Regardless of any formal announcement of whether or not the United States drops into an actual recession, the ongoing credit crisis guarantees a contraction of the American economy by virtually every measure we know. That period of darkness will be marked by a dramatic slowdown in economic activity, as well as by rising unemployment, additional declines in U.S. stock prices, and constant volatility. And it could last as long as 12-18 months.

But when the dawn does come, it will be one to remember. If U.S. President-elect Barack Obama gets it right – and I have every reason to believe that he will – then investors will be presented with the greatest investment opportunity of our generation. At that point, shares of American companies will be at such low levels that wholesale buying by individuals, mutual funds, pension funds, institutional money managers, and foreign-controlled sovereign wealth funds, will generate gains that will not only make us whole, they will make us rich once again.

A Market Mandela

Creating an analysis of the U.S. economy’s outlook for the New Year is akin to creating a mandala, a geometric work of art whose pattern, symbolically or metaphysically, represents a microcosm of the universe from the human perspective. In some Buddhist temples, mandalas are made of tiny colored beads, painstakingly created by several monks as a form of meditation. In celebration of the ever-changing nature of the universe, the mandala is then joyously shaken by its creators, until it is once again nothing more than chaos embodied in a box of colored beads.

Regardless of the big picture, analysis of a mandala – or the economy – always starts at the center and emanates outward. With the U.S. economy, that centerpiece is credit. The credit crisis has shaken the complex mandala that is our economy and transformed the United States economy into chaos. It’s complex because this economic-forecast mandala derived its form from thousands of individual pieces – in the case of the economy, from scores of data points, many of which are currently dark and foreboding.

The credit crisis we are experiencing results from the contraction – or worse, the cessation – of lending. Under normal circumstances, institutions and markets freely facilitate capital movement between lenders and borrowers. But that’s not happening, now.

Because of a lack of transparency into the balance sheets of borrowers holding such complex and illiquid securities as collateralized debt obligations, credit-default swaps, and non-performing loans, and because of increasing recessionary fears affecting businesses and households, lenders don’t want to increase their loan exposure. Banks are holding onto the cash and liquid securities they control, using them as a cushion against their own potential losses. The U.S. Treasury Department’s direct-to-bank capital injections do not alter these banking realities. In fact, as a Money Morning investigative story recently demonstrated, instead of using these taxpayer-provided infusions to increase their lending, these banks are using the money to finance takeover deals.

The Recipe for a Recession

The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) will ultimately determine whether or not the United States is technically in a recession. The business-cycle dating committee of this privately run, nonprofit economic research group is right now studying five factors in an attempt to determine if the United States has entered a recession and, if so, when that downturn started, MarketWatch.com reported. Those five factors are:

• Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
• Industrial production.
• Employment
• Income.
• Retail sales

Regardless of any formal announcement by the NBER of whether we’re in a recession, the credit crisis guarantees a general contraction of economic activity, by every measure.

“Any doubt that we’re officially in a recession can be put aside,” Anthony Karydakis, former chief U.S. economist for JPMorgan Asset Management – and now a professor at New York University’s Stern School of Business – recently wrote in Fortune magazine. “The rapid deterioration of labor markets points to a sharp decline in hours worked and output in the fourth quarter. This is likely to lead to a decline in personal consumption to the tune of 5.0% or so for that period. Since [consumer spending] makes up about 70% of the economy, the stage has already been set for real GDP to shrink at a more than 4.0% rate in the fourth quarter.”

Confirmation of that belief is evident by looking at each of the NBER’s five key indicators.

• Gross Domestic Product (GDP): The U.S. Commerce Department estimated that the U.S. economy, as measured by GDP, rose 0.9% in the first quarter. In the second quarter, GDP advanced an estimated 2.8%. For the third quarter, GDP declined an estimated 0.3%. My own econometric models suggest that GDP actually contracted at a 1.5% pace in the third quarter and will decline another 2.75% in the fourth quarter. For the year, that would mean the U.S. economy actually fell 0.55%. The U.S. economy last posted a full year’s negative GDP in 1991, when it declined 0.2%. Verdict: Recession.

• Industrial Production: This measure of output by the nation’s factories and mines dropped 2.8% in September, and a very steep 6.0% in the third quarter. Verdict: Recession.

• Employment: The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics announced Friday that October’s unemployment rate was 6.5%, a jump of 0.4%, which was double what most economists expected, and also its highest level in 14 years. The economy has now lost a total of 1.2 million jobs since the beginning of the year, with nearly half of those losses occurring in the last three months alone, pointing to an acceleration in the pace of erosion in labor markets. Karydakis, the Stern School professor, wrote in Fortune: “By way of comparison, during the 2001 recession and in the sluggish growth that followed in 2002-03, the unemployment rate reached a peak of only 6.3%, in June 2003. We’ve already exceeded that mark and, given that we are still in the early phase of the current recession, the unemployment rate should be expected to push toward the 7.5% range – and possibly higher – during the next three months to six months.” Verdict: Recession.

