What is abundantly clear, however, is that the new administration intends to push spending back up to pre-crash levels and to fill the entire credit void that has disappeared into the black hole of the U.S. financial system. Whether or not the prior levels of spending and lending were justified by market conditions then, or now, appears to be largely unexamined.

In the worldview of Geithner, and other like-minded economists, credit, rather than savings, is the central figure in the economic equation. Therefore, the new Treasury secretary sees anything that eases the process of lending to be an effective economic policy. With such a view in mind, the centerpiece of Geithner’s plan is the commitment of as much as $1 trillion to revive the collapsed market for securitized debt. In the run-up to the Crash of 2008, it was securitization – more than anything else – that permitted Americans to borrow more than they had ever borrowed before.

Developed primarily over the last 10 years, securitization permitted loans of all shapes and sizes to be packaged into investment-ready securities. The system worked, fueling unprecedented levels of lending in the home, auto, student, and credit-card sectors. But in the last few years, as the collateral underpinning these securities collapsed in value, the trillions of dollars of securitized debt now in circulation has become the toxic sludge at the bottom of our financial pit. Geithner is making the false assumption that cleaning up and rebuilding the securitization market is a prerequisite for a healthy economy.

Our nation’s short history with wide securitization has simply shown that the process can lead to a massive mispricing of assets and risk. By artificially rebuilding the securitization market, and committing taxpayer funds as collateral, the U.S. economy will be pushed farther and farther out on a leveraged limb, until no amount of market medicine can prevent a total economic collapse.

In truth, the only vital function provided by securitization was that it offered foreign savers a pathway to lend directly to American consumers (as a Money Morning investigative story underscored), and Wall Street executives a new asset class to over-leverage for massive profits. Our economy must dispense with these gimmicks if it hopes to pursue a meaningful recovery.

After more than a decade of unsustainable borrowing and spending, the private sector is currently attempting to restore balance through reduced consumer and mortgage credit, greater savings, and lower asset prices. With its trillions of dollars of credit injections and stimulus programs, the government hopes to allay this process by force-feeding Americans a diet of more borrowing. Government leaders feel that a restored securitization market will help. It won’t. It will just grease the skids for a quicker collapse.

Credit – securitized or not – cannot be created out of thin air. It only comes into existence though savings, which must be preceded by under-consumption. Since savings are scarce, any government guarantees toward consumer credit merely “crowd out” credit that might otherwise have been available to businesses.

During the previous decade, too much credit was extended to consumers and not enough to producers (securitization focused almost exclusively on consumer debt). The market is trying to correct this misallocation, but government policy is standing in the way. When consumers borrow and spend, society gains nothing. When producers borrow and invest, our capital stock is improved, and we all benefit from the increased productivity.

Consumers default on credit much more frequently than businesses. This is because businesses typically use loans to expand, and then have greater cash flow to repay the debt. In contrast, consumers typically borrow to consume and in the process, do not improve their ability to repay. As a result, one would expect consumer credit to be harder and more expensive to obtain. But that is currently not the case. Government guarantees have altered the playing field, so that now consumers are still being offered credit while businesses are being shown the door.

By shifting credit away from producers, fewer goods and services will be produced for consumers to buy and fewer employment opportunities provided for them to earn money with which to buy the goods.

To restore prosperity, credit (derived from real savings rather than a printing press) must flow to producers. Greater liquidity for business will lead to legitimate job creation, increased production, and rising living standards. By further encumbering the economy with burdensome regulation, and by transferring business decisions to vote-seeking politicians who will bail out the irresponsible, reward failure and punish success, the government will create a society destined for misery.

In an interview following his announcement, Treasury Secretary Geithner stated that government should replace the demand lost by the private sector. However, those with even a marginal grasp of economics know that demand is unlimited. It is the ability to spend that is not.

While Americans still want all the things they wanted years ago, they have made the rational choice that they can no longer afford to buy at the same levels they once did. Using a printing press to replace this “lost demand” will simply cause consumer prices to rise. Printed money does not create new purchasing power, but merely redistributes it from savers to borrowers. And since the plan will severely undermine the real productive capacity of our economy, there will not be much purchasing power left to redistribute!

