While I’ve always doubted that the “money on the sidelines” argument is really all it’s cracked up to be, one can hardly argue with a recently released report from Harris Private Bank of Chicago [part of the U.S. arm of the Bank of Montreal (NYSE: BMO) that notes that stocks have rallied for the next two years whenever money market assets have exceeded 25% of the capitalization of the Standard & Poor's 500 Index. According to the Los Angeles Times, that figure is now 43%, down from 58% after having peaked in December - and that's even after the 30%-plus run-up in the S&P 500 since March.

What's interesting is that many investors holding large cash positions view their money as an asset, when, ironically, it's really more of a liability at this stage of the game.
Some might take issue with that statement. After all, even we at Money Morning have counseled readers that cash - correctly deployed - can allow an investor to sidestep the worst stretches of a financial crisis, like the one from which we're currently attempting to extricate ourselves.

But when the markets are as beat up as they as they have been, history suggests there's probably more upside than downside - even if we haven't bottomed out yet.
And there's a broad body of research to support that contention - including our own newly created "LSV (LIBOR/Sentiment/Value) Index" (published as a part of The Money Map Report, the monthly investment newsletter that's affiliated with Money Morning).

There's also data sets widely published by others, such as Yale Economics Professor Robert J. Shiller. Shiller has found that when you look at 10-year periods of Price/Earnings (P/E) data dating all the way back to 1871, the markets tend to rise when the average P/E is low, as it is right now. Conversely, when the average Price/Earnings values are high - as they were in late 1999, and again in 2007 - a decline in stock prices is much more likely.

There are obviously no guarantees that history will repeat itself. But if it does, the same data implies we could see real returns of 10% a year or more "for years to come," as Shiller noted in a recent interview with Kiplinger's Personal Finance.

My own research seconds the general-market-increase theory, but I'm much more conservative in my expectations of returns and think that returns of 7% are more likely.

Perhaps what's more important right now is that inflation typically accompanies growth - and with a vengeance. And that means that investors who are sitting on cash "until the time is right" may have their hearts in the right place but are relying on the wrong protection strategy.

My recommendation is a four-part plan that can help lock in the expected returns you want, while also protecting your cash from the ravages of inflation. Let's take a close look at each of the four elements of this strategy:

• First, protect your cash with Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPs). Even though the trillions of dollars the Fed has injected into the system seem to be having some effect on the critically ill patient the U.S. central bank is trying to fix, we're likely to pay a terrible price in the future. Forget the hyperinflation scenario so many people are hyping at the moment. While that's certainly possible, it's not probable. However, what is likely is a dramatic realignment of the dollar and a general increase in worldwide living expenses.

If you're based in the United States and have mostly U.S. assets, you may want to consider something as simple as the iShares Barclays TIPS Bond Fund (NYSE: TIP) to offset this risk. The TIP portfolio is chocked full of inflation-indexed securities, but it also offers a healthy 7.46% yield. If you've got international exposure, you may also want to consider the SPDR DB International Government Inflation Protected Bond ETF (NYSE: WIP). It's a collection of internationally diversified government inflation indexed bonds that provides similar protection. Make sure you talk with your tax advisor about both, though. Depending on your tax situation, you may find that because of the tax liability on inflation-related accretion, these are generally best held in tax-exempt accounts.

• Own some gold but don't go crazy. Despite widespread belief to the contrary, gold has never been statistically proven as an inflation hedge. But the yellow metal has proven to be a great crisis hedge because of the 10:1 relationship between gold prices and bond coupon rates - which obviously are directly related to inflation. Over time, the two move in such a way that having $1 for every $9 in bond principal can help immunize the value of your bond portfolio.

So to the extent that you own gold, do so not because you expect it to rise sharply, but because it will offset the inflationary damage to your bonds. A good place to start is the SPDR Gold Trust (NYSE:GLD) because it's tied directly to the underlying asset without the hassles or risks of direct personal storage associated with bullion.

• Consider commodities. It's too early to tell if the so-called "green shoots" that everybody is so excited about are little more than weeds. Therefore, it makes sense to concentrate on picking up resource-based investments. History shows that these things are less susceptible to downturns, but more importantly, rise at rates that far exceed inflation when a recovery begins in earnest.

