What prompted us to tackle this bug bear now? Why aren’t we out on a Buenos Aires terraza sipping cold beer instead? Well, we couldn’t help noticing that the yields on long-dated US Treasuries are rising.

As underground investors Adam Lass writes in today’s Taipan Daily, last December future contracts for 30-year T-Bonds “were hovering around 142 and change with yields under 2%. Now we were looking 122, a drop of some 14%, forcing yields to just about double.” And last week the 10-year Treasury bond yield, which hit 2.07% in December, broke above 3% for the first time since the financial crisis started last September. It is currently trading at around 3.17%.

For those of you not familiar with the relationship between Treasury yields and inflation, higher yields on long-dated bonds is a sign that the bond market is anticipating higher interest rates in the future. (Higher interest rates being the typical monetary response of central banks to higher inflation rates.)

What could be pushing up pushing up yields on long-dated T-bonds? Look no further, dear reader, than the frantic action of the wonks at the US Federal Reserve.

This from Martin Hutchinson at Money Morning:

Monetary policy has been extremely stimulative for the last six months, with broad money growth running at more than 15%, and real interest rates substantially negative. The justification for this – that the United States was in danger of substantial deflation – was proved to be erroneous by last week’s report on first-quarter gross domestic product (GDP). In that report, the deflator – the rate at which domestically produced goods increase in price – was a surprisingly high 2.9%, indicating that inflation has by no means gone away.

In addition, the U.S. Federal Reserve is buying securities in the markets and financing others to do the same; its purchases of U.S. Treasury bonds, in particular, are nothing more than a pure monetization of the U.S. federal deficit, which can only lead directly to higher inflation.

As Martin points out, the German Weimar Republic did something similar. In the years leading the one trillion percent inflation of 1923, monetized 50% of government expenditure. The Fed isn’t that stupid, of course. In buying $300 billion of T-bonds in six months, it is only monetizing about 15% of government expenditure… Of course, as more pressure comes to bear on the Treasury’s bond auctions, the Fed may have to up its monetization efforts.

This from Sovereign Society:

Several segments of the credit markets have come back to life in December after crushing losses recorded in September and October. Though it’s too early to celebrate a broad-based credit revival, the largest issuers of investment grade debt surged this month as yields plunged. Mortgage-backed bonds, or agency debt, have also rallied sharply in December on the heels of government guarantees and the Fed’s plan to spend $500 billion dollars to shore up the sector.

With the United States and other governments amassing a truckload of debt to finance state sponsored bailouts of financial services and fiscal spending plans, it is conceivable that investors will increasingly swap low-yielding T-bonds for high quality corporate debt in 2009.

Since hitting a post-crisis peak of 4.88% in October, three-month LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) has plunged to 1.52% on December 19. On December 1, LIBOR stood at 2.22%. A lower LIBOR rate is the first indicator to finally emerge from stress amid the credit crisis. Banks are still largely hoarding cash but several large institutions have started to lend in overnight markets this month for the first time since late 2007.

The Growing Yield Dilemma

The Federal Reserve’s latest interest rate cut to effectively 0% on December 16 has laid the foundations for more trouble at money-market funds where yields for 30-day and 90-day Treasury bills continues to fetch just 0.01% – the lowest in more than six decades. Earlier in December, 30-day bills actually turned negative for the first time since 1940. That means investors are paying the government to park cash.

Money market funds are now sitting on potential losses as management fees erode the yield generated by Treasury bills and other short-term paper. Though other debt securities yield more than T-bills, investors might be embracing more credit risk as fund companies look to boost yield.

A better alternative to money market funds include one-year term deposits (CDs), short-term investment grade bonds and even intermediate-term corporate debt. Term deposits should be held only at the nation’s biggest banks, including J.P. Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo and Bank of America.

Yield Hungry? Here’s a Free Lunch

The Fed’s latest moves to spur lending in a massively credit-inflicted bear market since 2007 is forcing many investors to turn to distressed corporate investment-grade bonds. The effective yield on the benchmark Dow Jones Corporate Bond Index is 7.23%, down from a record high of 8.88% just a few months ago and down from 8.06% on November 30. A lower yield means corporate bond prices are rising in value.