• Income: Personal income increased $24.5 billion, or 0.2%, and disposable personal income (DPI) increased $25.7 billion, or 0.2%, in September. Personal consumption expenditures (PCE) decreased $33.6 billion, or 0.3%. Excluding the rebate payments made to U.S. taxpayers under the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, DPI increased $30.3 billion, or 0.3%, in September, and increased $44.0 billion, or 0.4%, in August. Verdict: Too close to call.

• Retail Sales: October retail sales are coming in well below already-diminished expectations, and some reports have been downright depressing – including The Neiman Marcus Group Inc. -26.8%; The Gap Inc. -16%; The Nordstrom Group -15.7%; J.C. Penny Co. Inc. -13%; Kohl’s Corp. -9%;  Ltd. Brands Inc. -9%; Target Corp. Inc. -4.8%; and Wal-Mart Stores Inc. +2.4%. In a report last week, Moody’s Investors Service projected that the retail sector’s woes will continue into 2009 as consumers cut back on buying apparel, footwear and accessories “in order to save money for essentials.” The credit rating firm said in a separate report that holiday spending “will prove even weaker than expected,” amid October’s financial-market swoon. Verdict: Recession.

If U.S. exports are taken out of the GDP calculations going back to January, it’s apparent that there has been very little domestic growth in the economy. And when revisions are finalized in the next few months, we’ll be looking back at the recession that we’re all but certain is upon us right now. Until the credit markets are freed up and borrowers are extended credit at reasonable rates, it’s unlikely that credit, the centerpiece of the economy, will be anything other than a major cog in the wheel.

There are some signs of a thaw, but not anytime soon. The U.S. Federal Reserve’s lowering of the Fed Funds target rate to 1.0%, and coordinated rate reductions by the Bank of England and the European Central Bank, as well as other major worldwide central banks, may start to ease the stranglehold gripping the worldwide credit markets.

The prospect of President-elect Obama’s choosing a different means of attacking the credit crisis will be closely watched and, by itself, may create an air of confidence that perceptions will change. But changed perceptions will not be enough.

The truth about our economic outlook is that it is predicated on demonstrably better transparency. If U.S. banks follow the lead of their European counterparts, which have recently been freed from fair-value, mark-to-market accounting, and which may retroactively mark assets to “internal models” back to July, then balance-sheet clarity will continue to be cloaked in darkness. Lack of confidence in the banking system will persist, especially among the banks themselves. The first order of attack needs to be the creation of a fundamental leadership position that leads to an open, transparent and accountable measure of balance sheet assets and liabilities. As long as failing banks are being propped up, this cycle of credit contraction will persist.

The outlook for the economy is inextricably tied to the price of oil. The run-up of benchmark crude this summer to the record $145 a barrel level, and its subsequent fall to half that level, has wreaked havoc throughout the economy. Similarly, the run-up in commodity prices, and their subsequent fall, also has caused a lot of damage. Together, the dramatic rise and fall in the price of oil and other commodities is a harbinger of greater volatility in the future.

Follow the Money

Follow the money. Capital rapidly inflated the tech-stock bubble. When that bubble burst, capital flowed into and flooded the hard-asset world of real estate. When that bubble burst fast, speculative money dove into oil and commodities. When the U.S. and world economies looked weak, those bubbles burst. The looming threat of inflation this past summer instantly gave way after the drop of oil, gold, metals and agricultural commodities. And now, deflation is seen as the looming threat on the horizon.

Which threat should we worry about?

The answer is – both. The prospect for near-term deflation seems all too real. As raw material prices fall and finished good prices fall due to a lack of purchasing power resulting from lack of credit and world-wide recessionary fears, the U.S. consumer has fundamentally changed his or her collective psychology. Is U.S. consumerism, which is responsible for 70% of GDP, in full retreat? If it is, as all measures project, then it’s likely that government stimulus efforts will overshoot their intended mark.

Just look at what the United States has done already as it battles this financial crisis. It has:

• Handed out more than $150 billion in stimulus rebate checks.
• Floated a $700 billion financial bailout rescue plan – almost $160 billion of which has already been placed.
• Bailed out American International Group Inc., to the tune of $125 billion.
• Covered JP Morgan Chase & Co.’s bet on taking over
  The Bear Stearns Cos. – to the tune of $29 billion.
• Looked to lend struggling automakers $25 billion.
• Agreed to guarantee depositors at all banks.
• Stepped in to buy commercial paper that no one else will buy.
• Guaranteed money-market-fund investors.
• And backstopped the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

And now we’re getting wind of another stimulus package and more help for everyone.

If, in six months to a year, the credit markets are facilitating borrowers again, the massive buildup of U.S. debt will result in a falling dollar and higher interest rates.

That spells inflation.

A massive re-inflation of the economy portends another flood of speculative money into oil and commodities. The cycles are increasingly condensed, more volatile and will be increasingly more disruptive.

Welcome to the brave new world of global finance and speculation.

The Federal Reserve’s balance sheet has ballooned from $900 billion to more than $1.8 trillion. That’s 13% of GDP. The Treasury Department has telegraphed its intention to float $550 billion of debt in the fourth quarter and estimates it will have to float another $368 billion in the first quarter of 2009. Our national debt will then be close to 49% of GDP.

