Unlike some stockpickers and newsletter analysts, who proudly trumpet all their winners, while shuffling the losers under the rug, I have no problem admitting when my calls go against me.

And to the delight of all the naysayers, this happened just a couple of days ago when gold prices shot to a record high. That triggered my sell-stop and, rather than let my pride come before a fall and hang on, it’s time to move on.

Don’t get me wrong, though… I’m still convinced that the yellow metal could suffer a correction for three main reasons…

• So far, inflation hasn’t reared its ugly head. If it stays in hiding much longer, disillusioned investors will probably head for the exits.
• If the U.S. economy recovers quicker than expected, investors will be inclined to abandon the safe haven of gold and reinvest in equities.
• The technicals point to a drop. The last four times gold spiked near or above $1,000 per ounce, it quickly (and sometimes precipitously) corrected.

However, giving into these convictions – and doubling down on gold – would mean abandoning two core investing disciplines that I swear by – position sizing and trailing-stops…

Have You Considered Using Trailing Stops & Position Sizing?

I know… you’ve heard about them countless times before. But indulge me for a moment, as I explain an aspect of both trailing stops and position sizing that you’ve probably never considered…

• When I speak at investment conferences, I always like to ask people to share their biggest loser. Heads go down and nary a hand rises.
• Conversely, when I ask them to share their biggest winner, it’s like I just offered free candy to an auditorium full of kindergarteners. Everyone’s hand shoots up and there’s a chorus of anxious, “Oohs!”

Nobody likes to talk about losing investments. Instead, we want to thump our chest over the latest 1,000% gainer. The reason for that is obvious, so let’s focus on the fear about talking about our losers.

Many investors turn their biggest loser into a total loss. Instead of employing a trailing-stop and exiting a trade as the price tumbles, they make it a long-term investment to save face. Or worse, they invest more at lower prices. Most times, the stock goes belly up and they lose even more.

Even the professionals can’t claim immunity here.

• For instance, take Bill Miller, the famous manager of the Legg Mason Value Trust Fund (LMVFX). Although Miller beat the S&P 500 for 15 consecutive years, he refused to man up to his mistakes when the market took a nosedive in 2008. He kept averaging down in stocks like Countrywide, Bear Stearns, Freddie Mac (NYSE:FRE), Merrill Lynch, Washington Mutual (OTC:WAMUQ) and AIG.
• He revealed the true depth of his arrogance when he was asked how he knew when to stop buying a falling stock. “When we can no longer get a quote,” he replied. In other words, the only price at which he was unwilling to buy more was zero.

Here’s my point…

Avoid Losses With A Position Sizing & Trailing Stop Discipline

When I joined The Oxford Club, I immediately stopped worrying about my losses. That’s because we religiously adhere to a 25% trailing-stop discipline and a position size of no more than 4% in any one investment. Thus, losses are always contained.

The beauty of such a simple, disciplined approach is two-fold…

• The results add up, decidedly on the plus side. Case in point: The independent Hulbert Financial Digest has ranked The Oxford Club newsletter (The Communiqué) among the top five in the nation. That’s based on 10-year returns, too.
• A trailing-stop and position sizing policy allow me to keep making bold calls without regret. The bolder they are, the smaller my position size.

For instance, for my short gold call, I only invested 2%. For a hypothetical $100,000 portfolio, that means investing  $2,000 and losing $500, or less than 1% of the total portfolio value.

Bottom line: I don’t ever let an investment turn into an unacceptable loss. And I never put too many eggs in one basket. Sure I might lose 25% here or 25% there, but when I keep my position sizes small, in the grand scheme of things, it’s no big deal.

Such a strategy leaves me with plenty of capital to re-deploy and keep gunslinging. And while gold didn’t work out, some other contrarian bets are already making up for the loss and then some.

• Take Sotheby’s (NYSE: BID), for example. Back in June, I advised readers to buy shares when everyone else believed the market for investing in fine art was going into a long hibernation. The fundamentals faltered, but they didn’t collapse. As a result, Sotheby’s rallied 68% from my entry point.
• Then there’s my recommendation last Thursday to buy into the beleaguered retail sector with hhgregg (NYSE: HGG). It’s up 5.7% since then.

If I take profits on both now, my misstep by shorting gold doesn’t even matter.

The Critical Component to a Disciplined Investment Approach: Accountability

But of course, a disciplined investment approach is useless without the critical component of accountability… In terms of position sizing, there’s only one person who can keep you honest: Yourself.

But when it comes to implementing trailing-stops, multiple options exist…

• A So-So Option: Enter the stop levels with your broker. However, this is not ideal. Market makers can manipulate prices to trigger these stops.
• A Better Option: Use a service like TradeStops (www.tradestops.com). For a nominal annual fee, it will alert you via text message and/or e-mail when your stocks hit their trailing-stops.
• The Best Option: Excuse my bias, but the best value for your money is The Oxford Club. We constantly remind you about position sizing and more importantly, notify you immediately when we hit a stop-loss or trailing-stop. And our members keep each other honest.

In addition, membership also comes with a constant stream of high quality, profitable recommendations. And they make up for the occasional downer, like my short gold recommendation! To find out more, take a few minutes to read our report on how it all works.

Good investing,

Louis Basenese

Source: Two Tips to Avoid Letting a Bad Stock Sucker-Punch You

Private equity is an asset class consisting of equity securities in operating companies that are not publicly traded.  The name “private equity”is the rechristened, kinder and more gentile label for what used to be known as leveraged buyouts, or LBOs. But make no mistake about it, while leverage may not be part of the name any more, it remains a big part of every private equity deal.

LBO firms, or “franchises”, as Henry Kravis, co-founder of Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. (KKR), likes to call his shop, acquire publicly traded operating companies. Then they streamline management and operations to increase profitability and hope to cash out through a merger, an outright sale of the company, or by taking the company public again through an initial public offering, or IPO.

Private equity firms are the debutante sisters of hedge funds. They raise huge pools of capital from pension funds, endowment funds, sovereign wealth funds, institutional investors and wealthy entrepreneurs. But while hedge funds buy and sell the stocks of companies they hope to profit from, private equity shops buy whole companies.

Generally, once a target is identified, an offer is made to buy a majority, or all of the stock of the company. The trick of the deal is to pay for the target by using as little equity capital as possible, and raising the remainder by actually having the target company borrow the required funds. Except for the private equity firm’s initial equity investment, the target company is essentially buying itself.

And if that isn’t enough of a trick, very often when the target is privatized, their new masters have the company borrow even more money so they can then pay themselves a dividend as a bonus for the good job they did in leveraging the company to the hilt so they can streamline it.

The leveraged buyout business has been around for a long time and it has worked very well for investors and the private investment bankers who make an extravagant living with other people’s money. In fact, the business was so successful it eventually led to its now very problematic fork in the road. The problem facing private equity is that their leveraged deals were at one time in such great demand that it became too easy to borrow too much money.

The result was that they chased too many deals, paid too much for targets, paid themselves too many dividends and fees, and now their portfolio companies are straining and collapsing under the weight of too much debt.

Act I: The Two Big Mistakes that Made Leveraging Possible

There are two elements that made massive borrowing possible.