Is President Obama’s Banking Bailout Plan Destined to be a Dud?

Of course, the reality is that bailouts are likely to do more harm than good in the long run, regardless of what sector they are in. But given the choice, I would rather bail out General Motors Corp. (GM) than Citigroup Inc. (C), because the automaker has a better long-term future.

The financial services industry got far too big during the 1995-2007 bubble. Its growth accelerated in the 1990s on the back of innovative new financing techniques such as derivatives and securitization, as well as a huge expansion in areas such as leveraged buyouts. As a result, its share of United States gross domestic product (GDP) has approximately doubled since the late 1970s.

It is now clear that many of the new financing techniques were misapplied or even spurious. The problem of separating loan origination from credit-risk assumption has become obvious, and so securitization will have a much more limited future.

Of the derivatives, credit default swaps are clearly destabilizing and will be tightly regulated. Many of the new market participants, such as hedge funds and private equity funds, should disappear, since they merely represented conduits through which higher fees could be charged rather than truly innovative investment choices. It is thus likely that the financial services business will revert to close to its previous share of GDP. That would involve a downsizing of its 2007 capacity by 50%.

The automobile industry, on the other hand, has no obvious need to become smaller. With global warming now high on the political agenda, its products need to change radically, employing new technologies that greatly reduce carbon emissions. However, the basic demand for personal transportation has not gone away.

Indeed, it is still expanding rapidly in the growth economies of emerging markets such as China and India. And U.S. urban geography, with its widely spread suburban developments, is wholly incompatible with a sharp drop in automobile usage and would be impossibly expensive to modify except over a very long term.

Why Citi Should Fail

Allowing a large bank such as Citigroup to disappear is probably beneficial. It reduces competition for other major banks, allows medium-sized banks to expand into the space opened up, and provides an appropriate penalty for decades of bad management. Citi was a leader in the Latin American loan crisis of the 1980s; its then-Chairman Walter B. Wriston famously opined that “countries don’t go bust,” a sentiment that has been repeatedly disproved.

Wriston got his succession wrong in 1984, choosing the overaggressive retail banker John Reed (who had pioneered the unsolicited credit card offer in 1978 and lost $100 million – real money back then – in 1980 by doing so) over the capable corporate banker Tom Theobald.

Citi almost went bust in 1991, but was bailed out by Saudi Prince Alwaleed bin Talal. It assembled a financial services conglomerate in 1998 that proved unmanageable, and from 2003-2005 was prevented from making any more acquisitions because of its shaky position.

In short, Citi has been a classically mismanaged behemoth that, in any other industry would, have already collapsed.

Yet, its bailout risks more than $300 billion of taxpayer money, and to no obvious economic benefit.

Meanwhile, General Motors has been damaged by two factors: Misguided government regulation of the automobile industry, and a drastic societal shift away from unionized labor.

CAFÉ Backfires

GM had a 60% share of the U.S. market in the 1950s, and was recognized for large cars that performed distinctly better than their imported competitors and were well suited to U.S. driving conditions. Some expansion of foreign competition was inevitable, as Europe recovered and Japan became a major automobile producer, but GM was particularly hard hit by the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFÉ) legislation. CAFÉ, which mandated fuel economy standards instead of simply raising the gasoline tax, put GM’s large models at a disadvantage to their smaller imported competitors.

However, U.S. automobile companies found a loophole, which is that its standards were limited to automobiles. Vehicles built on a truck chassis were exempt. That gave rise to the sports utility vehicle.  Now, higher fuel costs, environmental concerns, and tighter CAFÉ standards have made the SUV an endangered species, but it was a Frankenstein’s monster that only existed because of government meddling.

If GM and the other U.S. automobile manufacturers go out of business, only their foreign competitors will benefit. Furthermore, they have an interdependent network of suppliers, with a total of 3 million employees, which could easily be forced into bankruptcy by the disappearance of their major customers.  U.S. automobile manufacturers have important, and in some areas unique technological capabilities, whose loss would severely damage the U.S. economy as a whole.