If there is an easing of credit in the economy, and borrowers come to market with the pent-up demand that has not been met for the past year, the competition for funds will raise interest rates. Higher interest rates will counter any stimulus effect from government programs.

Who will buy U.S. Treasury debt if the world is less apprehensive about credit quality? Lenders will once again seek higher returns, potentially forcing the Treasury Department to increase its rates. The potential of this event may sink the dollar if investors perceive that the U.S. economy is stagnant and the world is awash in dollars. The yield curve – the spread between the Treasury’s two-year and the 10-year paper – has been steepening. A steepening yield curve, where short-term borrowing costs are low and long-term rates considerably higher, is good for banks that borrow short and lend long.

But if the perception of risk diminishes, and the perception of future inflation increases, the yield curve will invert and the threat of rising rates will cause a sell-off in the short end of the curve and a rush into longer-dated maturities. Any increase in short-term interest rates would be painful for struggling banks. An inverted yield curve would be devastating, and inevitably would lead to more bank failures.

Home on the Range …

At the core of the U.S. economy sits a desperately ailing piece of the mandala – the U.S. housing market. The once bright prospect of home ownership, which historically formed a beautiful economic picture, right now doesn’t exist. For most Americans, the family home constituted the bulk of their wealth. Or at least it did. And this family financial portrait will get worse before it gets better, since the real estate collapse is far from over. Goldman Sachs Group Inc., for instance, projects another 15% drop in housing prices.

I think that’s conservative. Mortgage rates are actually rising as Fannie and Freddie have to pay higher interest on their short-term notes and bonds. Thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage paper averaged 6.47% last week, up from its 52-week low of 5.36%. The 15-year fixed paper was trading at 6.18%, up from its 52-week low of 4.91% (based on Bankrate.com rate surveys). This trend is definitely not our friend. As housing prices continue to fall, and inventories stagnate and grow in many areas, homeowners are increasingly underwater and are increasingly entertaining foreclosure as a viable economic alternative to indentured servitude.

The Hope for Homeowners Plan, which looks to lower interest rates and reduce principal on mortgages, and which makes homeowners pay a share of the appreciation on their home to their lender when they sell it, was initiated in October and was expected to garner some 400,000 takers. As of last week, according to The Wall Street Journal, there had been only 42 takers. That’s not a misprint – 42 – I even checked with The Journal.

In the real estate realm, the proverbial “other shoe” hasn’t dropped yet, but certainly is dangling – and that’s commercial real estate. As homeowners writhe in agony and stop spending, retailers will go out of business, businesses of all stripes will suffer and commercial real estate will implode. The leverage left over from just the private equity foray into commercial real estate in the acquisitive 2006-2007 period is staggering. Refinancing will be impossible. Banks are stuck with hundreds of billions of dollars of leveraged loans that they took on as bridge and mezzanine financing from the private-equity shops alone, at the time believing they would  be able to securitize those loans and sell them off to investors.

There’s no chance of that, now.

One deal in particular illustrates this entire mess.  Private equity behemoth The Blackstone Group LP took Hilton Hotels Corp. private for $26 billion. Blackstone put up $6 billion of its own money as equity and borrowed the other $20 billion from Bear Stearns, Bank of America Corp., Deutsche Bank AG, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. and Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.

Based on a current analysis of the deal at the multiple of seven times projected cash flow that the market currently puts on Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide Inc. - Hilton’s nearest rival – if Blackstone values its property comparably, it will have to mark its Hilton holdings down 50%, because it paid 13 times projected cash flow. That wipes out all of Blackstone’s equity in the deal. What’s more, the $4 billion portion of the loan that Bear Stearns took on, courtesy of JP Morgan Chase casting off Bear’s orphaned liabilities, now sits on the Fed’s balance sheet – and isn’t likely to go anywhere anytime soon.

Until the real estate cycle completes its implosion and begins to stabilize, there’s nothing that will fundamentally alter the outlook for the economy. This is Ground Zero. President-elect Obama must resist creating only a political solution to the overwhelming economic problem of declining house prices and declining real estate prices in general. Any attempt to put a Band-Aid on this economic plague will only delay the day of reckoning. I regret deeply the conclusion that the lake must be drained before we can realistically climb out of it. But there just aren’t enough ferrymen to get us all to shore.

Always a Silver Lining – My Forecast

The outlook for the economy is not rosy – and that’s an understatement. But there is a silver lining. Even in the near term, the stock market will present innumerable wealth-creation opportunities.

• First, there are plenty of shorting opportunities out there now, and more will present themselves in the future.
• Second, in due course – in perhaps 12-18 months – we will be presented with the investment opportunity of our generation. If President-elect Obama gets it right, and I believe he’s got the potential to bring us all together and get the country through this (and if you’re reading this Mr. President-elect, I’d like to put in my vote for [New York Fed President] Timothy Geithner as next U.S. treasury secretary), American companies will be able to be purchased so cheaply that fortunes will be made. The recovery will not only make us whole, it will make our people and our nation rich again.