The first was a ready supply of capital courtesy of the U.S. Federal Reserve’s easy money policy and low interest rates. The second was the ability of banks that lend money to acquired companies to pool those loans into securities called  collateralized loan obligations, or CLOs, and sell them off to investors. Banks and investors refer to this asset class as “leveraged loans.”

Since banks were able to sell off their leverage loans to investors they had plenty of recycled money to lend out again and again. Competition to lend out all that money put borrowers in an advantageous position, which they exploited.

Banks and non-bank lenders attach covenants to the loans they make. Typically, covenants dictate to borrowers what specific balance sheet requirements must be met and include debt-to-cash flow leverage ratios, limitations on the total amount of debt a company can carry, minimum equity provisions and other dictates that serve to secure collateral that is relied upon by lenders.

But, banks were so flush with money and so eager to lend that privately acquired companies, driven by their new private equity masters, proposed that the money they borrowed should not be encumbered by the protective covenants lenders are used to demanding. Hence the birth of “covenant-lite” loans.

Covenant-lite loans included insane “reverse covenants” that benefited the borrowers not the lenders.

Among other things, some borrowers demanded and got rights to:

• Increase debt-to-EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation, and Amortization) levels to 10:1.
• Freely substitute collateral.
• Have collateral “released” outright.
• Issue unsecured debt equal to the total amount of existing debt (if they hedged or effected swaps.
• Employ PIK (payment-in-kind) options, where instead of paying interest in cash they could substitute more debt.
• Employ PIK toggles, sometimes called “extendibles.”

PIK toggles (think of a toggle switch which is used to turn something on or off) let the borrower can roll interest payments into principal and extend the maturity, instead of making twice yearly cash payments. If that sounds like an option ARM mortgage, where borrowers can choose whether to pay the interest due, some part of it, or none of it, and roll unpaid interest into principal, it’s because it is the exact same borrower covenant.

It’s like déjà vu all over again.

Act II: With No Leverage Private Equity Deals Fall Apart

Junk, junk and more junk. When the music stopped and the credit crisis began last August, money and credit evaporated. Only then did it bother leveraged loan investors that the private equity guys were leveraging their private companies to pay themselves huge dividends – enough in many cases to repay the entire initial cash equity investment used to underpin the leveraged buyout of their targets. And only then did they realize that all the debt heaped onto these companies was going to drag many of them into bankruptcy.

At that point, investors simply stopped buying leveraged loans. And the net result is that banks may be sitting on over $150 billion of junk leveraged loans that they can’t place. They are taking hits to their balance sheets as they have to mark down these loans which were securitized and subject to mark-to-market accounting. And they are terrified that the recession will drive more of these leveraged companies into bankruptcy.

Thomson Reuters recently reported that 40 private equity companies have sought bankruptcy this year. According to Standard & Poor’s, of 86 S&P rated companies that defaulted this year, 53 of them were private equity related transactions. Linens ‘n Things which was taken private by Apollo Group Inc. went bankrupt. Sharper Image, Wickes Furniture and catalogue company Lillian Vernon, were all taken private by Sun Capital Partners Inc., all of them are bankrupt. Mervyn’s which was taken private by Sun Capital and Cerberus Capital Management LP. is bankrupt.

Also in the clutches of the three-headed-dog from Hades, Cerberus, is Chrysler LLC; Chrysler Financial, GMAC LLC (General Motors Acceptance Corporation) (GMA) – 51% owned by Cerberus – and Residential Capital LLC, a GMAC company. By most accounting standards, all of these companies are, if not already, close to insolvent.

GateHouse Media Inc. (OTC: GHS), 40% owned by Fortress Investment Group LLC (FIG), is at risk of debt default and may likely be headed for bankruptcy. Former Lazard Ltd. (LAZ) deputy chairman and  media honcho Steve Rattner’s Quadrangle Capital Partners may lose control of American Media Inc., publisher of The National Enquirer and Star magazine, as he battles with bondholders and may also lose portfolio company Alpha Media Group Inc., publisher of Maxim magazine. These few examples of failures are just the tip of the iceberg.

Then, of course, there’s the pure genius of PE firms coming to the rescue of troubled banks. But, TPG Capital (formerly Texas Pacific Group) doesn’t look so genius with its $7 billion investment in Washington Mutual Inc. (OTC: WAMUQ) which was wiped out in a matter of five months.

It’s understandable that bankrupt target companies are suing. Mervyn’s, for example, filed a 57 page suit against its lead dog master Cerberus, alleging fraud among other charges. But what is not as easily understandable is that some other lawsuits have the potential to turn the game viciously against the private equity firms and all the major bank lenders. I’m not talking about the deals that got done; I’m talking about the deals that didn’t get done because private equity firms walked away or otherwise tried to dissolve pending deals.

Apollo Management asked a Delaware Court of Chancery to kill a transaction it had entered into to have one of its portfolio companies, Hexion Specialty Chemicals Inc., buy NYSE listed Huntsman Corp.(HUN) for $6.5 billion. Huntsman sued and won. The judge issued a ruling that Hexion “knowingly and intentionally” breached parts of the merger agreement and ordered the company to complete the deal. Not only is Apollo being forced to go through with the deal, the ruling allows Huntsman to seek damages from Apollo. Apollo is now suing the banks it had lined up to provide debt financing for the deal.

There are hundreds of billions of dollars of abandoned deals that may now be re-visited in courts around the country. The implication for private equity firms and banks is potentially staggering.

Here are a few of the larger failed deals that resulted from a lack of debt investor interest:

• Cerberus’ failed  deal for United Rentals Inc. (URI).
• The Blackstone Group LP’s (BX) failed deal for Alliance Data Systems Corp. (ADS).
• J.C. Flowers’ failed deal for SLM Corp. (SLM), also known as Sallie Mae.
• And Appaloosa Management in conjunction with Harbinger Capital Partners, Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. (MER), Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS), and UBS Securities LLC’s failed financing of Delphi Corp. (OTC: DPHIQ) to take it out of bankruptcy, for which they are being sued for fraud and conspiracy to “derail” the bankruptcy plan; a serious situation because interfering with a bankruptcy is a federal crime.

The amount of leverage involved in private equity deals is a problem if banks aren’t eager, or able, to supply needed loans. But that alone isn’t scary. What is scary is the effort private equity firms are making to actually get into the banking business themselves.

Act III: Private Equity Seeks to Corrupt Banking System

There’s a lot of pressure on banks to raise capital and there’s a lot of pressure being exerted by the private equity guys to lean on the Fed and U.S. Treasury to bend the rules to let them play in that sandbox. Pushing hard from the private equity camp are Randall Quarles, Managing Director of Carlyle Group Ltd. and a former senior Treasury official and none other than the former Treasury Secretary himself, Chairman of Cerberus Capital Management, John Snow.

What the private equity guys want is the ability to buy into banks and control them. If they get their hands on the low cost deposit-based capital at commercial banks, they’ll be unstoppable. How about having the piggy-bank, backed by taxpayers to leverage at will?

The prospect is frightening.

Right now there’s a limitation imposed on investors in Federal Deposit Insurance Company insured commercial banks. Once an investment exceeds 9.9% there must be an agreement with regulators to not “control or influence” management. If an investment exceeds 24.9% the investing entity must register as a Bank Holding Company, and subject itself to all necessary transparencies called for by regulators and the Fed. In addition, the holding company is forced to serve as a “source of strength”, meaning its capital will be called upon to support its bank.