I prefer companies like Kinder Morgan Energy Partners LP (NYSE: KMP) that are less dependent on the underlying cost of energy than they are on actual growth in demand. That way, if energy prices don't take off immediately for reasons related to deflation or stagflation, those still will benefit from demand growth. It's a fine point, but one that merits attention for serious investors. KMP, incidentally, yields an appealing 8.68% at the moment.

• Short the dollar to hedge your bets still further. Not only is the government going to borrow nearly four times more than it did last year, but when you add the complete federal fiscal obligations into the picture, our government owes nearly $14 trillion. This makes the dollar, as legendary investor Jim Rogers put it, "a terribly flawed currency" that could fail at any time.

To ensure you're at least partially protected, consider the PowerShares DB U.S. Dollar Index Bearish Fund (NYSE: UDN), which will rise as the dollar falls. It's essentially one big dollar short against the European euro, the Japanese yen, the British pound sterling and the Norwegian kroner, among other currencies.
In closing, there is one additional point to consider. You rarely get a second chance to do anything, especially when it comes to investing. So act now before the markets make it cost-prohibitive to protect yourself. When the economic recovery gets here, you'll be glad you did.

Source: Four Ways to Immunize Your Cash Against the Ravages of Inflation

[Editor's Note: Fourteen trades. All profitable. Since launching his Geiger Index trading service late last year, Money Morning Investment Director Keith Fitz-Gerald is a perfect 14 for 14, meaning he's closed every single one of his trades at a profit. And he did this in the face of one of the most-volatile periods since the Great Depression. Fitz-Gerald says the ongoing financial crisis has changed the investing game forever, and has created a completely new set of rules that investors must understand to survive and profit in this new era. Check out our latest insights on these new rules, this new market environment, and this new service, the Geiger Index.]

Grantham sounded the alarm on the credit crisis all the way back in 2006. And in a 2007 article in Fortune magazine, he warned: “In five years, I expect that at least one major bank (broadly defined) will have failed and that up to half the hedge funds and a substantial percentage of the private equity firms in existence today will have simply ceased to exist.”

What caught our eye in Grantham’s recent letter were his comments on what he terms the “Presidential Cycle.” Loyal readers will know that here at Notes we believe Washington is now the prime mover in the US economy and financial markets. Grantham offers interesting proof of our theory (emphasis added):

This Presidential Cycle effect is dismissed as an artifact by the great majority of financial academics, but they have a stalwart record of dismissing any data that implies even modest market inefficiency, and this effect implies great dollops of inefficiency. Simply summarized: since 1932, in the third year of the Presidential Cycle, the average S&P 500 return (from October 1 to October 1) is 22 percentage points ahead of the average of years one and two! And this is statistical noise? Year three is the time when, driven by politics, financial stimulus and moral hazard are applied so that the economy – particularly increases in employment – can be a little stronger in the run-up to the election in year four. In years one and two, in contrast, the system is tightened in order to leave some room for re-stimulus in the next year three (except during Greenspan’s era, when he basically could never stop stimulating and so periodically upset the applecart). It is all pretty understandable. All we have to believe is that politicians like to be re-elected and that completely independent Fed chairmen like to play ball with politicians. (Volcker of course, unlike the others, was never a ball player.) There have been no serious bear markets in year three, and many in years one and two.

Grantham, a well-known bear, says his familiarity with the Presidential Cycle has caused him to “part company” with many of his bearish allies for a while. That’s because the Presidential Cycle teaches us that fiscal stimulus and moral hazard have the power to “move the stock market many multiples of their modest effects on the real economy.”

Grantham’s central argument is that investors should never underestimate the power the Fed wields over the market through its ability to 1) boost liquidity 2) bailout speculators. This is borne out by empirical evidence. Britain has shown a bigger year-three jump on the US Presidential cycle since 1932 than the US itself. Europe and Japan have also historically shown sympathy with the cycle.

The implications of Grantham’s argument on the current market rally are huge. If relatively small liquidity injections and bailouts have had such a large effect on previous market cycles, then the unprecedented interventions by the Fed in the current case are likely to have unprecedented effects.

If the stock market is many times more sensitive to financial stimulus in the short term than the economy is, then we could easily get a prodigious response to the greatest monetary and fiscal stimulus by far in U.S. history. Second, if you don’t think there is a special, one-off, super colossal dose of moral hazard out there today, you are sadly uninformed. The moral hazard in play today is of a massively larger order than any we have ever seen.