I have absolutely no doubt that the United States will lead the world back into balance. The sea change that has arrived is the result of the conservative experiment having lost its true moorings, pushing the economy into disaster. Not that a wholesale swinging of the pendulum to the other side would be good. In fact, it would be disastrous. We have the potential to end up with a new, fair, transparent and judiciously regulated environment where capital formation can again spread its wings and the U.S. economy can fly.

There are new hands reaching into the colorful box of beads that comprise the American landscape and economy. From any human perspective, the United States is more than a microcosm of the universe; it is the center of the world as we know it. It will take time to construct the new mandala. We all need to meditate on the process to ensure that the design we embrace will ultimately be inclusive, forward-looking and – like all great art – an inspiration to all who view it.

Source: U.S. Economic Outlook for 2009

R. Shah Gilani, a retired hedge-fund manager and Money Morning contributing editor who is emerging as an expert on the worldwide financial meltdown, noted that the plan was apparently still that – a plan. Even so, he said that “any bailout plan that directly addresses foreclosures is political posturing that will ultimately be overwhelmed by inevitable economic realities.”

The New York Times carried the first reports of the Bush Administration’s new housing rescue new proposal yesterday (Thursday). According to the newspaper report, this program would be the most sweeping and direct government initiative aimed at home-loan borrowers since the financial crisis started last year.

As proposed, the federal government would incur half the loss on a home loan if the mortgage company that controls the loan agrees to lower the borrower’s monthly payment for at least five years. On any given loan, the mortgage company would reduce the payment borne by the homeowner by writing off part of the loan balance, reducing the loan’s interest rate or changing other loan terms, sources told
The Times.

The newspaper said it could not name the three senior officials who provided details of the plan because it was still being worked out.

In this case, the devil truly will be in the details: Trying to take a massive rescue plan – and matching the benefits up with individual homeowners – may be just too much to ask, Money Morning’s Gilani says.

“Who will be eligible, how will that be determined, what will happen when prices continue to fall and mortgage holders eventually walk away” are just some of the tough questions a workable plan would have to answer, Gilani said. Plus, “is the government going to shackle them to their mortgages the same way they’re shackling taxpayers to all these other ill-begotten bailout schemes?”

The plan – which would be part of the $700 billion banking-system rescue plan the government approved early this month – would cost $40 billion to $50 billion, with the money being used to cover future losses on loans that are deemed eligible for federal support.

That price tag is likely to be very much on the low side, Gilani says.

“The $40-$50 billion price tag could only have been plucked from thin air,” he said. “The real gravity of the problem will weigh in closer to $500 billion – at least.”

Officials with both the U.S. Treasury Department and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC) are collaborating on the proposal, and insiders believe that an announcement may be made sometime soon. FDIC Chairwoman Sheila C. Bair – a leading proponent of such a plan – publicly discussed the possibility a week ago.

Bush Administration officials clearly want to stabilize the U.S. housing market. But that’s easier said than done. Even at a time when roughly one in every 10 mortgages was either delinquent or in foreclosure – as was the case this summer – companies have been highly reluctant to aggressively reduce payments for two key reasons:

• They’re afraid the borrowers might default again.
• And they fear that the buyers of mortgage-backed securities might sue.

By offering to incur half the losses, federal officials hope that the U.S. housing market – and the accompanying market for mortgage loans – might finally settle out, which could also ease the financial crisis even as it provides a bit of a boost to the U.S. economy [For a related story on the U.S. economy – including a look at third-quarter gross domestic product (GDP) – check out this report elsewhere in the current issue of Money Morning.]

There’s one key challenge, however: If the economic slump ultimately ends up being deeper and longer-lasting than anyone right now predicts, the housing program could end up being much more expensive than planned – dumping still more unexpected debt onto the U.S. balance sheet. And the plan – or, at least, the details that have leaked out so far – doesn’t seem to address the one key problem with the U.S. housing market: Housing prices keep going down.

“Tragically, there’s no guarantee the plan won’t collapse on homeowners and taxpayers as it does nothing to stem the continuing slide in home prices, which is the real problem,”
Gilani says.

Treasury Department spokeswoman Jennifer Zuccarelli told  The Times that it would be premature to discuss a plan that policymakers were still working on.

“As we said last week, the administration is going through the White House policy process to look at ways to reduce foreclosures, and that process is ongoing,” she told the newspaper. “We have not decided on a particular approach.”

Source: Credit Crisis Expert Says Proposed Plan to Bail Out Delinquent Homeowners May Face Too Many Problems to Succeed

According to the newspaper report, this program would be the most sweeping and direct government initiative aimed at home-loan borrowers since the financial crisis started last year. As proposed, the federal government would incur half the loss on a home loan if the mortgage company that controls the loan agrees to lower the borrower’s monthly payment for at least five years. On any given loan, the mortgage company would reduce the payment borne by the homeowner by writing off part of the loan balance, reducing the loan’s interest rate or changing other loan terms, sources told The Times.