Private equity guys do not want any part of either of those restrictions. They don’t want their business looked through nor do they want their capital encumbered. The private equity firms are sitting on hundreds of billions of dollars of fresh money raised recently. While it may seem reasonable and expedient to allow private equity capital to be infused into ailing banks, any compromise of existing regulations would result in the creation of the mother of all moral hazard enablers.

There’s no doubt that if the recession is as deep and as long as feared,, the continuing failure and bankruptcy of leveraged private equity portfolio companies will result in far greater unemployment, and in and of itself, has the potential to deepen the recession on an inordinate scale.

There’s too much greed and far too much power in the form of private equity firms. Their greed has encumbered American banks with significant CLO and leveraged loan exposure and encumbered American companies with too much debt. Now, they threaten to undermine sound banking (wait a minute, that’s already been done by the banks themselves) by investing capital into them in order to control them.

Until concrete underpinnings replace the glue and duct tape that’s holding together the banking system, and until leverage is wrung out of companies, investment vehicles and households, banks and private equity firms will both be on a slippery slope.

Source: Overly Leveraged Private Equity Deals Add to Unemployment and Deepen Recession

PNC Financial Services Group Inc. (PNC), which will get $7.7 billion from Treasury’s Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), is using that cash infusion to help finance its $5.2 billion buyout of embattled National City Corp. (NCC).

And U.S. Bancorp (USB), which received a $6.6 billion capital infusion from that same rescue package, has acquired two California lenders – Downey Savings & Loan Association, F.A., a subsidiary of Downey Financial Corp. (DSL), and PFF Bank & Trust, a subsidiary of PFF Bancorp Inc. (OTC: PFFB). U.S. Bank agreed to assume the first $1.6 billion in losses from the two, but says anything beyond that amount is subject to a loss-sharing deal it struck with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC).

While the Treasury Department’s investment of more than $250 billion in U.S. financial institutions has been billed as a strategy that will bolster the health of the banking system and also jump-start lending, buyout deals such as these three show that the recapitalization plan has actually had a much different result – one that’s left whipsawed U.S. investors and lawmakers alike feeling burned, an ongoing
Money Morning investigation continues to show.

Those billions have touched off a banking-sector version of “Let’s Make a Deal,” in which the biggest U.S. banks are using government money to get even bigger. While that’s admittedly removing the smaller, weaker banks from the market – a possible benefit to consumers and taxpayers alike – this trend is also having a detrimental effect: It’s reducing the competition that’s benefited consumers and kept the explosion in banking fees from being far worse than it already is.

This all happens without any of the economic benefits that an actual increase in lending would have had. And it does nothing to address the billions worth of illiquid securities that remain on (or off) banks’ balance sheets – as the recent Citigroup Inc. (C) imbroglio demonstrates.

In fact, Treasury’s TARP program has even managed to create a potentially illegal tax loophole that grants banks a tax-break windfall of as much as $140 billion. Lawmakers are furious – but possibly powerless, afraid that a full-scale assault on the tax change could cause already-done deals to unravel, in turn causing investor confidence to do the same.

One could even argue that since this first bailout (the $700 billion TARP initiative) has fueled takeovers – and not lending – the government had no choice but to roll out the more-recent $800 billion stimulus plan that was aimed at helping consumers and small businesses – a move that may spur lending and spending, but that still adds more debt to the already-sagging federal government balance sheet.

At the end of the day, these buyout deals are bad ones no matter how you evaluate them, says R. Shah Gilani, a retired hedge fund manager and expert on the U.S. credit crisis who is the editor of the Trigger Event Strategist, which identifies trading opportunities emanating from such financial-crisis “aftershocks” as this buyout binge.

“Why in the name of capitalism are taxpayers being fleeced by banks that are being given our money to grow their businesses with the further backstop of more of our money having to be thrown to the FDIC when they fail?” Gilani asked. “Consolidation does not mean that bad loans and illiquid securities are somehow merged out of existence. It means that they are being acquired under the premise that a larger, more consolidated depositor base will better be able to bear the weight of those bad assets. What in heaven’s name prevents depositors from exiting when the merged banks continue to experience massive losses and write-downs? The answer to that question would be … nothing.”

Lining Up for Deal Money

In launching TARP, U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry M. “Hank” Paulson Jr. said the government’s goal was to restore public confidence in the U.S. financial services sector – especially banks – so private investors would be willing to advance money to banks and banks, in turn, would be willing to lend.

“Our purpose is to increase the confidence of our banks, so that they will deploy, not hoard, the capital,” Paulson said.

Whatever Treasury’s actual intent, the reality is that banks are already sniffing out buyout targets, while snuffing out lending – and the TARP money is the reason for both.

Fueled by this taxpayer-supplied capital, the wave of consolidation deals is “absolutely” going to accelerate, says Louis Basenese, a mergers-and-acquisitions expert who is also the editor of The Takeover Trader newsletter. “When it comes to M&A, there’s always a pronounced ‘domino effect.’ Consolidation breeds more consolidation as industry leaders conclude they have to keep acquiring in order to remain competitive.”

Indeed, banking executives have been quite open about their expansionist plans during media interviews, or during conference calls related to quarterly earnings.

Take BB&T Corp. (BBT). During a conference call that dealt with the bank’s third-quarter results, Chief Executive Officer John A. Allison IV said the Winston-Salem, N.C.-based bank “will probably participate” in the government program. Allison didn’t say whether the federal money would induce BB&T to boost its lending. But he did say the bank would likely accept the money in order to finance its expansion plans, The Wall Street Journal said.

“We think that there are going to be some acquisition opportunities – either now or in the near future – and this is a relatively inexpensive way to raise capital [to pay the buyout bill],” Allison said during the conference call.

And BB&T is hardly alone. Zions Bancorporation (ZION), a Salt Lake City-based bank that’s been squeezed by some bad real-estate loans, recently said it would be getting $1.4 billion in federal money. CEO Harris H. Simmons said the infusion would enable Zions to boost “prudent” lending and keep paying its dividend – albeit at a reduced rate.

Sounds good, right? Not so fast. During a conference call about earnings, Zions Chief Financial Officer Doyle L. Arnold said any lending increase wouldn’t be dramatic. Besides, Arnold said, Zions will also use the money “to take advantage of what we would expect will be some acquisition opportunities, including some very low risk FDIC-assisted transactions in the next several quarters.”

Buyouts Already Accelerating

With all the liquidity the world’s governments and central banks have injected into the global financial system, the pace of worldwide deal making is already accelerating. Global deal volume for the year has already passed the $3 trillion level – only the fifth time that’s happened, although it took about three months longer for that to happen this year than it did a year ago.

At a time when the global financial crisis – and the accompanying drop-off in available deal capital (either equity or credit) – has caused about $150 billion in already-announced deals to be yanked off the table since Sept. 1, liquidity from the U.S. and U.K. governments has ignited record levels of financial-sector deal making.

