keep the family jalopy on the road.

How much? The IEO report’s reference case calls for $130/barrel oil in 2030, but that’s based on relatively modest demand increases from India, China, and other developing nations, and we find it very optimistic. It easily could be twice that.

Regards,
Doug Hornig

Source: Washington Capitulates: Peak Oil Is Real

U.S. crude for October delivery settled down $2.78, or 3.8 percent, at $69.96 a barrel, having fallen as low as $69.13 in intraday trade. In London, Brent crude settled down $3.14 at $69.65 a barrel.

China’s key stock index dived 6.74 percent on Monday to a three-month low, prompted by concern that China’s government is trying to moderate economic growth and choke off some speculation in its stock market by tightening bank lending.

European equities closed lower and U.S. stocks fell after China’s index fall.

“The oil markets have been strongly affected by what’s going on in China, where the fear is that authorities will rein in on lending and in the process curtail growth,” said Phil Flynn, an analyst at PFGBest Research in Chicago

Jitters about the Chinese economy, the world’s second largest oil consumer, also weighed on other Asian stock markets.

The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries meets to review output on Sept. 9 in Vienna. Several ministers and officials from the group have said it is likely to leave output targets unchanged.

Even though OPEC agreed to 4.2 million barrels per day of supply curbs late last year, and has kept output targets steady so far in 2009, actual production has been rising in recent months, according to industry surveys.

In a further sign of that trend, Abu Dhabi, the main producer in the United Arab Emirates, an OPEC member, will lift supply to Asia in October, the state oil firm said on Saturday.

Despite the indications of higher supply from some in OPEC, oil has rallied from a low of $32.40 in December, the weakest price in nearly five years, to a 2009 high of $75 a barrel last week.

Aug 31 (Reuters)

U.S. crude for October fell 79 cents to $71.26 a barrel by 12:40 p.m. EDT (1640 GMT), after falling $2.32 on Tuesday. Brent crude fell 49 cents to $71.33 a barrel after losing $2.44 the previous day.

The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), the statistical arm of the Department of Energy, reported on Wednesday that crude stocks in the world’s largest energy consumer rose by 200,000 barrels last week.

While the build in crude stocks was nowhere near as large as the 4.3 million rise reported by the American Petroleum Institute on Tuesday, it still confounded initial market predictions for a 1.1 million barrel drop.

“We remain in a situation of massive over-supply, which is off the charts, but it does appear to be peaking,” Summit Energy analyst Brad Samples said.

Gasoline stocks fell by 1.7 million barrels last week according to the EIA, against expectations for a smaller 1 million barrel drop, while distillates rose by 800,000 barrels compared with predictions for a 300,000 barrel build.

SELL-OFF?

Investors took the opportunity to lock-in profits on Tuesday after crude touched the key psychological $75 mark for the first time since last October, crowning a near 130 percent jump in prices from the lows at the turn of the year.

Some analysts said the failure to break through the key level may signal that prices have topped out, with demand for oil still depressed by the global economic slowdown and signs of a broad recovery still murky.

“The price action of the past 24 hours would appear to favor additional price declines,” said Jim Ritterbusch, president of Ritterbusch & Associates.

Prices took some support from U.S economic data released on Wednesday showing a mild recovery in the housing market, but earlier data on durable goods orders suggested lingering weakness in the manufacturing sector.

Equity markets were mixed with Wall Street edging higher while European bourses generally dipped, highlighting the uncertainty surrounding the economic outlook.

Venezuela’s oil minister Rafael Ramirez said OPEC is unlikely to raise output at its September meeting, despite concerns from some quarters that oil prices are too high for a still fragile global economy.

“Inventories have declined but they remain above average. We need for them to come down to the average levels,” Ramirez said.

Another member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, Iran, said oil demand was set to increase next year by up to 1 million barrels per day after this year’s sharp decline.