The newspaper said it could not name the three senior officials who provided details of the plan because it was still being worked out.

The plan – which would be part of the $700 billion banking-system rescue plan the government approved early this month – would cost $40 billion to $50 billion, with the money being used to cover future losses on loans that are deemed eligible for federal support.

U.S. Treasury Department and Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC) officials are collaborating on the proposal and an announcement may be made sometime soon. FDIC Chairwoman Sheila C. Bair – a leading proponent of such a plan – publicly discussed the possibility a week ago.

Bush Administration officials clearly want to stabilize the U.S. housing market, but that’s easier said than done. Even at a time when roughly one in every 10 mortgages was either delinquent or in foreclosure – as was the case this summer – companies have been highly reluctant to aggressively reduce payments for two key reasons:

• They’re afraid the borrowers might default again.
• And they fear that the buyers of mortgage-backed securities might sue.

By offering to incur half the losses, federal officials hope that the U.S. housing market – and the accompanying market for mortgage loans – might finally settle out, which could also ease the financial crisis even as it provides a bit of a boost to the U.S. economy.

There’s one key challenge, however: If the economic slump ultimately ends up being deeper and longer-lasting than anyone right now predicts, the housing program could end up being much more expensive than planned – dumping still more unexpected debt onto the U.S. balance sheet.

Treasury Department spokeswoman Jennifer Zuccarelli told The Times that it would be premature to discuss a plan that policymakers were still working on.

“As we said last week, the administration is going through the White House policy process to look at ways to reduce foreclosures, and that process is ongoing,” she told the newspaper. “We have not decided on a particular approach.”

Source: Bush Administration Proposing Plan to Bail Out Delinquent Homeowners

As part of the just-passed U.S. bailout bill, the government has reiterated the Securities and Exchange Commission’s authority to relax the mark-to-market standards. If the SEC actually follows through on that directive, many professional investors worry that we won’t catch on to the next leg of the ongoing credit crisis until it’s way too late.

While politicians point to mark-to-market rules as the cause of the billions in write-downs and losses suffered by financial firms in recent quarters, in fact, it was mark-to-market accounting that first exposed the underlying problems in the complex markets for mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and credit-default swaps (CDS).

“Mark-to-market is reality-based accounting,” said Money Morning Contributing Editor Shah Gilani in a phone interview yesterday (Tuesday). “Anything else requires a looking glass and a ticket to Wonderland.”

“To me, mark-to-market accounting is the clarion sound of beagles barking, letting transparency hunters know down which dark hole the fox is hiding,” said Gilani, a former hedge-fund manager who recently penned a five-part investigative series on the U.S. credit crisis – including an alternate bailout plan that he says would’ve cost taxpayers very little.

Without the early warnings raised by mark-to-market accounting standards, the problems in the CDS market could have gone unnoticed for much longer, leaving no time to hedge or prepare for the ultimate carnage to the financial sector.

“In the past couple of weeks, fair-value accounting has been under attack,” JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) analyst Dane Mott wrote in a recent report, Bloomberg News reported. “Blaming fair-value accounting for the credit crisis is a lot like going to a doctor for a diagnosis and then blaming him for telling you that you are sick.”

Prior to the current credit mess, mortgage-backed securities were priced according to Markit’s ABX Index, which used the average weight of four series in the index to track the price of housing derivatives. But once the subprime market collapsed, the ABX Index plunged – and has yet to recover.

Mark-to-market accounting standards kicked off a round of write-downs at global financial firms that highlighted the overexposure of many to these risky securities. Without such standards, investors would have been unaware of the coming credit crunch.

The Rise of Fair Value

Mark-to-market accounting, or fair-value accounting as it is sometimes called, arose partly in response to the U.S. Savings & Loan Crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Financial institutions had inflated the value of assets on their books, which ultimately led to their financial collapse.

In order to bring more order and transparency to financial firm balance sheets, there was a shift from valuing balance-sheet assets at their purchase price to holding assets at fair market value – or the price the assets would fetch out in the marketplace if they were sold.

In mid-November, with the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis already taking its toll on global financial firms, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) released Statement No. 157, entitled “Fair Value Measurements.”

Due to the timing of its issuance, FASB 157 has been pointed to by many as a cause for the financial crisis currently gripping the United States and other markets abroad. But it is important to note that FASB 157 only clarified the fair-value accounting practices that had already been in place for decades – with perhaps one noted exception.

“FASB 157 is not the primary cause of this crisis – greed and poor judgment are,” Paul Shifrin, a principal at SC&H Group LLC, a Maryland CPA and management-consulting firm, said in an interview with Money Morning.

What FASB 157 did introduce was an asset hierarchy based on the market available for the assets. Assets are assigned to one of three categories based upon how liquid the assets actually are and, in turn, how easy they are to value, or price:

• Level 1 assets are fully liquid, and easy to price.
• Level 2 assets can be priced with the benefit of “comparable assets.”
• And Level 3 assets are completely illiquid and nearly impossible to price.