The automobile business is unprofitable now, but will eventually return its previous size in the United States, as well as expand worldwide. So, while there is no capacity downsizing needed, capacity restructuring, away from SUVs and towards smaller cars, hybrids and innovative power technologies, is essential.

Ultimately, the right decision would have been to bail out General Motors and allow Citi to go to the wall.

The Case for Citi

Of course, there are important modifiers to this recommendation. In Citi’s case, its interconnection with the financial system as a whole is such that an immediate bankruptcy followed by years-long court proceedings could render many of its counterparties unviable and damage the global economy badly. Hence, an orderly liquidation is needed, with a receiver appointed to wind down Citi’s positions and sell the viable portion of its operations, making good on those obligations incurred by Citi that appear to have systemic importance. Even if the taxpayer made Citi’s counterparts completely whole, however, it would not have been as expensive as the bailout.

As for GM, it has labor costs and pension obligations making it uncompetitive with foreign-owned producers. Those “legacy” costs can most efficiently be removed through a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing. The pension obligations will then fall on the taxpayer through the Pension Benefits Guaranty Corporation, while the labor contracts can be rewritten in a way that is competitive with the market in which GM operates. If a government subsidy is then needed to cover GM’s operating cash deficit during the recession, and the investment costs of transforming GM into a producer of environmentally friendly automobiles, it should be provided through a post bankruptcy “debtor-in-possession” financing.

There is nothing magic about banking that should allow the industry to be uniquely permitted access to taxpayer money when disaster hits. Only bank customers and the market should be protected. Conversely, the automobile industry plays an important role in the U.S. economy that is unlikely to be significantly downsized. So, there is considerable justification for assistance to GM and Ford Motor Co. (F), which have valuable capabilities and long-term competitiveness, though less for a bailout of the smaller and less industrially valuable Chrysler Corp.

Source: Why GM is More Bailout-Worthy Than Citigroup

This week’s news told us that good times are over. “For the time being, at least,” said the Governor of the Bank of England, “the ‘nice’ decade is behind us.”

Of course, just because an economist or a central banker says something, it doesn’t make it so. And when a central banker who is also an economist says something, it should be treated with the skepticism of an airline schedule.

“I am obviously biased, but I find it sad to conclude that the role of serious economists in financial institutions is very limited today,” said Han de Jong, Chief Economist at ABN Amro Bank to the Financial Times on February 21, 2008. ” We are little more than clowns, whose purpose is to entertain clients….”

Mr. de Jong is too modest. Economists are essential to the financial industry. They distract the customers while the boys on the sales desks pick their pockets.

We say that not in contempt but admiration; the role of the financial industry – like the contemporary art market or like Las Vegas – is to separate the punters from their money. Economists help them get the job done.

This they did in the last two decades with a variety of gaudy theories. It didn’t seem to matter that the theories were contradictory and absurd. On the one hand, prices were said to move randomly – permitting them to ‘model’ risk and sell extravagant securities. On the other hand, private equity experts and fund managers pretended to know which way the ‘random’ movements would go; they claimed to be able to produce “alpha” – above market returns – on a such a regular basis they could charge “2 and 20″ for it.

But while economists are usually wrong about things, the burden of the present essay is that Mr. King is right this time.

Last week, we argued that ‘alpha’ was a mountebank. The financial industry doesn’t often add much value, we pointed out. Instead, fair winds and convenient tides are what usually get investors’ little barks where they want them to go. Most of the results investors get depend upon setting sail at the right hour, from the right place, in other words, not in having a Wall Street hotshot at the tiller. Put an alpha-seeking whiz-kid out in a storm and he’ll sink along with everyone else.

In the 20-year period ’83 to ’03, for example, the price of oil barely moved. Sheep could graze peacefully in the Mideast, confident of being undisturbed. Now, everywhere they go, someone’s setting up an oil rig. The latest figures show oil exploration up 400% since 2000.

Almost a whole generation of investors got nothing from that greasy sector. Then, all of a sudden, in the following 5 years the roughnecks suddenly had money in their pockets and the wind at their backs.