According to Dealogic, government investments in financial institutions has reached $76 billion this year – eight times as much as in all of 2007, which was the previous record year. And that total doesn’t include the $250 billion in TARP money, or other deals that Paulson & Co. are helping engineer – JPMorgan Chase & Co.’s (JPM) buyouts of The Bear Stearns Cos. and Washington Mutual Inc. (WAMUQ), for instance.

If You Can’t Beat ‘em… Buy ‘em?

When it comes to identifying possible buyout targets, M&A experts such as Basenese say there are some very clear frontrunners.

“I’d put regional banks with solid footprints in the Southeast high on the list, and for two reasons,” Basenese said. “First, demographics point to stronger growth [in this region] as retirees migrate to warmer climates – and bring their assets along for the trip. Plus, the Southeast is largely un-penetrated by large national banks. An acquisition of a regional bank like SunTrust Banks Inc. (STI) would provide a distinct competitive advantage.”

There’s a very good reason that smaller players may be next: Big banks and small banks have the easiest times – relatively speaking, of course – of raising capital. It’s toughest for the regional players. Big banks can tap into the global financial markets for cash, while the very small – and typically, highly local – banks can raise money from local investors.

The afore-mentioned stealthy shift in the U.S. Tax Code actually gives big U.S. banks a potential windfall of as much as $140 billion, says Gilani, the credit crisis expert and Trigger Event Strategist editor. What does this tax-change do? By acquiring a failed bank whose only real value is the losses on its books, the successful suitor would basically then be able to use the acquired bank’s losses to offset its own gains and thus avoid paying taxes.

“While everyone was panicking, the Treasury Department slipped through a ruling that allows banks who acquire other banks to fully write-off all the acquired bank’s bad debts,” Gilani says. “For 22 years, the law was such that if you were to buy a company that had losses, say, of  $1 billion, you couldn’t just take that loss against your own $1 billion profit and tell Uncle Sam, ‘Gee, now my loss offsets my profit, so I don’t have any profit, and I don’t owe you any tax.’ It was a recipe for tax evasion that demanded an appropriate law that only allows limited write-offs over an extended period of years.”

Given these incentives, who will be doing the buying? Clearly, the biggest U.S.-based banks will be the main hunters. But The Takeover Trader’s Basenese says that even foreign banks will be on the prowl for cheap U.S. banking assets.

Basenese also believes that Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS) and Morgan Stanley (MS) will be “big spenders.” Each will use TARP funds to help accelerate its transformation from an investment bank into a bank holding company.

The changeover will require each company to build up a big base of deposits. And the best way to do that is to buy other banks, Basenese says.

“One thing [the wave of deals] does is to restore confidence in the sector,” Basenese said. “It will go a long way in convincing CEOs that it’s safe to use excess capital to fund acquisitions, and to grow, instead of using it to defend against a proverbial run on the bank.”

Not everyone agrees with that assessment. Investors who play the merger game correctly will do well. But the game itself won’t necessarily whip the industry into championship form, Gilani says.

“While consolidation, instead of outright collapses, in the banking industry may serve to relieve the FDIC of its burden to make good on failed banks, it in no way guarantees fewer failures,” he said. “In fact, it may only serve to guarantee, in some cases, even larger failures.”

Source: Billions in U.S. Bank Rescue Funds are Fueling Buyouts Worldwide – Instead of Lending at Home

Such concerns may be warranted in the short-term. But in the long run, deflation won’t be the challenge we face.

Thanks to an overly aggressive central bank, and more than $1.5 trillion in U.S. Treasury Department bailout programs – as well as other factors related to the ongoing global financial crisis – inflation will be the problem that ultimately bedevils us.

As long as oil and commodity prices drop, the PPI and CPI indices, which include oil and commodity prices, also will fall. Such a decline, however, does not constitute deflation; it is simply a one-time price adjustment. This is particularly true if most of the commodity-price declines are simply a reversal of excessive increases that had occurred over the previous year. That’s essentially what we’ve been seeing here.

However, the deflation believers currently have an additional argument: With output in the United States plunging, and the stock market down around 50% from its October 2007 peak, there are very few pressures pushing prices upward. For instance:

• Manufacturers, facing sudden sales declines, cut prices in an attempt to clear inventories or engage in foreign sales drives, intensifying price competition in all markets.
• Nobody is pushing for wage increases – folks are all too pleased to keep their jobs, and their employers know this.
• So while the U.S. economy is declining sharply, prices will not increase significantly and may even decline.

But even this will not turn into deflation, unless the recession is exceptionally prolonged. Currently, output and employment are dropping very sharply, as is the stock market. This cannot continue for more than a few months – the latest being perhaps late spring of the New Year. As output declines, forces pushing it towards recovery will become stronger and equilibrium will appear.
Provided world trade remains open healthy – and doesn’t plunge by 60%, as it did during the horrid stretch from 1929 to 1932 – we will avoid a second Great Depression, so the bottom in output cannot be all that far down, and will be reached relatively quickly.

Since inflation was running at more than 5.0% when output began its steep descent, it is unlikely to have turned significantly negative by the time the economy reaches bottom. After all, the so-called “core” PPI rose at a rapid clip of 0.4% (equivalent to 5.0% per annum) even in October, while the Cleveland Fed’s “median” CPI, which smoothes out fluctuations, rose by 0.1% in October and 3.2% over the past year.

Once the bottom has been reached, the excess liquidity that has been created over the last few months through the various bailouts – such the Treasury Department’s $700 billion Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), which is fueling bank takeovers, and not expansionary lending, and the follow-on $800 billion credit-market stimulus unveiled late last month – will combine with the huge federal budget deficit to spur inflation. By that time, discounting will have become much less prevalent, as the most aggressive discounters will have gone out of business and inventory excesses will have been worked off. Costs will have increased, since many producers will be operating well below capacity.  And the excess money supply will push up inflation.

This time, there will be no surges of foreign competition restraining price increases – Chinese producers are currently suffering high inflation in both wages and prices, so their sales prices are increasing fast.

To estimate the inflation rate we might see, you can look at money supply growth over the past year. The St. Louis Fed’s M2 money stock, the broadest money supply growth now reported by the U.S. Federal Reserve, has increased by 10% over the past year, while the St. Louis Fed’s Money of Zero Maturity (MZM), the nearest we can get to the old M3, has increased by 7.4%.

Both those rates are far higher than the increase in nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In fact, money supply has been increasing about 65% faster than GDP since 1995, which is when former U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan began to overly relax monetary policy. In the most recent two months, MZM has risen only modestly, at a 3.1% annual rate, but M2 has risen much more rapidly, at a 20.6% annual rate. (The difference between the two figures reflects quirks produced by the various bankruptcies and bailouts – for example Washington Mutual Inc. (OTC: WAMUQ), nominally a “thrift,” has been taken over by Bank of America Corp, (BAC), a bank).

In any case, it seems likely that inflation in the 7%-10% range lies in our future once output stabilizes. The deflationists here have a huge problem: Their view of falling prices is in incompatible with swiftly rising money supply, so only a sharp fallback in money supply, which we are not seeing, would make deflation plausible.

The Fed has been blamed so widely for not expanding money supply fast enough during the Great Depression, that it is showing every sign of making the opposite error now.