A Growing Crisis

As the market for MBS and collateralized-debt obligations (CDO) dried up, financial firms were caught holding billions in securities for which there was no longer a market. That led to a steep decline in prices and huge write-downs, which translated into escalating quarterly losses. These complex securities, which had been “Level 1” assets, were quickly becoming “Level 3” assets.

But rather than place the blame on the over-leveraging or the risky securities in question, some politicians and banking lobbyists blamed mark-to-market accounting for the resulting huge losses at global financial firms.

“Onerous mark-to-market rules for certain financial assets that have no market value have worsened the credit crisis, and changing them has been a priority for House Republicans,” U.S. Rep. John Boehner, R-Ohio recently told The Wall Street Journal reported.

Congress and such financial-firm lobbying groups such as the American Bankers Association have called for a relaxing of the mark-to-market rules. But doing so would represent a grave error, says Money Morning’s Gilani.

“Nobody is going to trust anybody,” says Gilani. “That’s a real problem if you do away with mark-to-market accounting.”

And that’s an even bigger problem in a market that is already seized up with a crisis of confidence.

The main argument against fair-value accounting is that in a “disorderly market” such as the one we have now due to the ongoing credit crunch, mark-to-market doesn’t take into account the actual cash flow of CDO securities or if the owner plans to hold those securities until maturity. In other words, the security could be worth more than the current sale price if it is held and not sold.

“It’s a knee-jerk reaction from politicians and the banks are trying to find a scapegoat to blame for their own errors in judgment,” said SC&H Group’s Shifrin.

If mark-to-market rules are relaxed or eliminated, financial firms will be able to hide future errors in judgment from investors, allowing corporate executives to falsely protect their companies’ share prices, and to protect their own salaries and bonuses.

“To suggest you don’t track and report fair values means you end up in a world where management still knows the real prices, as do market counterparties, but not the investors,” Sam DiPiazza, chief executive officer of the accounting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers, told The Financial Times.

]]> http://www.contrarianprofits.com/articles/has-the-us-switched-off-its-financial-crisis-early-warning-system/6013/feed 0 http://www.contrarianprofits.com/articles/how-private-equity-firms-could-make-a-killing-from-the-bailout/5984 http://www.contrarianprofits.com/articles/how-private-equity-firms-could-make-a-killing-from-the-bailout/5984#comments Tue, 07 Oct 2008 13:22:42 +0000 Andrew Gordon http://www.contrarianprofits.com/articles/how-private-equity-firms-could-make-a-killing-from-the-bailout/5984 The markets haven’t exactly soared on the passing of the bailout bill. But Andrew Gordon says some firms are going to make huge profits from the bill.

Andrew says, “Real estate companies, hedge funds, and private-equity firms have raised tens of billions this year alone for the specific purpose of buying distressed debt. The bailout is about to kick off the biggest fire sale of real estate in US history.“

However, these firms may also inherit heaps of bad debt if they don’t do their research properly. There will be plenty of big losers for every big winner from this bailout.

This from Investor’s Daily Edge:

Love it or hate it, the $810 billion, pork-laden bailout is now a fact. After all the preaching and political…

]]> The markets haven’t exactly soared on the passing of the bailout bill. But Andrew Gordon says some firms are going to make huge profits from the bill.

Andrew says, “Real estate companies, hedge funds, and private-equity firms have raised tens of billions this year alone for the specific purpose of buying distressed debt. The bailout is about to kick off the biggest fire sale of real estate in US history.“

However, these firms may also inherit heaps of bad debt if they don’t do their research properly. There will be plenty of big losers for every big winner from this bailout.

This from Investor’s Daily Edge:

Love it or hate it, the $810 billion, pork-laden bailout is now a fact. After all the preaching and political maneuvering, the market reacted to its passage on Friday with a yawn, followed by a sharp drop. But one thing I do know about the bailout is this. The government won’t be spending a trillion dollars without some companies making huge bucks.

In the war in Iraq, for example, it’s the oil services, big construction companies and security firms which made out. Following government money is a time-honored and proven way to make money. Heck, the entire defense sector is predicated on this strategy. Northrop, Raytheon and Lockheed have done it successfully for decades.

Fact is, the bailout will cost more than the Iraq war. Companies are already forming a line and raising billions of dollars to “help” the government carry it out. The bailout will create two distinct markets. One is completely government-controlled. The government will be using its trillion-dollar budget to purchase bad debt at the prices it sets. The government will also be selling that debt through auctions into the private sector. That’s the other market, and this is where things get interesting.

Real estate companies, hedge funds, and private-equity funds have raised tens of billions this year alone for the specific purpose of buying distressed debt.

Then there’s the half trillion dollars of private-equity money forced on the sidelines when credit dried up. More than 60 transactions announced in 2007, valued at a combined $180 billion, have been abandoned. Normally, this money would be used to finance leveraged buy-outs. But there’s no law that says the funds can’t be used to buy bad banks’ bad debt from the government, or buy into banks once stripped of their bad debt.