Likewise, in America, you could have held residential housing for 100 years – from 1896 to 1996. You would have gotten nothing for your trouble but leaky roofs and cracked paint; prices rose only as much as consumer prices. Then, the next ten years, a tide of easy credit rushed into the residential real estate market; prices rose 70% in real terms.

Behind both these booms is a story too long to tell here. But the moral of it is simple enough. The average investor makes far more by accident than by fund manager. And here we venture a guess: of all the times and places in which a US investor might hope to get a decent return on his money, this is not one of them.

But the beauty of capitalism is that people get what they’ve got coming – not matter what they think. NICE is an acronym for “non-inflationary consistent expansion,” according to Mr. King. It is his way of describing what other economists called the “great moderation,” a period so agreeable that they gave themselves credit for it. Macro economists believed they had finally mastered the art of central banking – so perfectly manipulating the credit cycle as to produce growth without causing the consumer price inflation that typically accompanies it.

If economic wizards were really responsible for the Great Moderation, it would be reasonable to think they could keep it going. Alas, they can no more sustain it than they can claim credit for it. What really happened, over the last 25 years, was a unique series of events and trends that now seem to have run their course. Labor rates fell as millions of new workers entered the modern economy. Now, even in China and India, salaries are rising fast. Logistical expenses declined as computers and just-in-time inventory systems were put in place; now inventories (and associated costs) are rising again. Outsourcing, globalization, deregulation, capitalization, securitization – all these trends helped keep prices down; now, all seem to have played themselves out, gone into reverse, or backfired.

Finally, the cost of money has fallen for the last 27 years. Sometimes it fell naturally. Sometimes it fell unnaturally, even grotesquely – such as when Alan Greenspan lent the Fed’s money at below the inflation rate for more than a year. Normally, cheaper money creates boom-like conditions. But normally, it comes at a cost: consumer prices soon begin to rise. As the economy “heats up,” the domino of labor costs falls over; workers are in demand so they ask for more money. Then, that domino knocks over consumer price stability; prices rise. Then, a whole line of dominos topples over. Bond investors run for cover, for example, forcing up interest rates. Then, the economy “cools down,” as the cost of money increases.

That was what was so nice about the ‘nice’ years. The dominos wouldn’t budge. Thanks to so many things working so hard to keep prices down, the normal process of self-correction broke down. As demand for labor increased, new, cheaper workers were found overseas. And even though the supply of dollars increased twice as fast as GDP, the domino with the CPI on it stayed right where it was.

Alas, those happy days are over. The Great Moderation is finished. This week, oil rose over $130 a barrel. T. Boone Pickens said it would hit $150 this year. And America’s core producer price index registered its biggest increase in 17 years.

Of course, the real level of consumer price inflation is probably far higher than the official numbers. The raw data suggest price increases closer to 10% per year than the 4% the US Department of Labor confesses. But the economists have their ways of making the numbers say whatever they want. In March, for example, the consumer price index was “seasonally adjusted” from 0.9% down to 0.3%. In April, wouldn’t you know it, another seasonal adjustment took the number from 0.6% down to 0.2%. We don’t know what the real number should be; no one does. But Mervyn King is right; the season has changed.

Source: Not So NICE Anymore

But that’s not the case at all.

You see, the bubble and subsequent crash were inevitable under the current system of housing finance. Fundamental changes must be made.

Standard and Poor’s recently projected the likely future loss rate on the $650 billion of subprime-mortgage-backed securities that are still out in the marketplace. From that we can estimate the losses S&P is projecting on the actual mortgages themselves.

According to S&P, senior AAA-rated bonds will pay out about 60% of principal, junior AAA-rated bonds about 35%, AA-rated bonds about 5% and lower-rated bonds nothing at all. Since about 75% of subprime mortgage-backed securities were AAA rated, we can calculate that S&P thinks subprime mortgages will eventually return about 40% on the original principal amount.

That’s a startling number.

Losses Still to Come

If you had a portfolio consisting entirely of 100% loan-to-value mortgages, on which the appraisals were accurate but a large percentage of the borrowers had poor credit, and house prices were destined to drop between 20% and 25% over the next few years, you’d expect to lose 25% – or perhaps 30% – of principal, but still manage to keep 70% to 75% of your money.