If inflation does return with renewed force, we need to invest accordingly. One way of doing so would to use Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS). TIPS yields have recently risen, as investors have focused on deflation. Indeed the 10-year TIPS currently yields 3.11%, only 0.08% lower than the 10-year conventional Treasury, so the market is saying inflation will average 0.08% over the next 10 years. That’s nonsense, and such a mis-pricing makes TIPS an attractive investment, even though conventional Treasuries are vulnerable.

Another investment that benefits from inflation is gold, which has declined in price, albeit less than oil, and is currently selling around $770 per ounce. If inflation is expected to take off, gold prices will rise sharply, and a gold price of $1,500 per ounce is by no means out of the question. The most efficient way to buy gold is through the SPDR Gold Shares ETF (GLD).

Source: Why Fed Policies and Treasury Department Bailouts Will Lead to Inflation Rather Than Deflation

This from Money Morning:

When federal banking regulators last week seized the Houston-based Franklin Bank SSB (FBTX), it became the 18th bank failure this year amid the ongoing credit crisis. With total assets of $5.1 billion and total deposits of $3.7 billion, Franklin wasn’t the largest bank failure this year – that honor belongs to IndyMac Bancorp Inc. (OTC: IDMCQ), which had more than $30 billion in estimated assets when it was seized by U.S. banking regulators in July. At the time, IndyMac was also the third-largest bank failure in U.S. history, reaching all the way back to 1934, U.S. News & World Report said at the time.

That begs the question: Is your bank safe? And perhaps a second question: Why should you care? After all, aren’t deposits guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC)? And weren’t the limits on covered deposits raised from $100,000 to $250,000 as part of the $700 billion banking bailout deal?

Those all are true points. So long as we continue to see a bank failure here and another one there, everything should be copacetic.

But here’s the thing: By the end of 2009, about 110 U.S. banks with assets of more than $850 billion will fail – and that could cost the FDIC as much as $200 billion more than it has, says Christopher Whalen, co-founder of the Los Angeles-based Institutional Risk Analytics, a risk-management and consulting firm with an expertise in the financial-services industry.

Most banks are fine, IRA says. But even industry insiders say the banking business is in for some rough times.

“It’s not going to be Armageddon,” Mark Vaughan, an economist and an assistant vice president for banking supervision and regulation at the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, told Bloomberg Markets magazine recently. “But it’s going to be bad.”

If bank failures accelerate, and the FDIC insurance fund goes bust, there will probably be a taxpayer bailout. But no one knows what form that could take or what the payout ratio might be. And industry experts do expect dozens of banks to fail in the months to come.

So why take the chance?

You shouldn’t. But how can you tell if your bank could be one of them?

Ironically, if you look to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC) for guidance – as most investors do right now – you won’t have a clue. That’s because its list of so-called “troubled institutions” is a closely guarded secret. The FDIC will tell you that 117 banks were on the list recently, up 30% from 90 at the end of the first quarter. And, in its desire to be ever so helpful, the agency also will tell you that the combined assets of troubled banks recently rose to $78 billion, a jump of 200% from only $26 billion at the close of the first quarter. Capital-loss provisions rose 240% to $50.2 billion.

But the FDIC won’t tell you – no matter how politely you ask – which institutions are most at risk (nor which are the healthiest) even though the government has this information at its fingertips. The FDIC says that it maintains this secrecy to prevent a run on troubled banks and enhance the overall stability of the banking community.

To me that seems an awful lot like asking investors to buy insurance after they’ve crashed their car.

So, we’ve got to turn to other sources in an effort to protect our capital.

One of our favorites is the IRA Bank Industry Stress Index published by Whalen and his colleagues at Institutional Risk Analytics. What makes the IRA Stress Index so compelling is that it’s based on the FDIC’s own data. That means it’s sort of like a financial X-ray that allows you to see what’s really under the hood – even though the government won’t tell you.

“Problems in the financial industry are of a scale that most people simply can’t imagine,” Whalen says. “Existing ratings and research coverage are clearly inadequate. That means we’ve got to come up with new ways to look at bank safety and soundness – particularly when it comes to increasing consumer awareness of transparency. And safety.”

Martin Hutchinson, a fellow editor here at Money Morning and a 30-year veteran of the banking industry, agrees, noting that “knowledge, after all, is power. Particularly when consumers are caught in the middle like they are now.”

Although this financial intelligence originally was designed for institutions trying to make sense of the FDIC’s database, IRA recently created a personal report that allows individual investors to X-ray their own banks. Available for $50, the report classifies data into six broad categories at combine to create what IRA calls the “Key Safety and Soundness Indicators:”

• An overall “Stress Rating.”
• Return on Equity (ROE).
• Loan defaults.
• Capital.
• Lending capacity.
• Efficiency.

In contrast to other free services that simply provide a numerical grade or a star ranking without much in the way of helpful context, IRA provides an industry benchmark for each category so that investors can make “apples-to-apples” comparisons between banks. It also helps investors judge for themselves how risky any U.S. financial institution tracked by the FDIC actually is – or isn’t.

Whalen notes that the IRA model frequently provides early warnings, too. In the early months of 2006, for instance, he noted that the “Overall Industry Banking Stress Index began climbing at a time when most of Wall Street was in denial.”

Pointing to a sample report on Washington Mutual Inc. (OTC: WAMUQ), which he shared with Money Morning, Whalen said that, “in June 2008, just before Uncle Sam crashed WaMu’s party, the beleaguered bank had an Overall Stress Rating of 21.6 – versus an industry average of 1.4.”

In other words, according to IRA’s calculations, WaMu was more than 10 times riskier – which equates to more than a full order of magnitude – than the average bank. WaMu has since been purchased by JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM).

Obviously, WaMu is hardly alone. And it won’t be the last bank to fail.

According to Whalen, the IRA Overall Industry Banking Stress Index is still rising, which is why as many as 110 banks are at risk of failure.

But individual investors no longer have to fly blind, for they now have a tool to gauge whether their bank is likely to be on the FDIC’s watch list.
To find out more, please click here.

Source: Credit Crisis Safety Plays: Banking Ratings Report Can Provide Peace of Mind and Warn You if Your Bank is Weak

This from Money Morning:

While the U.S. government’s plan to invest $250 billion into U.S. financial institutions has been billed as a strategy that will bolster the health of the banking system and also jump-start lending, the recapitalization plan is likely to have a secondary effect – one that whipsawed U.S. taxpayers likely won’t be very happy to learn about.

Those billions are a virtual lock to set off a merger tsunami in which the biggest banks use taxpayer money to get bigger – admittedly removing the smaller, weaker banks from the market, but ultimately also reducing the competition that benefited consumers and kept the explosion in banking fees from being far worse than it already is.

One last point: Experts say that takeovers financed by the government infusions are likely to have less of a beneficial impact on the economy than an actual increase in lending levels would have. And because so much of this money will be used for buyouts, the reduction in the benchmark Federal Funds target rate announced yesterday (Wednesday) by central bank policymakers will likely do very little to actually spur lending, experts say.

Fueled by this taxpayer-supplied capital, the wave of consolidation deals is “absolutely” going to accelerate, Louis Basenese, a mergers-and-acquisitions (M&A) expert and the editor of The Takeover Trader newsletter, told Money Morning.

“When it comes to M&A, there’s always a pronounced ‘domino effect.’ Consolidation breeds more consolidation as industry leaders conclude they have to keep acquiring in order to remain competitive.”