Aug 26 (Reuters)

Oil prices continue to hover around $70 a barrel, and gold is in the mid-$900 range. Meanwhile the CRB Continuous Commodity Price Index has surged to a level 30% above its March low.

Finally, copper, supposedly a barometer of the global economy, went above $6,000 per metric ton – up more than 96% this year.

And while prices for most commodities are still well below last year’s peaks, the price spike is more dangerous than it looks.

Normally, commodities prices zoom at the top of a global inflationary boom, as in 1973, 1980, or last summer. This time, the surge is happening at the bottom of a recession. If it continues, the commodities price resurgence could cut off global recovery before it really gets going.

Commodities prices usually take off at the top of a normal business cycle, as inflation is accelerating. The price rise then causes commodity consumers to feel poorer. This reduces demand and brings on a recession. Then, new production capacity comes on stream after demand has fallen back, causing prices to remain depressed for several years.

That’s what happened in 1973, with the first Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil price rise, and again in 1980, with the second. After 1980, we didn’t see a real commodities price surge until the middle 2000s. That’s because the tech revolution caused consumer demand to move to things like computer chips that used fewer raw materials than traditional products.

Last summer, we had a similar price peak. Given the depth of the current recession, you’d expect commodities prices to stay low for several years, as new production capacity comes on stream. But that hasn’t happened. Instead, prices have rebounded sharply.

There are three possible reasons for this year’s surge.

First, it could be the result of very low interest rates and loose monetary policy. In that case, it will soon lead to a rise in general inflation.

It could also be due to the worldwide fiscal stimulus – in the United States, China, the United Kingdom, India and most other economies. Much of the stimulus - particularly in China – consists of infrastructure spending. Infrastructure development requires lots of steel, copper, cement and other commodities. If that’s the case, the resulting budget deficits are likely to cause bond market problems. That would restrict the supply of funding for capital investment and other private sector needs.

Finally, the surge in commodities prices could be due to continued rapid growth in India and China. The 2.4 billion citizens of those countries, as they get richer, are demanding more goods that require a lot of commodities to produce, like automobiles.

Thus, when India and China grow faster than the rich West, we can expect commodities demand to surge more than global gross domestic product (GDP). If this is the cause, rapid commodities demand will lead to a rise in general inflation and spot commodities prices that will accompany shortages and price spikes. That would have a deflationary effect on output.

We saw this effect in 2008’s third quarter, when real U.S. GDP dropped 2.7%. That drop must have been the effect of $147 oil in July, since the financial crisis did not hit home until the very end of that quarter.

It’s impossible to tell which of these three is really causing the current commodities price surge. We can, however, be sure that it will choke off global recovery if it carries on much longer.

That’s a miserable possibility, especially if it means we also get inflation and higher interest rates. However, as investors we can make some money from the commodities surge.

Here are some ideas:

Powershares DB Base Metals Fund (NYSE: DBB): This exchange-traded fund (ETF) tracks the Deutsche Bank AG (DB) base metals index, allowing you to invest directly in the price movements of non-precious metals. With a market capitalization of $308 million, it is reasonably liquid. Plus, a lot of money has been flowing into it recently.

Vale S.A. (NYSE ADR:VALE): Vale is the world’s largest iron ore producer and a key supplier to China’s exuberant infrastructure growth. Historical P/E of less than 10; will benefit hugely from price run-ups in steel.

iShares Silver Trust (NYSE: SLV): This ETF Invests directly in silver bullion, which has been left behind somewhat in its relationship to gold’s price rise and can be expected to move up as gold does, possibly by a much greater percentage.

Market vectors Gold Miners (NYSE: GDX): Gold miners benefit disproportionately from a rise in the gold price because their production costs are fixed. They are thus a more leveraged way to play it than the metal itself, particularly as surging speculative demand can increase mining companies’ price-to-earnings (P/E) ratios.

Four Ways to Profit From Resurgent Commodities Prices