This heady cocktail of two fingers of moral hazard plus more than a dash of liquidity could send the S&P 500 to the 1,000 – 1,100 level before the end of the year, says Grantham. But this hasn’t changed his overall bearish stance.

In a rally to 1000 or so, the normal commercial bullish bias of the market will of course reassert itself, and everyone and his dog will be claiming it as the next major multi-year bull market. But such an event – a true lasting bull market – is most unlikely. A large rally here is far more likely to prove a last hurrah … a codicil on the great bullishness we have had since the early 90s or, even in some respects, since the early 80s. The rally, if it occurs, will set us up for a long, drawn-out disappointment not only in the economy, but also in the stock markets of the developed world.

Private equity is an asset class consisting of equity securities in operating companies that are not publicly traded.  The name “private equity”is the rechristened, kinder and more gentile label for what used to be known as leveraged buyouts, or LBOs. But make no mistake about it, while leverage may not be part of the name any more, it remains a big part of every private equity deal.

LBO firms, or “franchises”, as Henry Kravis, co-founder of Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. (KKR), likes to call his shop, acquire publicly traded operating companies. Then they streamline management and operations to increase profitability and hope to cash out through a merger, an outright sale of the company, or by taking the company public again through an initial public offering, or IPO.

Private equity firms are the debutante sisters of hedge funds. They raise huge pools of capital from pension funds, endowment funds, sovereign wealth funds, institutional investors and wealthy entrepreneurs. But while hedge funds buy and sell the stocks of companies they hope to profit from, private equity shops buy whole companies.

Generally, once a target is identified, an offer is made to buy a majority, or all of the stock of the company. The trick of the deal is to pay for the target by using as little equity capital as possible, and raising the remainder by actually having the target company borrow the required funds. Except for the private equity firm’s initial equity investment, the target company is essentially buying itself.

And if that isn’t enough of a trick, very often when the target is privatized, their new masters have the company borrow even more money so they can then pay themselves a dividend as a bonus for the good job they did in leveraging the company to the hilt so they can streamline it.

The leveraged buyout business has been around for a long time and it has worked very well for investors and the private investment bankers who make an extravagant living with other people’s money. In fact, the business was so successful it eventually led to its now very problematic fork in the road. The problem facing private equity is that their leveraged deals were at one time in such great demand that it became too easy to borrow too much money.

The result was that they chased too many deals, paid too much for targets, paid themselves too many dividends and fees, and now their portfolio companies are straining and collapsing under the weight of too much debt.

Act I: The Two Big Mistakes that Made Leveraging Possible

There are two elements that made massive borrowing possible.

The first was a ready supply of capital courtesy of the U.S. Federal Reserve’s easy money policy and low interest rates. The second was the ability of banks that lend money to acquired companies to pool those loans into securities called  collateralized loan obligations, or CLOs, and sell them off to investors. Banks and investors refer to this asset class as “leveraged loans.”

Since banks were able to sell off their leverage loans to investors they had plenty of recycled money to lend out again and again. Competition to lend out all that money put borrowers in an advantageous position, which they exploited.

Banks and non-bank lenders attach covenants to the loans they make. Typically, covenants dictate to borrowers what specific balance sheet requirements must be met and include debt-to-cash flow leverage ratios, limitations on the total amount of debt a company can carry, minimum equity provisions and other dictates that serve to secure collateral that is relied upon by lenders.

But, banks were so flush with money and so eager to lend that privately acquired companies, driven by their new private equity masters, proposed that the money they borrowed should not be encumbered by the protective covenants lenders are used to demanding. Hence the birth of “covenant-lite” loans.

Covenant-lite loans included insane “reverse covenants” that benefited the borrowers not the lenders.

Among other things, some borrowers demanded and got rights to:

• Increase debt-to-EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation, and Amortization) levels to 10:1.
• Freely substitute collateral.
• Have collateral “released” outright.
• Issue unsecured debt equal to the total amount of existing debt (if they hedged or effected swaps.
• Employ PIK (payment-in-kind) options, where instead of paying interest in cash they could substitute more debt.
• Employ PIK toggles, sometimes called “extendibles.”

PIK toggles (think of a toggle switch which is used to turn something on or off) let the borrower can roll interest payments into principal and extend the maturity, instead of making twice yearly cash payments. If that sounds like an option ARM mortgage, where borrowers can choose whether to pay the interest due, some part of it, or none of it, and roll unpaid interest into principal, it’s because it is the exact same borrower covenant.