In September, investment grade bonds were hammered following the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings and posted their single worst month of performance since February 1981. Many bonds plunged more than 15% in September alone.

More than half of the investment grade bond sector is comprised of financial services debt or bonds issued by some of the largest banks in the United States and Europe. With the Fed’s implicit guarantee on the largest issuers of such debt, investors can now tap into bank issued bonds trading at a 5.16% premium to expensive Treasury bonds.

For a portion of an investor’s liquidity, corporate high quality debt is literally a “free lunch.” The largest issuers of corporate paper have started to return to the market since November, including IBM and other large cap companies. In Europe, some banks without government guarantees have managed to raise sizable offerings – a positive development.

Corporate Debt: The New Safe-Haven?

Since October, governments in the United States and Europe have swapped government paper for toxic mortgage-backed assets previously held at banks. Despite these efforts, most banks are still laced with all sorts of other clogged credits like leverage loans, auction rate securities and repo credits.

The credit crisis has not disappeared because of aggressive government and central bank action; rather, swaths of credit risk has been transferred from bank balance sheets to government balance sheets, effectively polluting central bank coffers with largely illiquid and near worthless paper. Since August, the Fed’s balance sheet has mushroomed from $850 billion dollars to more than $1.5 trillion dollars – and still rising.

Indeed, credit default swap rates since October have risen sharply on government paper while swap rates have decreased for the highest quality companies. This suggests investors are starting to place a risk premium on government issued bonds.

Are we at the cusp of a major transition in the credit markets whereby investors might increasingly purchase investment grade debt as a hedge against rising yields on government bonds? After all, outside of the financial sector many industries harbour their highest net cash levels in more than a decade. For some companies, especially the food and beverages and fast-food companies, cash flow is largely generated internally and, in most cases, these companies don’t need to raise cash to finance operations. I would argue that companies like Kraft Foods (NYSE:KFT), General Mills (NYSE:GIS) and McDonald’s (NYSE:MCD) are a better long-term credit risk than most sovereign borrowers.

Failed Auctions Rising

To confirm the above theory that perhaps investors are starting to embrace riskier bonds like investment grade debt because of bulging government deficits, consider the trend in Europe since October whereby several governments have scrapped bond auctions.

Over the last sixty days, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Austria and the United Kingdom have either scrapped bond auctions or reduced their planned offerings because of tepid investor interest. These governments, including Germany, the largest and most liquid, are paying higher yields to draw institutional buyers. This could mark the beginning of a bear market for government bonds at some point later in 2009, once credit markets stabilize and risk taking is resumed.

In the United States, demand for Treasury’s remains strong because of fears of deflation. The current environment – a disaster for just about every asset class except T-bonds – has supported the dollar to an extent. Foreigners are chasing Treasury securities as they scramble for safe havens. Yet even Treasury is not immune to the deluge of supply coming our way in 2009.

Over the next 12 months Treasury estimates it will have to raise about $1.5 trillion dollars to fund gargantuan fiscal spending plans, bailouts, and possible tax cuts. Treasury will re-introduce one-year, three-year and five-year T-bonds in 2009 to finance part of this spending spree. At some point, investors will force long-term rates higher. The Fed will try to influence the long end of the yield curve but will ultimately be unsuccessful. The Fed can only control short-term lending rates.

Investment grade bonds shouldn’t supplement T-bills. The risk spectrum is normally quite significant in a normal economic environment. Yet these are anything but normal economic times. It is possible that as 2009 progresses and, assuming credit markets continue to grudgingly normalize, the new safe haven in bonds will be high quality investment grade bonds at the expense of super low-yielding Treasury debt.

Source: Is Investment Grade Corporate Debt Safer Than Government Bonds?

But Eric says TIPs buyers must be cautious: a prolonged spell of deflation would be devastating to both prices and yields.

More from The Rude Awakening:

Everyone knows that a deflationary deep-freeze is paralyzing the global economy. Everyone also knows, therefore, that inflation is as good as dead. The sellers of stocks know it; the buyers of long-dated Treasury bonds know it; and the sellers of TIPs (Treasury Inflation-Protected bonds) know it better than anybody. When so many financial market participants are certain about anything, a forward-looking investor might want to challenge the thesis…and try to make a few bucks in the process.

