The first time around, the three-headed federal serpent – the Bush administration, the Treasury Department and the U.S. Federal Reserve – used Fannie Mae (NYSE: FNM) and Freddie Mac (NYSE: FRE) to “legitimize” trillions of dollars worth of toxic financial waste known as subprime mortgages.

The result was the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression – a mess that was global in nature.

And we’re now headed for a repeat performance.

Some of the players may have changed since the first subprime-mortgage crisis, but the game apparently remains the same. With banks currently unwilling to lend, the new federal triumvirate of the Obama administration, the Treasury and the Fed are trying to inflate the moribund U.S. housing market. This time around, however, the FHA is the weapon of choice.

Obama & Co. are making an all-or-nothing bet that the U.S. economy will recover and bail out the housing market before the final bill for this ill-advised gambit comes due.

When this bubble bursts – and it will – U.S. taxpayers will be on the hook for more than $1 trillion in government-guaranteed debt.

Ginnie Mae: Fannie and Freddie’s Once-Quiet Cousin

As a direct result of the real-estate meltdown, U.S. banks have become reluctant lenders. And they’ve raised their loan standards considerably. Federal officials knew they had to keep the mortgage spigot open, especially to suspect borrowers, so they turned to their new “secret weapon” – the FHA.

The FHA has been cranking out new government-insured subprime loans, which it packages into government guaranteed securities for sale to banks. This frightening reflation of the subprime bubble is being engineered for two key reasons:

• To put a floor under falling house prices.
• And to let banks swap toxic Fannie and Freddie securities for new toxic debt that is 100% guaranteed by U.S. taxpayers.

The almost inevitable insolvency of the FHA could rapidly undermine the fragile recovery of the U.S. economy. And it could plunge stock prices and bank viability to new lows.

Why the FHA?

That’s simple. In an era of increasingly stringent lending standards, the FHA’s standards are laughably lax.

Created by the National Housing Act of 1934, the FHA insures private mortgage lenders against borrower default on residential real estate loans. But its current allure is that it opens the door to prospective homebuyers who almost certainly wouldn’t qualify for a conventional home mortgage. These are buyers with no credit history, a history of credit problems, or not enough cash to cover the down payment and closing costs.

The FHA has quadrupled its insurance guarantees on mortgages in just the last three years, with the bulk of that growth coming in the past two years. Currently, the FHA insures $560 billion of mortgages.

Loans that are FHA-insured are pooled and packaged into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) by the Government National Mortgage Association, more commonly known as Ginnie Mae. Ginnie Mae insures the actual MBS pools composed of FHA loans. Ginnie Mae securities are the only mortgage-backed securities backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government.

Two weeks ago, Ginnie Mae proudly announced that it had issued a monthly record $43 billion in FHA mortgage-backed securities, and through the end of July held guaranteed securities with a value of $680 billion. It is on track to exceed $1 trillion worth of guaranteed securities by the end of calendar year 2010.

Ginnie Mae is a cousin of its better-known siblings Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Those two mortgage giants are technically insolvent, and were forced into government conservatorship at the height of the financial crisis – ostensibly due to concerns that foreign central banks in China, Japan, Europe, the Middle East and Russia might stop buying our bonds. As “government-sponsored enterprises,” or GSEs, Fannie and Freddie were only supposed to have the “implicit” backing of the U.S. government. But recent events have shown these to be fully backed by taxpayers.

The implosion of Fannie and Freddie severely threatened the mortgage market. It essentially shut down the two giant repositories that bought the loans banks and mortgage originators didn’t want to hold as assets on their own balance sheets.

The FHA and its mortgage-backed securities “factory” – Ginnie Mae – have taken up where Fannie and Freddie left off, and are now the dumping ground for toxic mortgages. Using the FHA is the core strategy in the administration’s misguided effort to prop up mortgage origination and modifications, real estate prices and insolvent banks.

Warning Signals?

Administration officials might want to take heed of some eerie parallels between the current situation and the one involving Fannie and Freddie. They could serve as an early warning system.

First and foremost, the FHA has already started to acknowledge systemic fraud in its business. In the earlier subprime crisis, similar circumstances led to the revelation of massive fraud in the issuance, packaging, ratings and sale of subprime toxic mortgage-backed securities.

On Aug. 4, the FHA suspended Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corp., one of its largest approved independent mortgage originators, from making anymore FHA-backed loans. The suspension came one day after federal investigators raided Taylor Bean’s Ocala, Fla., headquarters.