Lining Up for Deal Money

Late last week, the Pittsburgh-based PNC Financial Services Group Inc. (NYSE:PNC) became the first U.S. bank to make use of the government’s Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), announcing plans to purchase the beleaguered National City Corp. (NYSE:NCC) for $5.2 billion. To help finance the purchase, PNC will sell $7.7 billion worth of preferred stock and warrants to the U.S. Treasury Department, as part of that department’s bank-recapitalization program.

With regards to that program, U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry M. “Hank” Paulson recently said – yet again – that the government’s goal was to restore the public’s confidence in the U.S. financial services sector – especially banks – so that private investors would be willing to advance money to banks and banks, in turn, would be willing to lend, The Wall Street Journal reported.

“Our purpose is to increase the confidence of our banks, so that they will deploy, not hoard, the capital,” Paulson said last week.

Whatever the Treasury Department’s actual intent, the reality is that banks are already sniffing out buyout targets, thanks to the TARP money. Indeed, they’ve been quite open about it during conference calls related to quarterly earnings, or in media interviews.

Take the Winston-Salem, N.C.-based BB&T Corp. (NYSE:BBT). During a conference call that dealt with the bank’s third-quarter results, Chief Executive Officer John A. Allison IV said the Winston-Salem, N.C.-based bank “will probably participate” in the bailout program, accepting federal infusions. Allison didn’t say whether the federal money would induce BB&T to boost its lending. But he did say the bank would probably accept the money in order to finance its expansion plans, The Wall Street Journal said.

“We think that there are going to be some acquisition opportunities – either now or in the near future – and this is a relatively inexpensive way to raise capital [to pay the buyout bill],” Allison said during the conference call.

Talk about brazen. However, he’s not alone. For instance, there’s also Zions Bancorporation (NASDAQ:ZION), a Salt Lake City-based bank that’s feeling the pain due to losses from bad real-estate loans. On Tuesday, Zions announced it would be receiving $1.4 billion in capital from the Treasury Department – cash it would use to boost lending and keep paying a dividend, albeit at a reduced rate.

“As a strong regional bank with a major focus on financing small and middle-market businesses, we are pleased to have this additional capital to better serve the lending needs of customers throughout the Western United States,” Chairman and CEO Harris H. Simmons said. “We expect to deploy this new capital in the form of prudent lending in the markets we serve. This new lending will be good for our country’s economy, our customers and our company.”

However, during a recent earnings conference call, Zions Chief Financial Officer Doyle L. Arnold said that while new capital might allow it to boost lending, the increase wouldn’t necessarily be a dramatic one. The Journal said. Besides, Zions will also use the money “to take advantage of what we would expect will be some acquisition opportunities, including some very low risk FDIC-assisted transactions in the next several quarters.”

Buyouts Already Accelerating

The reality is that – with all the liquidity the world’s governments and central banks have injected into the global financial system – the global game of “Let’s Make a Deal” has already become a reality.

Indeed, as WSJ.com reported a week ago, global deal volume for the year has already passed the $3 trillion level – only the fifth time that’s happened, although it took about three months longer this year than it did a year ago.

This time around, the new kings of deal making aren’t such highly compensated “Masters of the Universe” as The Blackstone Group (NYSE:BX) LP’s Stephen A. Schwarzman, or KKR & Co. LP’s Henry R. Kravis, The Journal’s blog reported. Instead, they are the much-lower-paid – but decidedly more powerful – civil servants of the U.S. and U.K. governments: Treasury Secretary Paulson, U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, U.K. Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling, the Web site stated.

At a time when the global financial crisis – and the accompanying drop-off in available deal capital (either equity or credit) – has caused about $150 billion in already-announced deals to be yanked off the table since Sept. 1, liquidity from the U.S. and U.K. governments have ignited record levels of financial sector deal making.

According to Dealogic, government investments in financial institutions has reached $76 billion this year – eight times as much as in all of 2007, which was the previous record year. And that total doesn’t include the $125 billion the U.S. government is investing in the large U.S. banks as part of its rescue package, the similar amount it may invest in smaller banks, or other deals that the feds are helping engineer (JPMorgan Chase & Co.’s (NYSE:JPM) buyouts of The Bear Stearns Cos. and Washington Mutual Inc. (WAMUQ) are two such examples).

When the dust settles on this buyout boom, we may well have a record in hand that’s even less beatable than Joe DiMaggio’s 56-game hitting streak. That’s because with the Fed, the U.K. and other governments and central banks doling out the capital, there’s no financial-sector equivalent of Kenny Keltner to bring this buyout fest to an abrupt close. That means that the “hits” – the buyout deals – will just keep coming.
If You Can’t Beat ‘em… Buy ‘em?

When it comes to identifying possible buyout targets, M&A experts such as The Takeover Trader’s Basenese say there are some very clear frontrunners.

“I’d put regional banks with solid footprints in the Southeast high on the list, and for two reasons,” Basenese said. “First, demographics point to stronger growth [in this region] as retirees migrate to warmer climes – and bring their assets along for the trip. Plus, the Southeast is largely un-penetrated by large national banks. An acquisition of a regional bank like SunTrust Banks Inc. (NYSE:STI) would provide a distinct competitive advantage.”

With a lot of bigger deals already in the books, many analysts agree with Basenese’s assessment, and are now watching to see if regional banks will be the next to succumb to the dealmaker’s bid. Indeed, earlier this month, Matthew Schultheis, a senior analyst at Boenning & Scattergood Inc., told a reporter that he expected this to be a “trend that continues at least through the first half of ’09, unless some of these [companies] stabilize. It could even last beyond that.”

There’s a very good reason that smaller players may be next: Big banks and small banks have the easiest times – relatively speaking, of course – of raising capital. It’s toughest for the regional players. Big banks can tap into the global financial markets for cash, while the very small – and typically, highly local – banks can raise money from local investors. Regional banks have a tougher time, says Doug Landy, a partner in the U.S. banking practice of the law firm of Allen & Overy.

“A regional bank lacks both the international access and the local character,” Landy told The Associated Press.

Several big regional banks at least acknowledged the possibility of buyouts on recent earnings conference calls, The Journal reported.

The Cincinnati-based Fifth Third Bancorp (NYSE:FITB) talked about raising $1 billion in capital by selling non-core assets. Bank executives said that a difficult 2009 is “a view that continues to seem likely to us.” They confirmed discussions with a number of possible investors or asset-purchasers, and said they were “confident that an attractive transaction would be available to us as the opportunity and timing are appropriate including the ability to generate capital in excess of our original expectations.” Earlier this week, however, it announced that it was getting $3.4 billion in TARP funds, the Cleveland Plain Dealer newspaper reported.

Clearly, the bank isn’t thinking in terms of an outright sale, or at least doesn’t admit to that publicly.

One other potential buyout candidate includes Huntington Bancshares Inc. (NASDAQ:HBAN), a Columbus, Ohio-based regional that just received a $1.4 billion federal infusion of its own, the Plain Dealer said.

Who will be doing the buying? The Takeover Trader’s Basenese tells investors to “also look for banks with foreign ownership” to be on the prowl for acquisitions.