When you had a foreclosure, there would be costs involved that increased your loss. On the other hand, some of the borrowers would be able to make their mortgage payments, leaving you with no loss at all. Thus, if subprime mortgages are expected to return only 40%, almost half of them must have had some fraud involved, either by the borrower, the mortgage broker or the appraiser.

Let’s now turn to actual housing prices. The S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices of home prices in the Top 20 urban markets dropped a bigger-than-anticipated 12.7% in the 12 months that ended in February – the worst showing since the index debuted in 1991. What’s even more alarming, however, is that the decline is accelerating. In February alone, prices dropped 2.7%  – the equivalent of a 28% decline if this rate persisted for the entire year.

That should have alarmed both homeowners with large mortgages and mortgage market participants – if prices were to drop 30% to 40%, instead of the generally expected 15% to 20%, even prime home mortgages would get in trouble and the losses would be appalling – in the range of multiple trillions of dollars.

Since the first-quarter vacancy rate in U.S. housing – owner-occupied and rental – increased to 2.9%, the highest level in 50 years, we may indeed be approaching such a bearish scenario.

However, when you look at factors like the ratio of house prices to incomes, it becomes obvious that the problem is not the current drop, but the previous rise. Since World War II, the average house price was 3.2 times the average income. By 2006, however, the average house price had jumped to 4.5 times the average income. With house prices outrunning incomes in that way, mortgage financing was bound to become more and more risky, and a substantial drop was eventually inevitable – to take prices from 4.5 times income to 3.2 times would require housing prices to plunge 29%. And that doesn’t even consider the possibility that prices might overshoot on the downside. 

The principal reason for the excessive rise in house prices and the high level of fraud was the housing finance system. In the modern system, the originator of a home mortgage loan is paid a fee on the origination, and never has to worry again about the credit risk on that loan, which is passed off to investors through a process known as “securitization.”

Because securitization separates the mortgage originator and the actual investor, the investors – often foreigners – have no idea of the actual underlying quality of the loans that they’re purchasing.

The mortgage broker’s incentive is to maximize loan volume – pretty much regardless of whether or not the borrower can afford the loan. Falsification of documents, suborning of appraisers, and other similarly reprehensible machinations becomes a normal course of action in such a situation, as does turbo-charging the housing market to valuation and sales levels it cannot sustain. A system in which prices are forced up to unsustainable levels and fraud is rampant is broken, and needs to be replaced with something better.

It (Once) Was a Wonderful Life

Years ago, the United States had a superior home-financing system; it was extolled in the 1946 Jimmy Stewart movie, “It’s a Wonderful Life.” Home-mortgage loans were made by local institutions to borrowers whom they knew personally. The system had some inefficiencies. For example, if the housing needs in a particular area expanded rapidly, there might be a shortage of funds, so that mortgages would be unavailable. However, banking is mostly national today, so local funds shortages would be less important, although there would probably be a corresponding decline in personal knowledge of the borrowers.

It’s not true that the Jimmy Stewart system of financing home mortgages was less efficient than today’s: That’s a myth put out by Wall Street, which has been one of the chief beneficiaries of the recent shenanigans. (Riddle me this: Do you think that “George Bailey” – Jimmy Stewart – ever got a million-dollar bonus?).

If you look at the U.S. Federal Reserve statistics on U.S. interest rates (which started recording home mortgage rates in 1972), you will discover that in 1972-78 – when the Jimmy Stewart home financing system was still mostly in place – 20-year Treasury bonds yielded an average of 7.41%, while 30-year fixed rate home mortgages yielded 8.49%, a differential of 1.08%. In 2000-06, an equivalent period that predates the recent worries about credit risk, 20-year Treasuries yielded an average of 5.28%, while home mortgages yielded 6.50%  – a differential of 1.22%. 

Thus, the “spread” of home mortgage interest costs over Treasury bond yields, the most appropriate measure of home mortgage costs, has widened by 0.14%. That may not sound like much until you realize that it’s an effective cost increase of 13%. Where did that increase go?

While some lawyers made money, too – what did you expect – it’s largely Wall Street that would rather you didn’t think about that question.