Lots of options here but LBO funds might just want to stick to their knitting. For example, TPG Capital handed Washington Mutual (WAMUQ) $7 billion a couple of months ago which was wiped out when WaMu went into government receivership (because of how the deal was structured, TPG itself probably lost less than $2 billion – that’s still not chickenfeed).

If buying bank equity is risky, then how about buying their bad debt? I wrote about a year ago in this space that they haven’t invented an x-ray machine capable of seeing through the complicated debt instruments that banks hold. That is where the risk comes from. Banks didn’t (still don’t) know exactly what kind of collateral is backing up their debt paper.

The bailout is about to kick off the biggest fire sale of real estate in U.S. history. Whatever you want can be had at big discount prices. Hotels, apartment complexes, office buildings, shopping malls, condo complexes, residential home developments… companies will shortly be able to get them for pennies on the dollar.

But there’s just one small problem…

Companies that go after these properties will also be inheriting foreclosed homes, property saddled with liens, half-built developments, and so on. How much bad stuff is mixed in with the good stuff will determine how much these companies offer for the debt they’re buying … if they’re able to deconstruct these complex debts. They may not be able to.

Sifting through the bad debt of the savings and loans was a walk in the park compared to this. Back in those days you could do it one bad mortgage/property/development at a time and you had all the documentation to figure things out. Does it need repairs? Are the tenants credit-worthy? What’s the neighborhood like? Private-equity companies made big profits by snapping up distressed properties at bargain prices, fixing them up, and selling them off.

This time around, those who want to play the game will have to check out thousands of properties at a time. The banks couldn’t/wouldn’t do it. They used fancy formulas instead. And they got into big trouble as a result. The ratings agencies couldn’t/wouldn’t do it. And they gave bogus ratings on this debt as a result.

Now vulture companies and ambulance chasers are zeroing in on this debt. Can they dig deep enough to know exactly what they would be buying? If they can’t or won’t, will they manage risk any better than the hundreds of banks in need of rescuing?

Will you be able to trust these companies – firms like TPG Capital, KKR Financial (NYSE:KFN), Carlyle, Apollo Group (NASDAQ:APOL), Blackstone Group (NYSE:BX) and banks such as Goldman Sachs (NYSE:GS) and Citigroup (NYSE:C) which have private equity teams – with your money?

They could be the next great money-making sector. Or the sector that produces more hype than profits. Don’t get pulled in by the hype. I’m betting there’s going to be a lot more big losers than big winners in this game.

Then there’s this. It took the markets one year to recover from the less complicated savings and loan crisis. It took the real estate market two years to recover. It took the economy three years to recover. The scale and opaqueness of this crisis is much bigger. You can probably double those numbers this time around.

Source: Making Money after the Bailout

]]> http://www.contrarianprofits.com/articles/how-private-equity-firms-could-make-a-killing-from-the-bailout/5984/feed 1 http://www.contrarianprofits.com/articles/bankers-headache-getting-worse/4615 http://www.contrarianprofits.com/articles/bankers-headache-getting-worse/4615#comments Fri, 15 Aug 2008 16:16:50 +0000 Doug Casey http://www.contrarianprofits.com/articles/bankers-headache-getting-worse/4615 Delinquency rates on single-family mortgages have reached their highest level on record (the Fed started tracking this statistic in 1991), dragging up the delinquency rate on all loans held by U.S. banks.

This chart is more proof that, despite lowered interest rates, there are a record number of mortgages in the hands of subprime borrowers who can’t make their payments.

These delinquency rates show that the financial system has not emerged from the credit crisis, but rather, entered a new stage where bad loaning schemes are blowing up in the face of the bankers who created them.

Source: Bankers Headache Getting Worse

]]> Delinquency rates on single-family mortgages have reached their highest level on record (the Fed started tracking this statistic in 1991), dragging up the delinquency rate on all loans held by U.S. banks.

This chart is more proof that, despite lowered interest rates, there are a record number of mortgages in the hands of subprime borrowers who can’t make their payments.

These delinquency rates show that the financial system has not emerged from the credit crisis, but rather, entered a new stage where bad loaning schemes are blowing up in the face of the bankers who created them.

Source: Bankers Headache Getting Worse

]]> http://www.contrarianprofits.com/articles/bankers-headache-getting-worse/4615/feed 0 http://www.contrarianprofits.com/articles/the-three-signs-that-the-credit-crisis-has-yet-to-hit-bottom/4347 http://www.contrarianprofits.com/articles/the-three-signs-that-the-credit-crisis-has-yet-to-hit-bottom/4347#comments Wed, 06 Aug 2008 16:19:01 +0000 Keith Fitz-Gerald http://www.contrarianprofits.com/articles/the-three-signs-that-the-credit-crisis-has-yet-to-hit-bottom/4347 “Have we seen the worst from the financial sector?”The question – a very good one – came from an audience member following my global investing presentation at the Agora Wealth Symposium in Vancouver, British Columbia. During my entire time there, the interest in the ongoing credit crisis was intense.

I took a deep breath and launched into my three-point response.