It’s like déjà vu all over again.

Act II: With No Leverage Private Equity Deals Fall Apart

Junk, junk and more junk. When the music stopped and the credit crisis began last August, money and credit evaporated. Only then did it bother leveraged loan investors that the private equity guys were leveraging their private companies to pay themselves huge dividends – enough in many cases to repay the entire initial cash equity investment used to underpin the leveraged buyout of their targets. And only then did they realize that all the debt heaped onto these companies was going to drag many of them into bankruptcy.

At that point, investors simply stopped buying leveraged loans. And the net result is that banks may be sitting on over $150 billion of junk leveraged loans that they can’t place. They are taking hits to their balance sheets as they have to mark down these loans which were securitized and subject to mark-to-market accounting. And they are terrified that the recession will drive more of these leveraged companies into bankruptcy.

Thomson Reuters recently reported that 40 private equity companies have sought bankruptcy this year. According to Standard & Poor’s, of 86 S&P rated companies that defaulted this year, 53 of them were private equity related transactions. Linens ‘n Things which was taken private by Apollo Group Inc. went bankrupt. Sharper Image, Wickes Furniture and catalogue company Lillian Vernon, were all taken private by Sun Capital Partners Inc., all of them are bankrupt. Mervyn’s which was taken private by Sun Capital and Cerberus Capital Management LP. is bankrupt.

Also in the clutches of the three-headed-dog from Hades, Cerberus, is Chrysler LLC; Chrysler Financial, GMAC LLC (General Motors Acceptance Corporation) (GMA) – 51% owned by Cerberus – and Residential Capital LLC, a GMAC company. By most accounting standards, all of these companies are, if not already, close to insolvent.

GateHouse Media Inc. (OTC: GHS), 40% owned by Fortress Investment Group LLC (FIG), is at risk of debt default and may likely be headed for bankruptcy. Former Lazard Ltd. (LAZ) deputy chairman and  media honcho Steve Rattner’s Quadrangle Capital Partners may lose control of American Media Inc., publisher of The National Enquirer and Star magazine, as he battles with bondholders and may also lose portfolio company Alpha Media Group Inc., publisher of Maxim magazine. These few examples of failures are just the tip of the iceberg.

Then, of course, there’s the pure genius of PE firms coming to the rescue of troubled banks. But, TPG Capital (formerly Texas Pacific Group) doesn’t look so genius with its $7 billion investment in Washington Mutual Inc. (OTC: WAMUQ) which was wiped out in a matter of five months.

It’s understandable that bankrupt target companies are suing. Mervyn’s, for example, filed a 57 page suit against its lead dog master Cerberus, alleging fraud among other charges. But what is not as easily understandable is that some other lawsuits have the potential to turn the game viciously against the private equity firms and all the major bank lenders. I’m not talking about the deals that got done; I’m talking about the deals that didn’t get done because private equity firms walked away or otherwise tried to dissolve pending deals.

Apollo Management asked a Delaware Court of Chancery to kill a transaction it had entered into to have one of its portfolio companies, Hexion Specialty Chemicals Inc., buy NYSE listed Huntsman Corp.(HUN) for $6.5 billion. Huntsman sued and won. The judge issued a ruling that Hexion “knowingly and intentionally” breached parts of the merger agreement and ordered the company to complete the deal. Not only is Apollo being forced to go through with the deal, the ruling allows Huntsman to seek damages from Apollo. Apollo is now suing the banks it had lined up to provide debt financing for the deal.

There are hundreds of billions of dollars of abandoned deals that may now be re-visited in courts around the country. The implication for private equity firms and banks is potentially staggering.

Here are a few of the larger failed deals that resulted from a lack of debt investor interest:

• Cerberus’ failed  deal for United Rentals Inc. (URI).
• The Blackstone Group LP’s (BX) failed deal for Alliance Data Systems Corp. (ADS).
• J.C. Flowers’ failed deal for SLM Corp. (SLM), also known as Sallie Mae.
• And Appaloosa Management in conjunction with Harbinger Capital Partners, Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. (MER), Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS), and UBS Securities LLC’s failed financing of Delphi Corp. (OTC: DPHIQ) to take it out of bankruptcy, for which they are being sued for fraud and conspiracy to “derail” the bankruptcy plan; a serious situation because interfering with a bankruptcy is a federal crime.