Since 2007, the value of FHA-backed loan originations underwritten by Taylor, Bean had soared 117%. By contrast, the origination of conventional loans by the firm dropped 34% over the same period. Taylor, Bean subsequently filed for bankruptcy.

Earlier this summer, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which oversees the FHA, raised concerns about FHA practices. On June 18, HUD released an internal inspector general’s report that revealed that the FHA’s default rate exceeded 7% and that more than 13% of its insured loans were delinquent by more than 30 days.

In a “Review and Outlook” piece, The Wall Street Journal reported that the FHA’s reserve fund dropped from 6.4% in 2007 to about 3% today, putting it dangerously close to its mandated 2% minimum. That translates to a “33-to-one leverage ratio, which is into Bear Stearns territory,” the newspaper report stated, referring to the now-failed investment bank that had been a central player in the original subprime mortgage crisis.

Bear Stearns is now owned by JPMorgan Chase & Co. (NYSE: JPM).

The HUD inspector general’s report stated that the agency’s growth makes it “vulnerable to exploitation by fraud schemes” and that it may need “Congressional appropriation intervention.”

In a recent article – “FHA Disputes Whispers of Capital Reserve Problems” – on the Mortgage News Daily Web site, HUD Secretary Shaun Donovan said in June that “there’s a better than even chance that we will stay above the two percent reserve threshold. That suggests, not just for the 2010 business, but overall for the portfolio, that we’ll more than likely to stay out of a broader need for any taxpayer funding.”

It may be more than a little disheartening to know that in a very uncertain economic environment, precisely due to fraud in mortgage lending and increasing borrower defaults, that our government is stretching a 50/50 wager on the backs of taxpayers.

That’s only part I of the FHA dilemma story.

Part II is even more frightening.

A Look Ahead

Banks are dumping Fannie and Freddie-backed securities onto the Fed’s balance sheet and replacing them on their own balance sheets with FHA-insured loans packaged into government-insured securities issued by Ginnie Mae. Banks aren’t reducing their net assets, they are aggressively swapping acknowledged toxic securities that no-one wants for a new variety that no one will want in the future. Why?

It’s not just that Ginnie Maes are fully backed by the U.S. taxpayers and Fannie and Freddie’s securities are only implicitly backed. All of them will be covered by taxpayers.

The devil is in the details.

Because Fannie and Freddie securities are only implicitly guaranteed, banks that hold these securities as assets on their balance sheets must “haircut,” or set aside reserves, based on a 20% risk-weighting assigned to the value of those holdings.

Because Ginnie Maes are explicitly 100% guaranteed, they are considered “risk free,” and on par with U.S. Treasury bonds, notes and bills. There is no reserve requirement, or haircut, on Ginnie Mae securities.

By replacing their asset mix and holding Ginnie Maes, banks don’t have to set aside reserves. They can use the money they otherwise would have to set aside to actually leverage-up their balance sheets. And guess what they’re buying?

More Ginnie Maes, naturally.

The effect of the asset swap – basically one toxic pool for a replacement that’s not much better – creates the illusion that banks have healthier balance sheets and that they are meeting their reserve requirements. It’s such a good deal for the banks and actively promoted by the Fed and Treasury, that banks are using Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) money to buy Ginnie Maes.

But it’s all a façade.

Capital ratios are being manipulated and insolvent banks are being propped up.

The danger of relying on the FHA to prop up the shaky housing market by facilitating mortgage origination, modifications and refinancing to less-than-stellar borrowers will only result in more subprime loans being stockpiled on the Federal Reserve balance sheet.

Eventually, defaults will overwhelm the FHA. And the hoped-for floor in residential real estate pricing will be pulled out from under us all. The next down-round in real-estate values will expose bank balance sheets for what they really are: Over-leveraged and over-stuffed with junk. Already on the ropes, banks will lose capital and will have to tighten the credit screws on consumer borrowers even more.

We may be headed for another bruising round of real-estate and MBS-related depreciation. Even a mild financial-markets setback could put the economy and the stock market onto the canvas for a 10-count. Further pummelling of shaky consumer confidence accompanied by a couple of major bank failures could easily send the U.S. market down for the financial-system equivalent of a TKO.

Taxpayers, always the lowly cornermen holding the spit buckets, are already in place with the safety nets. We will catch the FHA loans because we insure private lenders against subprime borrowers with no skin in the game. We then will have to catch the buyers of Ginnie Maes, because we guarantee those MBS securities. And we will be forced to catch the falling banks, because we already insure depositors through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC).