The nearby chart shows quite clearly that prices of long-dated Treasury bonds (as represented by the iShares 20+ Treasury Bond ETF – NYSE:TLT) have been soaring, whiles the prices of TIPs (as represented by the iShares Treasury Inflation Protected ETF – NYSE:TIP) have been falling. Most long-dated TIPs have tumbled 15% in less than two months. Evidently, investors want nothing to do with inflation protection, but will stampede to obtain DE-flation protection.

But is deflation such an utter certainty that investors should be scooping up 10-year Treasury bonds that yield a near-record-low 3.11%?  To rephrase the question, is inflation such impossibility that investors should be unloading 10-year TIPs (Treasury Inflation Protected) that currently yield 2.40%, but could produce a vastly greater return if inflation heats up?

We ask these questions, not because we believe a deflationary episode is unlikely, but rather, because we do not believe that an inflationary episode is impossible. Investors in long-dated Treasury securities seem to have convinced themselves that inflation has been “deep-sixed,” not just for the next two or three years, but for the next 10 to 20 years as well.

The cost of taking the other side of that trade has never been cheaper. But TIP-buyers beware!…The other side of the trade is not without risks. A potent deflationary trend would depress the value of TIPs, both in absolute terms and relative to conventional Treasuries.  In such a circumstance, TIP prices could fall… a lot.  At maturity, of course, the TIP-buyer would receive at least “par” for his bonds.  But no investor wants to wait a decade or more to see the return of his capital.

[To better appreciate the virtues and vices of a TIP of security, consider the following brief primer: http://www.treasurydirect.gov/indiv/products/prod_tips_glance.htm]

As noted above, the conventional 10-year Treasury bond yields 3.11%, which is 71 basis points more than the 10-year TIP yield of 2.40%. The TIP-buyer accepts yield penalties like these in exchange for the comfort of inflation protection.

But comparing current yields is only one small part of the calculus that leads an investor to either buy or shun a TIP.  The most important aspect of the comparative analysis is the “implied breakeven inflation rate.”  In other words, what would the average inflation rate need to be during the life of a given TIP to make it a better buy than a conventional Treasury of the identical maturity?

During the last decade, the implied breakeven inflation rate for a 10-year TIP has fluctuated around 2% – meaning, if the inflation rate averaged less than 2% during the life of the TIP, a conventional 10-year Treasury bond would have been a better buy.  On the other hand, if the inflation rate averaged more than 2% during the life of the TIP, the TIP would have been the better buy.

Lately, a very strange thing has happened in the TIP market: breakeven inflation rates have collapsed to all-time lows. The 10-year TIP, for example, is pricing in a razor-thin inflation rate of just 0.3% per year during the next 10 years.  I.e, if the inflation rate averages more than 0.3% per year during the next 10 years, the buyer of a 10-year TIP at today’s prices would be better off than the buyer of a conventional 10-year Treasury bond.  The inverse would also be true.

Let the reader decide, therefore, whether the average U.S. inflation rate will exceed 0.3% per year during the next decade. But before deciding, let the reader also do enough homework about the quirky world of TIP securities to avoid making unintended errors.  One of the easiest – and costliest – errors a TIP-buyer could make would be to underestimate the capital-destroying potential of a severe deflation.  If the Consumer Price Index were to decline sharply for a sustained period of time, the price of a long-dated TIP would also decline sharply.  Furthermore, the current yield provided by the TIP would decline at the same time – a deflationary double-whammy.

Thus, the TIP buyer’s world is very simple: inflation = good; deflation = bad. But therein lies the appeal of these unique securities as well.  Inflation is rarely a good thing for the value of a financial asset, but it is a good thing for a TIP.

When the central banks of the world flood the global monetary system with titanic quantities of credit and currency, an inflationary uptick does not usually trail far behind.  And when the US Federal Reserve pours so many trillions of dollars into the US financial system that an $800 billion bailout seems like nothing at all, an inflationary uptick becomes increasingly likely.

TIPs are risky, but inflation is devastating.

Source: Beat the Rush; Sell Treasury Bonds Now