“Just like Spain’s Banco Santander SA (ADR: STD) [which earlier this month said it would buy the 76% of Philadelphia-based Sovereign Bancorp Inc. (NYSE:SOV) it didn’t already own for about $1.9 billion], foreign-based banks will likely jump at the opportunity to expand their U.S. presence at a discount,” Basenese said. “M&T Bank Corp. (NYSE:MTB) fits the bill, as Allied Irish Banks PLC (ADR: AIB) already owns a 24% stake.”

Then there’s the Minneapolis-based U.S. Bancorp (NYSE:USB), which is one of the few regionals still in a strong position. CEO Richard K. Davis has reportedly rejected the idea of buying large banks that are already in trouble and was asked if the new rescue plans might change his mind.

“It makes it a little easier to do those things,” Davis told The Journal. “But first and foremost, whether the capital is less expensive or the opportunity that TARP is present, we’ll continue to look at deals on an accretive basis where they make sense and where they would fit into this company’s long-term structure. So it would definitely make it more attractive, and so some of our positioning and our targets look more attractive and our valuation is easier now.”

There’s something else to consider, Davis said.

“To the extent that [a deal] has to hit all of the normal bellwether marks and the expectations we have for the near term and long term, it still has to be a good deal. So it doesn’t really change our philosophy, but it does make it easier to find our way to partnerships that might be more accretive sooner.”

Basenese, the M&A expert, believes that Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (NYSE:GS) and Morgan Stanley (NYSE:MS) will be “big spenders,” using the TARP funds to help accelerate their conversions from an investment bank to a bank holding company – a transition that will require them to bulk up their deposit bases. And the quickest way to do that is to buy other banks, Basenese says.

“One thing [the wave of deals] does is to restore confidence in the sector,” Basenese said, “It will go a long way in convincing CEOs that it’s safe to use excess capital to fund acquisitions, and to grow, instead of using it to defend against a proverbial run on the bank.”

Source: Billions in Bank Rescue Funds are Fueling Buyout Deals, and not the Increase in Loans That Would Help Ease the Financial Crisis

“Once the global economy emerges from the current financial crisis, which it will, the countries that do well on our index are those that are best prepared to bounce back and perform well in the longer term,” Jennifer Blanke, director of the WEF’s global competitiveness network told The Financial Times.

And the United States is at the top. That’s the good news.

The bad news is that the safety of U.S. banks dropped to 40th this year from 26th in the WEF’s 2007 – 2008 report.

“Despite rising concerns about the soundness of the banking sector and other macroeconomic weaknesses, the country’s many other strengths continue to make it a very productive environment,” the report said of the United States.

But such a fall in the rankings for bank safety is a bit frightening for U.S. banking customers already spooked by the collapse of investment bank such as Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (OTC: LEHMQ) and regional banks such as IndyMac Bancorp Inc. (OTC: IDMC).

Summing a Country’s Competitive Balance Sheet

The WEF analyzes 110 economic indicators in 12 different categories for each of 134 countries to come up with its overall GCI ranking. One of those 12 areas is financial market sophistication, which is made up of factors such as “venture capital availability,” “strength of investor protection” and even “regulation of securities exchanges.”

But perhaps the most important factor in this category is the soundness of banks.

Confidence in a nation’s banks is what keeps citizens from stuffing dollars under a mattress. Banks need deposit assets to keep the wheels of U.S. industry turning, as deposit assets are used to fund the short-term credit markets that are so vital to the daily operations of many corporations.

And it’s an area where the United States ranks a disappointing 40.

Coming in behind such well-developed nations as Canada, which tops the list, or even Hong Kong in the 11th spot, might not seem so bad. But even the small African nation of Namibia ranks in at 17, illustrating the United States has some definite room for improvement.

While there are plenty of surprises at the type of the bank safety list, there aren’t many such surprises at the bottom. Algeria comes in dead last with Libya just above it.

Of the “BRIC” nations – Brazil, Russia, India and China – most moved up the list this year against better-developed nations. China landed in the top 30 for the first time as it moved up four spots to reach 30, but China’s banking system is still near the bottom of the list at 108. India, however, slipped two spots to 50 from 48 due to a widening budget deficit. India’s banks also slipped, falling to 51 from 46.

Meanwhile, Brazil was the biggest mover with an eight-spot jump to 64 on the overall list, and also tops the United States when it comes to the soundness of its banks with its 24th spot on the banking safety list. Oil revenues gave Russia a gain of seven to move to 51 from 58 the year prior, but Russia’s banks clocked in at 107 on the soundness rankings.

Slipping Bank Titans?

The United States wasn’t the only nation to find its ranking slipping in the bank safety category. The United Kingdom made a stunning plunge from 4th in the 2007 – 2008 survey, to 44th in the current one, after the emergency nationalization of banks such as Northern Rock PLC (PINK: NHRKF).

Even Switzerland, synonymous with banking to many, was hit hard by the global banking crisis, as it slipped from its top spot in last year’s banking soundness rankings to 16th this year. Swiss giants such as UBS AG (UBS) got caught with over-exposure to U.S. subprime mortgage-backed securities that necessitated government intervention while #2 rival Credit Suisse Group AG (ADR: CS) was forced to raise fresh capital.

Nations from Sweden to the United Kingdom to the Netherlands have all introduced government-sponsored packages to help support ailing domestic banks and avoid the fate of nearly bankrupt Iceland and Pakistan.

The United States $700 billion bailout package is by far the largest, but even that might not be enough to return the domestic banking industry back to safety.

The U.S. financial landscape has been changed forever as firms such, as Lehman Brothers – old enough to have weathered the Great Depression – toppled under the crushing weight of a credit market. The strong – Bank of America Corp. (BAC), JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) and Wells Fargo & Co. (WFC) – have bought out the weak.

Bank of America bought both mortgage lender Countrywide Financial Corp. (CFC) and former standalone investment bank Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. (MER). JPMorgan bought both regional bank Washington Mutual Inc. (OTC: WAMUQ) and the failed Bear Stearns Cos. Inc. Wells Fargo is buying Wachovia Corp. (WB).

But in the wake of such massive acquisitions, the United States is left with huge nationwide banking complexes dangerously close to the 10% regulator’s cap any one bank is allowed to have of domestic market share.

And with 117 financial firms on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.’s (FDIC) “Problem List” at the end of the second quarter, more bank acquisitions and rescues could be on the way. The FDIC’s list for the third quarter won’t be published until November.

The FDIC’s coffers have already taken a hit from the rescue of IndyMac and with the recent bailout law raising the cap for FDIC-insured deposits, it doesn’t seem like much of a stretch to imagine the nation’s banking insurance coming up short if one of the largest banks were to fail.

Bank Safety Plays

The FDIC doesn’t publish the names of the banks on its watch list, but luckily there are some simple ways to help ensure your banking deposits are safe. Here are three quick and easy steps from Money Morning Investment Director Keith Fitz-Gerald that you can take to determine if your bank is safe or not:

1. Click over to Bankrate.com’s Safe & Sound ratings page. There you can plug in your bank’s name and see how it scores on the basis of 22 objective measures designed to gauge the capital adequacy, asset quality, profitability and liquidity of thousands of banks. “If your bank doesn’t make the cut with a higher rating, then switch to one that does,” says Fitz-Gerald.