The amount of leverage involved in private equity deals is a problem if banks aren’t eager, or able, to supply needed loans. But that alone isn’t scary. What is scary is the effort private equity firms are making to actually get into the banking business themselves.

Act III: Private Equity Seeks to Corrupt Banking System

There’s a lot of pressure on banks to raise capital and there’s a lot of pressure being exerted by the private equity guys to lean on the Fed and U.S. Treasury to bend the rules to let them play in that sandbox. Pushing hard from the private equity camp are Randall Quarles, Managing Director of Carlyle Group Ltd. and a former senior Treasury official and none other than the former Treasury Secretary himself, Chairman of Cerberus Capital Management, John Snow.

What the private equity guys want is the ability to buy into banks and control them. If they get their hands on the low cost deposit-based capital at commercial banks, they’ll be unstoppable. How about having the piggy-bank, backed by taxpayers to leverage at will?

The prospect is frightening.

Right now there’s a limitation imposed on investors in Federal Deposit Insurance Company insured commercial banks. Once an investment exceeds 9.9% there must be an agreement with regulators to not “control or influence” management. If an investment exceeds 24.9% the investing entity must register as a Bank Holding Company, and subject itself to all necessary transparencies called for by regulators and the Fed. In addition, the holding company is forced to serve as a “source of strength”, meaning its capital will be called upon to support its bank.

Private equity guys do not want any part of either of those restrictions. They don’t want their business looked through nor do they want their capital encumbered. The private equity firms are sitting on hundreds of billions of dollars of fresh money raised recently. While it may seem reasonable and expedient to allow private equity capital to be infused into ailing banks, any compromise of existing regulations would result in the creation of the mother of all moral hazard enablers.

There’s no doubt that if the recession is as deep and as long as feared,, the continuing failure and bankruptcy of leveraged private equity portfolio companies will result in far greater unemployment, and in and of itself, has the potential to deepen the recession on an inordinate scale.

There’s too much greed and far too much power in the form of private equity firms. Their greed has encumbered American banks with significant CLO and leveraged loan exposure and encumbered American companies with too much debt. Now, they threaten to undermine sound banking (wait a minute, that’s already been done by the banks themselves) by investing capital into them in order to control them.

Until concrete underpinnings replace the glue and duct tape that’s holding together the banking system, and until leverage is wrung out of companies, investment vehicles and households, banks and private equity firms will both be on a slippery slope.

Source: Overly Leveraged Private Equity Deals Add to Unemployment and Deepen Recession

This from Money Morning:

The leaders of 20 of the world’s most developed nations, the G20, will convene in Washington D.C. on Nov. 15 for an emergency financial summit considered by many to be the 21st century version of the Bretton Woods initiative of 1944. This will be the first chance for European leaders – many of whom blame the current financial contagion on U.S. free market capitalism run – to press for an overhaul of a global financial system the United States has dominated for more than 60 years.

The summit will “seek agreement on principles of reform needed to avoid a repetition of the problems and assure global prosperity in the future,” U.S. President George W. Bush, European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso and French President Nicolas Sarkozy said in a joint statement.

However, Barroso was more explicit – and less diplomatic – earlier this week when he said that  “we need a new global financial order.”

President Sarkozy has also expressed his desire for a more dramatic remaking of the current financial system, which he says “has distanced itself from the most fundamental values of capitalism.” It was the French president who earlier this week pressed President Bush to call a summit of the G8 and include the developing nations of India and China.

Sarkozy, over the past week, outlined some of the broad principles of reform he hopes to achieve. Specifically he argued that “no bank that works with government money should be allowed to work with tax havens” such as the Cayman Islands. He also raised the issue of curbing executive pay.

“No financial institution should escape regulation,” the French president said, referring to hedge funds and private equity firms. And the world’s most prominent credit agencies – dominated by such U.S. institutions as Moody’s Corp. (MCO), Fitch Ratings Inc., and Standard & Poor’s – should have their role in the global credit market reduced after their “scandalous” behavior.

Sarkozy isn’t alone either. The European Union (EU) is also on board with tougher regulations on hedge funds, limits on executive pay, and new rules for credit rating agencies. And British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, who has been instrumental in pushing for reform, has called for 30 cross-border “colleges of supervisors” to be established by the end of the year to monitor the activities of the world’s 30 biggest banks.