Perhaps our ultimate fate is that of the permanently punchdrunk veteran boxer, who rues his decision to stay in the game, realizing that he fought “one bout too many.” If that’s the case, that “one bout too many” could be Subprime Crisis II, arranged by the very market referees whose job it was to protect us from such beatings.

Source: How the Government is Setting Us Up for a Second Subprime Crisis

The FDIC currently insures bank depositors up to $250,000 – up from $100,000 prior to the financial crisis. So far this year, 81 banks have failed, costing the FDIC an estimated $21.5 billion.

And the situation is almost certainly going to get worse.

A Growing List of Troubled Banks

The FDIC reported yesterday (Thursday) that the number of distressed banks rose to the highest level in 15 years during the second quarter, thanks to an economic malaise that’s saddling banks with a growing level of bad loans.

The number of troubled banks rose to 416 at the end of June from 305 at the end of March. The FDIC hasn’t had that many banks on its “problem list” since June 1994, when there were 434, the agency said. Assets at these troubled institutions totaled $299.8 billion – the worst level since the end of 1993, according to the FDIC.

The FDIC’s insurance fund, as of March 31, was down to its last $13.5 billion. Bank failures in the second quarter cost the insurance fund an estimated $9.1 billion. These hits were mostly offset by an emergency special assessment of $6.2 billion and an additional $2.6 billion raised as part of the regular quarterly assessment on FDIC-insured banks.

The FDIC just took another hit due to the recent failure of Colonial Bank, which cost the fund an estimated $2.8 billion, and the failure last week of Guaranty Bank, which cost an estimated $3 billion. FDIC Chairman Sheila C. Bair is determined to not have an insolvent FDIC turn to the U.S. Treasury Department to draw on a $500 billion line of credit set up for just this purpose, although that move is clearly inevitable.

In a fatalistic twist of irony, however, the FDIC’s demand for another special assessment in the fourth quarter and another expected special assessment in the first quarter of 2010 may tip several more banks into failure.

Although there seems to be a desperate need for private equity capital to come running to the rescue, the reality unfortunately isn’t that simple.

A Disappointing Decision

As most all consumers and investors know, the FDIC only covers insured deposits. However, the ongoing cost of a busted bank becomes higher for the FDIC if the agency cannot merge that failed institution with a healthy player, or can’t sell it outright. When The FDIC can’t find a willing partner or buyer, the agency must instead manage the “unwinding” of every failed bank’s stockpile of illiquid and toxic assets. With so many more banks in trouble and so many fewer banks willing to acquire additional suspect assets, private equity firms have offered to step up and buy failed banks these professional investors believe can be turned around.

On July 9, the FDIC published and sought comments on its “Proposed Statement of Policy on Qualifications for Failed Bank Acquisitions.” The controversial proposed policy statement suggested tough terms and conditions under which the federal agency would be willing to sell failed banks to non-traditional buyers – specifically, private equity firms.

A total of 61 comments were filed during the 30-day comment period – most of them from private-equity firms, their lawyers, financial-services trade associations and lobbyists. There were also comments from academics, four U.S. senators and six individuals. The FDIC also received 3,190 form-letter comments in support of the controversial proposal.

The FDIC issued its final decision on the matter on Wednesday. The new version was much weaker, once again underscoring the federal government’s proclivity for weakening banking regulations – a willingness we’ve repeatedly warned will have dire consequences for the U.S. financial system, as well as for the broader economy.

These alterations are setting the stage for an escalation in bank failures. The real losers will once again be the U.S. taxpayers, who will end up footing the bill for the FDIC’s failure to take a tough stand.

How much weaker were the new regulations, when compared with the earlier proposals? In one instance, instead of the initially proposed requirement that new investors maintain a 15% Tier 1 common equity capital ratio – three times what traditional bank holding companies are required to maintain – the new entry hurdle is only a 10% ratio.

Private equity firms will be spared the requirement of other bank holding companies and will not be called upon as a “source of strength,” should their investment in a bank need shoring up.

Bank holding companies have to make their resources available if their banking operation requires support. But private equity companies don’t want to expose their vast pools of capital to any one investment. Just as Cerberus Capital Management LP refused to put any more money into its failed Chrysler LLC investment – leaving taxpayers to bail it out – firms are loathe to be put into a position to support a bank holding with anything more than what was deemed as a suitable capital investment at the outset.

The FDIC granted other compromises granted in favor of private equity buyers. For instance, the agency spared them from having to cross-guarantee their portfolio-bank investments – unless they owned at least 80% of two or more banks.