First, I’m encouraged by what I see lately but still believe there is a fair distance to travel before all the skeletons are cleaned out of the financial sector’s closet.

There is a growing body of data that suggests banks have recognized only a fraction of the overall potential losses – approximately $50 billion to $75 billion so far on subprime debt alone.…

]]> “Have we seen the worst from the financial sector?”The question – a very good one – came from an audience member following my global investing presentation at the Agora Wealth Symposium in Vancouver, British Columbia. During my entire time there, the interest in the ongoing credit crisis was intense.

I took a deep breath and launched into my three-point response.

First, I’m encouraged by what I see lately but still believe there is a fair distance to travel before all the skeletons are cleaned out of the financial sector’s closet.

There is a growing body of data that suggests banks have recognized only a fraction of the overall potential losses – approximately $50 billion to $75 billion so far on subprime debt alone. And a variety of estimates suggest that total subprime losses may be more than $300 billion before we’re through.

And that figure, incidentally, doesn’t include the additional losses from secondary-prime mortgage loans, auto loans, credit card balances, student loans and the other credit-related flotsam and jetsam floating around in the debt markets.

That suggests that the hundreds of billions of dollars in emergency capital infusions from the world’s central bankers we’ve seen to date may only be a fraction of what’s ultimately needed by the time fully leveraged figures are thrown into the mix.

Second, liquidity conditions now may actually be worse than when the entire credit-crisis mess began to unravel this time last year. For example, the benchmark London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) remains higher than so-called “policy rates” and U.S. Treasuries of comparable maturities (Please see accompanying chart).

This suggests that banks still don’t trust each other and therefore are keeping so-called “Interbank” borrowing rates high in order to reflect what they perceive to be the added risk of doing business. We’ve been warning investors to watch out for this since as far back as April, and have generally been preaching caution since the credit crisis began last year.

In other words, the fact that Libor-Treasury spreads are wider today than they were a year ago suggests that the banks really don’t know who continues to hold the toxic debt instruments the entire world has come to fear – despite a recent earnings parade of CEOs making claims to the contrary.

The upshot: Many institutions are hoarding cash – something you’d hardly expect to see if the credit crisis were really on the mend.

Third, judging from recent reports, it’s beginning to dawn on financial regulators that this crisis was never about a lack of liquidity in the first place, which is something I suggested in an open letter to U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke some time ago.

Instead, this crisis is about three things:

• Too much liquidity.
• Fundamental structural problems in the credit industry, including the almost-total lack of regulation.
• And the lack of transparency of complex financial instruments for which there is no public market, making them tough to value and nearly impossible to trade.

It is becoming clearer by the day that – partly because of these three factors – a good deal of money has been made fraudulently, if not illegally.

Granted recent changes surrounding the “mark-to-market” accounting of so-called “Level 3″ assets are a step in the right direction. But what few people realize is that, in the short-term, these new requirements could involve the immediate recognition of even larger losses than we’ve seen to date.

The reason is that many of the firms involved – think Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. (MER), Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (LEH) and Citigroup Inc. (C), for example – will no longer be able to hide their losses in Level 3 assets, as they have in the past.

As you might expect, there’s a counterargument to this, and it’s a highly popular one on Wall Street – especially inside the CEO set, whose members desperately want to stop the financial hemorrhaging their firms are enduring. They claim they’re “selling” risky assets and “de-leveraging” their balance sheets.

But here’s what they are not telling you.

Even though these folks are technically “selling” assets – particularly the distressed “Level 3″ assets I mentioned a bit earlier – what they are really doing is assigning the upside to hedge funds, private equity firms, and sovereign wealth funds in exchange for cash.

But here’s the kicker: The banks actually are holding onto the downside liability in the event the underlying securities go bad. That brings us back to the start of this commentary, when I said that I expect more securities to go bad.

No matter how you look at it, these financial institutions are playing a vicious shell game, hoping all the while that they’re not the loser who is taken to the cleaners when he picks up the wrong shell.

Where this goes from bad to worse is that at the same time they’re playing more fancy accounting tricks, these firms continue to pony up to the Fed’s private backdoor lending window for sweetheart financing. After all, they can’t get the financing anywhere else.

That means that every taxpayer in this country is involuntarily being put in the bailout business.

As for whether or not we’re near the end of the credit crisis as a whole, it depends on whom you ask.

When this crisis started a year ago, I was asked a similar question and answered it by saying that we would not even begin to approach the end of the line until the total losses exceeded $1 trillion.

My audience chuckled politely.

Fast-forward 12 months, and nobody’s laughing anymore – especially when I say that I’m now raising my industry loss estimate to nearly $2 trillion.

Increasingly, other analysts are embracing a similar viewpoint. UBS AG (UBS) raised it’s estimate of the total cost of the credit crisis to $600 billion, while noted hedge fund manager John Paulson suggested $1.3 trillion is not unthinkable. Meanwhile, in a report issued last May, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projected the bailout costs at $1 trillion.

All of this leads us to a single conclusion: At least for now, this is a “recovery” in name only.

The Three Signs That the Credit Crisis Has Yet to Hit Bottom

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