Indeed, the recent rash of criticism from leading politicians is indicative of the prevailing sentiment in Europe that the failure of U.S.-style free market capitalism is most to blame for the credit crisis that has put the world economy at risk of a recession. For Sarkozy, Brown and others, reform will not end with increased oversight of financial institutions but extend to the fabric of the global financial system, as well as the U.S. dominance that lies at its heart.

“Europe wants it. Europe demands it. Europe will get it,” Sarkozy said in reference to global financial reform last Saturday.

And while President Bush has insisted that the United States will seek to preserve the foundations of democratic capitalism – a commitment to free markets, free enterprise, and free trade,” Sarkozy has branded the lax regulation that has become the hallmark of the U.S. economic philosophy as a “betrayal of the spirit of capitalism.”

To Europe, the capital excess that is behind the global financial meltdown epitomizes the behavior of an America that has essentially squandered its role as the standard bearer of global finance.

“We cannot continue accepting the increasing deficit of the world power,” Sarkozy said. “Americans for three decades have been living over their limits.”

Bretton Woods – Then and Now

In 1944, the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference – a collection of 740 delegates from 44 Allied nations – convened in Bretton Woods, N.H. The goals were to prevent a repeat of the Great Depression and facilitate the reconstruction of Europe following World War II.

After three weeks of deliberation, delegates agreed to a number of principles that established the rules for commercial relations among the world’s major industrial states and served as the foundation for today’s financial system. To this day, that complex plan is known as the “Bretton Woods system of monetary management.”

The nations participating agreed to fix their exchange rates to the dollar. The dollar was, in turn, fixed to gold at a value of $35 per ounce of gold bullion.  The conference also led to the formation of the Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The Bretton Woods system met its demise in 1971 when U.S. President Richard M. Nixon severed the link between the dollar and gold. Most major world economies now float their currencies. However, such Bretton Woods institutions as the Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) live on in the form of the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO), respectively. The IMF, meanwhile, is currently negotiating broad-based bailouts for Iceland, Ukraine, Hungary, and Pakistan.

And analysts aren’t confident that the upcoming round of dialogue will produce the “very large and very radical changes,” that British Prime Minister Gordon Brown has called for and Sarkozy has seconded.

The original Bretton Woods conference took years of coordination and planning. It was also a three-week gathering of the world’s foremost economists, including John Maynard Keynes – not an impromptu political salon for world leaders to pontificate on the obvious shortcomings of the current financial system. And as the IMF’s continued intervention in many struggling world economies illustrates, many of the old Bretton Woods Institutions still have value.

“Things like this that produce real results for the world are planned years in advance,” Edwin M. Truman, who was an assistant secretary of the Treasury under U.S. President Bill Clinton, told The New York Times. “The notion that you’re going to have something come out of this in three months is probably naïve.”

The timing of the conference is also precarious, as it will come just 11 days after a new U.S. president is elected and just a few days before President Bush takes his last official trip abroad. The U.S. president will be joining an annual summit of Asian-Pacific leaders in Peru.

The meeting is being planned in such haste that the White House was not yet certain where it will actually be held. And with so many nations participating – not to mention a lame duck U.S. president – it unlikely the November summit will achieve anything substantive.

Still, there remains the hope that at least a framework of discussion – and perhaps even an outline for reform – can be established.

Instead the leaders who attend will be challenged to “agree on a common set of principles for reform,” White House Press Secretary Dana Perino told The Times. It will then be up to financial experts “to put meat on the bones when it comes to fleshing out the principles.”

Source: Will Calls for a “New Global Financial Order” Result in a Second Bretton Woods and the End of U.S. Dominance?

Recent high-profile bankruptcies of mainstay American retailers, such as Sharper Image Corp. (SHRPQ) and Linens Holding Co.’s Linens ‘n Things, as well as the proposed mergers between Blockbuster Inc. (BBI)/Circuit City Stores Inc. (CC) and Delta Air Lines Inc. (DAL)/Northwest Airlines Corp. (NWA), and the admissions from the nation’s leading student lenders that their business models are no longer viable, mark the beginning of a long overdue overhaul of the American economy.  In short, the economy will be getting smaller and more expensive.

The success of all of these seemingly disparate sectors depends, to a large extent, on the ability of Americans to continue to borrow cheaply and easily.  Now that home equity extractions and zero-interest credit card rollovers can no longer be used to fund electronics purchases, vacations or tuition, those corresponding sectors are suffering.  The foundation of our bloated service-sector economy, supported by overseas savings and production, is now giving way.