Getting “Real” About Private Equity

Private equity interests certainly didn’t get everything they wanted. For one thing, the final policy statement prohibits “insider” and “affiliated” loan transactions and strips firms of using a controversial “silo” structure to obfuscate ownership and control positions.

The final policy statement reads like the painful enunciation of a split decision in a controversial heavyweight title fight. The valiant efforts Bair, the FDIC chairman, to keep the howling wolves of private equity at the door and out of the banking henhouse were ultimately undermined by the rapidly dwindling coffers of the Deposit Insurance Fund, which brought the FDIC to its knees. The compromises in the final policy statement grant the private-equity crowd a lot of what it was lobbying for while only momentarily sparing the FDIC the embarrassment of being knocked out.

But make no mistake. That day of reckoning is on its way. And not even the entrepreneurially gifted private-equity set will be able to keep that from happening.

Let’s be clear: We’re not saying that the private-equity sector is made up of angels (angel investors, yes, but outright angels, no way). Indeed, as we’ve demonstrated in past columns, the private-equity set is actually a group of uber-capitalists who are hell-bent on turning their gargantuan ambitions into extraordinary wealth – and who aren’t above shopping for regulators or hardballing Congress to get what they want.

Private-equity players demanded – and got – the FDIC to agree to share whatever losses they might incur, whereby the government (meaning taxpayers) must bear the brunt of the losses incurred when risky loan pools are acquired.

In all fairness to private equity firms, acquiring banks also have loss-sharing agreements with the FDIC. But they are regulated entities and private equity firms are not. Nor will private equity firms willingly become regulated in order to buy banks.

And there are actually some advantages in having private equity investors acquire failed banks – including a host of issues that critics describe as “self-serving,” grousing that the private-equity benefits come only at a cost to taxpayers.

Given the new set of rules, private equity firms can swoop in and pick up failed banks by banding together and dividing the equity commitment and investment liability assumed upon purchase. If there is no recourse against other private equity firm assets or even any cross-guarantees against other acquired banks, unless they are 80% owned, the consortiums cannot be called upon and certainly not relied upon to be a “source of strength” for their depository, taxpayer-backed portfolio banks.

Regardless of any rules on self-dealing, as sure as “bank” is a four letter word, private equity firms will find a legal way to lend from their taxpayer-backed banks to leverage their other portfolio companies and extract their usual exorbitant fees. If they don’t lend to their own portfolio companies, they will surely lend to other private equity firms’ portfolio companies in a modified version of the “club deals” that bind them together. These firms have a mutual interest in generating deal fees and in controlling their lucrative franchises.

A Glimpse of What’s to Come

The problem with banks is that they became too leveraged. When they couldn’t amass assets on their books, against which they had to set aside “reserves,” they established “off-balance-sheet” vehicles to acquire leveraged pools of assets. They were leveraged inside and out.

But now the originators of the leveraged-buyout business model want to control taxpayer-backed banks, to apply another round of leverage to already crippled banks in order to squeeze out all the profits possible. Although this comes at a cost to duped and already drained taxpayers, regulators, legislators and the American public would be foolish to expect anything else from the private equity crowd. If the FDIC thinks it has a problem now, wait until the next implosion of leveraged banks happens.

In a comment letter to the FDIC on the original policy proposal, the Private Equity Council, an industry advocacy group, without recognizing the irony of its comment, suggested that mandating higher capital ratios for private equity buyers of failed banks would actually increase the risk at those banks because their owners would essentially have to employ more leverage to generate sufficient returns to meet the higher capital standards – while still generating returns high enough to satisfy the investors in their private-equity funds.

If that’s not an advance look at the next round of financial-sector problems we could be facing, we are deluding ourselves.

Private equity should be allowed to buy banks, but should also be held to a higher standard. They have a proven record of success at leveraging companies when they have access to cheap funding, and they also have a record of spectacular failures that resulted from their leverage. The last thing that American banks need – especially right now – is a hyper-aggressive management that leverages them to the hilt in order to generate “acceptable” rates of return for a select group of private investors.

Unfortunately, we’ve once again placed ourselves in a position where the viable solutions to the problems that were created will end up causing an entirely new set of problems – problems that always seem to provide a benefit to the old crony network while leaving the battered U.S. taxpayer as the ultimate victim.

We have no one to blame but ourselves.

More town hall meetings and more vocal opposition to being duped and used by Wall Street would be a good place to start.

Source: Desperate for Capital, the FDIC Backs Away From Tougher Rules Governing Private Equity Purchases of Failed U.S. Banks