1. Use the FDIC’s electronic deposit insurance estimator to see if your assets are covered in full. With the recent signing of the bailout legislation into law, the FDIC now covers accounts up to $250,000 at any one bank in any single account or $250,000 per co-owner for joint accounts. Traditional and Roth IRAs, SEPS and other retirement accounts on deposit at an FDIC-insured bank or savings institutions are insured up to $250,000 separately from any other deposits you may have at the same institution. “But remember,” said Fitz-Gerald, “this is mainly deposit accounts and doesn’t include stocks, bonds, mutual funds or life insurance policies.”

1. Double-check your ownership. If a portion of your assets is uninsured, getting full coverage may just be a matter of changing ownership or spreading out your accounts to different banks. “Like most things the government doesn’t make this easy, so that means more paperwork,” Fitz-Gerald said.

Source: Global Credit Crisis Takes a Toll on Former Titans of Banking

• Microsoft Corp.’s (MSFT) quarterly profit rose 2% from a year ago, the company said yesterday (Thursday) in a statement. The world’s largest software maker earned $4.37 billion, or 48 cents per share, in the quarter ended Sept. 30. Sales rose 9% to $15.1 billion.

• Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS) is cutting 3,200 jobs, or 10% of its work force, as the firm struggles with the credit crisis and transitions into a holding company. The cuts add to more than 130,000 jobs eliminated in the financial industry since mid-2007, topping the 83,000 lost after the Internet bubble burst in 2001, Bloomberg reported.

• The Dow Chemical Co. (DOW) yesterday (Thursday) reported a 6% rise in third-quarter profit. The company reported earnings of $428 million, or 46 cents per share, up from $403 million, or 42 cents per share, a year ago. Sales rose 13% to $15.4 billion.

• Sony Corp. (ADR: SNE), the Japanese consumer electronics giant, announced (Thursday) that profits would be markedly weaker for fiscal year 2008. Sony predicted earnings of $1.5 billion (150 billion yen), down from an earlier July forecast of $2.4 billion (240 billion yen), The Washington Post reported.

• An auction to set the value of Washington Mutual Inc. (OTC: WAMUQ) debt was held yesterday (Thursday). Markit and Creditex, auction administrators, set the debt cost of failed bank Washington Mutual at 57 cents on the dollar. Sellers of credit default swap protection must pay 43 cents to counterparties, MarketWatch reported.

• Crude oil gained $1.09, or 1.6%, to settle at $67.84 yesterday (Thursday) in anticipation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) meeting today (Friday). “If OPEC makes a cut of 1 to 2 million barrels tomorrow, prices should firm up and move higher in the short term,” Gene McGillian, an analyst at Tradition Energy in Stamford, Conn., told Bloomberg News. “Unless there is something huge announced, the market will eventually start moving lower again because of the weak economy.”

Source: Global Investing Roundups Friday, October 24th, 2008

Andrew says, “Real estate companies, hedge funds, and private-equity firms have raised tens of billions this year alone for the specific purpose of buying distressed debt. The bailout is about to kick off the biggest fire sale of real estate in US history.“

However, these firms may also inherit heaps of bad debt if they don’t do their research properly. There will be plenty of big losers for every big winner from this bailout.

This from Investor’s Daily Edge:

Love it or hate it, the $810 billion, pork-laden bailout is now a fact. After all the preaching and political maneuvering, the market reacted to its passage on Friday with a yawn, followed by a sharp drop. But one thing I do know about the bailout is this. The government won’t be spending a trillion dollars without some companies making huge bucks.

In the war in Iraq, for example, it’s the oil services, big construction companies and security firms which made out. Following government money is a time-honored and proven way to make money. Heck, the entire defense sector is predicated on this strategy. Northrop, Raytheon and Lockheed have done it successfully for decades.

Fact is, the bailout will cost more than the Iraq war. Companies are already forming a line and raising billions of dollars to “help” the government carry it out. The bailout will create two distinct markets. One is completely government-controlled. The government will be using its trillion-dollar budget to purchase bad debt at the prices it sets. The government will also be selling that debt through auctions into the private sector. That’s the other market, and this is where things get interesting.

Real estate companies, hedge funds, and private-equity funds have raised tens of billions this year alone for the specific purpose of buying distressed debt.

Then there’s the half trillion dollars of private-equity money forced on the sidelines when credit dried up. More than 60 transactions announced in 2007, valued at a combined $180 billion, have been abandoned. Normally, this money would be used to finance leveraged buy-outs. But there’s no law that says the funds can’t be used to buy bad banks’ bad debt from the government, or buy into banks once stripped of their bad debt.

Lots of options here but LBO funds might just want to stick to their knitting. For example, TPG Capital handed Washington Mutual (WAMUQ) $7 billion a couple of months ago which was wiped out when WaMu went into government receivership (because of how the deal was structured, TPG itself probably lost less than $2 billion – that’s still not chickenfeed).

If buying bank equity is risky, then how about buying their bad debt? I wrote about a year ago in this space that they haven’t invented an x-ray machine capable of seeing through the complicated debt instruments that banks hold. That is where the risk comes from. Banks didn’t (still don’t) know exactly what kind of collateral is backing up their debt paper.

The bailout is about to kick off the biggest fire sale of real estate in U.S. history. Whatever you want can be had at big discount prices. Hotels, apartment complexes, office buildings, shopping malls, condo complexes, residential home developments… companies will shortly be able to get them for pennies on the dollar.

But there’s just one small problem…

Companies that go after these properties will also be inheriting foreclosed homes, property saddled with liens, half-built developments, and so on. How much bad stuff is mixed in with the good stuff will determine how much these companies offer for the debt they’re buying … if they’re able to deconstruct these complex debts. They may not be able to.

Sifting through the bad debt of the savings and loans was a walk in the park compared to this. Back in those days you could do it one bad mortgage/property/development at a time and you had all the documentation to figure things out. Does it need repairs? Are the tenants credit-worthy? What’s the neighborhood like? Private-equity companies made big profits by snapping up distressed properties at bargain prices, fixing them up, and selling them off.

This time around, those who want to play the game will have to check out thousands of properties at a time. The banks couldn’t/wouldn’t do it. They used fancy formulas instead. And they got into big trouble as a result. The ratings agencies couldn’t/wouldn’t do it. And they gave bogus ratings on this debt as a result.

Now vulture companies and ambulance chasers are zeroing in on this debt. Can they dig deep enough to know exactly what they would be buying? If they can’t or won’t, will they manage risk any better than the hundreds of banks in need of rescuing?

Will you be able to trust these companies – firms like TPG Capital, KKR Financial (NYSE:KFN), Carlyle, Apollo Group (NASDAQ:APOL), Blackstone Group (NYSE:BX) and banks such as Goldman Sachs (NYSE:GS) and Citigroup (NYSE:C) which have private equity teams – with your money?

They could be the next great money-making sector. Or the sector that produces more hype than profits. Don’t get pulled in by the hype. I’m betting there’s going to be a lot more big losers than big winners in this game.

Then there’s this. It took the markets one year to recover from the less complicated savings and loan crisis. It took the real estate market two years to recover. It took the economy three years to recover. The scale and opaqueness of this crisis is much bigger. You can probably double those numbers this time around.

Source: Making Money after the Bailout