This diminished capacity will result in a wave of bankruptcies and consolidations to restore profitability in what will become a much smaller service sector.  The days of cheap consumer goods from Wal-Mart Stores Inc. (WMT) and cheap airfares from JetBlue Airways Corp. (JBLU) are coming to an end.  It is all part of the process of an unprecedented decline in America’s standard of living, which is the inevitable result of years of living beyond our means.

For retailers, the business model of selling cheap foreign imported goods to over- leveraged Americans was doomed from the start.  It is fitting that just prior to the collapse, Wall Street private equity firms decided to jump aboard a sinking ship (Linens ‘n Things was purchased by Apollo Management LP for $1.3 billion back in 2006).  No doubt the added debt subsequently piled on to the firm by the profit-squeezing buyout boys hastened the company’s demise.  As revenue declines and debt-servicing costs rise for many retailers (who have been similarly hog-tied by private equity firms), look for additional blow-ups down the road.

As the dollar continues its historic decline, imported goods will become too costly for many Americans.  In addition, more of those products still made (or more likely grown) domestically will be exported to wealthier foreign consumers whose appreciated currencies increase their purchasing power.  As a result, fewer products will be available to fill our shelves and those that remain will carry much higher price tags.

In addition, as defaults on both credit cards and store-charge cards continue to increase, the market for such debt soon will disappear. As a result, the credit crunch will spread from subprime mortgages to all forms of consumer credit. 

The bottom line: Not only will Americans be staring at higher prices; they will have to pay in cash. 

Similarly, the looming airline consolidation will usher in a harsher era for the American airline industry.  In truth, given the rising costs of building, flying and servicing aircraft, U.S. carriers currently supply more planes and passenger miles than American consumers can afford to utilize.  While this may seem illogical in a time when domestic flights are usually fully booked, it is important to realize that these crowded planes do not translate into profits at current ticket prices.  While mergers may help the airlines hold down costs for a bit, the only lasting pathway to profit is fewer flights and significantly higher ticket prices.  Of course, this will mean that Americans of modest means will travel less by air. Unfortunately, that fact is simply an inevitable consequence of a sagging currency and diminishing national wealth.

Although many Americans have come to regard affordable air travel as a birthright, from a global perspective it remains the province of the wealthy.  The massive borrowing that has financed the American economy for generations – combined with an evaporating industrial base and a lack of domestic savings – have all combined to reduce America’s wealth in comparison to the rest of the world.  Consequently, as more materials, technicians and jet fuel go to service the burgeoning Asian air travel industry, the higher the costs will become for American travelers.  As with other hallmarks of a diminished standard of living, Americans now have to confront the reality of staying closer to home.

The same mathematics will come into play for our ridiculously expensive higher education system, which cannot exist without a well-lubricated loan infrastructure.  Limit the ability of students to take on heavy loans, and college education becomes untouchable for anyone but the wealthiest Americans.  If loans dry up, universities will be forced to slash their bureaucracies and substantially reduce tuitions.  Ironically, the silver lining here is that with low tuitions students will no longer need the loans that kept tuitions so high in the first place.

For a more in depth analysis of our financial problems and the inherent dangers they pose for the U.S. economy and dollar-denominated investments, read Peter Schiff’s new book “Crash Proof: How to Profit from the Coming Economic Collapse.”  Click here to order a copy today.

After a private bid went unanswered, Blockbuster made an unsolicited $1 billion acquisition bid for wounded electronics retailer Circuit City Stores Inc. (CC) for at least $6 a share – a move that sent Circuit City’s shares up 60% in pre-market trading Monday.

Blockbuster said it first approached Circuit City Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Phillip Schoonover with the offer on Feb. 17, but when the movie-rental giant didn’t get a response, Blockbuster decided to take its proposal public “because it believes the shareholders of Circuit City should have the opportunity to participate in determining the destiny of the company.”

However, Blockbuster already has an outline with regard to what that “destiny” would be: The merged companies would create a $18 billion retail enterprise that would benefit from their complementary products, marketing, distribution and financial synergies.

“Our vision for the ‘new’ Blockbuster is to be the most convenient source for media entertainment,” Blockbuster Chairman and Chief Executive Officer James Keyes wrote in a letter to Schoonover.

A Blockbuster Deal for a Browbeaten Market

Circuit City is the second-largest electronics chain in the United States, but the company has struggled recently. Over the past year the company has slashed retail management positions, eliminated jobs at its corporate offices and laid off 3,400 retail workers.

Making matters even worse: Circuit City not only lost more market share to industry leader Best Buy Co. Inc. (BBY), on March 28 it lost its spot in the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index.

Blockbuster hasn’t faired much better. Once an innovative icon in family entertainment and a cornerstone in the realm of media distribution, Blockbuster has more recently been the victim of increased competition and such technological changes as “video-on-demand” that have threatened its business. So it’s cut marketing costs and shed unprofitable customers in a desperate bid to fend off the Internet-based Netflix Inc. (NFLX).

The company’s troubles have led some – including Circuit City – to question whether or not Blockbuster even has the capital to follow through on its $1 billion all-cash offer.

“To date Blockbuster has been unable to satisfy Circuit City and its advisers that Blockbuster’s proposal could be financed,” Circuit City said in a statement.

The statement also questioned whether the proposed acquisition would require debt financing (and, if so, what the terms and structure would be) and how large a rights offering would be required to fund the transaction.

In a conference call, Blockbuster’s Keyes said the company has the support of billionaire board member Carl Icahn.

Presuming Blockbuster does indeed secure the proper financing, Louis Basenese, an mergers and acquisitions (M&A) expert and the editor of The Takeover Trader newsletter, said the deal bodes well for both companies, but mainly because independently, they are headed for the trash heap.

“This is clearly a merger to fight off extinction,” Basenese said. “Combining forces might only delay the inevitable.”

Technology business blog, the Digital Home, called Blockbuster’s proposal “laughable.”

“Blockbuster is nothing more than an irrelevant shadow of its former self. For years, the company stood atop the rental business and destroyed any and all competitors in its path,” Digital Home author Don Reisinger wrote. “But once Netflix saw it fit to change the way the rental business works, Blockbuster couldn’t adapt and its once booming business turned into an overpriced cesspool of old business models.”

A 2008 M&A Revival

A recent report from Thomson Financial indicated that the global volume of M&A plunged 31% to $661 billion in the first quarter of 2008. But that drop-off comes after a banner year for M&A activity. Total global deal volume checked in at $4.5 trillion in 2007, up 24% from the previous high-water mark set in 2006.

Since then, credit conditions have tightened significantly as many banks were badly burned by credit defaults. But while an era of “easy money” has come to an end, there is still ample opportunity for takeovers and tie-ups.

Basenese attributes most of the drop-off in M&A to a shift in the balance of power. Over the past several years, private equity firms had established themselves as the main drivers behind M&A activity by outbidding companies for assets.

However, it was those same buyout firms that led to the collapse in first quarter deals, with a 77% drop in acquisitions. And that has opened the door for companies flush with cash to get back down to business.

“Corporations are sitting with almost near record amounts of cash on their balance sheets,” Basenese said. And with that, they can “take advantage of the depressed stock prices of competitors without the fear of being outbid by overly aggressive private equity shops.”

Deals on the Docket

Microsoft made its move with an unsolicited $44.6 billion bid for Internet portal operator Yahoo! Inc. (YHOO). So far, Yahoo has done its best to thwart Microsoft’s advances, but most analysts believe Microsoft will get its way if it ups its $31 a share offer.

If that buyout goes through, it will be the largest-ever acquisition in the high-tech sector, exceeding even Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co.’s $26 billion buyout of First Data Corp. However, Yahoo’s explicit opposition to the takeover makes it impossible to rule out a narrow escape.

Swiss drug maker Novartis is taking Nestle’s 77% slice US eye-care company Alcon for $39 billion. Yahoo!, meanwhile, is sending smoke signals to Microsoft that it wouldn’t be against a bid if the price is right.

According to CityWire in Britain, the FTSE 100 broke through the 6,000 level “on a flurry of major corporate merger and acquisition reports from across the Atlantic.”

“The deal-making market is a key to the health of the US stock market,” says Jason Simpkins.

“The US buyout market is about to enter a new phase as corporate takeovers pick up where private-equity firms left off last fall. During much of 2006 and 2007, it was the steady stream of private-equity buyouts and corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deals that propelled the key U.S. stock indices to one record high after another.

“When the deals are flowing, investors are willing to pay more for their shares, figuring the odds for a nice payday are higher. And the deal market was white-hot through the middle half of last year. Private-equity firms had amassed huge war chests. They were buying stakes in big companies and were buying smaller companies outright.”